The Rationale of Cruise Missiles—I
Tara Kartha,Research Fellow,IDSA
The threat from ballistic missile proliferation in the developing world has kept arms control analysts and the Pentagon busy since the mid-1980s. The technology control regimes fashioned to curtail this spread have been variously assessed by analysts with some contending that the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) has proved an effective brake, restricting would-be power mongers to basic Scud technology, while others point to a rising graph of proliferation of not only ballistic missiles, but even the infinitely more dangerous cruise missile technology. Rather predictably, such perceptions and voluminous data produced from accompanying studies were strengthened whenever a particular developing country stepped out of line--as apparent after the war in the Gulf, the withdrawal of North Korea from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the testing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) by India. Since the mid-1990s, the insecurity of the nuclear powers regarding Third World machinations, has increased considerably due to the very real possibility of the leakage of weapons and technologies from the FSU (Former Soviet Union) and the possibility of the developing world moving to take advantage of this suddenly much more porous nature of the missile market. Analysts, therefore, have honed their arguments with the contention that new missile powers would not need to "reinvent the wheel" but would find the necessary technologies on the increasingly fast paced quasi-civilian market. Such analysts tend to be from the group that is also propagating the expensive missile defence programme, as well as from the intelligence community.
Whatever the motivations, the threat from the proliferation of cruise missiles is one that is taken seriously enough by the US government. The Annual "Proliferation: Threat and Response" from the Office of the Secretary of Defence of the United States identifies North Korea, Iran, China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, India, Russia and others as states with cruise missile programmes or in their inventories.1 The Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency, James Clapper, in 1995 informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that there were some 130 cruise missile types in the world possessed by 75 countries, produced in 19 different countries.2 Out of these 19, (US, Russia, UK, France, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Italy, Israel, China, Brazil, Argentina, India, Japan, Taiwan, South Africa, Iran, and Syria), only the last six were non-exporters. More specific to this study, other estimates have pointed out that 70 countries deploy over 75,000 cruise missiles most of which were designed to strike ships at sea.3 British analysts like Duncan Lennox, the Editor of Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, have also warned that "the cruise missile will become a serious proliferation issue over the next 10 years."4
Since recently these warnings have increased due to the rise of the UAV (unmanned air vehicle) and its cousins (the remotely piloted vehicles—RPV, drones, etc.). Analysts comment that these low observables may vary their payload from the present optical cameras and other imaging equipment to a small chemical, nuclear or conventional warhead. Indeed, at least 23 countries produce UAVs, drones or target vehicles (see below). Military exercises have thus included the threat from RPVs, UAVs and other such low observables which would provide (in US estimation) an easy and relatively cheaper option for the aspiring developing country, even as counter-measures against more sophisticated weapons continued to be studied in the form of the multi-billion dollar theatre missile defence programme (TMD) as well as revived interest in aerostats as a long endurance and cheaper alternative to surveillance aeroplanes. Overall, the arguments that warn of impending cruise missile proliferation are:
-- Development of long range cruises would be easier if a country already "possesses" short range cruises. In other words, great enhancement of the missile (as in the case of ballistic missiles which would require a 2nd or 3rd stage) would not be required.
-- Small size and weight allow easier launching.
-- Since no re-entry technology is required, simpler to produce.
-- Ideal platform to circumvent the increasing dependency by the West on "non-strategic missile defence systems."
-- Ideal platform to launch nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons--usually known as the poor man's weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
While the spotlight so far has been on ballistic missiles, it is worth asking what the future of this new threat may look like a few decades from now. What is the role of the cruise in the present era, both among the West and the rest, and in the past and in the future. This paper attempts to evaluate the attractiveness or otherwise of the weapon by examining briefly its development, characteristics, and utility under modern battle conditions. In conclusion, the security implications of cruise missile proliferation (if indeed it has proliferated) for the country is evaluated.
What is a Cruise Missile?
