The Missile Technology Control Regime: Chinese and US Positions
A successful Sino-US summit has just been concluded. Three major joint statements were signed by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and American President Bill Clinton. They dealt with (i) Biological Weapons Convention; (ii) Anti-Personnel Landmines; and (iii) South Asia. The joint statement issued on South Asia by the US and China, made critical statements about nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. China continues to make bold statements about its "no-first-use" policy and its desire to see complete nuclear disarmament, even as it modernises its nuclear arsenal.1 The thrust points made in the meeting between the two Presidents were:
(i) Eliminate (so far as technically possible) the danger of accidental nuclear war, and secure nuclear materials and nuclear warheads against diversion.
(ii) Prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia and the Middle East.2
President Clinton asked China to start various ways of "de-targetting" nuclear weapons, which is essentially a cosmetic step towards reduction of the risk of nuclear wars. Complete de-alerting would mean that there is a vast reduction of accidental nuclear war and it would be a major step towards a nuclear weapons moratorium. As per the US de-alerting commitment, Clinton could invite the other nuclear weapons states, including India, Israel and Pakistan, to an urgent nuclear summit where an eight-power de-alerting agreement in principle would be signed and a process accomplishing it would be set in motion. The agenda of the summit would include a multilaterally verified commitment by India, Israel, and Pakistan not to mount their weapons on delivery systems and to remove any one of them if they, singularly or otherwise, have been mounted. India and Pakistan would also agree to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).3 (Israel has already signed the treaty.)
However, there is no less danger of nuclear weapons by this process than what existed in 1991, when President Bush made a unilateral decision to remove most tactical nuclear weapons from deployment. President Clinton, therefore, would have to come out with bolder steps proposing programmes to reduce regional as well as global nuclear dangers as a part of his normalisation of the situation which has emerged of late.
In the recent years, China, Russia and Ukraine have presented special challenges for American missile non-proliferation policy. Though, their economies are in a backward state, the missile and space industries in these countries are among the most advanced in the world. Non-proliferation has been one of the highest priorities of the Administration's engagement with China, both because of the central importance of non-proliferation to US security and because China—as a nuclear weapon state, a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, and a producer of a wide range of arms and sensitive technologies—has become an increasingly indispensable player in international efforts to curb proliferation.4
Another reason that non-proliferation has been high on the US-China bilateral agenda is that China's past record in the area of proliferation has been a source of serious concern. For decades together, China has been outside the international non-proliferation regime. In the 1960s, during the time of Mao, China went on to say that it would even support the proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to break the hegemony of the superpowers. And in the 1980s, it had provided critical assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, which would have constituted a violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), had it been a party to the NPT. Also, China had sold missile equipment and technology, dual-use chemicals and production equipment, and advanced conventional arms to recipients in regions of tension and instability, primarily Iran and Pakistan. It was only in 1992 that two major powers—China and France—became signatories to the NPT after they had duly tested their latest devices to suit their nuclear programmes.
Also, to manage the missile proliferation threat from China, the Clinton Administration has constructed an incentive-based strategy of providing it a guaranteed share of the space or satellite launch market and inviting it to participate in international space projects. This policy would make the Chinese missile industries come under a more restricted and controlled system. Since September 1985, under the 1985 US-China Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, Washington has also permitted American-made satellites to be launched into orbit by surplus foreign ballistic missiles. This joint venture programme was started in 1989, but was suspended in 1989 because of the Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators. The programme was resumed in 1992 and a number of launches have taken place. About further cooperation in the same field, John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), said, "We are willing to expand the number to increase cooperation. And the increase would be of value to China."5 As a result, they both launched ventures in order to facilitate their cooperation in this area. The following are the joint ventures between the US and China for which Presidential waivers have been granted.
