Countering Transnational Terrorism
Tara Kartha, Research Fellow, IDSA
The spectre of transnational terrorism has risen from a relatively peripheral issue in the 1980's to one of the foremost security challenges for the country. No more can we view the debate of terrorism from the sidelines, or indeed take postures that were more in line with our foreign policy objectives. Today the threat has hit home, and has been increasing in scope and lethality from the late 1980's .
The term "transnational terrorism" is indicative of the shifts and changes that have been attendant on terrorism itself. Terrorism is no longer a largely" domestic "phenomenon, where a few disgruntled actors espousing leftist (or capitalist ambitions) committed acts of violence that were primarily aimed at gaining world publicity and showing the state in a bad light. The aphorism that "terrorists want a lot of publicity, and not a lot of people dead" caps in a nutshell the typical operating patterns of the past. Groups avoided targeting patterns that would earn them the hostility of the populace, and indeed did everything to ensure that the cause and objectives they upheld had a degree of legitimacy and sympathy among them. By and large, terrorist groups had clear political ends, and their patrons were known, as well as their affiliations. Terrorism was thus largely committed to serve political ends and evolved and grew as a separate activity of violence, distinct from war or conflict. It was true that terrorists did take shelter in other states, and that many did also acquire funding from the usual states—primarily the Soviet Union, Libya or later Iran.
Today however, not only are terrorists operating at a vastly more lethal level than their predecessors—in that each terrorist attack causes far more casualties than before—but are organised along far more structured lines in large hierarchical groups, and most pertinent to this paper, depend almost entirely on transnational sources for their weapons, funding and even fighters. Ideology itself is transnational, with religion taking the place of Marxist/Leninist doctrines. This is not just an aspect that is seen in the Indo-Pakistani context but holds true for terrorism in Central Asian countries, the United States, and parts of Europe. To elucidate this, all of the groups operating inside India, Afghanistan, China or Central Asia are armed with weapons that have not been produced within that particular country. Most have mercenaries within their ranks, and all are funded in part by that most transnational of operations—drug trafficking. The transnational aspects emerge more clearly when considering the new aspects of terrorism that are apparent across the world, and in Southern Asia in particular.
Scope of this study
While taking the larger picture into account, this paper however concentrates on the Indian experience, with the objective of outlining possible strategies for countering what is essentially a major security threat to this country.
At the outset, it needs to be clarified that this paper makes a differentiation between counter-terrorism as a set of operational strategies against terrorists and their supporting structures, and the strategies that are followed by a country to deal with terrorism as a phenomenon. In effect, counter-terrorism is a narrower field dealing primarily with intelligence activities, tactics on the ground, and sabotaging and infiltration of terrorist groupings, selected targeting of such figures and such operations that are associated with covert activities by a state to deny a terrorist his activities. This is a field that is usually a police/paramilitary activity. Strategies of countering terrorism however deal with a broader canvas—foreign policy, domestic laws, overall national posture, and sometimes military force—all of which should ideally be aimed at buttressing the activities of counter-terrorism. In the US for instance, while the police and FBI deal with the ramifications and outlines of the actual terrorist act (when it is within the US), the armed forces may be used to define the overall policy that the US adopts against terrorism. This is apparent in the air strikes on training camps in Afghanistan in the present, and the bombing of Tripoli in the past. In India however, the line between these two activities—once clear in the past—is increasingly becoming blurred, with the military rather than the police more and more involved in the business of daily counter-terrorism. This is the direct result of the merging of terrorism, militancy and war. This paper deals only with the strategies of countering terrorism, not the tactics on the ground.
Before going into the possible strategies that might be used to counter transnational terrorism, it would be useful to provide a broad picture of terrorism as it exists today, narrowing down to a focus on the main aspects of this phenomenon in India. This overall picture will provide the main entry points for considering strategies of countering this phenomenon.
l Terrorism now primarily runs on the wheels of radical religious belief. Whereas in 1968 none of the 11 identifiable terrorist groups were religious, their number increased to seven by 1980 and six times that number by 1992.1 Further, empirical data generated, reveals that 64 out of a total of 96 active terrorist groups are clearly identifiable as being religiously motivated, even if the doctrine and theology that they swear by is violently extremist, and far from actual precepts.2
l The fact emerges that 14 have ex-mojahideen among their ranks, and 17 are based or closely involved with Pakistan (this last figure is a conservative estimate—if even transitory links are taken, this rises to more than 21) Thus the centre of gravity of terrorism has moved much closer to our borders.
l Nearly all Asian groups are involved with the trafficking of narcotics. The cultivation base remains in Southern Asia, while the trafficking routes move through Asia and into Europe and the United States. This naturally means a degree of cooperation between the groups involved—the Taliban for instance—with mafia cartels in Russia and Central Asia, Europe and beyond.
l The "tools of terror"—the automatic weapons, grenades and explosives—are trafficked largely in the opposite direction. That is, while narcotics trade is "east to west" the weapons flow in from the industrialised countries of the north through and to the developing countries of the south. This again means a level of cooperation between ( corrupt) state and non state actors within these countries. An additional source is the huge international black market, that can offer a variety of weapons—from a tank to an anti-aircraft gun. One indicator of this plenitude is the estimated 500 million weapons that are said to be out of government hands, and the roughly 67 thousand kilograms of explosives that have been seized in India.3
Not surprisingly, given the above scenario, terrorist acts are far more lethal than before. Though the number of attacks have decreased, the relative jump in the numbers dead in each incident testifies to the fact that the motto for today's terrorist is "the more dead the better".4 Empirical data also points to the fact that religious groups/cults have come closest to taking the step towards WMD (weapons of mass destruction). In the past, such acts included attempts to poison the water supplies of major American urban centres, dispersing toxic chemicals through ventilation systems, and in Japan, the actual use of chemicals to poison commuters. It appears that the ideology that sustains such religious groups/cults considers the elimination of peoples who are "unholy" or alien to their belief systems as not just pardonable, but desirable.