A cruise missile is in effect, a small pilotless aircraft operating within the atmosphere at speeds associated with those of conventional aircraft rather than missiles. Even with present day cruises operating at supersonic speed, it remains a vehicle that will operate at a speed of a lower order of magnitude than its ballistic cousins. It is essentially an offensive weapon, and its unique qualities are its accuracy, low RCS (radar cross section), and low level penetration. The engine depends on the range and speed required, and it is possible to reach distances of 4-6nm using only the kinetic power of the launching vehicle. Beyond that range, it may use small jet engines (turbofan or turbojet) or a strap on rocket motor for added energy in the case of glide bombs like the American GBU-15. Early cruise designs had a continuous tussle between required range and possible engine power.
In comparison to a ballistic missile--for instance between the Tomahawk (BGM-109) and the traditional ballistic CSS-5 (DF-21) which have similar ranges and payloads--it is noticeable that the launch weight of a cruise missile is 10 per cent that of a ballistic missile. Analysts have also pointed out that the technology needed to produce a cruise missile is less advanced and make the suggestions that once a country has light aircraft production capability, the costs would be about 10-25 per cent of total cost of an equivalent ballistic missile in the same range and payload.5 While such calculations are highly variable (since a ballistic missile programme may be part of a developmentally oriented space programme), they are indicative of the cheaper production costs of the cruise as compared to the ballistic missile. With the advent of the poor man's cruise--the UAV and its cousins--costs should come down further.
There is no clear definition of what constitutes a cruise, which can be ground, ship, submarine or air launched. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty got by, by simply referring to it as an "unmanned self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight." This covers both rocket and air breathing weapons, as well as those that are either fully autonomous or have a man in the loop guidance. The range may be anything from 20 km to as much as 3,000 km. The 1987 INF Treaty defined cruise missiles as having a range in excess of 500 km; START I defined it as within 600 km. The preferable definition is the 300 km plus range criterion which applied in the 1987 MTCR. This range is also suitable for this study, as most of the developmental activities are aimed at this bracket, while those sold energetically tend to fall just within this range. A third characteristic which defines a cruise is that it can change direction or altitude at any time during its flight, and depending on technology, may do so several times. The fourth and last point--the crux of the cruise as it were--is its accuracy. A ballistic missile is guided for the five of the twenty minutes it takes to travel (for instance) 5,000 km; a cruise which flies at subsonic speed would require close to six hours of continuous guidance to cover the same distance. Development of guidance systems suffered due to the fact that guidance errors that accumulate with time would be almost a hundred times more for the cruise than for a ballistic missile. This was an important factor that left first generation cruises by the wayside, besides continuing to dog the efforts of Third World states today. However, short range cruises get by, using inertial guidance coupled with a terminal guidance (heat seeking/radar guided, etc.)6 while maintaining considerable accuracy. Due to these various factors that mark the modern cruise, classifying is difficult, and this may be done through range or role.
Types of Cruises: The Old and The New
The Strategic Cruise (2,000-3,000 km)
This has traditionally been identified with the highly accurate, long range (3,000 km) nuclear armed, precision guided weapons that were understood to be basically nuclear delivery vehicles, and remained in the arsenals of the superpowers. Matters have now changed somewhat, and the phenomenal accuracy of the cruise has led to it being used more in the conventional mode--with the BGM-109 family of ship and air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) gaining the attention of the world in 1991 against Iraqi sites. France has the capability of building ALCMs, but significantly it has now decided to abandon the longer range versions (air sol longue portee) as unnecessary for the new doctrinal requirements. Most sophisticated long range cruises use the TERCOM (terrain contour matching) or the TERPROM (terrain profile matching). The former was first patented in 1958 for early US systems by mapping data into a digital presentation. The cruise carries a radar altimeter which, by means of a computer, compares the reading it takes from the terrain below with the digital map and determines corrections.7
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (50-500 km)
It is the contention of analysts that more than 70 countries possess these potent weapons (though they are produced by 13 including the countries of the former Soviet Union). Only Russia, the US, and China are at present in the race to produce anti-ship missiles of 500 km or more. France's Exocet has seen service in 29 Navies while the Harpoon is present in 21, Russia's Styx in 21 and the Chinese Hai Ying 1 and 2 (known interchangeably as Silkworm) supplied to at least six countries.8 Other popular cruises are sold by Italy (Otomat) and Israel (Gabriel). It may be noted that all these main suppliers are also those in the race to build longer range anti-ship cruises, as well as more sophisticated land attack versions. The rest of the 70 get by with buying short range missiles from these primary suppliers, though Argentina and North Korea have their own programmes, while Iran is also said to have her own version based on the Silkworm of Chinese/North Korean design.
