Revisiting Gunboat Diplomacy: An Instrument of Threat or Use of Limited Naval Force

P.K. Ghosh, Research Fellow



The operational flexibility of navy combined with its 'reach' makes it an ideal exponent of gunboat diplomacy in which the threat or use of limited naval force is instrumental in attainment of national political objectives. A concept that is erroneously treated as archaic by some analysts despite its increased and frequent use in the post-Cold War scenario with some prominent examples such as the Chinese PLAN exercises off Taiwan during 1996, use of Indian Navy during Kargil conflict and the US Naval firings on Al Shija and Khost in 1998, an incident which greatly enhanced its geographical sphere of influence. The increased use has been mainly because, in their attainment of national objectives, governments are anxious to avoid an overt war with its accompanying implications. Occupying the last two steps of escalation control within the purview of the War Paradigm, gunboat diplomacy has eased itself into the relatively unused niche of overt warfighting, thus ensuring its increasing currency this century, for achieving national objectives without the disadvantages of a full scale armed conflict.

"Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments"

— Fredrick the Great 1712-1786

Many strategic analysts are of the confirmed opinion that gunboat diplomacy is an anachronistic concept. Actually even in the early 20th century this was a persistent thought, with the opinion that this concept had died with Queen Victoria! That modern governments continue to use the navy for diplomacy—with considerable flourish and frequency—for achieving national objectives, diplomatic aims, for averting losses in furtherance of an international dispute is aptly borne out by statistics. Thus gunboat diplomacy as a concept seems to keep resurrecting itself like the proverbial Phoenix.

In the inter-war years between the two World Wars there had been 71 instances of use of gunboat diplomacy, in some form or the other between nations. However, with the dramatic increase in the number of nations (and obviously navies) and an amalgamation of the politically fragmented world into a bipolar one – post-World War II – has seen a near trebling of the instances of gunboat diplomacy.

Since 1945 there has been one real naval war, half a dozen rather one-sided naval contributions to land operations, and more than 200 political applications of limited naval force.1 Thus it is obvious that the political configuration of the world did little to dampen the use of naval forces as a tool for diplomacy.

The aim of this article is to examine the aspects of implied or actual use of naval forces as a tool of diplomacy and seek the relevance of gunboat diplomacy (in its present form) to the Indian context within the matrix of international politics. In addition, it is also to assess its currency in the 21st century.

Actual naval war fighting or its use in policing or anti – smuggling operations will be construed as outside the scope of this article.


Gunboat diplomacy is difficult to define – a concept familiar to many yet amorphous in nature it defies a simple a priori definition. However, James Cable describes it as "the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state".2 Thus gunboat diplomacy is a form of coercive diplomacy carried out in peacetime or in less than war situations and is intended to secure specific advantage from another state and forfeits its diplomatic character if it either contemplates the infliction of injury unrelated to obtaining that advantage or commits an otherwise act of war. Hence coercive, gunboat diplomacy is an alternative to war and if it leads to war then we must not only hold that it has failed, but hesitate to give the name gunboat diplomacy.3 The other important aspect of gunboat diplomacy is that it must be accompanied by political diplomacy since it is an extension of the same. If there is no accompanying political diplomacy, there can be no gunboat diplomacy.

Concept of Use of Naval Force

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of gunboat diplomacy is obviously the use of naval forces (not necessarily only gunboats as the name suggests) to achieve aims as stated earlier. While the direct use of land or air power singly or in conjunction may signify the commencement or escalation of hostilities to war. The navy on the other hand can be used more subtly. The main reason for this may lie in the words of Mahan who has described the sea as a 'great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common over which men may pass in all directions'4 Thus the freedom of the seas bestowed by UNCLOS III, giving naval vessels the advantage of 'innocent passage' through high seas and even inside territorial waters thus bringing them nearer to the scene of action. This gives naval forces flexibility and distinct advantage over the other two forces. Nearer the forces to the scene of action better the effect.5 On the other hand, neither the army nor the air force possess such distinctive mobility. Both cannot cross into another territory or state without authorisation since doing so may lead to escalation on to a limited war by stepping over the threshold of tolerance. In any case there are inherently greater risks of using the land or air arm since the land nexus can convert to a significant political commitment with all its rigidities that are implied.