Presidential Waivers for Satellite
Launches in China
Date of Tainanmen Manufacturer Satellite Launch* Long March
Waiver Dates Launcher
BUSH Hughes AsiaSat 1 4/7/90 LM-3 12/1/89
BUSH Hughes Optus B1 8/14/92 LM - 2E
12/19/89 Optus B2 12/21/92 LM - 2E
Optus B3 8/28/94 LM - 2E
BUSH Various US Freja 10/6/92 LM-2C
BUSH Martin Marietta AsiaSat 2 11/28/95 LM-2E
BUSH Various US DFH 3-1 11/29/94 LM-2E
9/11/92 companies DFH 3-2 5/11/97 LM-3A
BUSH Hughes Apstar 1 7/21/94 LM-3
9/11/92 Apstar 2 1/26/95 LM-2E Apstar 1A 7/3/96 LM-3
Apstar 2R 10/16/97 LM-3B
BUSH Space Systems/ IntelSat 708 2/15/96 LM-3B
BUSH Alcatel Afristar Scheduled for
CLINTON Motorola Iridium 42&44 12/8/97 LM-2C/SD
7/2/93 Iridium 51&61 3/25/98 LM-2C/SD
Iridium 69&71 5/2/98 LM-2C/SD
CLINTON Lockheed Intelsat 801 2/28/97
7/2/93 Martin Intelsat 802 6/25/97
Intelsat 803 9/23/97
CLINTON Lockheed Echostar 1 12/28/95 LM-2E
CLINTON Space Systems/ Mabuhay 8/19/97 LM-3B
CLINTON Hughes Chinasat 7 8/18/96 LM-3
CLINTON Lockheed Chinastar 1 5/29/98 LM-3B
CLINTON Hughes APMT Scheduled
6/23/96 for 2000
CLINTON Space Systems/ Globalstar 3 launches in
7/9/96 Loral in early '99
CLINTON SISE FY-1 Scheduled for
CLINTON Eura Space & SinoSat-1 Scheduled for
11/23/96 various US companies 7/98
CLINTON Space Systems/ ChinaSat-8 Scheduled
2/18/98 Loral late 19986
* Dates are according to the American system—i.e. month comes before the date followed by the year.
These current joint space projects are, however, not a real incentive to the Chinese because, if they are unable to profit from their missile and space industries within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), they would resort to seeking contracts with rogue states.
Another major incentive brought out by the US towards China has been that of the MTCR membership. But it has not been a major attraction to Beijing. In response to various exports programmes carried out by China, the Bush and Clinton Administrations have imposed trade sanctions against China. And under a 1994 agreement with China, Washington lifted sanctions in exchange for Beijing's promise to stop missile deals with Pakistan and abide by the MTCR guidelines. However, the export control practices of China have not improved in a major way.
In his statement, Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, listed the goals of the US in the nuclear non-proliferation talks with China:
(i) to terminate Chinese assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and nuclear explosive programme;
(ii) to curtail Chinese cooperation with Iran's unsafeguarded nuclear programme;
(iii) to establish an effective Chinese nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use export control system; and
(iv) to obtain Chinese participation in multilateral nuclear export control efforts.7
Einhorn then reviewed the important results achieved in each of these areas:
— China made a commitment in May 1996 not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in Pakistan or anywhere else.
— China has agreed to phase out its nuclear cooperation with Iran.
— China is putting in place for the first time a comprehensive, nationwide system of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use export controls.
— China became a member of the NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee) in October 1997, the first time China has joined a multilateral non-proliferation export control regime.8
President Clinton's visit could be claimed to be a success to an extent, but for a few important things. It appears from a few developments of the visit that the basic concern for South Asian security has not been the primacy of objectives of the visit. They have remained short of realisation of the objectives—either advertently or inadvertently. China should have been made a signatory to the MTCR, which would restrict the secret flow of sensitive technology from China to other nations in South Asia as well as West Asia, the two regions volatile in their nature. Nuclear tests in the subcontinent have created tremendous changes in the international arena. Though the US, European nations, Japan and other countries reacted very sharply immediately after India's nuclear tests, they seem to understand India's security concerns which led it to conduct five nuclear tests.