Tactical Land Attack Missiles (TLAM 180-600 km)
These are the missiles to watch, and are the focus of research and development in major producers as well as cruise aspirants. The TLAMs range is suspect, and may be anything from the Tomahawk class to less than 200 km like the Chinese version under development. France, and the US had developed this type during the 1980s, and they were meant to be fired at high value, well defended targets like command and control centres, and other crucial areas. The continuing interest in this type is evident in the production of the Tri Service Standoff Attack Munition, a more than $15 million programme that the US unveiled in mid-1991. France's long range cruise, the Apache is another TLAM while Sweden and South Africa are both known to have had such long range TLAMs under development.
Like all other missiles, it is essentially a component of air power, and hence is subject to all the opportunities and limitations of air power. The first use of the cruise, therefore, violated one of the basic rules--to be effective it must be used offensively. By the time the first Vergeltungs Waffe Eins (V-1s) were launched in June 1944, by Germany, the D-day invasion of Normandy was already a week old. Even if it had been used in a tactical offensive (against the slowly building Allied forces at Normandy), the tide of war might yet have been reversed.
The V-1 was essentially a simple unmanned aircraft with a wing span of around 19 feet and a length of over 24 feet, with a warhead of around 850 kg and a range of 200 miles.9 Guidance was provided by a gyroscope governed by a magnetic compass. Though this primitive form of inertial guidance did not allow accuracy (circular error of probability (CEP) 8 miles), nonetheless it was more than enough for the purpose for which it was eventually used--as a terror weapon and a retaliation for city bombing by Allied Air Forces. Given its considerable size, it had a large RCS, and slow speed (around 375 miles an hour). Though subsequently regarded as having made little difference to the outcome of the war, nonetheless it is possible that had it been inducted earlier, it would have made Operation Overlord a costly if not impossible task. The now often quoted comment by the Supreme Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, "It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible."10 Analysts differ over the actual damage caused by the missile. Some put the damage created by the V-1 as having caused 1.5 times the German cost as well as leading to an Allied defensive effort that was 2.4 times the German cost.11 Others observe that the conventional raids on Germany caused more damage than all the V-weapon attacks combined.12 Rate of fire increased from a mere 10 on June 13, 1943, to 193 weapons fired on London on the first night after the attempt on Hitler's life and 200 more on the second. The peak was 800 fired in July well after the offensive had brought the Allies well within bombing range of the anti-aircraft defences.13
Efforts to neutralise the bombing sites were hardly effective, though the scale of the attacks was considerable. One attack on a total of 24 sites (out of 69 identified sites) with 672 B-17s of the US Air Force starting on December 24 dropped over 3,000 tonnes of bombs with the result that it destroyed seven launching sites, and damaged 14.14 Later the Germans were to camouflage the sites within a periphery of dense anti-aircraft defences. Photographic surveys were extensive, but the attacks themselves continued well into the war.
The defences of London against the V-1 attacks included airborne interceptors, AA (anti-aircraft) guns and barrage balloons. It is important to note that at the beginning the V-1 was given a boost after the terror bombing by the Allies. Without comparable number of aircraft or aircrew (specially the latter), the V-1 offered a cheaper retaliatory weapon against the combined might of the Allies. Though the number of aircraft produced increased steadily, it was never likely to be able to keep up with the sheer numbers the Allies were able to bring into play, and as already noted, the numbers of airmen could not by any length of effort, come up to the required level. While the physical costs were tangible in terms of property destroyed and numbers of Allied aircraft used to bomb the sites, the psychological impact is less easy to quantify. General Eisenhower writes "The effects of the new German weapons were very noticeable upon morale...soldiers at the front began again to worry about their friends and loved ones at home."15 However, it is pertinent to note that in spite of this, operations were not changed in any way to make the capture of weapons sites a priority.
