Regional Denuclearisation—I Tlatelolco Treaty: How Successful?

-Savita Pande, Research Fellow, IDSA

 

The Concept

The concept of regional denuclearisation, which entails establishment of the nuclear weapon-free zones, can be considered as the twin track to global elimination of nuclear weapons. Based on the building block approach (or the "step-by-step" approach) to the process of disarmament, the proponents of this concept believe that by de-emphasising the role of nuclear weapons, it will eventually be possible to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world. A study conducted by the UN in 1975 maintained that one of the means through which the trend towards nuclear proliferation could be achieved is through the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones, through regional initiatives.1

From the point of view of definition, a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a specified territorial entity, normally a recognised geographical region, in which the manufacture, receipt, storage and installation of nuclear weapons is forbidden. The UN General Assembly adopted a declaration on September 11, 1975, which incorporated the Mexican definition of an NWFZ as under:

"A nuclear weapon-free zone, as a general rule, is any zone recognised as such by the United Nations General Assembly, which any group of states in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention."2

In this area, the manufacture as well as the acquisition of direct and indirect control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, warheads or mines based on nuclear fission or fission is prohibited.

In 1975, the UN General Assembly recommended that states setting up an NWFZ should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Obligations relating to the establishment of such zones may be assumed not only by a group of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by a smaller group of states and even individual countries; (b) NWFZ arrangements must ensure that the zone would be, and would remain, effectively free of all nuclear weapons; (c) the initiative for the creation for an NWFZ should come from states within the region, and participation must be voluntary; (d) whenever a zone is intended to embrace a region, the participation of all militarily significant states, and preferably all states in the that region would enhance the effectiveness of the zone; (e) the zone arrangements must contain an effective system of verification to ensure full compliance with the agreed obligations; (f) the arrangements should promote the economic, scientific, and technological development of the members of the zone through international cooperation on all peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (g) the treaty establishing the zone should be of unlimited duration.3

Interestingly, the United States has laid down its own criteria for supporting the creation of an NWFZ. Among other things, these conditions stipulate that proposals for the NWFZ should originate from states within the zone; all relevant states in the zone should participate; adequate mechanisms for verifying compliance must exist; zones should not disturb the existing security arrangements; zones should prohibit the development or possession of any nuclear explosive device; zones should not infringe on the exercise of rights recognised under international law, particularly the freedom of navigation, innocent passage and overflight; and zones should not affect the rights of states under international law to grant or deny other states transit privileges including port calls or overflights. Even zones that satisfy all seven criteria do not automatically guarantee US participation.4

NWFZs in Uninhabited Areas

Historically, there are three precedents in the successful establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in uninhabited regions. The first was the Antarctica Treaty signed by 12 countries in Washington on December 1, 1961, and effective from June 23, 1961, whereby Antarctica was declared an area used solely for peaceful purposes. The second was the Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which came into force on October 10, 1967, forbidding the use of the orbit around the earth for any object of mass destruction, for the establishment of military presence and for the installation of nuclear weapons.5 The third step in this direction was the treaty prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons in the seabed and ocean floors, effective from May 18, 1972.6

While the NWFZs in the uninhabited regions were established without much contention because of lack of vested interest in these areas, the road to achieve these in the inhabited regions was full of contortions.

NWFZ in Inhabited Areas

Initial Moves (Repacki and Others)

The proposal for NWFZs in inhabited areas was mooted by the Soviet Union in 1956 in the sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union suggested the "creation of a zone in Europe", including the territory of both parts of Germany and of states adjacent to them, where the "stationing of atomic and military formations and location of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any kind shall be prohibited".7 A Polish proposal known as the Rapacki Plan (named after the Polish Foreign Minister) was submitted to the UN General Assembly in October 1958 to treat Central Europe consisting of both East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland as a nuclear weapon-free zone.8 The other European countries would have had the opportunity to accede. In the area in question, the stationing, manufacture, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and of nuclear delivery vehicles would be prohibited. The nuclear powers would have to respect the nuclear weapon-free status of the zone and undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the members of the zone. According to Goldblat who believes the idea of nuclear weapon-free zones was conceived basically to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapons, the Polish government "feared nuclearization of West Germany and wanted to prevent the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory"9

According to Roman-Morey, "When this proposal was made, Poland belonged to the Warsaw Pact, thus the proposal was unable to be achieved mainly because of security problems existing between the member states of the Warsaw Pact and those proposed by the memebr states of NATO."10 In the political climate of the 1950s, the Rapacki Plan had no chance of becoming a serious international negotiation. Nonetheless, several of its elements were later adopted as guidelines for the establishment of denuclearised zones.