Some of the other advantages that are bestowed upon a naval fleet or an individual unit by virtue of their physical characteristics lie in their self-sufficiency and compactness. A single naval unit is self-sufficient on its own. A naval task force is a stand-alone unit that incorporates the elements of land, air and sea power into it. In addition, modern missile and weapon systems increase the area of the 'circle of influence' of such task groups tremendously.

In addition to the above the most probable reason why navy is the chosen arm in this form of 'muscle flexing diplomacy' is because of the flexibility of command and control of units at sea (i.e. units can act independently and/or act on the real time situation developing ashore on orders from shore control). Besides it is also due to the secrecy involved in the movement of naval units and due to the relative difficulty in tracking them unless being tracked by satellites.

Concept and Nature of Limited Naval Force

Limited naval force is basically a political concept. The threat of force does not cease to be limited in nature either due to the size or characteristics of the ships involved or due to the supplementary actions such as landing of troops or shore bombardment. In gunboat diplomacy no category of actions can be labeled as a safe threshold – that which will restrain the affected adversary from escalation to war levels. In fact the acceptance of all concerned parties of an act of force as limited rather than an act of war is independent of objective, motive, valid criterion, morals or international law – only the result matters.6

An assailant must give due consideration to the political fall-out of each act of gunboat diplomacy as it arises. An assailant who contemplates using either the threat or actual use of limited naval power must answer three questions to himself: - what is the desired terminal objective? More importantly, can it be achieved by application of limited naval force? Does the risk of an escalation to war exist and hence if the stakes are high is the risk worth taking ?7

Unfortunately, the analysis of many previous incidents tells us that these questions are often asked and answered only after the assailant has put his naval units to sea resulting in either no tangible results, or to an avoidable war.

Some examples of the former are the assembly of a task group of three US aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan, after the capture of the crew of USS Pueblo in January 1968 by the North Koreans, after the ship was discovered snooping (carrying out an Elint mission) off the coast of North Korea. The assembly of such a large American task force bestowed no great advantage to the Americans in subsequent negotiations.8 Similarly the longish deployment in 1977 of the massive French naval force consisting of two aircraft carriers and 18 warships off Djibouti during and after the referendum achieved no great or tangible results.9

In the recent case of the Chinese carrying out extensive missile firings and exercises off the coast of Taiwan in 1996 in an effort to intimidate the pro- independence Taiwanese, it served no tangible purpose as it only hardened Taiwanese postures and forced the US to move its naval forces.

Another important aspect of gunboat diplomacy which must be stated is that the assailants in each case need not always be superpowers, or that the victors need not necessarily have considerable power asymmetry between themselves and the vanquished. Often superpowers have themselves been victims of relatively insignificant assailants. In 1971 the Ecuadorian Navy seized eight US fishing vessels in high seas on grounds of poaching in a 200 mile zone not recognised by the US. The Americans were also made to pay half a million dollars for the same.

In 1977 the Argentinean Navy fired, inflicted casualties and captured seven Soviet fishing trawlers in what Argentina claimed was their 200 mile exclusive zone.10

From these two incidents and also the USS Pueblo incident it is clear that the superpowers, despite having immensely powerful naval forces could not prima - facie prove the efficacy of gunboat diplomacy. The reason for this paradox may lie in the fact that even though gunboat diplomacy is a weapon of strong against weak, but the important thing is that the measure of strength is not by potential but by the ability to apply it about the point of issue.11

Gunboat Diplomacy in War Spectrum

Gunboat diplomacy is definitely an instrument to be used in peacetime or less than peacetime scenarios. Occasions during which gunboat diplomacy has steadily escalated to war have proved the failure of this type of coercive diplomacy in its conventional sense since the aim is to achieve the objective with mere threat or precise and limited use of naval forces. Its culmination in a state of war implies the failure of diplomacy irrespective of who overcomes whom.

Table 1. The War Paradigm or Spectrum

Level/Type of War Nature of War

Nuclear War Inter- state, highly organised, indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons

Conventional (unlimited) Wars Highly organised, inter-state, military to military, mostly fought with major weapons and small arms. No limitation on aims, scope and methods of application of military power.

Conventional (limited) Wars Inter state military to military with limitations on aims, scope and methods. Minimum collateral civil targeting.