In an exclusive interview to ANI TV in Washington, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl F. Inderfurth said, "We fully understand that India has its national security concerns and understand those concerns are very much related to China and Pakistan," adding that they "do not dispute India's concerns".9 The influential Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, too appeared to have softened his views on India's nuclear tests. Soon after the tests, he had acidly reacted against India's "absurd assumptions" that it could assume superpower status when "so many millions of its people" were mired in poverty and disease.10 Now that the situation has calmed down, and policy-makers and strategic analysts are contemplating over the issue, Jesse Helms holds the view that Washington cosying up to Beijing had more to do with the Indian nuclear tests than New Delhi's rivalry with Pakistan.11 Later, over the weekend, in his comments to the media, Helms zeroed in on the latest controversy that has engulfed the Clinton White House—the murky "China connection." The crux of these allegations is that the Clinton Administration's special Presidential waivers for China to transfer sensitive technology for satellite launches were sparked by alleged illegal campaign cash donations from Beijing as well as by Bernard Schwartz, chief executive of the American aerospace company Loral Space and Communications.12 President Clinton and his aides, however, denied these allegations. The China connection has attained much more significance in the wake of widespread human rights violations and the continuing Chinese transfers of nuclear and missile technology to countries like Pakistan and Iran. The Senate and the House of Representatives have set up a string of probes to investigate the complex affair.
Some of the prominent Republican leaders like Speaker Newt Gingrich have considered China's illegal exports of sensitive technology as a prime reason for India's insecurity, following which it conducted nuclear tests. There have been instances from the early 1970s onwards, where the Chinese have engaged in transferring nuclear and missile technology. It has been a well-known fact that China has made Pakistan's nuclear tests possible. The following facts may warrant such an observation further.
In 1974, China had assigned 12 scientists to help Pakistan develop a nuclear device. In 1975, it helped Pakistan build nuclear-weapons research centres. In 1977, China and Pakistan planned to build and test Pakistan's first nuclear bomb, but the fall of Pakistan's government suspended the operation.13 In 1983, China gave Pakistan a complete design for a nuclear weapon and enough enriched uranium for two bombs, according to US intelligence.14 In 1986, China reportedly gave Pakistan enough tritium gas for 10 nuclear weapons, as well as enriched uranium.15 In 1989, China allowed Pakistani scientists to observe a nuclear test. In 1994-96, China helped build a 300 megawatt nuclear power plant at Chasma and a tritium gas purification plant at Kahuta. In 1995, a Chinese company sold 5,000 ring magnets used to make weapons-grade uranium to a nuclear research laboratory at Kahuta.16 In 1996, to avoid US sanctions, China pledged not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. It also signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).17 Pakistan tested its first nuclear bomb on May 28 and 30, 1998.18
Hence, it was the China factor that made India's nuclear tests happen all at once. The information from the US about the Sino-Pak cooperation especially missile technology, sent signals to the Indians to take care of their security. Also the Sino-US cooperation in condemning India after the nuclear tests has been quite alarming.
A noted commentator, Martin Woollacot, has described China's role in the Guardian. He says that China will have to greatly modify the policies it has been following for years, including missile technology assistance to countries in West Asia, including Pakistan, Iran, and earlier, Iraq. The Chinese have thus contributed to developments that could produce usable nuclear weapons in the hands of several Muslim states.19
The Missile Technology Control Regime
It has been a decade since the MTCR was formed by the United States and its G-7 allies (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany) as a voluntary arrangement designed to restrain the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. The MTCR was not a legally binding international agreement nor a treaty like the NPT—it was a voluntary arrangement designed to limit the risk of nuclear proliferation by controlling the transfer of equipment and technology that could contribute to the development and production of nuclear-capable, unmanned delivery systems.20 The participants had agreed to common guidelines and to a common annexe of items to be controlled. Thus, these countries sought to prevent any of these nations from gaining a commercial advantage over other members.21 The regime's annexe of controlled items included equipment and technology directly relevant to the production and operation of missiles. Transfers of these goods were taken up, case by case, considering the nuclear non-proliferation concerns, the requirement of the space and missile programmes to the recipient state, and also the proliferation or non-proliferation record of the recipient nation.