Less publicised were the experiments and launching of air launched cruise missiles. The Heinekel III with a V-1 fitted to its pylon carrier to starboard, achieved accuracy comparable to the ground launched missiles. The attacks launched from Belgium, however, tailed off by September 1944, because the radio beacons on which navigators relied for precise launch were jammed, and because more than half of these missiles fell prey to AA fire. Overall, the assessment made after the war was that the campaign had cost the Allies an expenditure of 47,635,000 pounds while the cost to the Germans was estimated at 12,600,000 pounds--which indicates at least 4:1 in favour of the attack.16 The strategy of offensive attack succeeded to the extent of imposing considerable costs, but left too late, it was mainly a tactical defensive manoeuvre and did not achieve its strategic objective--that of changing the course of the war.
The Emergence of the Cruise: US Development
Early development of what were essentially follow-ons to the V-1 were of doubtful value. The "Snark" admittedly suffered from the changing operational requirements of the US Air Force, which now required it to outrun chasing fighter aircraft, besides achieving a better CEP. The result was a rather unpredictable missile that once flew off its path to Brazil, and was discovered only twenty years later. The Navaho and the tactical Matador, though they met with little interest, however, led to important technological breakthroughs like the ATRAN (automatic terrain recognition and navigation), a forerunner of the TERCOM (terrain contour matching) that was to give the cruise its true "strategic" (in the sense of "distance" which is how the US interpreted it) capability. But significantly, the guidance systems increased costs (besides being unreliable) to an extent that the MACE, the successor to Matador, stayed in service for only six years. All these programmes including the Navy's Reuglus suffered basically from the fact that the operational requirements were ahead of available technology; moreover aircraft were yet to be baffled by increasing sophistication in air defence systems and were shown to be able to do the job better and perhaps cheaper (in terms of overall costs) than the erratic missiles. Interest revived in cruise technology predictably with the Russians taking a somewhat more active interest in its development. In 1984, the Soviet Union lacking experience in aircraft carriers, deployed a long range land attack cruise missile aboard its intercontinental bombers. Additionally, it began a sea based programme as well as land based ground-launched cruise missiles—GLCMs—(coastal defence) growing out of the naval version. Soviet worries about the vulnerability of much vaunted defences (air defence has always occupied a prime place in Soviet thinking) is illustrative by this quote from the Red Star on the danger from cruise missiles: "The great destructive power of the nuclear charge (presents) difficulties of detection in flight. Ease of camouflage owing to the small size of the missiles and their launchers, concealing them from existing means of technical detection...their numbers and basing locations are extremely difficult to verify, and that facilitates their employment for a surprise attack."17
However, US forces were not quite so enamoured with the cruise especially in its initial stages. The cruise was always the favoured child of Defence Secretaries and Parliamentarians anxious to cut costs, rather than the preferred choice of the professionals--especially in its nuclear role. Thus the Strategic Air Command fought tooth and nail against the early versions of the cruise, the SCAD (subsonic cruise armed decoy) seeing it as a threat to the B-1 funding (which was eventually cancelled in favour of cruises fitted on B-52s). The Navy like the US Air Force remained uninterested until a somewhat dramatic incident--the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in October 1967 by the Egyptians with a Soviet supplied anti-ship cruise--which underlined the effectiveness of sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The result was the 60 nautical mile Harpoon, and later a full blown SLCM the General Dynamics Tomahawk.
The cruise suffered throughout its life from a "role" problem. Airmen and high profile professionals were unwilling to give the cruise a role that they sought exclusively for themselves. Further, the cancellation of the B-1 in 1977, increased the hostility of airmen to the cruise programme, though it was admitted that the cruise on the B-52s gave the Air Force a capability to hit from a stand off range of 1,500 nautical miles, thus allowing an unprecedented reach into Soviet space. Notably, even the powerful "carrier club" of the Navy opposed the anti-ship cruise because it was a threat to their own primary role, while few Air Forces of the time were sympathetic to a system that threatened their elite status.
