An Energy Security Policy for India: The Case of Oil and Natural Gas

-Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Fellow,IDSA

 An energy security policy can best be described as long-term measures to adequately maintain the required supplies of energy resources, both domestic and imported, for a country at all times and at minimum costs. This would primarily involve the production, import and consumption of commercial energy fuels, such as coal, crude oil, natural gas, and hydro and nuclear power. In essence, this would entail the avoidance of a situation which could lead to the disruption of supply (along with its consequent implications), as well as the mitigation of such consequences, should any such disruption occur. In this respect, regional cooperation in accessing energy resources as well as ensuring security of supply, ought to be core aspects of Indian economic, foreign and defence policies.

In the case of crude oil and natural gas alone, for example, this policy would entail, at an international level, an assessment of power and security, especially the geo-politics of energy resources and supplies; the growing importance of oil and natural gas in the world economy; trends in global supply, demand and pricing; and global concerns for environment protection. At the national level, this would involve import, domestic production, and supply; financial implications on the central budget and the balance of payments; policy initiatives in both "upstream" (exploration and production) and "downstream" (refinery) activities; along with an examination of port facilities, pipeline transportation, rail transportation, strategic reserves, crude oil pricing, product prices, the tariff structure, research and development (R&D) activities, role of Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs), and environmental concerns.

Although the formulation of an energy security policy is clearly of strategic importance to a country like India, this has not taken place. To date, no policy on energy security has been enunciated by the government; nor has any "White Paper" on this issue been published, as if it were of no consequence to the country. Whereas the economic-related Ministries, as well as those of External Affairs and Defence, are involved in separate and independent programmes to enhance energy security, there has been no attempt to cooperate formally on this issue. This situation needs to be redressed on an urgent basis.

Clearly, a major problem in enunciating a comprehensive policy on energy security is simply that the energy sector is not the purview of a single governmental Ministry or Department of Energy. Indeed, a multiplicity of such organisations exist. These include, for example, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (crude oil and natural gas); the Ministry of Coal (coal and lignite reserves); the Ministry of Power (electrical energy); the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (new and renewable sources of energy); the Ministry of Environment and Forests (environmental and forestry programmes); the Ministry of Steel (import of coal for the manufacture of steel); and the Department of Atomic Energy (nuclear power); along with a host of PSEs, such as the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) and Oil India Limited (OIL), primarily for exploration and production, and the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), for the purchase of oil from foreign sources. The Ministry of Surface Transport is also responsible for the transportation of energy imports aboard ships of the government-owned Shipping Corporation of India (SCI). The Parliamentary Committee on Energy, the Energy Policy Division of the Planning Commission,and the Hydrocarbons Board are also involved in various aspects of energy policy of the country. In addition, a Hydrocarbons Regulatory and Development Authority (HRDA) is to be set up soon through an Act of Parliament.

Energy Requirement

Sustained reforms in the past six years have resulted in a liberalised Indian economy increasingly becoming integrated with the major economies of the world. According to the World Bank, the Big 5 developing and transition economies (including India) are likely to emerge as key players in the world economy over the next quarter century.1 Another World Bank study has projected India as the fourth largest economy in the world (after China, the United States and Japan) by the year 2020, in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).2 Changes in the government in New Delhi in the past have not affected the nature of reforms, although their pace has been influenced somewhat. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of the Indian"elephant" in the past five years (1992-97), for example, has averaged 6.5 percent annually. However, this is expected to decrease in the current financial year in view of the political uncertainty in the country and the forthcoming general elections in February 1998.

The critical requirement for achieving higher growth rates is clearly the supply of sufficient amounts of energy resources. However, not only will India continue to remain deficient in energy, but the gap between demand and domestic production is expected to grow considerably in the near future. This will necessitate increasing dependence on the import of energy resources aboard ships, and possibly through pipelines. The inability to meet this demand, or the disruption of energy supplies, would severely destabilise the Indian economy, and give rise to social unrest and instability within the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Parlimentary Standing Committee on Energy (March 1994) would note that energy is security.3

The importance of energy in the sustenance of economic activity and growth can be seen from the extent of funding allocated to this sector over the years. This increased from 20 percent of planned expenditure in the First Five-Year Plan (1951-56) to 28 percent in actual terms in the Sixth (1980-85) and Seventh (1985-90) Five-Year Plans. The annual plans for 1990-91 and 1991-92 accordingly allocated 29 percent and 31 percent of total funding, respectively, to the energy sector; the latter figure accounting for nearly a third of total planned expenditure. During the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-97), the energy sector accounted for 27 percent of total planned expenditure (a sum of Rs.115,561 crore), thereby continuing to constitute the single latest source of funding in the country's financial plans.4