The Gomulka Plan of February 1964 proposed for the zone a freeze at existing levels of all nuclear weapons irrespective of the means of their employment and delivery under a system of control posts at nuclear plants and at rail, road, sea and air points of access.11

Some other proposals included the Romanian one in 1957 for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Balkans;12 a similar proposal for the Balkans and the Adriatic in 1959;13 and the Mediterranean nuclear weapon-free zone proposal also made by the Soviet Union on May 27, 1958.14 An area-by-area nuclear weapon-free zone proposal was made by Ireland on September 23, 1959.15

The second concrete attempt (after Rapacki) for creating an NWFZ was the proposal made by Finland. In 1963, Finland's President Kekkonen suggested the creation of an NWFZ in the northern countries. This proposal covered Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Despite their otherwise sharing of values, history and joint attitude in many forums, the countries of the region differed in their attitudes towards nuclear issues. Finland and Sweden announced that under no circumstances would they accept nuclear weapons on their territories. Denmark, Iceland and Norway, being the founding states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had a different idea. In 1978, the development of new weapons such as the neutron bomb and long-range missiles prompted the northern countries to create a nuclear weapon-free zone. Finland set forth a modification of its 1963 proposal, which included nuclear weapon states' security assurances. Due to Cold War political reasons, the effort could not attain its goal.

It is a fact that all these initiatives and the existing NWFZs have their roots and origins in the Cold War. Nevertheless, some of the previous initiatives (discussed above) failed due to the Cold War, others prevailed and developed despite the Cold War (examples of this are the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga); and yet others have been possible to obtain mainly due to the demise of the Cold War (Bangkok Treaty for South-East Asia and the Pelindaba Treaty for Africa).

Tlatelolco Treaty

Traditionally regarded as the first successful NWFZ in inhabited areas, the Tlatelolco Treaty, which established the NWFZ in Latin America, had its origin in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. During the crisis, Brazil presented to the First Committee of the General Assembly a resolution (later joined by Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador) calling for the establishment of an NWFZ in Latin America. The resolution could not be put to vote probably because of the wide scope the co-sponsors wanted to give to that resolution in mentioning not only Latin America, but also the African continent as zones that should be given denuclearised priority.16 In April 1963, at the initiative of Mexico, five Latin American Presidents (of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico) announced that they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement that would make Latin America a nuclear weapon-free zone.17

Structure of the Treaty: Scope and Obligations

Article 1 of the treaty prohibits testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means as well as receipt, storage installation, deployment, and any form of possession of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Encouraging or authorising or in any way participating in testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of the weapon its equally prohibited. Research and development directed towards acquiring a nuclear weapon capability is not expressly forbidden.

The next four Articles (2-5) give definitions of some terms employed in the treaty: nuclear weapon, contracting parties, territory and zone of application. Article 6 deals with the "meeting of signatories", while Articles 7-11 establish the structure and procedures of the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" (OPANAL) created by the treaty, and state the functions and powers of its principal organs: the General Conference, the Council and the Secretariat. The General Conference, composed of all parties to the treaty, is the supreme organ of the OPANAL and holds regular as well as special sessions. The Council also elects the five members of the Council. The General Secretary is the chief administrative officer of the Agency.

The five succeeding Articles (12-16) and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 18 decribe the functioning of the "control system", also established by the treaty. Each party must conclude an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Article 17 contains provision for use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (which should be in conformity with Article 1), and Article 18 deals with nuclear explosions for the same purposes. Article 19 examines the relations of the OPANAL with other international organisations, whereas Article 20 deals with measures to be taken in case of violations (mainly transmission of such reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations). Article 21 safeguards the rights and obligations of the Organisation of American States, under existing regional treaties. Article 23 makes it binding for the contracting parties to notify the Secretariat of the OPANAL of any international agreement concluded by any of them on matters with which the treaty is concerned. The application of the treaty is covered by the Article 24.