The Nuclear Cruise and Changing Doctrines
Several factors came together in the mid-1980s to boost the utility of the cruise. For one, nuclear parity led both the US and the USSR to consider conventional "war winning strategies," bringing in theatre doctrines like the Air Land Battle and the Soviet equivalent. This was backed up by huge strides in guidance and allied technologies (which the Soviets referred to as the Military Technical Revolution), made possible by advances in solid state microelectronics which led to the development of TERCOM and digital scene matching area correlator (DSMAC) systems. Parallel advances in turbojet and turbofan technology plus high energy fuels, extended the range of the missiles. The cruise got smaller and more accurate, and in terms of destruction it appeared that conventional munitions could do the job (without collateral damage) just as well as a small nuclear charge. For instance, the Tomahawk class SLCM had only one nuclear variant, and three conventional ones. The conventionally armed cruise needed better guidance, and hence the TLAM was incorporated with the DSMAC, though it still lost in range (due to a heavier warheads). But at 1,250 km, the Tomahawk family was still very much a stand-off weapon. Subsequent research has been aimed at bettering engine thrust, while reducing the size of the warhead, and retaining lethality. The stealthy air launched cruise was the follow-on to the AGM-86B which had entered service in 1981.
Similarly, the ship based missiles gave them a reach that had earlier only been achieved by carrier based aircraft. The fact that a cruise could carry much more payload when compared to a tactical missile of the same range (since it needed no booster fuels), its inherent stealth capabilities (its radar signature lost in ground clutter--except to an airborne radar), and its relative cheapness (especially to Parliamentarians) all added to its attractiveness.
The Nuclear Cruise
In the nuclear role, the cruise missile was an obvious answer to the increased accuracy and lethality of the SS-21 which began to replace the SS-4s in the mid-1980s. In 1985, a new modification of the SS-20 was reported which represented an almost three-fold improvement over the 1977 version.18 The GLCM in Europe had the advantage of combining both military and political advantages. Politically, it was the only system that allowed maximum possible participation, while committing the US to the defence of the Alliance. Militarily, it combined low collateral damage, with a high launch survivability (being mobile and capable of being launched from unsurveyed sites). To launch a pre-emptive strike at all GLCM sites, Moscow would have to launch a strike on a scale that would almost certainly activate British "strategic" systems as well as the French and possibly American systems. The GLCM thus sent a signal of usability with a degree of restraint that allowed the possibility of renewed political parley (which after all was at the basis of the flexible response strategy). Targets were thus limited both by political considerations and technical limitations, with target selection based on the premise that attack on defence installations far from civilian habitation would give the requisite "pause" for political activity, rather than the high value targets that would cause a knee-jerk reaction to a nuclear response.
The utility of the cruise to the Soviets was seen to be more political than military, since it presented tricky problems for command and control, besides which the "ICBM lobby" was strong within the power structures.19 However, the AS-15 cruise on the Bear-H bomber soon threatened the continental US, (as a riposte to the GLCM), and was even seen as a counter to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) concept if produced in sufficiently large numbers. The Soviet cruises were typically high altitude (18,000 metres) supersonic (mach 3.5) cruises attaining a terminal dive on reaching the targets. These were with difficulty incorporated as "cruise" missiles, since they did not follow the classic sea skimming, low altitude patterns.
Nothing demonstrates the importance of the cruise to the superpowers more than its consistent health and persistence throughout the various decades of arms control. The INF Treaty, removed an entire category of "intermediate weapons" but the air launched cruise came through unscathed. Similarly, the START-I process allowed the Americans to "build up" their land attack cruise missile capability, while the Russians were to build up their capability from a zero figure. The cruise, as yet a relatively unknown figure, was able to keep out of the limelight while the triumph in the reduction of ballistic missiles was publicised. Research continued with the 200 kiloton ALCM by the US (1981), the follow-on stealthy cruise.