Nearly all such groups, including the more established ones like the Taliban, operate cheek by jowl with transnational criminal groups (gun runners, narcotics traffickers and smugglers of more conventional goods). This enables them to claim that they receive no state support, but rely on their "religious brethren". Linked to this is the fact that their funding networks are far flung and difficult to trace (For instance, London is known to be a primary meeting point for groups of various persuasions). This further allows them to claim an "independent" status, and also persuade religious charities and private individuals to contribute to their just cause.
Terrorism—the specific challenge to India
From this overall aspect of terrorism world wide is the question as to what are the specific aspects that are to be considered when evaluating terrorism in India .
While terrorism has generally been seen as a form of warfare by other means5 even in the past, it is far more focussed in the case of India, merging with near regular war, with the objectives as: seizing of territory, a tying down of the armed forces, and overall destabilisation. Simply put, while the objectives are "conventional" the methodology is not. This was most apparent in Kargil, where a group of regulars, (the Pakistani Northern Light Infantry) tried to project themselves as being irregulars, using tactics and practises (including mutilation of the dead) that are more in tune with irregular war.
In India, terrorism has indeed waxed and waned, with violence beginning in the 1980's as sporadic acts of terrorism, rising to a full fledged militancy, and then degenerating into terrorism again in the late 1990's. The "fighters" of this war in all its different phases are both the irregulars ( the religious extremists) and the regular Pakistani army. When considering the main aspects of terrorism in India it is useful to flag the following points:
l The terrorists face no lack of weapons or ammunition. Both appear to be in plenty, (ironically it is the regular army which is faced with depletions) with the source being both Afghanistan and Pakistani army stocks.
l The so called " world community " has been remarkably ambivalent on the issue of Pakistan sponsored terrorism, in spite of clear proof of her involvement.
l The audacity of attacks in Kashmir has shown a marked increase after Kargil.
l Militancy and terrorism is not limited to Kashmir and the Northeast but has spread its tentacles into other parts of the country.
l Terrorist groups and their sponsors use the infrastructure of all our neighbours, with extremist groups sometimes forging political alliances with like—minded groups and substate actors in these countries. Nepal has become a major transit area for militants and terrorists from both the Northeast, Punjab and Kashmir (as well as criminal elements from the rest of the country) . Myanmar is also a transit area for weapons and militants along its coastline.
l All these states (unlike in the past) now face a fall out in terms of related internal security problems—Nepal faces increasingly strident Maoist insurgency, Bangladesh has seen a rising spate of armed student and political violence, even as elements of radical extremism make their presence felt. Bhutan has seen a nexus between militant groups and refugees from Nepal. India has also seen a severe fall out in terms of internal security.
l Except for Pakistan, few have the resources to combat terrorism even if they should wish to do so .
All of the above have immense implications when considering strategies for countering terrorism. A definiton that might emerge is that terrorism today, has changed from being a vehicle of intrastate violence to a transnational phenomenon, using mercenaries, organised crime cartels, sophisticated weaponry and modern communications to operate from, through and into various countries. It seeks to acquire the legitimacy of religion or ethnic identity, and its aim is not just the "liberation" of a given area, but apparently also the triumph of their particular ideology.
Given the above realities, it is clear that terrorism has to be fought along several fronts, with different tools and by adopting different postures. Firstly the posture. Terrorism can never be fought defensively at the strategic level. Thus we have to be able to demonstrate our determination to resist terrorism by all means, as well as be prepared to deal with the problem in the long term. This projection is not for the benefit of Pakistan alone but—given the linkages noted above—to the world at large and our neighbours in particular.
A second prong rises from the facts related above—that given the realities of the situation we have to cooperate as much as possible with our neighbours, or at any rate persuade them to cooperate with us in dealing with terrorism. A third point which emerges is that international action is also required to buttress our efforts, and to prevent anti-terrorism measures being seen as the machinations of a large neighbour.
That terrorism is both an internal and external issue then forces on us the simple yet difficult to implement assertion—that terrorism can only be dealt with by a strong bonding in perception and action between the bodies dealing with both aspects of security—the defence, foreign and home ministries. Thus the specific tools required to deal with terrorism will encompass these different arms of the government with weightage to each depending on a given situation. These are dealt with below in terms of overall strategies to be adopted.
Strategies for Countering Terrorism
Once we decide that terrorism is a form of warfare with both internal and external aspects and using all the tools at our disposal, and with a clear political objective then we need to :
(a) Evaluate and constantly monitor the evolving political and increasingly economic context within which this warfare is being waged. It has been seen that terrorism rises and falls depending on the political situation in Pakistan, as well as that of some of our neighbours. (Academic analysis, intelligence analysis).
(b) Understand its larger purpose and the audience that it seeks to address. (Diplomatic initiatives).
(c) Accept that in a climate where military action is increasingly acquiring international near legitimacy, the arguments for a "military solution" will be considerable. (Armed Forces assessments).
(d) Address the realities that underpin terrorism—the huge stocks of weapons, the trafficking of narcotics, and the large reserve base of "religious" mercenaries which has clear extra regional inputs and global dimensions. (International initiatives).
(e) Accept that in combating and coping with terrorism a considerable domestic and international consensus will have to be built up, which will present difficulties.( Media management).
Ideally counter terrorism strategies therefore require action at national, regional and international levels.
Evaluation of the political context of terrorism: The possibilities for early warning
Terrorism—especially state sponsored terrorism—does not obviously exist in a vacuum, but arises out of the perceptions of a state (or group) that it can attain its objectives through this form of warfare. Careful cost benefit calculations are required before terrorism can be launched, where the concerned state feels that it can "get away" with these acts without bringing upon itself unbearable costs or possibilities of reprisals. Such an analysis is even more important (personally) to the men in power, who in Pakistan have had to pay heavily for their mistakes. The internal security perceptions are vital—and not surprisingly common to almost all regimes—thus providing valuable indicators as to the possible "mix" that might result in an explosive situation.