Sub- conventional War Irregular and covert war:

Proxy War:

Civil War and Insurgencies: indigenous as well as externally supported.

Militancy and terrorism:

Force without War Stand off (long range) use of destructive military power for political purposes without necessarily resulting in war.

Threat of use of Force Including military exercise/manoeuvers, demonstrative deployments and implicit through standing forces and their posturing.

In the context of the War paradigm or War spectrum, shown in Table I, 12 gunboat diplomacy occupies the two bottom steps of escalation control.

The threat of use of naval forces for achievement of specific objectives conforms to the geometry of the bottommost rung. On escalation however, the second step of use of force without war is symmetrical to the limited use of military power (naval power in this case) for political purposes without resulting in war, which is the concept of gunboat diplomacy. However, any further escalation, to that of limited war or beyond goes outside the purview of its scope.

It must also be stated that since gunboat diplomacy is towards the bottom extreme of the spectrum of war—victory or defeat shift into a political and psychological dimension;13 with any standoff between a weaker and a stronger state being perceived as a defeat for the stronger one. This was the case in the USS Pueblo incident in which the Americans lost face.

Evolution of Gunboat Diplomacy

It is probably the evolving nature of use of limited force that has misled many politicians and strategists to believe that gunboat diplomacy is obsolete and dead. The truth is that it has just evolved. The original class distinction between the assailants and the victims as seen during the late 19th /early 20th century has totally eroded. In those days the assailants were few in number with a strong naval force compared to the victims who were relatively defenseless with a chaotically administered center—the distinction no longer holds good. Today gunboat diplomacy is a powerful game involving any country with a coast acting out any of the designated roles.14

This change, firstly, can be attributed to the tremendous growth in the number of independent nations in the post-colonial era. (States, some of which, are bestowed with considerable economic, and military clout in international politics.) And secondly, due to the availability without much difficulty of effective weapon systems.

In 1900, for example, there were just 37 independent states (some of these enjoyed nominal independence) while today in the UN there are 185 states as members.

The majority of these enjoy total independence in their affairs and even the relatively weaker ones are aligned into economic blocks or military alliances, which convey a sense of strength. On the other hand, the benefits of modern technology in surveillance radars, missiles, coastal batteries and mines have made defense of coasts easier for the victim while it has raised the stakes for the assailant thus overcoming the lacunae faced by states earlier. As is now said ' where once a gunboat and its landing party would have sufficed, a task force is now necessary.'15 As a consequence of this, more navies can now not only deploy gunboat diplomacy but also resist it.

Thus what has changed most is not the relevance of limited force but the degree of political judgment and discrimination needed to make it successful.

Types of Gunboat Diplomacy

Luttwak has suggested the term 'suasion' to describe the political use of naval power. In his 'Theory of Suasion' 16 the term 'suasion' has been used to denote a neutral term whose meaning usually suggests the indirectness of any political application of force.

He opines that Armed Suasion in general and Naval Suasion in particular constitute two aspects, the Latent Naval aspect and that of Active Suasion. The former involves the reaction of adversaries evoked by routine and/or undirected actions of naval units like routine fleet exercises, which may be seen as threatening since threat is latent in them. This may either deter the adversary and be in the deterrence mode or be supportive of an ally in the supportive mode. It must be added that Latent Suasion continuously shapes the military dimension of the total environment which policy makers perceive and within which they operate. On the other hand, Active Naval suasion17 involves the effects evoked by the deliberate exercise of limited armed action, which is to elicit a given reaction from a specified party. The supportive aspect of this Active Naval suasion, generally reassures the ally or the client. The coercive aspect on the other hand can be negative (deterrent) or positive (compellent) by nature.

James Cable on the other hand has classified gunboat diplomacy into four political categories18 they are: definitive force, purposeful force, catalytic force and expressive force.

Definitive Force: Limited naval force is definitive by nature if it creates a fait accompli in that it creates a situation in which the victim has no choice but to agree to an escalation or submit with meek acquiescence. The main aspect of definitive force is that it tries to remove the cause and thus settle the issue, for example by destroying an area, rescuing prizes or captives, maintaining or breaking a blockade or seizing/sinking ships. Unfortunately, very few international disputes lend themselves to resolution by use of this type of force. However, when conditions are right, definitive force is one of the most effective ways of employing gunboat diplomacy.