The fears of conventional war, the beginning of conventional arms control, and later the collapse of the Soviet Union followed, and with it the relevance of the long range (3,000km) cruise for warfighting. Research began to concentrate on multipurpose cruises that would have anti-tank roles, while the SLAM (standoff land attack missile) performed sterling service as the missile which was manoeuvred into a Iraqi power generation plant during the war in Iraq.
Use of the Cruise--Missile Use in War and "Coercion"
The cruise meanwhile had been making news in major and minor wars throughout the world. Wherever it was used, it set itself a reputation for accuracy and lethality. Needless to add, all cruises were conventionally tipped, mostly short range weapons, except where a superpower used them for "instant coercion."
In the Falklands War (1982) out of a total of five AM-39 Exocets fired by Argentina, three scored direct hits on the HMS Sheffield, the containers and the destroyer HMS Glamorgan. The Russian SS-N-2 Styx was used in 1967 against Israel by Egypt, in 1971 by India against Pakistan, and by Iran during its 1980-88 war with Iraq. Chinese copies of the Styx design (CSSC-2 Silkworm and CSSC-3 Seersucker) coastal defence missiles and the ship launched CSS-N-1 and CSS-N-2 were used by both sides in the Iraq-Iran War, and more importantly by Iraq against coalition ships in 1991. The Soviet air launched AS-5 Kelt was used against Israel in 1973, and the Israeli Gabriel I against Egypt in 1973. Iran used US RGM/AGM-84 Harpoons against Iraqi shipping from 1980-1988 and the USA used Harpoons against Libya in 1986 and against Iraq in 1991. The Exocet was also used against Iran.20
The most publicised use of the cruise in recent years was in the war against Iraq in 1991. Though the cruise received its "blue ribbon" in this period, studies done later reveal that its efficiency was not quite of the level of the various claims made by individual companies. Interestingly, nearly 30 per cent of cruise missiles used were launched from rotary wing aircraft, and not from fighter aircraft, underlining the need for stealth rather than speed. In fact, it now appears that few pilots of high speed aircraft were able to handle the high workload weapons in a high intensity warfare situation. Ironically, it was the A-10 that had the necessary loiter capability to use the Maverick to acquire a target.21 Some experimental weapons were also used, but overall the effectiveness of the cruise remains difficult to quantify. It must be noted that the "success rate" propounded by concerned defence industries only covers the "launch and guidance to target" while mentioning nothing of the actual "hit". The Gulf War Air Power Survey also notes the limitations of long range cruises--the need for a lengthy targetting process, and that they could not be retargetted after launch. Nonetheless, the cruises used are all under development for better stand-off ranges, even while the strategy of warfighting in "regional wars" undergoes a review.
More interesting still is the "near use" of the cruise during the 1991 Gulf War, when Israel planned to destroy mobile Iraqi Scud and Frog ballistic missile transporter/erector launchers (TELs) in western Iraq involving the use of UAVs: flights in a killbox grid, a series of 30x30 nautical square miles overlaid on the theatre of operations.22 While in this instance the UAVs were used with GPS (global positioning system) and secure video links to locate and find the TELs, it demonstrates the accuracy achievable with what in essence is an unarmed cruise.
Apparently use of these missiles against a developed country (as by Argentina against the UK and Iraq against coalition shipping) raised the costs to Western forces, though that did not change the long-term objectives of those forces. More interesting is the fact that cruises have emerged as the favoured weapon for "persuasion"--against Libya for suspected terrorist activity, against Iraq for non-compliance, and against the Bosnian Serbs for a similar reason. Clearly, the cruise missile can send a message that ordinary munitions or even a nuclear test/simulation may not--in the post-Cold War scenario the "political utility" of nuclear weapons may be undeniable, but they still remain essentially unusable weapons--especially in a conflict where such a threat would be clearly counter-productive to US/Western security. The changed nature of war in the new international landscape, and the relevance of the cruise therein will be examined in part II of this study.