The pattern of India's energy consumption has switched over the years, from the dominance of traditional to commercial energy fuels. In 1996-97, these fuels, primarily coal, crude oil, natural gas, and hydro and nuclear power, constituted some 60 percent of the total energy consumed in the country. Amongst them coal easily constituted the largest share (54.2 percent), followed by oil (31.1 percent) and natural gas (10.8 percent); with hydro power (2.8 percent) and nuclear power (1.2 percent) lagging far behind.5

As the fundamentals of a comprehensive energy security policy are clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it will focus only on crude oil and natural gas, and examine the major constituents for such a policy. This would involve only an assessment of demand, production, import, policy initiatives, financial implications, shipping, ports, pipelines, threats and vulnerabilities.

Rising Demand For Crude Oil and Natural Gas

Crude oil is particularly important in view of its crucial role in the transportation sector, especially for a large country like India, with a population of 950 million people and growing. Transport by road, sea, and air is totally dependent on oil.6 In this respect, the share of oil increased from 54 percent of the total energy consumed by the transportation sector in 1972-73, to as much as 92 percent in 1991-92. Meanwhile, natural gas is expected to play a far more important role in the near future, as well as help reduce somewhat the demand for crude oil. If the 20th century was the century of oil, it is said that the 21st century will be the century of natural gas.7 Natural gas is increasingly being utilised as a major energy fuel for special core industries such as power, fertilisers and petrochemicals.

India is fast emerging as a major global market for petroleum products. During 1991-96, consumption of petroleum products rose at approximately 6 percent annually, increasing from 57 million tonnes in 1991-92 to 78 million tonnes in 1996-97; during April-September 1997, it reached 41 million tonnes, in comparison to 37.4 million tonnes in the corresponding period the previous year. This is expected to increase even further, to some 7-8 percent in the future. As a result, the demand for petroleum products is officially estimated to increase to 115 million tonnes in 2001-02; 155 million tonnes in 2006-07; and as much as 200 million tonnes in 2010-11 (when it is expected to constitute a slightly lower share of primary energy consumption).8 Another official estimate, however, estimates the rate of demand even higher; to as much as 10 percent or so annually over the next few decades, to exceed 270 million tonnes by 2020.9 In this respect, by the early part of the next century, India would become the third largest consumer of petroleum products in the world, after the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia; followed by France and the UK.10 Despite such rates of growth, per capita energy consumption in India is projected to continue to remain low; at present it is approximately 87 kg. of oil equivalent (kgoe) in comparison to the world average of 900 kgoe.

Amongst petroleum products, middle distillates account for the largest share of consumption in India—just over 60 percent; this is followed by the heavy ends (just over 20 percent) and the light distillates (just under 20 percent). In view of the growing importance of the transportation sector in the Indian economy, high speed diesel oil accounts for the single largest petroleum product (over 40 percent from 1992-93), followed by kerosene and furnace oil.11 High Aromatic Naphtha (HAN) is the only petroleum product that the country does not import.

Insufficient Production

Offshore Resources: Crude Oil and Natural Gas

The discovery of crude oil and natural gas off the west coast in the Arabian Sea in 1974 dramatically changed the pattern of domestic production. Within five years, in 1979-80, offshore oil constituted over a third of total production, over half by 1982-83, and over two-thirds in 1986-87.12 Since then offshore oil has stabilised at just under two-thirds of total production; in 1996-97 it accounted for 21.15 million tonnes, some 64 percent of total domestic production of 32.89 million tonnes. During April-October 1997, the total production of crude oil was 19.76 million tonnes. The reduction in offshore oil for most of the 1990s has been due largely to mis-management of reserves through over-production and unscientific methods of exploitation.13 Meanwhile, since 1987-88, offshore natural gas has constituted over 70 percent of total producton; in 1996-97, it accounted for 16.72 billion cubic metres (bcm), approximately 73 percent of the total gross production of 22.90 bcm.