The successful (from the British point of view) 'Altmark' incident in February 1940, during which the British warship HMS Cossak ventured into neutral Norwegian waters and freed 299 British prisoners holed up in 'Altmark', a German tanker, was a classic case of gunboat diplomacy and use of definitive force, which was described as limited and even tolerable!19 An important lesson that emerged out of this incident was that violence if confined in time and space of the actual operation will tend to reinforce the idea of limited character. While diversionary or prepatory attacks will suggest a general hostility more akin to starting a war.20

On the other hand, the example of 'Operation Rosario' started by the Argentineans in 1982 for capturing Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands from the British ended disastrously because the victim, the British, chose to react by escalating into war known as the Falklands war.21

The Indian experience of use of definitive force in November 1988 ended on a much better note. Indian naval ship Godavari was involved in 'Operation Cactus', which foiled the coup in Maldives, carried out by mercenaries. This ship rescued the hostages and sank the ship carrying the mercenaries. Subsequently Dr Abdul Gayoom, the President, who was briefly overthrown, was restored to power.22

Purposeful Force: In this the aim is to induce the victim to take some action or to prevent him from doing so or to restrain him from even starting it. It is a less direct and less reliable expedient than definitive force since its success depends on how the victim chooses to respond to this sort of pressure.23 It is also a risky expedient – fighting fire with fire – and the risks are aggravated when the involved parties are more or less of equal military strength.

On August 19, 1981 aircrafts from aircraft carrier USS Nimitz shot down two oncoming Libyan aircraft while the carrier task force was in the Gulf of Sirte to emphasise the US rejection of the Libyan claim that the gulf was in their territorial waters. This was an example of use of purposeful force.24

As stated earlier, the recent case of the Chinese carrying out missile firings and extensive naval exercises in 1996 off the coast of Taiwan in an effort to intimidate the latter led to no valuable advantage for the Chinese. On the contrary it worried the Americans enough to incite them to take supplementary action and send in their naval forces.25 This was another example of use of purposeful force without much advantage for the assailant.

Catalytic Force: This is not so much a response as a readiness to respond to an essentially formless menace. There may be a crisis and the government with a naval force may believe that the presence of a naval fleet would prevent the crisis.26 Thus the force here is often applied for a vaguer purpose. Something, it is felt, is going to happen, that might be prevented if force were available at the critical point.27 Like the US for example, had maintained two or even three carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean—Persian Gulf region till recently, should the crisis in the turbulent Western Asia escalate.

Similarly in November 1979 the US deployed two carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean after the US Embassy in Tehran was attacked and its members taken hostage. The action made little discernible impact.

Experience has so far not clearly established catalytic force to be a cost effective expedient. Nevertheless, naval powers are often tempted to deploy their naval forces where they feel it is needed.28

Expressive Force: The last and least of the uses of limited naval force in furtherance of the objective is expressive force. In this the warships are employed to emphasise attitudes, to lend verisimilitude to otherwise unconvincing statements, or to provide an emotional outlet. It is distinct from the use of purposeful force on one hand and a mere flag showing on the other, but it is as vague and uncertain as the usual result of its employment. Yet it must be attempted since the expedient is more common than it is valuable.29

In January 1990 the US sent their aircraft carrier USS Kennedy and support ships to monitor the Columbian coast for airborne drug trafficking. The operation was abandoned due to vigorous Columbian protests.30 This was an expression of expressive force but with doubtful results.

The Indian Experience

Many Indian thinkers have been rather quick to dismiss gunboat diplomacy as a concept not entirely relevant to the Indian context. However, facts show otherwise, India has been involved in at least five publicly known scenarios that can be classified under the purport of gunboat diplomacy. The last one being during the Kargil conflict with Pakistan.

Out of these five incidents India was the victim only in one case while in all the other cases her role was perceived as that of an assailant.