It may be recalled that even before launching the 1965 war, the Pakistani army was noted by analysts to be "gung ho" about the prowess of the Muslim versus the Hindu, as well as extremely upbeat about their "success" in the earlier engagement in the Rann of Kutch.6 This sentiment—as well as Bhutto's advice and the expected mass support that Sheik Abdullah was said to have promised— eventually overrode the compunctions of President Ayub Khan.7 The result was disastrous for Pakistan, but provides clear indications as to some of the factors that leads up to a "war making" decision.
Similar and additional factors are also apparent well before the launching of the proxy war in Kashmir in the 1980's. The proxy " victory" of the Pakistani army in Afghanistan where a superpower was readying for a pull out, the undoubted and massive access to a huge arsenal of light weapons, and the final perception (outlined by the journalist turned Information Minister Mushadid Hussain) that the situation in two of the Indian bordering regions which had historically provided the setting for Pakistan-Indian military conflicts was serious. "In both East Punjab and Kashmir, there is a virtual state of insurgency reinforced by the fact that these are the only two regions in India which have non–Hindu majority populations. …8." Thus the time was felt to be ripe. By 1983, Pakistan was also understood to have accquired a "nuclear capability". This factor together with the internal instability that India was seen to be suffering from would have added to the perception that the balance of power had shifted in Pakistan's favour. With this, the launching of the Third war was almost predictable. Apart from this was the internal pressures faced by the leadership. Benazir Bhutto's overwhelming popularity and her truimphant return to politics did little to assist her in her continuous battle with the ISI, nor did it help her to wrench more power for the executive from a clearly reluctant army. This evolved its own set of dynamics. The internal dimensions are apparent in the comment by a senior politician on Bhutto's enthusiastic embracing of the Kashmiri cause "Kashmir has come to her rescue just as Afghanistan did for Zia".9
However, in the final analysis, the Kashmir issue could do little for Benazir, (as she herself was to admit later). The subsequent administration of Nawaz Sharif however was to fall into the same trap. As militancy waned in the Valley, and Kashmir went off the news (at the international level) , the Army (which had been asking for such action into the Kargil area since the days of Gen Zia ul Haq) was given the go ahead to start the operation."10
While the political factors which led to the Kargil adventure are clearly still in the realm of some uncertainty, yet some pointers can again be gained:11
l Sharif had gathered unprecedented power to himself, and was in the process of attempting to "trim" that of the army. The army had been uncomfortable since 1997 with Sharif's style of decision- making, and was clearly heading for a show down,—a factor which was compounded by attempts to cut down the armed forces' budget. The Kargil victory would have taken care of both, power equations as well as any lessening of funds for the services.
l As before, the armed forces assessment that the Chagai blasts had made conventional war impossible was crucial. Thus the perception may have been that this negated India's previous counter ploy of crossing the international border, leaving the larger country with no choice but to fight it out in her own land (which is what did happen) .
l Again apparent was the perception that a weak caretaker government in India could not act swiftly, and that the Indian Armed Forces were demoralised and overstretched.
l Pakistan's own "vast experience" in Afghanistan had made it extremely strong.
Thus it is apparent that the "indicators " to an incipient attack are really not that different. Equally apparent are the internal and external motivations that have always prompted Pakistan to act. A careful reviewing of the political situation within the historical context would (together with other indicators) prove to be an early warning system that could then set off action aimed at averting a coming incident. This would provide warning at the broad level, which would also allow preparation for further action should the initial efforts fail.
Intelligence : The Need for a Fresh Look at Indicators
The buttressing of early warning by actionable intelligence is clearly crucial, since the aim is to prevent the incident rather than to act hastily after it. However, in such situations of continuous proxy war, the "indicators" that intelligence at the ground level is likely to pick up would be considerably repetitive. Considering that the proxy war has been going on for nearly a decade, the reports of infiltration and warning of possible strikes over time would make it difficult in the extreme to home on to which particular situation was in fact volatile. False alarms are part and parcel of intelligence analysis, but if merged closely with the analysis above, the possibility of providing some warning increases considerably.
However, it must be realised that the use of actionable intelligence itself is fraught with difficulties when it is aimed at preventing a terrorist strike. The recent bomb attacks by US aircraft against alleged Sudanese chemical weapons complexes illustrates the problem.12 If intelligence is to be used swiftly, complete secrecy of the source is vital. This in turn means that the public cannot be taken into confidence, until perhaps years later. Secondly, the possibility of such intelligence being either deliberately or accidentally incorrect may lead to disastrous results.
There is a clear need for a single body to be able to gather for itself ALL the intelligence reports available, and then be able to assess and analyse it in the light of sustained political and economic analysis. This tasking of responsibility should ideally be accompanied by periodic threat analysis to different bodies to ensure a degree of transparency. It is vital to take the public and the press into confidence, (the CIA reports made public serve a precise purpose) which serves to immeasurably assist the government of the day to garner support for its foreign policy.
Given that terrorists acquire much of their life-blood from exposure through media, the importance of this aspect cannot be overemphasised. Given that most Indians tend to distrust anything put about by the government, the media plays a crucial role. So far the media has "analysed" without a true picture of the overall problem—a lack that has been exacerbated by the sheer paucity of clear information. That media members are not specialists needs to be remembered, which in turn makes them open to disinformation campaigns that may cause immense harm. Skilful use of the media has time and again assisted the acceptance of foreign policy. In this regard note the near unanimous condemnation of the Serbs in the war in former Yugoslavia, where few had bothered to go into the nitty gritty of separation.