The most important offshore oil and natural gas area is located in the Arabian Sea, some 110-200 km north-west of Mumbai. This comprises the fields of Bombay High, Heera, Panna and South Bassein; three new fields, Neelam, Bombay L-II and Bombay L-III began production only in mid-1994. Crude oil and natural gas from western offshore areas are extracted by 173 platforms and transported to shore through 49 submarine pipelines, the longest of which runs for a distance of 203 km.

At present, only two offshore oil and natural gas areas are located in the Bay of Bengal, off the east coast. These are the Ravva field in the Krishna-Godavari basin, south-west of Vishakapatnam, and the PY-1, PY-3 and KH-3 fields in the Kaveri basin, south of Chennai. These two areas, however, constitute a miniscule proportion (less than 5 percent) of total offshore production. The area off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal may also possess the largest reserves of Coal-Bed Methane (CBM) in the country; a government agency is presently testing the seabed 900 metres below the sea.14 ONGC has already successfully extracted CBM gas onshore at a depth of 500 to 700 metres from an exploratory well at the Jharia coal fields in Bihar.

Growing Imports: Crude Oil

India's dependence on primary energy imports at present is limited to coal and crude oil. As only minimal amounts of superior grade coal are imported into the country (from Australia and New Zealand), concern rests on the import of crude oil. This has been increasing over the past few years in relation to domestic production. Imports of crude oil exceeded domestic production for the first time in 1992-93, when they constituted 52 percent of total demand. This took place in 1993-94, and then again in 1996-97, when imports constituted just over 50 percent of total demand. Moreover, it has been estimated that by the year 2010-11, as much as 73 percent of India's demand for oil and gas annually will be met by imports.15

In order to meet the requirement of petroleum products by the year 2010-11, it is estimated that India would require recoverable oil reserves of approximately 2.3-3 billion tonnes. Currently, its proven recoverable reserves of crude oil and natural gas are only 0.76 and 0.71 billion tonnes. But this is due largely to the limited exploration of India's sedimentary basins. Of its 26 offshore (380,000 sq. km) and onshore (1,340,000 sq. km) basins, less than a quarter have been explored; in addition, the average of 11 exploratory wells per 10,000 sq. km. compares poorly to the world average of 100 wells. During the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-97) aproximately 165 million tonnes of recoverable reserves were added, although the target was 330 million tonnes. The projections for the Ninth and the Tenth Plans are not expected to alter dramatically, unless giant oil fields are found in deeper water offshore.16 However, it has been estimated that India's sedimentary basins contain as much as 30 billion tonnes of hydrocarbon reserves, although some of them may be of low prospectivity.17

Government Policies

As a result, dramatic reforms in the hydrocarbons sector are being undertaken; these include the participation of the private sector, both Indian and foreign, in upstream and downstream activites (till late 1997, contracts for 30 medium and small discovered fields and 35 exploration blocks had been approved, with 18 of the former signed); the enunciation of the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP), which attempts to broaden the extent of participation (the ONGC having shortlisted 12 foreign oil majors for deep sea exploration); and the phased dismantling (finally) of the Administered Price Mechanism (APM). The APM, the cost-plus formula for oil pricing, is to be phased out over a period of five years from 1998, and replaced by a realistic Market Determined Price Mechanism (MDPM). These reforms are aimed at the gradual decontrol of the hydrocarbons sector, in order to overcome internal financial limitations for exploration and production, and enhance domestic production, thereby reducing dependency on imports. It has been oficially estimated that the required levels of exploration and production would necessitate investments in the range of Rs. 593,000 crore (US $ 150 billion) in the next 15 years.

New Imports: Natural Gas

Natural gas is seen as an increasingly important source of energy for the country. Not only is it economical and clean (absence of sulphur dioxide, and reduction of nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide), it is critical for certain core industries. Although India has never imported natural gas before, this is expected to begin early in the next decade; transported aboard ships (in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas/LNG) in the short term, and via pipelines (a mix of submarine and onshore) in the long term. This is also an attempt to enhance energy security by diversifying the sources and nature of supply. In this respect, in May 1997, a new company, Petronet LNG Limited, was formed—a joint venture of the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL), ONGC, IOL, and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL).