On December 10, 1971 amidst considerable media attention the US 7th Fleet (Task Force) centered around aircraft carrier USS Enterprise sailed into the Bay of Bengal apparently to deter India from pushing her victory against Pakistan during the on-going Indo-Pak conflict to an extreme. The stated motive was 'to insure the protection of US interests in the area'.31 Apparently Indian warships in the area never encountered the said Fleet supposedly due to a Soviet anti- carrier group also in the area. In any case the result of the US expedition in its effort to influence the conflict is most suspect. This incident could be classified as a catalytic and expressive use of force. Or of Latent Naval suasion with the deterrence aspect for the Indians and supportive one for the Pakistanis. In August 1987 the Indian Government sent naval warships off Colombo to evacuate if necessary, members of the Indian High Commission, whose lives were endangered due to the prevailing circumstances of civil war there.32 It was a purposeful display of force.

In November 1988, Dr. Abdul Gayoom of Maldives was overthrown by a coup d'etat by mercenaries. On a request for Indian assistance the Indian naval ship Godavari was dispatched. In an operation code-named 'Cactus' the warship assisted in foiling the coup and sank the ship carrying fleeing mercenaries after rescuing the terrified hostages and arresting their captors.33 It was a successful show of definitive force in gunboat diplomacy.

The dispatching of Indian aircraft carrier Viraat to cruise off Colombo after Sri Lanka demanded the withdrawal of IPKF from their country during July 1989 was seen as use of the lower limit of purposeful force, but with little impact.34

In a recent case, during the onslaught of Kargil conflict in 1999, the Indian Navy deployed its Western Naval fleet in and around the Arabian Sea, near the coast of Pakistan. Firstly it was to deter Pakistan from launching low intensity insurgency attacks on the Indian coast or off-shore oil targets35and secondly to convey the message that the blockade of the Pakistan coast (chiefly their main port Karachi) was imminent if the Kargil conflict escalated to a wider dimension. The naval deployment was subsequently stepped up to a more visible profile in a calibrated manner. Annual exercises of Eastern fleet were shifted to the western seaboard. Ikran Sehgal a Pakistani commentator interpreted this to mean that the Indian Navy was prepared to enforce a "quarantine or blockade of coastline". Alarmed that its supply of energy resources from West Asia might be choked in the face of dwindling reserves and an unprepared Pakistan Navy left to face far superior Indian naval forces, the Pakistani leadership yielded. This was an important factor, which led to Pakistan's humiliating withdrawal from the heights of Kargil. Thus the Indian Navy, an instrument of national power, played its part in convincing the Pakistani military leadership of the futility of prolonging the Kargil conflict.36 This was obviously a successful display of gunboat diplomacy at the lower limit of purposeful force.

The Future of Gunboat Diplomacy in the 21st Century

The onset of the 21st century has witnessed that not only does gunboat diplomacy continue to thrive but is constantly evolving. Today smaller navies have attained the technological edge and speed with faster missile boats, stand off missiles, torpedoes and sophisticated radar systems. These navies are unhesitant in occupying the mantle of the assailant. These states have realised the cost of other benefits of gunboat diplomacy in attaining national objectives against a scenario of going to war.

The attack of Al-Shija target in Sudan and terrorist camps at Khost in 1998 with cruise missiles37 (Tomahawks) from US ships stationed hundreds of miles away at sea adds a completely new dimension to the use of limited force in gunboat diplomacy. With the 'coastal outlook' of gunboat diplomacy getting blurred, the important factor is that land-locked states, hundreds of miles hinterland have come under the purview of gunboat diplomacy and limited use of naval force. Thus enlarging and enhancing the sphere of influence of gunboat diplomacy.

In future, political development and political objectives of the state will form important considerations in gunboat diplomacy. In the post-Cold War scenario, the emergence of regional power points in the face of US in the role of a fluctuating 'global policeman' (due to internal pressures and external contradictions) will set the tone for the 21st century.

The emergence of China as a trans military and economic power38 may generate diffused wavelets of the Cold War. However, to emerge as a true global actor China will have to traverse a long way. With such a scenario emerging, maritime powers, big or small, become dominant employers of gunboat diplomacy, especially in regional hot spots like Spratly and Paracel group of Islands in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the turbulent Gulf, or similar hot spots around the world.