However one crucial question has to be addressed before media management is set in place—which is the direction and the image that the country wishes to project. Such a decision flows out of a realistic examination of what we are capable of, and the objectives that we seek in the light of capability. For instance there is little point in projecting ourselves as a "hard state" (as against a soft state willing to absorb terrorism) if we do not have the requisite economic, political and military clout as well as consensus vis-a-vis a particular situation.
Creating the Organisation
All of the options considered above clearly demand an organisational set up which, considering that the threat and dangers of terrorism fall upon the civilians, may be headed by a team drawn from the CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) the IB (Intelligence Bureau), MI (Military Intelligence), MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) and other bodies that would be called in for consultations. At another level, there are other bodies which could function directly under the NSC—for instance a dedicated terrorism research desk as part of the secretariat—which would liase closely with home and external affairs ministries. The objective is to provide for quick action, and whatever be the mode of organisation (and its structure) has to be tailored to do this. A traditional hierarchical pyramid structure will not suffice, since it would remain hostage to diverse interests.
Given that this country has been involved in anti-militancy operations since its very inception (with a respite in the 1980's) the problem of continuous military involvement in internal security duties has become a paramount problem. This is especially so because we are on the path of mulling over how to reduce the manpower while upgrading our overall capabilities.
So far we have adopted a purely defensive and reactive posture to militancy, which means flooding an area with troops, use of specialised anti-terrorism laws, and the recent welcome move to cooperate and involve the police forces in anti-terrorism. Ideally, terrorism should be treated as a criminal activity requiring police action, rather than military. However, the basic problem is that the terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir were, and still are, vastly better equipped than the police. The arming of the police with similar weapons has been a difficult choice, and not one that can be followed across the board (note here that even forest officials in Assam, police in Andhra Pradesh, and others, have with some justification been asking for automatic weapons).
Post-Kargil India has had to make the difficult decision of how to cope with terrorism that is clearly on the rise, threatening to flare into conventional war at the enemy's choosing. The debate invariably has turned towards a need for more proactive action to "punish" the state rather than the myriad actors, with the clear understanding that it is the state that is ultimately accountable. In other words, this approach rejects the theory that non state actors are outside the "control" of the state. The trends of proactive counter terrorism strategy world wide has emerged along these lines :
— Unilateral action ( air/land) against terrorist sites /states ( US , Israel, Turkey, Russia, Uzbekistan,)
— Regional consensus on action ( SADEC,13 NATO, CIS)
— Use of air power or "cruise missile diplomacy" (US, NATO, Turkey, Russia)
— Creation of defensive zones/ hot pursuit/ sustained action in neighbouring countries' territory ( Uzbekistan, Israel, Turkey)
— Targeting of the leadership of a state ( US, Russia)
We now consider these and other responses in terms of the peculiar situation faced by this country. It is as well to note here that military action would only follow after all other options have been reviewed, and a strong domestic consensus ensured, as well as prior diplomatic moves that have already projected the issue of terrorism as one where the country is now prepared to retaliate. These options are briefly contextualised below.
The Use of Force- Reprisals
Given that terrorist camps are usually situated near the border of a conflict area, the temptation to go in for reprisals strikes (air) is considerable. The trend set in place by the US, (which indeed has been following such a proactive policy since 1984) and now by Russia ( which portrays itself as emulating the US in Chechnya) are projected as part of a "just war" against "evil" elements . Reprisals, defined as "coercive measures directed by a state against another state in response to (or "in retaliation for") illegal acts of the latter for the purpose of obtaining, either directly or indirectly, reparation or satisfaction of the illegal act" are actually recognised under international law,14 except that it places certain restrictions on it. The party responding with reprisals may not use excessive force, and may use it as the last resort after all other peaceful means have failed.
The principle of proportionality however is difficult to calculate, and countries like Israel and the US are unwilling to let a period of time go by to allow "redressal" (which may take years) but prefer the psychological value of an immediate and overwhelming show of force. Arguments against such a policy revolve round the contention that such strikes in terrorism merely increase discontent, and reinforce the terrorist cause ( as in Israeli attacks against the Hezbollah in Lebanon). More to the point is the fact that this option is available to states with a preponderant military capability (either its own or as part of an alliance) vis a vis the enemy. Israel was able to carry on with this policy also due to disunity among Arab nations as well as the US support in extreme emergencies.15
This is often justified on the grounds that the UN Charter protects the rights of a state to self defense. It is also undoubtedly a fact that preventing death and destruction is far more desirable than any number of strikes and "lessons learnt" after a strike. Preemption does not always mean air strikes. In fact many a quiet success story is built around rendering potential terrorist strikes ineffective. The crucial input in this is actionable intelligence, and early warning. The latter especially requires close and constant study (academic) and surveillance (intelligence) of terrorist groupings and their patrons as described at the beginning of this paper.
Such zones have been either formal or informal arrangements. The case of the security zone declared by Israel in Lebanon is one which is aimed at protecting Israeli territory from terrorist strikes. However, this was circumvented by the Hamas by using rockets with longer range (Katyushas), leading again to air strikes by the Israeli air force against alleged terrorist centres. However the domestic and international costs of retaining the security zone have led to a serious review of this policy. What is worth noting is that this publicised change of policy is linked to a complete stoppage of terrorism assistance by other countries like Syria. Thus there is a distinct "land for peace" motive here. An example of an "informal zone" is that supported by Uzbekistan in Afghanistan through General Dostum. This also proved to be a costly enterprise, and the general himself became something of a loose cannon with no clear interests other than those aimed at self-preservation. At another level, Turkey has crossed over into Iraq several times, even as NATO aircraft patrol a "no fly zone". However, again Turkey's success in battling terrorism (for the moment) has come primarily through the single minded determination the administration has shown in capturing Abdullah Ocalan—the leader of the Party of Kurdish Kurdistan (PKK), rather than her activities in the security zone itself. However, all these cases did serve to underline the seriousness of the state in combating the terrorist threat. In other words these were carefully assessed "hard options" that the state chose to exercise.