In 1996-97, domestic production of natural gas was nearly 23 bcm, whereas demand was estimated at 30 bcm. By 2000-01, the growth in demand is estimated to reach 55 bcm, whereas supply is projected to be only 28 bcm. By 2005, demand is expected to increase further to nearly 75 bcm.18

In order to import LNG, six terminals are to be set up near ports, including three in the province of Gujarat on the west coast (Pipavav, Hazira and Dahej), and one in the province of Tamilnadu on the east coast (Ennore). The first phase of the project envisages the establishment of three LNG terminals, with an annual capacity of 2.5 million tonnes each, to expand to 5 million tonnes each. At the present time, only 30 import terminals are in operation worldwide (with half in Japan), four are under construction, and over 30 new terminals are being planned. In comparison, there are, at present, 11 export terminals in operation worldwide, with four under construction, and 20 planned.19

International consortiums, including oil and gas majors such as Enron, Royal Dutch/Shell, British Gas and Elf, have bid for the construction of these terminals, and storage and regasification facilities. However, the implementation of these plans will take a minimum of five years, and will necessitate an estimated investment of Rs.39,500 crore (US $10 billion) for two terminals alone.20 Meanwhile, 17 proposals were received from oil multinationals to supply LNG; of these, 7 have been shortlisted, including Royal Dutch/Shell.

The import of natural gas from Oman and Iran through submarine and onshore pipelines is being considered at present, although both proposals have run into problems. These pipelines are projected to supply 20 bcm and 27 bcm of natural gas respectively. Technical (laying pipelines at a depth of 3.5 km) and financial problems (project costs rising to over US $7 billion), along with the prospect of insufficient reserves, have stymied progress on the India-Oman project.21 Meanwhile, the Iran-India project, with pipelines routed either on the seabed or overland via Pakistan, is uncertain, in view of Pakistan's refusal to grant unambiguous access to its territory (both maritime and land). The extension of such a pipeline across India to the states of South-East Asia has also been proposed.22 An overland gas pipeline, linking Bangladesh to India, is being planned by the American Unocal Corporation, as part of its South Asia Integrated Gas (SAIG) project. Unocal also plans to set up a US $2 billion integrated pipeline connecting Myanmar to the gas fields of Bangladesh, enroute to Haldia (India). In a reverse energy flow, Bangladesh would be fed with natural gas from the fields of Tripura (India).23

Meanwhile, the "great game" is once again being played in the Caspian Sea basin/Central Asia, this time over access to energy and transit facilities. The construction of a US $3.5 billion oil and gas pipeline overland from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, via Afghanistan, is to take place; carried out by Unocal, in association with Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia and Gazprom of Russia.24 The Taliban militants of Afghanistan have apparently agreed to this project. At the same time, Iran is also competing to provide the critical communication links between the Central Asian states and Europe/the Indian Ocean. A US $2.5 billion pipeline is being planned to transport natural gas onshore from Turkmenistan to Turkey, via northern Iran.

Financial Implications

Increasing dependence on the imports of crude oil and natural gas in the near future will clearly have a major impact on the fiscal balance of the country, especially in the event of any sudden or steep rise in prices. During the 1973-74 oil crisis, India's import bill rose by over 50 percent in the first year. The 1979-80 crisis in West Asia, meanwhile, imposed tremendous pressure on the country's balance of payments. The current account deficit also increased from 0.2 percent in 1979-80 to 1.5 percent in 1981-82. During the Gulf war (1990-91), for example, the net value of the import of oil that year rose by 50 percent, and that of petroleum products by as much as 72 percent to Rs. 11,000 crore (US $3.5 billion). The latter increase accounted for as much as a third of total export earnings for the year. Moreover, in 1995-96, the import of crude oil and petroleum products was valued at Rs. 24,000 crore (US $6.6 billion). In 1996-97, this figure rose to over Rs. 34,000 crore (US $9.4 billion); in 1997-98, this is expected to further increase to over Rs. 43,450 crore (US $11 billion).25


At present, India is wholly dependent on shipping to transport energy resources from abroad. This is not surprising, since over 97 percent of the country's external trade by volume is carried aboard merchant ships, both Indian and foreign. In 1996-97, this accounted for over 33 million tonnes of crude oil. The bulk of these imports emanate from West Asia, and are transported through the Straits of Hormuz and across the Arabian Sea to ports in western India. It is, therefore, not surprising to note that India's trade with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has increased considerably over the years, from less than 8 percent in 1970-71 to just over 21percent in 1994-95, constituting over a fifth of India's total trade in terms of value.26

As a result, considerable attention remains focussed on the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The security of shipping, from both military and non-military threats, is critical for the economic growth and political stability of the country. This is especially important as the coast line of Pakistan, a country with which India has adversarial relations, and has fought three wars, lies astride the major SLOCs from West Asia to the western part of India. Moreover, India's dependence on West Asia for its energy resources is expected to grow in the future, in view of the vast reserves of crude oil and natural gas present in the region.