Thus the increased acceptance of gunboat diplomacy is truer since war in its traditional and classical sense is not very viable as an instrument of politics, since states are increasingly vulnerable to the effects of even conventional wars combined with technological and cost factors. The focus of armed conflict is shifting from traditional regular war to the use of military power on the lines of modern gunboat coercive diplomacy.39

Hence the partial vacuum left behind by an increasing shift away from wars (due to reduction in defence allocations, economic costs and an extreme sensitivity to human casualty) has led to the comparatively lower costing coercive diplomacy in the form of gunboat diplomacy to fill its place. This will result in gunboat diplomacy, with all its nuances, accentuated in its use during the 21st century.


The potential, reach and operational flexibility of the navy makes it the ideal exponent of coercive diplomacy. History is witness to maritime nations that have exploited these innate advantages of the navy in different forms through the vicissitudes in time and space. While there have been many attempts to classify the types and modes of the limited use of naval force in gunboat diplomacy, it may be stated that though the terminology may be different, but the common trait which runs through is the sense of deterrence in its diplomatic employment of objectives.

While in the second half of the 20th century gunboat diplomacy got its importance due to superpower rivalry, towards the latter half, during the post- Cold War scenario, smaller nations have increasingly realised the importance of gunboat diplomacy and have resorted to it.

In this context of Cold War and post-Cold War scenarios, it is necessary to mention that the violent peace of the recent decades has made governments most anxious to avoid war with the frustration of diplomatic negotiations or with the indignity of bargaining under duress. Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect that this tendency for violence of peace will lessen in future.

While the level of 'violent peace' will fluctuate in future, armed conflicts will increasingly find themselves out of currency and unviable in the modern world due to economic and resource constraints, human casualties and international opinion. However, with the steady increase on dependence on the seas, in the number of nations with varied interests and objectives, the growing frictional disputes between states will continue to rise.

Hence coercive diplomacy with use of limited naval power and without the disadvantages of armed conflict will obviously try and fill in this niche created by lack of use of the latter. Thus in the 21st century gunboat diplomacy will find its increased use as a low cost option to the advantage of states willing to use it.



1. James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy," International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, vol. III, p. 1135.

2. James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991" (London: Macmillan, 1994) p. 14.

3. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

4. Capt. A.T. Mahan USN "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" (New York: Dover Publication Inc. 1994) p. 25.

5. Cdr. M.A. Razzak BN, "Gunboat Diplomacy: An Outlook for 21st Century." The Naval Review, April 2000, p. 145.

6. Cable, n. 1, p. 1133.

7. Ibid., p. 1134.

8. Ibid., also see Cable n. 2, pp. 195-196.

9. Ibid.

10. Cable, n. 1, p. 1133.

11. Cable, n. 2, p. 32.

12. Jasjit Singh "Dynamics of Limited War," Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no. 7, p. 1208.

13. Ibid., p. 1212.

14. Cable, n. 1, p. 1134.

15. Ibid.

16. Edward N. Luttwak, "The Political Uses of Sea Power," (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1974) Ch. 1.

17. Ibid., also see p. 7.

18. James Cable op. cit. n. 1, p. 1132.

19. Cable, n. 2, p. 24.

20. Ibid.

21. Cable, n. 1, p. 1132, also see n. 2, p. 207.

22. The Times, November 9, 1988.

23. Cable, n. 1, p. 1132.

24. C. Weinberger, "Fighting for Peace," (London: Michael Joseph, 1990) pp. 124-125.

25. Newsweek International, "Gunboat Diplomacy", March 25, 1996, pp. 8-10.

26. Cable, n. 1, p. 1132.

27. Cable, n. 2, p. 46.

28. Cable, n. 1, p. 1132.

29. Cable, n. 2, p. 62.

30. The Times, January 10, 1990.

31. B. Dismukes and J. Mcconnell, "Soviet Naval Diplomacy," (New York: Pergamon Press, 1990).

32. The Times, August 3, 1987.

33. The Times, November 9, 1988.

34. The Times, July 28, 1989.

35. C. Uday Bhaskar, "The Maritime Dimension," Economic Times, July 21, 1999.

36. Gurmeet Kanwal, "Pakistan's Military Defeat," in Kargil—1999 Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, October 1999) p. 159.

37. Razzak BN, n. 5, p. 147.

38. Ibid.

39. Jasjit Singh, "Beyond Kargil" in Kargil 1999—Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, October 1999) p. 220.