Can India consider military action? More to the point, would such an action be discouraging or encouraging to terrorism in the long term? Some facts need to be faced. So far it has been apparent (in Bosnia, Kosovo, and to an extent in South Africa) that non state actors are not so "out of control" as is made out to be by the leadership of states. Given that in Pakistan these actors operate with the express wish of the state since they are in no way impeded in their work, are allowed the use of the infrastructure of Pakistan for their purpose, and are provided shelter there after heinous attacks—the onus for controlling them clearly falls upon the state. This was the message that was sent to President Milosevic by the NATO aircraft (regardless of the rights and wrongs of the situation as a whole)—that the state stood accountable for its actions, covert or otherwise. This is the first "reality" of terrorism in India.
The second reality that has to be faced is that there is no possible "defence " against terrorism. In the light of this, the possibility of an air strike against a terrorist grouping (say in Muridke, the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba) is a possibility that needs to be considered. The air offers the option of precise, graduated response without the possibility of getting bogged down. However it must also be clearly recognised that the immediate response will be an increase in terrorism in the short term. Again it needs to be said, that such an action can only succeed if the principle of overwhelming force is applied. That is, the state applying such action would have a clear and overwhelming military superiority over the other so that the latter is under no illusion that it can in any way benefit from escalating the situation to that of a near war.
The third reality is the nuclearisation of the subcontinent. The fear has been raised that such actions could lead to escalation to a nuclear strike. The possibility that Pakistan will use its highly limited nuclear forces against India for anything less than a threat to its very existence is a remote one. However Pakistan gambles on this uncertainty, while India (with an equally limited arsenal vis-a-vis our other threats) desists from this brinkmanship. The projection of India as a "responsible" nuclear state is one that has larger dimensions than the immediate neighbourhood and is admittedly a good posture. But its benefits are yet to be seen. Deterrence of war (not nuclear strikes) is a part of an overall posture of a strong state. It is unfortunately true that deterrence does not sit well with a posture of giving in to terrorism. Again such decision-making can only be done after a close examination of the results of the Kargil "near war". Did the threat of conventional escalation persuade Pakistan from giving up its very real victories? Was the US involvement more crucial or was it the Indian determination that won the day?
The equally hard option of creating a security zone that could protect vital roads and points from artillery and small arms fire is a tempting one. While it can legitimately be argued that these areas (in Kashmir) are indeed part of India, which had been illegally seized by Pakistan, the costs of maintaining such a zone vis a vis the existing costs of maintaining the status quo would need hard headed calculation (that would include the diplomatic costs). The theory that land can then be bartered for peace (which is in essence what Pakistan is trying to do, only she seeks more territory) is in some ways a sound one, but the problem of getting bogged down in that territory—unable to leave without losing face and unable to stay due to the costs involved is a real one.
Hot pursuit is an option that has regularly been called for by the army personnel. This has however been resisted even against our smaller neighbours, for the fear of increasing anti-India sentiments there, and fuelling discord in SAARC.
The first facet of terrorism that has to be highlighted with regard to our neighbours (including Pakistan at some stage) is that terrorism affects their own internal security. The demand for weapons from India's interior (Northeast states) has led to Cox's Bazaar becoming a major weapons market which ties up with Southeast Asian bazaars. Inevitably, therefore, weapons have been diffused into Bangladesh leading to campus and political violence.16 Fears of an appearance of a "Taliban"—with the backing of the Pakistani intelligence services17 have surfaced as also apprehensions about the large rise of madrassas preaching extremism.18 Similarly, Sri Lanka has faced a series of politically motivated terrorist incidents, while Nepal faces a rising swell of Maoist insurgency that is thought to be linked to the increasing strength of the People's War Group based in India19. It is felt that it is only a matter of time before this group also arms itself. Bhutan faces a similar problem from the groups that shelter in her territory, and threaten to assist anti-monarchical forces there.
Thus the need for cooperation seems to be immense. However politicians on all sides find it difficult to "sell" a cooperative agenda. The Gujral Doctrine and the policies that flowed out of it, have had their share of criticism from bureaucrats who note that all the "cards" in India's hands have been given away unilaterally with no returns (The Treaty on the Sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka December 1996 and the Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty 1996). This criticism is also directed against later initiatives like the Indo-Nepalese Transit Treaty (January 5, 1999) which unlike the past yearly review provide for automatic renewal. While this was accompanied by economic concessions and the like, the expected cooperation in terrorism does not seem to have taken place. Demands for extradition, offers of cooperation and capacity building in terms of their facilities has often been rejected. The SAARC treaty of Terrorism has suffered mainly due to the recalcitrance of Pakistan—who makes the plea that enabling legislation is not necessary since the crimes within the treaty are already seen as criminal. The reality that Pakistan has to be bypassed, by creating a ring of "like minded states" to the east and west, appears to be the only way out.
There is a clear need to push for capacity building at the regional level—in terms of airport immigration security (Nepal), shipping and container monitoring (Bangladesh), joint border management (Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka), and regular police and intelligence training for all these countries. The objective is to make cooperation habitual; therefore joint courses should be extended to all levels including policy-making levels. This aspect of regional cooperation may need a degree of firmness to get our arguments across—with the clear message that the smaller state (especially its ruling party) stands to gain from such (quiet) cooperation rather than otherwise. An example that may be used here is the efforts underway in the US where academic programmes are now aimed at providing Russia with a coherent export control system. Thus the system is built, and cooperation made habitual due to the inherent capabilities of the system itself.