1. "Proliferation: Threat and Response", US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1996.
2. See Jane's Defence Weekly, May 1, 1996.
3. Jane's International Defence Review, May 1996, pp. 21-24.
4. Duncan Lennox "Cruise: A Missile for the 1990s," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1994, p. 19-20.
6. Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).
7. Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage, Unmanned Aircraft (New York: Brassey's, Pergammon, New York, 1988).
8. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 12.
9. n. 7, p. 8.
10. D.D. Eisenhower, "Crusade in Europe," (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1948), p. 284.
11. Kenneth P. Werrel, "The Modern Cruise Missile," Journal of Military History, October 1989, pp. 429-38.
12. Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and the Technics, (Oxford University Press, SIPRI, 1996) p. 41.
13. n. 7, p. 11.
15. n. 10, p. 284.
16. n. 7.
17. For an excellent treatment of the subject, see Richard K. Betts ed., Cruise Missile Technology: Strategy and Politics, (Brookings Institute, 1987), p. 345.
18. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, 1986, pp. 37-80.
19. Rose E. Gottemoeller, "Land Attack Cruise Missiles," Adelphi Papers, no. 226, Winter 1987/8.
20. Jane's Defence Weekly, May 1, 1996, p. 20.
21. For an exhaustive analysis, see Anthony H. Cordesmann and Abraham R. Wagner The Lessons of Modern War: The Gulf War, Vol. IV (Westview Press: 1996).
22. As reported in Asian Defence Journal, December 1992, pp. 28-36.
23. Missile Technology Control Regime Guideline http://www.acda.gov/treaties/mtcr.htm.
24. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 12.
25. Beijing Review, 1/6/97, pp. 17-20.
26. Jane's Air Launched Weapons, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, UK.
27. According to paragraph 3 of the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex cruise missile engines are also subject to limitations. Light weight, fuel efficient turbo-jet and turbo prop engines, (ii) ramjet/scramjet/pulsejet/combined cycle engines including devices to regulate combustion. Qualitative limitations are also provided in thrust and fuel consumption.
28. For a discussion on this see Gennady Khromov "The threat of cruise missile proliferation requires urgent coordinated actions" The Monitor, Fall 1997/ Winter 1998. Centre for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia.
29. Denis M. Gormley "On the threat of Cruise missile proliferation" The Monitor, Spring-Summer 1998.
30. World Unmanned Aircraft (Jane's Publishing Inc. 1988).
31. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 7.
32. See Aaron Karp "Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics" (SIPRI: Oxford University Press, 1996).
33. Cooperation with Kazan for the DAN UAV, powered by a turbojet, and equipped with an anti radiation seeker or a millimetric wave radar and on board altimeter was reported in Asian Defence Journal, December 1992.
34. Data is drawn from Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Jane's Defense Weekly, May 1, 1996; Ian O Lesser, Ashley J. Tellis "Strategic Exposure" Rand, 1996. (MR-742-A).
35. Kathleen C. Bailey (ed.) "Director's Series on Proliferation" Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, June 1, 1995.
36. See Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 07. Also see Aviation and Space Technology, September 6, 1993, pp. 54-55.
38. Flight International,
39. Washington Times, December 11, 1996. Also see Times of India, January 21, 1998.
40. Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 1, 1993, pp. 26-27.
41. Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1993, p.A12.
42. Washington Times, January 21, 1998, p.A9.
43. Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia (?), South Africa, and South Korea. See Robin Ranger et. al, "Cruise missiles: New Threats, New Thinking" Comprehensive Strategy, Vol. 14, pp. 255-275.
44. These 15 are China, France, Egypt, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Taiwan, the UK, and the US. Egypt is included for possessing nine types of imported ASCM's, N. 25.
45. Reportedly, an agreement was signed to release classified information on the Conventional Stand Off missile requirement to Kentron (which is the missile subsidiary of ARMSCOR) Flight International, June 12, 1994, p. 5.
46. Written statement by Richard N. Cooper, Chairman National Intelligence Council, for Hearing of the House National Security Committee, February 28, 1996.