The annexe contained two categories of lists. Category I consisted of very few sensitive items that would contribute to rapid missile proliferation, if exported. It included items like ballistic missiles, SLVs, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, and target and reconnaissance drones capable of delivering at least 500 kg over a range of 300 km or more. It also included specially-designed production facilities and related sub-systems such as rocket stages, guidance sets, and rocket engines. Category II controls were designed to constrain those proliferators that could not acquire complete systems, production facilities, or major sub-systems from overseas. This list consisted of "dual-use" items, such as propulsion components, propellants, structural materials, flight instruments, inertial navigation equipment, and so on, all of which could be used to produce nuclear-capable missile systems indigenously.22
Although the MTCR was not intended to limit peaceful, and civilian applications of rocket technology, the regime has recognised the dual-use potentials of these technologies. Hence, the regime controls the transfer of civilian and military rocket technology. In the recent years, the member countries have broadened the regime's coverage to include all missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means of combatting increased chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. Also the membership of the regime has grown wider to include countries like Argentina, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, each of which was once targetted by the regime.
The MTCR, since the time of its inception, has had many controversies and drawbacks. One of the most heated debates took place on the issue of controlling the export of space launch technology. It took the United States 18 months to get all of the other G-7 countries to accept the controls on ballistic missile technology and space launch technology. This had become a major issue because it meant that the members would have to broaden their export controls to include dual-use items and not simply munitions. By restricting access to space launch technology, the member states would cause irritation in the relationships with the developing countries. This had created much heat between member and non-member states, among the member states themselves, and also among certain agencies in the US government. Numerous instances of missile proliferation from Russia in the recent months have called into question Moscow's ability and intention to enforce its MTCR guidelines more effectively. Other issues like China's continued missile sales (despite its agreement with Washington to "adhere" to the guidelines) have always been there on the regime's table and this constituted a major concern to the US when in March 1988, it was revealed that Beijing had entered the missile suppliers market by exporting 2,700 km range DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMS) to Saudi Arabia.23
Between 1989 and 1993, the situation became very grim on this front. Among the major developments were the transfer of M-11 technology by China to Pakistan, Israeli collaboration with South Africa to develop a medium-range rocket, North Korea's development of a 1,000 km range Nodong-1 and also the exporting of Scud-B and -C missiles to Iran and Syria, and India's Agni test-firing. In response to these developments, the Bush Administration and the US Congress decided to enhance and institutionalise the MTCR, but it generated a lot of controversy among the member states. Anyhow, by 1993, the regime was expanded to include 15 more countries, who shared the common goal of non-proliferation. The new countries included the remaining EC countries—Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Austria, and Australia, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.24 In 1993, the regime's equipment and technology annexe was revised and updated in response to technological developments and the previous recorded problems. The regime's coverage was widened to include missiles capable of delivering all WMD, in order to reflect increased concern over chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Thus, the focus of the MTCR became the intention of potential recipients, regardless of the range and payload of the missile systems.
However, this is not to deny the significant role played by the MTCR since 1987. The missile proliferation has been slowed drastically and it has made the development of ballistic missiles much more difficult for the developing world, considering the economic and political costs associated with proliferation. Especially since 1993 onwards, the regime's effectiveness had been enhanced considerably. Regular meetings of the member states take place to discuss issues of concern like the prevailing export control systems, and their effectiveness. Also, the regime's expansion of members has helped towards promoting a missile non-proliferation norm. The regime was able to delay or cancel many of the technology and weapons transactions. Argentina announced the termination of the Condor II project in 1990, largely because of the embargo that was placed on technology transfer to Argentina by the MTCR member states and diplomatic pressure from the United States.25 There were also other cases like those of Brazil, Israel, South Africa.