One road which South Asia should ideally follow is that of a Regional Convention that will address all these issues—production, export, import and gun control. The model of an OAS (Organisation of American States) Convention already exists. That model takes (wisely) the line of least resistance, and merely seeks to standardise law making and procedures, while declaring illicit movement of weapons as a crime. Transparency is a key word, and rightly assessing that the security of countries would hardly be threatened by transparency in the area of light weapons, the convention seeks to share import, export and movement data. Such a convention in South Asia should be extended to all those interested in tackling the problem—for instance towards South East Asia. This should also help in acquiring the critical mass for an effective set of norms, and does not require the Convention to wait until all states of South Asia have joined. In short, the Convention should not be allowed to go at the pace of the slowest.
Addressing the audience and understanding the larger purpose
The Pakistani methodology of holding India in a defensive posture, and keeping it in the dock for human rights violations are fairly clear. To a large measure, astute diplomacy, and increased transparency have negated most of these advantages. However, the international audience is still open to suggestions of "self determination" for Kashmiris, and an ethnically divided Valley , which is clearly one of the most dangerous arguments going.
That this theme tends to get taken up again and again at the international level is due to more factors than one, and is dealt with below, but overall we also need to realize that Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism has been ignored by the US and China, who are the largest benefactors of that country. The US has been accused of simply ignoring South Asia and India in particular. That this loss of interest has been China's gain is without doubt. Both may wish to keep India on a destabilized mode, though this is only apparent in the case of China.
However, after the May tests, this interest has clearly increased, and may well be a double-edged sword. In the US the State Department and the Pentagon do not speak with one voice, and the latter clearly still has extremely strong links with the Pakistani military.20 China on the other hand, in the future may find it more difficult to stomach a region that is clearly moving towards the religious right. The question then arises—will these two countries assist or detract in restricting Pakistani forays into terrorism, especially if it is linked to religious extremism? Instead of making this a "bilateral issue" alone—that is in trying to convince these countries of the dangers to themselves, it would be as well to first deal with it on an international framework. Some ongoing moves on the international agenda are given below which would assist in focussing attention on the issue rather than on Pakistan. The issue then is the point made at the beginning of this paper that terrorism is far more lethal than ever before due to its capacity to access huge numbers of weaponry.
Dealing with the tools of terror—the weapons issue
With more than 55 million weapons on the loose, there is a clear case for restricting the present and future proliferation of weapons into the hands of non-state actors. The point here is that the huge proliferation of weapons allows even small states the option of arming dissidents with weapons from a huge international black market. Apart from this, continued proxy arming is made possible due to the same lack of controls on the export and import of firearms. Pakistan regularly argues that militants in India are armed from the weapons infusions into Afghanistan, and that they extend only "moral support". Recall that prior to the 1990's the weapons with terrorists were in their tens and twenties. Today they have access not only to larger numbers but also to an alarming variety of sophisticated weapons including shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons.
The problem of the proliferation of light weapons is one that has come on the Agenda of the UN as well as multilateral organisations like the G-8. Other international bodies like the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) have been trying to evolve a global convention that deals with the criminal aspects of proliferation. The UN Group of Governmental Experts also made a series of recommendations that are aimed at limiting the spread and abuse of the automatic weapons, grenades, explosives, and others that are so prevalent in the world's conflict spots. Regional bodies like the OAS (Organisation of American States) have made illicit trafficking of weapons and explosives a crime, and thus are half way towards limiting the spread of violence. Such a convention in South Asia was proposed by India during the Heads of State meeting at Male, but as expected was brushed aside by Pakistan. It can be expected that Pakistan will continue to be obstructive of such a convention. The possibility of a convention that integrates South Asia with Southeast Asia (which is also suffering considerably from the menace of weapons proliferation) has already been noted. However it is vital that we also selectively back those international initiatives which seek to limit weapons anywhere in the world. The objective is to contribute to the creation of norms and international transparency with allied media attention on illicit transfers.
The range of activities that are presently being considered in this field are too numerous to adequately deal with here. The most important paths along which such controls are evolving are:
l Making marking of weapons mandatory
l Increasing the marking data (to include more than just the serial/lot number) and hiding the precise location of such marking.
l Export controls to prevent the supply of weapons to countries sponsoring terrorism.
l Link donor aid to weapons collection/weapon interdiction/ tight gun laws
l Destruction of weapons in conflict zones
l Weapons exchange programmes
It is worth noting that while the attempts to mop up existing weapons have not been wildly successful, the increased media attention on possible weapons transfers have led to some successes.
Dealing with the failed states
Tied to the problem of limiting the weapons is the issue of vastly over-armed states like Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and others, where a spiral of violence has been let loose, and the efforts of developmental agencies negated by the huge availability of weapons. Apart from this the main threat from these states are:
l They provide the bases for fighters (mercenaries) of various hues who then move into various trouble spots.
l The unchecked growth of narcotics cultivation/trafficking
l The possibility that their territory may be used to launch a CBW or even a nuclear raid on a third country. While it is clear that such acts—especially those involving nuclear terrorism—would mean strong covert state support, nonetheless the responsibility in such acts would be difficult to ascertain or prove, since the facilities and actors would be located far away from the patron state's territory.
It is tragic that those who enthusiastically armed these states, are now notably reluctant to contribute effectively to bringing back some semblance of normalcy to these states—a chaos that is basically engendered by the fact that the region is awash with light weapons, explosives and small arms. Indeed, many of these actors are still engaged in supplying weapons to warring factions adding to the conflagration either for profit (in the case of Ukraine) or for strategic gains (Russia, US, China). In short, peace has never been popular—war is not just interesting copy, but profitable business.
It is interesting to note that African states have managed to put themselves in the forefront of multilateral aid forums that are now acting to retrieve weapons from society and to rebuild devastated societies. This is obviously not just due to their own energies, but also primarily due to the fact that they are important areas for European strategic resources. Additionally one important fact that needs to be recognised, is that much of this initiative is coming from South Africa, who clearly sees the need for a safe neighbourhood to pursue her own goals.