Notwithstanding dependence on external trade, especially imports of crude oil, on shipping, the Indian shipping industry is beset with problems. The strength of its merchant marine fleet in January 1997 was only 484 ships (for both coastal and overseas trade), with a total of just over 7 million Gross Registered Tonnes (GRT).27 In effect, it has taken two decades for Indian shipping to expand by 2 million GRT to cross the 7 million GRT mark for the first time. This is less than 1.5 percent of total world tonnage. In order to alleviate this situation, fiscal incentives are desperately required, as is increased investment. The Ninth Five-Year Plan of the country (1997-2002) has fixed a target of 9 million GRT for Indian shipping by 2002. This will require a minimum investment of at least Rs. 16,600 crore (US $4.2 billion) in the next five years. The new shipping policy, to be unveiled shortly, is not expected to bring about a radical change in the fortune of the shipping industry.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the share of external trade carried on Indian bottoms is low. During 1994-95, Indian vessels carried only 29 percent of the country's total sea-borne cargo; a substantial drop from 36 percent two years previously. This comprised 17 percent of bulk carrier and 9 percent of liner traffic. In terms of Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), however, the figure was higher, for obvious security reasons; but still not at a comfortable level. This comprised some 54 percent of total POL imports annually.28 To date, India does not possess any LNG tankers. The planned import of LNG aboard ships, therefore, will be wholly dependent on foreign shipping for the first few years.

Notwithstanding proposals to import natural gas through pipelines in the long-term, the dominance of shipping in India's external trade is expected to continue. The share of energy supplies carried aboard ships may be affected in the long-term, if the projects are finally implemented, and natural gas flows unhampered. At the moment, this does not seem possible in the short or medium-term, for technical, financial and political reasons. In any case, this will not affect dependence on imports of crude oil aboard oil tankers, although the extent of the imports may vary somewhat.

The existing port structure in India is also insufficient to effectively handle annual increases in ship-borne trade. Most of India's 11 major ports are in dire need of expansion, and require considerable financial investment. The Average Ship Turn Around (ASTA) period remains high, at 8.5 days in 1995-96. Meanwhile, the Average Ship Berth Output (ASBO) increased slightly to just over 4,000 tonnes the same year.29


In view of these assessments, it is clear that an energy security policy for India (in the case of crude oil and natural gas alone) would involve the following aspects of the country's economic, foreign, and defence policies:


It is imperative that the momentum of reforms in the hydrocarbons sector continues. Although recent policy initiatives such as the NELP and the dismantling of the APM by 2003, clearly provide considerable financial, and equally important, psychological benefits, there is much more that needs to be done to fully decontrol this sector. Only in this way will the level of financial investment required (for exploration and production) be achieved. As it is quite clear that this cannot be met from internal resources alone, the bulk of the investment is expected to come from abroad. The resulting pressure to open up India's economy even further, in hitherto closed areas, cannot be ignored, and will most likely create its own tensions. These would need to be overcome in the best possible manner, with minimum cost to the country. In addition, in order to encourage, as well as utilise, a substantial increase in investment, India would need to strengthen its infrastructure and core capabilities; this in turn leads to its own catch-22 situation, whereby foreign investment is required to do just this!

New initiatives also need to be developed and undertaken in a systematic manner. It is important, for example, that the oil and gas PSEs become internationally competitive, to undertake exploration and production efforts worldwide, in order to maximise their equity oil globally.30 This would maximise India's share in global equity oil, and provide a secure supply to the refining sector, thereby enhancing the country's energy security. In this endeavour, ONGC's global exploration wing, ONGC-Videsh, has entered into production sharing contracts in offshore Vietnam, along with other foreign companies, and has stakes in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. It is presently focussing on the exploration of the 15,000 sq. km, field at the Pavladar Basin in Kazakhstan, possibly to be carried out jointly with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). In addition, ONGC needs to strengthen its R&D activities, and concentrate increasingly on unexplored areas, such as CBMs, deep water, satellite and marginal fields, as well as gas hydrates.31


In view of India's increasing dependence on West Asia for crude oil and natural gas (via LNG tankers and/or pipelines) in the future, its foreign policy needs to take a much closer look at the complex interplay of geo-politics and geo-economics in the area. The importance of the "freedom of navigation" needs to be stressed, along with the sovereign rights of some of the littoral states of the region. An effective diplomatic response to any military manoeuvres in the area needs to be developed, rather than an ad hoc approach at the last minute. The stakes for India's energy security are too high for ad hocism in policy initiatives.