Articles 22, 25-27 and 29-31 contain what is generally known as "final clauses" dealing with questions such as privileges and immunities, signature, ratification and deposit, reservations, amendments, duration and denunciation. Article 28 deals with the entry into force.18

The Tlatelolco Treaty is the only agreement of this nature which defines a nuclear weapon. Accordingly, a nuclear weapon is any device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and having characteristics appropriate for warlike purposes. According to Goldblat," An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof. Most countries interpret these requirements as prohibiting the manufacture of all nuclear explosive devices, unless or until nuclear devices are developed that cannot be used as weapons."19 For a long time, Argentina and Brazil contested this interpretation. However, in their July 1991 agreement for exclusive peaceful use of nuclear energy, both countries undertook to prohibit in their respective territories the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by other means of any nuclear device, as long as no distinction can be made between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes.20 Thus, the controversy regarding whether the indigenous development of a nuclear explosive device is compatible with the treaty has been set aside.

Entry into Force

The Tlatelolco Treaty enters into force among states that have ratified it only when certain conditions have been met, the same as are required under Article 28 for the extension of the geographical area. Most parties have waived the conditions as is permitted under the treaty. The treaty became operative in April 1968 when El Salvador joined Mexico in ratifying it and in waiving the requirements for its entry into force. The treaty is of permanent nature (Article 30) and is not subject to reservations (Article 27). A party may, however, denounce it with three months notice if it feels circumstances connected with the content of the treaty have arisen (or may arise) which threaten its supreme interests or peace and security of other parties.

Amendments

In 1990, the official title of the treaty was amended to add the words "and the Caribbean" in order to incorporate the English-speaking states of the Caribbean area into the zone of application of the treaty. By another amendment in 1991, all the independent states of the region became eligible to join the denuclearised zone. Earlier a political entity which had a part or whole territory under dispute between an extra-continental state and one or more Latin American state could not be admitted. Belize and Guyana joined the treaty after the amendment.

Again, in 1992, at the initiative of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the General Conference of OPANAL decided to amend the Articles relating to verification (Articles 14,15,16,19, 20) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The most significant of these pertained to challenge inspections called special inspections which could be undertaken either by the IAEA under the safeguards agreement or by OPANAL upon a request by a party suspicious of breach of treaty by another party. Inspectors would be given full and free access as well as all necessary information. The cost would be borne by the requesting party or if the Council so decides, by OPANAL. As per the amendment to Article 16, the IAEA will have the exclusive power to carry out special inspections. OPANAL can only request the IAEA to organise the inspection. Information regarding conclusion of inspection will be given to the Secretary General of OPANAL after it has been forwarded by the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors.21

The treaty does not say anything about the entry into force for amendments. They are believed to be in force for countries that have ratified them, waiving the requirements under Article 28.

Area of Operation

The treaty is applicable to the territory, territorial sea, airspace and any other space over which the zonal state exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation. Upon fulfillment of several requirements specified in Article 28, it will also include vast areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, hundreds of kilometres off the coasts of Latin America. These requirements are adherence to the treaty by all states of the region; signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols by all the states concerned; and conclusion of agreements with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to the nuclear activities of the parties. France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States have undertaken to adhere to Protocol I of the treaty and apply the statute of military denuclearisation to these territories. All nuclear powers have assumed an obligation under additional Protocol II to respect denuclearisation of the treaty as set forth in the treaty" that is covering the designated high seas."22 However, in their subsequent statements the signatories to the Protocol pointed out that they would not accept any restriction on their freedom at sea.

As for transit of nuclear weapons, while the treaty does not explicitly prohibit it, according to the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearisation of Latin America (COPREDAL), it is the prerogative of the territorial state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for transit. In joining the Additional Protocols of the treaty, the United States and France made a declaration of understanding to the same effect, while the Soviet Union expressed the opinion that authorising transit of nuclear weapons in any form would be contrary to the spirit of the treaty. China believes that transport of nuclear weapons through Latin American territory, territorial sea, or airspace is prohibited.