In September 1993, the Clinton Administration made some reforming policies in the regime. The Administration relaxed the US criteria for admitting new members, and thus the US policy changed to support great expansion of the regime, thereby including additional countries who subscribe to non-proliferation standards. Under the new policy, prospective members were not required to forfeit their civilian rocket programmes to join the regime. Also, while it remained American policy not to support the development of SLVs by non-regime countries, the United States began to consider exports of MTCR-controlled items to member countries for peaceful programmes on a case-by-case basis.26 This policy could have been adopted in order to let countries like Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and may be even India and Israel join the regime by offering US space launch technology as an incentive.
It is in this direction that the origin of the MTCR became a pertinent issue in the above developments. Its historical trajectory clearly indicated the shortfall between what was envisaged and what transpired, particularly in a few cases such as China, Pakistan and Iran. Let us peruse through a few details.
The issue of missile proliferation can be traced back to the early years of the 1960s, but it had not become a major issue until the late 1970s and 1980s. Major attention was focussed in those Cold War years when the erstwhile Soviet Union transferred 280 km range Scud-B missiles to several Arab countries. America's anxiety grew alarmingly after the attempts by several countries to make their own rockets. This issue centred around a few countries like Israel, Libya, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. The worry grew further when the US saw that each country was trying to pursue its own civilian programme and often diverting it to military related nuclear programmes. All these countries depended on some industrialised country to further improve upon their technical know-how, and manufacturing technology. Towards the end of the Carter Administration, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) put in a nutshell the nature of the missile problem in its 1980 annual report, which said:
"US technology (in the form of products or know-how) with direct applicability to missile production could indeed be purchased component by component, ostensibly for civilian purposes through normal commercial licensing procedures."27
The problem became much more acute and beyond control when the Soviet Union was willing to sell Scud-B missiles to its client states in the Middle East, and other developing countries were acquiring the necessary components, technical know-how, and manufacturing technology from other various countries to develop their own missiles indigenously. Most of the items were acquired from countries like France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany. What increased the US worry was the fact that most of these items have been "dual-use" elements and they could be easily diverted for military purposes. Thus, by 1981, the Reagan Administration felt the need to check proliferation and tighten the existing export controls. Reagan's initiative manifested itself in National Security Decision Directive 70 (NSDD-70) of November 30, 1982.28 This directive instructed the relevant agencies to implement methods to restrain the spread of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. The US government was directed to work further with other missile technology supplier countries to control the transfer of sensitive technology and equipment. It was in conjunction with this that the Reagan Administration negotiated the MTCR with other G-7 nations between 1983 and 1987.
MTCR and China
In 1994, China finally pledged to follow the MTCR and its guidelines.29 Even after agreeing to abide by the MTCR guidelines, China has continued its technology transfers to many developing countries. Among the three nations of missile proliferation—China, Russia and Ukraine —China has the poorest non-proliferation record. Several recent revelations have continued to draw attention to Beijing's ambiguous stance on missile non-proliferation. A recent CIA report said that China had engaged in (1) the export of M-11 missiles and guidance equipment to Syria; (2) the sale of C-802 cruise missiles to Iran; and (3) the sale of blueprints and equipment to Pakistan.30 Also, Pakistan's test-firing of the projected 600 km-range Hatf III missile in July 1997 provided further evidence of Chinese assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan's test-firing of the intermediate range ballistic missile, Ghauri in April 1998 is further proof of Chinese assistance to Islamabad in the field of missile technology. Pakistan has a track record of clandestine acquisition of technology, material and missile components from foreign sources.
The testimonies provided by US officials to various Senate sub-committees indicate the extent to which China continues to aid Pakistan's missile programme. But the Pentagon's pressure dictated the US disinformation campaign for the Ghauri test and it has been passed onto a hapless North Korea.