South and Central Asia—especially the latter—are rich in strategic minerals, besides being a "vacuum" which is likely to be filled either by China, Russia, or a combine of NATO nations. The World Bank, and other international agencies are also eager to get into the act—but at the moment few are able to see just how they can do so without completely ignoring their own "rules of engagement". The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is beginning to show interest in stabilising these countries. Central Asian states at present do not have the capacity to combat either the drugs or weapons menace, and therefore are open to destabilisation by these elements allied with hostile powers. Afghanistan is clearly a case for sustained aid, and it may be possible to influence the policy of the Taliban through such targeted aid schemes in areas, which are relatively at peace.
Dealing with mercenaries
It is noteworthy that the illegal status of mercenaries is the one thing that the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention was clear on, and no protection is offered to this kind of transnational fighter. However, the new "just wars" waged in the name of Islam (which itself is portrayed as a transnational ideology) has allowed these so-called "mujahids" to enter other states with impunity. One of the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries is to include this dimension in working groups, commissions and studies on terrorism. He notes with concern that states tend to see the use of mercenaries as verging on the legal, which constitutes a danger to a unified law on the ban on the use of mercenaries. At present the proposed International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries is gathering dust, once again hostage to the short-sighted policies of states. This needs to be revived, given that there is a realisation among Islamic states that they are the most under threat from extremist groups.
Pushing for the stateless terrorist
The treatment meted out to the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan is heartening at least on one point—that no country was willing to give him shelter. The strategy used by Turkey—with the single aim of getting the elusive terrorist leader, showed a readiness to use all tools at its disposal—economic, military, and the awarding of defence contracts. European countries in the end caved in and refused to provide the leader with political asylum. Turkey is far from being an economic or military superpower—but clear prioritisation of terrorism yielded clear results.
In the long run, countries need to realise that it is in their best interests not to shelter terrorists of any hue. Nothing can discourage future aspirants to international terrorism so much as the spectacle of a leader running from pillar to post. This does not mean that countries fighting terrorism can hope to gain a reprieve by violence and counter terrorism alone. Any attempts at redressing genuine grievances (most of which lie at the door of poor governance rather than any desire for ethnic differentiation) has the most rewarding results, even in the short term.
Towards a Global Convention: The need to get an acceptable definition
Finally, the biggest hurdle that any country seeking to deal with terrorism faces is to be able to adequately define exactly who a terrorist is. This definition is important, since around it hinges the subsequent legislation that all states would need to incorporate to have common laws to deal with terrorism. What has been done so far by states wishing to deal with terrorism is to go around the definition and specify in an as exact a terminology as possible, the specific acts that are to be considered terrorist. This has had some success in terms of united action against hijacking (Hague Convention, 1970) aircraft sabotage (Montreal Convention, 1971), and internationally protected persons (New York, 1973) which by making the specific crime punishable among members of the international community, has allowed individual members to enact laws which deal with the curbing of this menace. Enforcement is certain, since major carriers can refuse to fly to areas where such enforcement and prescribed security is not in place.
However, the large number of incidents that affect daily civilian life, lie outside the pale of most terrorist laws. Even while declaring most of these violent acts punishable, these laws however exempt "freedom fighters", and those seeking self determination from their ambit. The background to the now hugely problematic clause of "self determination" dates back from the language used in the protocols that were intended to update the Geneva Convention in 1977.The fact that the 1977 Conference has on its list of invitees such "liberation" movements like South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led to the conference conferring legitimacy on "Wars of national liberation: which are defined as struggles against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes. This heavily politically loaded definition naturally had its fallout over the ensuing years, and gave the terrorist a patina of fighting a "just war". 21 Articles 43 and 44 were the most contentious. It completely favoured irregular groups by removing at one stroke the clauses that had been inherent to the 1949 Convention which had noted that insurgents, irregulars or guerrillas had to have four requirements to be recognised as such and to then claim POW status.
l They must be commanded by a person responsible for subordinates
l They must wear some fixed, distinctive insignia, recognisable at a distance
l They must carry their arms openly
l They must operate within the laws of war
The 1977 Protocol however retained only the first, and made no reference to the last three. While the protocol does call upon such elements to follow the laws of war, it is no longer a prima facie requirement. This has two effects.
First, as a scholar noted six years before the conference began, "once you allow the irregular combatant, the peasant by day, the soldier by night, the man without a uniform … once you allow such people to be brought within the ambit of the law (the law of war) then you open a Pandora's box and you make unmitigated misery for every civilian who loses what precious little protection he has under the law of war".22 This erosion of the distinction between who constituted a civilian and who a militant was to lead to the worst human rights abuses by both sides to a conflict. The US refused to ratify the convention it had helped to draft with the State Department arguing that it was fundamentally flawed—which it was. The Government of India too did not ratify the convention.
Secondly, by bringing essentially internal conflict into the ambit of an "international conflict" it appeared to legitimise the conflict, which in turn would allow assistance by states to the liberation struggle—which did not constitute an interference in the internal affairs of states. This was redeemed by the Preamble, which however notes that nations should refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. This principle, which upholds non-interference in the affairs of a country, then makes the drafting of such a convention on "international armed conflicts" unnecessary.