According to Galvez," In this respect, we should distinguish two situations; if it a question of a nuclear weapon belonging to the member states, the transit in the territory is not possible since the state cannot legally make it, acquire it, or possess it in accordance with the means according to the prohibitions of Article I. Nevertheless, if it is a question of a nuclear weapon belonging to a third state which is not a contracting party, its transit may be prohibited by the territorial state using sovereignty in accordance with international law. This is what Mexico, as the seat of OPANAL, as well as Panama, have done in the context of Tlatelolco. Thus, for the future, other Latin American states can do so if they wish."23 In any case, since transportation of nuclear weapons in any case is a closely guarded affair, permission would hardly ever be sought for it.

Assurances by N-Weapon States

Interestingly, while the nuclear weapon states, under Additional Protocol II, have given negative security assurances to the parties to the treaty (not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them), they have done so under their own terms. The USA and the UK reserved their right to reconsider their non-use pledges against a state in case of an armed attack carried out by that state with the help of another nuclear power. The Soviet Union also made a similar qualification. France talked of the right of self-defence as enshrined in the UN Charter.

Assessment

The Tlatelolco Treaty has largely been held as the first successful regional denuclearisation attempt in an uninhabited area, being" an unfailing source of innovative proposals for enriching international law; an effective and appropriate step towards one of humankind's biggest hopes—general and complete disarmament."24 The treaty has also been credited as having served as the "precursor for other nuclear weapon-free zones."25 William Epstein says, "The negotiators of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) even borrowed some of their ideas on the system of control and safeguards in Article 3 of the NPT directly from Article 13 of Tlatelolco, but regrettably, not the prohibitions."26 The then United Nations Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, in a congratulatory message when the treaty was adopted by the Preparatory Commission on February 12, 1967, stated: "The nations of Latin America can, with ample justification, take pride in what they have wrought by their own initiative and through their own efforts."27

Later that year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which welcomed the treaty "with special satisfaction" as an event of significance. The person generally regarded as the father of the treaty, Alfonso Garcia Robles, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982.

Equally hailed is the fact that it is the only one that establishes a now-considerable relationship between the control regime and the activities of the IAEA. After the last amendments, which, as stated above, entrusted the IAEA (and only the IAEA) with special inspections, it is believed the IAEA then "for the first time was charged with a protective mission it has not had under the Non-Proliferation Treaty." This modality, it is believed, has been adopted in all the nuclear weapon-free zones "which have come into place afterwards, i.e. the Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba, and at the same time have maintained the integrity of the regime in the hands of those who have to keep them, who are the actors, the members of the treaties, and the regional bodies these create (as in the case of OPANAL). It is in this respect that the treaty demonstrates an important erudition."28

All this, of course, would mislead one to believe that there never was any problem in establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America. On the contrary, the very first proposal mooted in the UN General Assembly in 1961, calling for creation of an African nuclear weapon-free zone, one year prior to the Cuban missile crisis, was supported by only two Latin American nations--Brazil and Cuba. All other Latin American nations joined the United States in opposing or abstaining on the resolution, which nonetheless was supported by the majority of the UN membership.29

Besides the country with the region's most advanced nuclear programme did not initially support the Brazilian initiative and only reluctantly joined its Latin American colleagues at the United Nations in supporting the nuclear weapon-free zone proposal. During the UN General Assembly discussions, the Argentine representative strongly cautioned that a nuclear weapon-free zone could freeze Latin American states into a permanent state of inferiority.30 In fact, Argentina was developing plans for full, independent mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone was viewed with suspicion because Argentine officials felt that the initiative could interfere with the development of an indigenous nuclear option.

Brazil's support for the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone proved to be short-lived. After the April 1964 military coup, the new leadership moved quickly to distance itself from certain features of the previous regime's foregn policy and hardened the Brazilian position vis-à-vis ongoing Tlatelolco negotiations.

For nearly three decades, policy makers in Argentina and Brazil were outspoken in their criticism of the non-proliferation regime at all available international fora, including the UN, the IAEA, and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The two nations developed parallel positions on nuclear issues, somewhat at variance with those of the other Latin American nations and eventually declined to join the nuclear weapon-free zone in 1967. This so-called coordination in foreign policy continued with mutual rejection of the NPT following its completion in 1968, and deepened in the mid-1970s in reaction to the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In addition, beginning in the mid-1970s, both countries were continuously engaged in protracted disputes with the United States and other technically advanced countries regarding the transfer of nuclear material and equipment.