Thus, neither the space cooperation with the United States nor the MTCR membership has put a halt on China's missile proliferation activities. China enjoys its leader-like position among the Third World countries by providing weapons and weapons technology rather than getting into complex space projects with the US. The Chinese are also taken by the idea of making a "quick buck" through arms exports. Deals with Iran and Pakistan are good cases in point: 70 per cent of Pakistan's budget goes into defence and payments to other countries and world bodies like the World Bank.31
There have been many criticisms levelled against the Clinton Administration that the level of sanctions against China is inadequate. The United States had imposed sanctions twice before, for missile exports to Pakistan and once in 1997, a one-year sanction against two Chinese companies for transferring chemical weapon components to Iran. But, on the whole, Washington had been soft towards Beijing on the missile proliferation issue. As one expert put it:
"President Clinton's China policy - trade over everything—has so trapped Washington that it can neither deal honestly with the American public and Congress nor act effectively about China in support of other American interests. Knowing Washington would not endanger trade with China, Beijing increased its sales of missiles, nuclear material and chemical weaponry."32
On the other hand, China looks at American missile proliferation policy and the MTCR as hypocritical because the United States has been the world's biggest exporter of conventional arms and China's share in the world of arms market is relatively small. China has criticised the MTCR on another account, that it includes missiles, which China exports, but does not include the export of aircraft, which the US and its allies export. In November 1995, Lia Huaqiu, China's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, said:
"Ballistic missiles per se are not weapons of mass destruction, but rather a carrier vehicle. Likewise, fighter aircraft are also a carrier vehicle that can carry nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons . Limiting missile exports without limiting fighter plane exports is clearly a double standard."33
Moreover, Beijing, like Washington, views the transfer of military technology—including missile technology—as a means for realising strategic goals, for expanding its diplomatic influence, and an effective means for enhancing its foreign relations. The issue here, thus, is of a different nature. Ultimately, all these proliferation policies depend on whom one wants to give the technology to. China's energy requirements for the future could make it a vibrant supplier of one technology or the other to oil-rich countries in West Asia. It could also trigger off an exercise in futility as far as the MTCR is concerned, if effective control and strict vigilance are not observed.
Hence, it was expected that Clinton's visit would result in confidential parleys with the Chinese leadership on matters of strict control like the MTCR. However, from available records of published statements through the media, no optimistic estimate has been forthcoming in this direction. Sino-US relations may have brought about euphoric feelings on both sides, but it has been a grim reminder of developments in this region of South Asia.
1. Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Steps Back from Danger" The Washington Post, July 9, 1998.
4. USIS, Official Text, Einhorn Statement on Nuclear Proliferation with China, (New Delhi: USIS), February 5, 1998.
5. USIS, "Transport: ACDA's Holum 4/9 Briefing On Recent Trip to China," Wireless File, April 13, 1998.
6. Source: Aerospace Industries Assn./Geoffrey Perry/Arianspace/Loral, taken from Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 29, 1998, p. 26.
9. Hindustan Times, July 14, 1998.
10. Times of India, May 15, 1998.
11. Times of India, June 9, 1998.
13. CIA, Review Data in Far Eastern Economic Review, June 11, 1998, p. 22.
19. Times of India, May 17, 1998.
20. United States Department of State Press Briefing (extract), "Missile Technology Control Regime" Current Documents, United States Department of State, April 16, 1987, p. 75.
22. Ibid., p. 76.
23. OPR (Riyadh), March 9, 1988; in FBIS NES-88-054, March 21, 1988, "Statement on the Purchase of Chinese-Made Missiles" in The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, n. 1, Fall 1997, p. 25.
24. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Missile Technology Control Regime: Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, May 17, 1993), p. 1.
25. Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation," SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and DisarmamentI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 327.
26. Wyn Q. Bowen, "US Policy on Ballsitic Missile Proliferation: the MTCR's First Decade (1987-1997)," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Fall 1997, p. 30.
27. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control 1980 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1981), p. 27.
28. n. 13, p. 23.
29. Victor Zaborsky, "Viewpoint: US Missile Nonproliferation Strategy Toward the NIS and China: How Effective?" The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Fall 1997, p. 88.
30. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 11, 1998.
31. J.N. Dixit's Lecture at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, March 24, 1998.
32. A. Rosenthal, "China's Poisonous Lie," The New York Times, May 27, 1997.
33. Liu Huaqiu, Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995 in, n. 13, p. 33.