Pakistan's strategic location astride the SLOCs to West Asia will necessitate sufficient naval and air capabilities to ensure the security of crude oil and natural gas to India. This will clearly not be effective in the absence of a limited "sea control" capability, simply because it is not possible to defend shipping against threats from the air by submarines and the limited anti-air capabilities aboard surface ships. Indian submarines alone may only be able to deny parts of the sea to the Pakistani Navy, they will not be able to control (defend) movements (shipping) on the surface of the sea. The provision of carrier air capability, therefore, is a necessity, in order to seriously ensure the security of SLOCs in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, critical to India.

In addition, it is imperative that a realistic position be adopted vis-a-vis the strong American naval presence in the Persian Gulf and the western part of the Indian Ocean. It is clearly in the interests of both the United States and India to keep the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean secure and safe.



1. The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (1997), p.1. The other four countries are China, Indonesia, Brazil and Russia.

2. See Ashley Tellis, Stability in South Asia, RAND Report, 1997, pp.37 and 75. The other Asia-Pacific countries amongst the top 15 economies in the world in the year 2020 are projected to be Indonesia (5), South Korea (7), Thailand (8), and Taiwan(10).

3. "Energy for 90s and Beyond: Prospects, Reality and Challenges", Third Report, Standing Committee on Energy (1993-94), Tenth Lok Sabha, March 1994, p.ix.

4. Eighth Five-Year Plan 1992-97, vol.2, Sectoral Programmes of Development, Planning Commission, Government of India, 1992, p.163, and The Economic Survey 1995-96, Government of India, 1996, pp.S 42-46.

5. A. Bhattacharyya, "Liquid Fuel Availability and Associated Risk Assessment for IPPs (Independent Power Producers) in India", unpublished paper presented at a conference on "Mitigating Risks in Power Projects in India," New Delhi, July 17-18, 1997.

6. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, "Indian Ocean, Oil and Security", Strategic Analysis, November 1992, p.705.

7. Vijay L. Kelkar, "India's Oil Policy for the Next Century", unpublished paper, The Third Lovraj Kumar Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, August 26, 1996, p.5.

8. Ibid., and TERI Energy Data Directory Yearbook 1997/98 (1997), p.2.

9. n. 7, p.14.

10. Ibid.

11. TERI Energy Data Directory Yearbook 1996/97 (1996), p.71.

12. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power and Indian Security (1995), p.89.

13. Shebonti Ray Dadwal, "India's Energy Situation", Strategic Analysis, June 1997, pp.376 and 380.

14. The Pioneer, September 12, 1997.

15. Website of Bharat Petroleum, a major Indian PSE, on the internet; at http:// www. bharatpetroleum, com

16. n. 7, p.15

17. Deepak Mehta, "New Licensing Round Reactivates Interest in Exploration", Petroleum Economist, April 1997, p.4.

18. Special Correspondent, "Natural Gas: Imports to Meet Supply Gap", The Hindu Survey of Indian Industry; 1997 (1997), p.161.

19. n. 5.

20. Ibid.

21. See Narsi Ghorban, "Middle East Natural Gas Pipeline Projects: Myth and Reality", The Iranian Journal of International Affaris, Fall 1996, p.649.

22. Aurangzeb Z. Khan, "India and Pakistan: Bilateral Cooperation in the Energy Sector", Stimson Centre Report, 1997, p. 93.

23. The Economic Times, December 9, 1997, p.15.

24. C. Raja Mohan, "Geo-polities and Energy Security", Strategic Analysis, December 1996, p. 1274.

25. For further details, see Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "Energy Security and Sea Lanes", in Jasjit Singh ed., Bridges Across the Indian Ocean, (1997), pp. 156, and 158-59.

26. The Economic Survey 1995-96, Government of India, 1996, p.S-89.

27. Rear-Admiral (Retd.) Krishan Dev, "Indian Shipping in the Global Context", Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, July 1997 p. 212.

28. Government of India, Economic Survey 1996-97 (1997), p. 175.

29. Ibid., p. 177

30. n. 7, p. 19.

31. n. 15.