As for the Tlatelolco Treaty, the two countries were fully committed to retaining their complete freedom to develop nuclear technology in the future. While the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union held the view that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) could not be permitted under the treaty, Argentina and Brazil shared the view that the Tlatelolco Treaty permitted parties to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including devices similar to nuclear weapons. Mexico and the majority of Latin America nations interpreted the treaty as prohibiting PNEs until it became possible to distinguish between peaceful and warlike nuclear explosive devices. Argentina and Brazil maintained their advocacy of PNEs until 1990, at which point they jointly declared their support of a ban on all nuclear testing. However, it needs to be mentioned that neither country has explicitly reversed previously stated positions that PNEs are legal under the Tlatelolco Treaty, though they have rejected PNEs under their bilateral agreement.

The two countries were at variance with the majority of other countries on the transportation issue also. Argentina and Brazil argued for complete prohibition on the transportation of nuclear weapons through the zone by nuclear weapon states. The majority of Latin American states, in response to the US and British pressure, prevailed with the view, as stated above, that the decision should be left to each state in the free exercise of its sovereignty.31

Again, on entry-into-force, it has been stated that had the Argentine-Brazilian formula prevailed, the Tlatelolco Treaty would have been dead on arrival. They supported a very strict formula, requiring ratification by all Latin American states, completion of formal agreements by all nuclear weapon states and by those having territorial interests in the Americas, and conclusion of a bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It was the Mexican compromise (proposed earlier by Chile) whereby states could waive the aforementioned provisions and allow the treaty to enter into force for their territory.32

Argentina and Brazil also differed with other countries on the issue of "reservations". Reservations, by which a nation might alter the intent of the treaty when ratifying, are prohibited by Latin American parties and by nuclear weapon states (required to ratify Additional Protocols). In order to assure the adherence of the nuclear weapon states, it was ultimately agreed, over Argentine and Brazilian objections, that such states include " interpretive statements" accompanying their Protocol ratification.33 Ultimately, the US, the UK and France all used this procedure to advance their interpretation on such controversial issues as PNEs and transportation of nuclear weapons through the zones.

While these compromises led to the so-called successful completion of the negotiations for a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America, Argentina and Brazil concluded that the treaty was prejudicial to their interests and chose not to become contracting parties for over 25 years.

Both Argentina and Brazil embarked on their ambitious nuclear programmes. The two countries achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency and were shrouded in secrecy. The Brazilian programme (called the Parallel Programme), in fact, was under the military control, and hence very little was known about it.34 The two economies, however, could not sustain the programmes in their countries. According to Carasales, "In the economic realm, the allocation of resources to nuclear activities became increasingly difficult as their economies deteriorated. Moreover, the somewhat generous financial support that the nuclear industry had received became the object of frequent questioning."35 Both countries had to face export restrictions from the United States as a consequence of its 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, but were able to surmount the difficulties at some cost by finding other suppliers or by developing the restricted elements locally. It is argued that the "possibility of using these alternative sources diminished with the decrease in funds available for nuclear projects and with the strengthening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines."36 This coupled with other factors like changed leadership in the two countries and a rapprochment between the countries eventually led them to give up their nuclear weapon plans and eventually to the signing of the bilateral accord, "Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federal Republic of Brazil, Exclusively for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy "by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries at Guadalajara, Mexico, on July 18, 1991.37 The agreement established the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC).

The attitude of the two countries to nuclear non-proliferation in general also changed. The two agreed to sign and eventually ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty.

It took Argentina 26 years and Brazil 27 years to formally become parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty. The Argentine Congress ratified it in March 1993 and the Brazilian Congress in May 1994. Interestingly Chile, had ratified the treaty in 1974, but its posture was dependent primarily on that of its rival, Argentina. Consequently, Chile became a contracting party of Tlatelolco six months after Argentine ratification.

It is in this background that the Tlatelolco Treaty needs to be seen. While it may be a regional effort and have many firsts to its credit like defining a nuclear weapon, having a waiver provision, a reasonably more organised system of verification and many aspects of it having served as "models" for subsequent regional treaties, it cannot be denied that the treaty has been highly overrated in terms of denuclearisation. The two states with the most advanced nuclear programmes and the potential nuclear weapon powers remained outside the purview of the treaty for almost twenty-five years. In fact, so opposed they were, in interpreting the treaty, to the rest of the members that even if their nuclear intentions were different, they would not have become parties to the treaty. In fact, if the treaty terms were not so flexible, their attitudes would have prevented the treaty itself from coming into force. The negative security assurances in the Protocol provided by the nuclear weapon powers are revocable. Even the question of transit is subjective, dependent on what the concerned regional state deems fit. While economic difficulties influenced denuclearisation of the two most viable countries—Argentina and Brazil—they became parties to the treaty after they decided to give up the nuclear option and not the other way round.

To plead for treating Tlatelolco as a role model for other regions is, therefore, as erroneous as it is to expect this kind of regional approach to lead to global elimination of weapons. Since regional specificity is non-duplicable, regional treaties cannot but be that—they have to be crafted as per the needs and requirements of each one separately.

 

Notes

1. United Nations Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in all Aspects, Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (New York, 1967). Emphasis added.

2. World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, Year, 1976 (Oxford University Press, 1977), and p. 303.

3. UN Document A/10027/Add.1.

4. Zachary S. Davis, "The Spread of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Building a New Nuclear Bargain," Arms Control Today, February 1996, p. 16.

5. United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 302, no. 5778, p. 72; and Documents on Disarmament, United States Department of State, Vol. II, 1945-59 (Washington D.C; US Government Printing Office) 1020-23.

6. General Assembly Resolution 2260(XXV), Annex (Text).

7. Disarmament Commission Official Records, Supplements, January to December 1956, Documents DC/83, Annex 5 (DC/SC.1/41), p41.

8. A/PV,697,A/PV.698,A/C.867.

9. Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessments," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 3, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 18.

10. Enrique Roman-Morey, "Precursors of Other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones" in Pericles Gasparini Alves and Diana Belinda Cipollone, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1997), p. 15.

11. ENDC/C.1/March 1, 1964.

12. Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59, n. 5, vol. 11, pp. 1434-36.

13. Ibid.

14. Disarmament Commission Official Records, Supplement for January-December 1963, Doc.DV/208. Annex1, Section M (ENDC/91 and Corr).

15. A/PV.805.paras 47-80.

16. Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, "Thirty Years of Experience Towards the Consolidation Of the First Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the World" in Alves et. al. ed., n. 10, p. 3.

17. UN General Assembly Document A/5415/Rev.1,1963.

18. Alfonso Garcia Robles. "The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", in David Pitt and Gordon Thompson ed., Nuclear- Free Zones, (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 15.

19. Goldblat, n. 9, p. 20.

20. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), Briefing Book, document G-1, 1993, cited in lbid.

21. 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference document, NPT/CONF.1995/10.

22. Goldblat, n. 9, p. 21.

23. Galvez, n. 16, p. 4

24. Morey, n. 10, p. 8.

25. Ibid., p. 7.

26. William Epstein, "Tlatelolco and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" in Alves et. al., n. 10, p. 24.

27. Ibid., p. 7.

28. Berguno Barnes, "Actual Projection of the Treaty of Tlateloco," in Alves et. al. ed., n. 10, p. 30.

29. John R. Redik, "Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil" Henry L Stimson Centre, Occasional Paper 25, (Washington D.C., 1995), p. 16.

30. UN General Assembly, Official Records, 1335 Meeting, November 13, 1963, p. 122.

31. COPREDAL/76, February 14, 1967, p. 8.COPREDAL, was the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearisation of Latin America, cited in Stimson Centre Report, n. 29, and p. 17.

32. The Chilean Proposal can be found in COPREDAL/OAT/August 7, 1966, p. 7.

33. Redik, n. 29, p. 18.

34. For details of the two countries programme, see Savita Pande, The Future of NPT (Lancers, 1995), p. 288-94.

35. Julio C. Carasales. "The Argentine-Brazilian Rapprochement," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 2, no. 3, Spring-Summer, p. 45.

36. Ibid, p. 46. Although he does say, "but there is no evidence that it was a major ingredient."

37. IAEA/INFCIRC/395, November, 26, 1991.