Subsequently no international level conference has been able to present a satisfactory definition of terrorism due (today) primarily to the Palestinian cause. The Arab Interior Ministers Conference (January, 1998) while it called for a fight against terrorists, and backed an international conference by the US, distinguished between "terrorism and the right of people to struggle against foreign occupation and aggression by all means including armed struggle". The meeting significantly declared that all assistance would be given to the Palestinian police—a clause that is evidently aimed against Hamas and other Palestine Islamic groups. This is a clear recognition of terrorism as a two edged sword which hurts the Arabs as much as it does Israel. This has angered the extremist groups, who are equally unhappy at the definition of terrorism which was provided by the Interior Ministers in their conference in 1989 which noted " Terrorism is every organised act of violence or threatening by violence that causes terror and fear such as killing, assassination, kidnapping of hostages airplanes or ships, and the use of bombing, aimed at achieving political objectives".23
In January of the same year, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings ( A/RES/52/164) . This was in the wake of the June 1996 bombing of the US base at Dhahran by a truck bomb. The Convention is one of the strongest yet and clearly states the circumstances under which a person may be convicted/extradited for a wide range of offenses involving explosive substances. Article 4 takes out the fig leaf of "considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature " which might motivate a bomber. However Article 19 still notes that the convention would not affect an individual's rights (or that of a state) as contained in International Humanitarian Law. Once again a terrorist remains undefined.24
In the wake of the terrorist bombings in Russia, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on October 19, 1999 (Resolution 1269) which was progressively stronger, condemning all acts of terrorism, irrespective of motive. However with countries free to define what constitutes terrorism, this resolution (like the many before it) also falls by the wayside. Obviously extradition, denial of safe status, asylum, or moves against the financing of these groups depend on whether a given state views a particular act as a terrorist act or not. Similarly, the Indian Government has put forward just such a "Convention against Terrorism", which, unlike the other drafts that have been put forward, leaves no loopholes such as "self determination", humanitarian law etc, and adopts an all encompassing definition of terrorism, and also enjoins states "to refrain from organising, instigating, facilitating, financing, assisting or participating in the commission of terrorist offences". This comes out of the commitment made in the Gujral doctrine where India has declared that she will not interfere in the internal affairs of her neighbours. Such a convention has at present, increased chances of at least being considered, since Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) and the media have been able to identify perpetrators who continue to supply weapons to trouble spots. The case of the United Kingdom supplying weapons to Sierra Leone was one such occasion where the government was embarrassed into ordering an investigation.
Evolving international norms
While Conventions and the like do provide an umbrella under which countries wishing to cooperate may do so, it is far from being effective against those countries who regularly sponsor terrorism. Moreover in practice, very few countries are willing to take effective measures—for instance by freezing the assets of criminal groups supportive of terrorism (the shelter given to the Dawood don in the Gulf states is one example).
It is an unfortunate fact that state sponsored "proxy " war continues to be seen as a viable alternative - Africa continues to see this phenomenon, while all actors in Bosnia at one time or another were sustained by the assistance of neighbouring states. Until this "covert acceptance" of covert war and sponsored terrorism is eliminated there can never be any clear controls on the diffusion of weapons. The reality that one state's proxy war may feed another's criminal enterprise has yet to be fully appreciated. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and press focus has done much to focus attention on the behaviour of states in fuelling war or supplying weapons to areas, which are under a UN embargo. This has obviously led to some states being held publicly accountable, and though state behaviour cannot be expected to change overnight, continued attention will make such moves more difficult.
Transparency in armaments sales has long been pushed by NGOs, with their trade into conflict areas seen as a particular problem. Madeline Albright has proposed the setting up of a global body to oversee the trade in weapons.25 This should at the very least be able to pinpoint irresponsible arms transfers and bring pressure to bear. What would happen if a Security Council member was involved is however not clear.
Strategy in dealing with terrorism fundamentally evolves from the victim states' determination to deal with an issue at all levels. A small state like Sri Lanka has done much to highlight the issue to its own advantage, by sustained public relations exercises and the encouragement of media people to focus on issues that are calculated to get world attention (like the issue of child soldiers). International sympathy which had undoubtedly been with the Tamils initially has shifted completely. Today the US has decided to classify the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist group, and has moved to freeze its assets in the US. On June 25, 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a unanimous opinion upholding the Secretary's designation of the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organisation and rejecting various due process and other challenges to the designation statute.26
This has of course evolved over several years during which the island has suffered grievously. However, the point here is that sustained efforts at all levels are required to get countries to take action. Given the large number of Asian states who face terrorism within their own countries (and who in the past were admittedly major sponsors) the time may be ripe to push for at least regional controls across Southern Asia. If some countries want to remain holdouts, this will only focus attention on their activities.
1. This is as per the Rand data base on terrorism since 1968. See Bruce Hoffman " Responding to Terrorism across the Technological Barrier", Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, P-7874.
2. This data is generated from both the "Terrorism: A Global Survey Jane's Information Group, (Surrey, UK: 1999), and IDSA files.
3. These are the figures for explosives seized between 1991 –1997. Ministry of Defence Annual Report- 1996-97, Government of India, New Delhi.
4. This fact emerges in various studies including the US State Departments "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999", Also see Bruce Hoffman " Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations" Santa Monica: Rand, 1999) P-8039
5. In this instance see Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell Arnold " Fighting Back: Winning the War against Terrorism" (USA: Lexington, 1986).
6. This is underlined by Stephen Cohen The Pakistan Army, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1999) .
7. This is reiterated by noted analyst Altaf Gauhar " 1965 War , Boomerang Scenario" in Nation, September 19, December 3, 1999.
8. Mushadid Hussain in Nation, December 17, 1989.
9. Quoted in India Today May 31, 1990.
10. Altaf Gauhar " Four Wars and One Assumption", Nation, September 5, 1999.
11. For a fuller treatment of these issues see Jasjit Singh ( ed.) " Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir" (New Delhi: IDSA, 1999).
12. Investigative reports of the attacks revealed that intelligence assets in Sudan had been drawn down over a period of time, that there had been no military protection of the site ( as alleged) and that foreign engineers who had worked and designed the plant denied that it was ever used as a chemical weapons plant. Most of all Sudan has been demanding an international investigation into the incident, even inviting US personnel to examine the site. See Michael Barletta " Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence" The Non Proliferation Review Fall 1998.pp115-136. Earlier investigative reports which squarely indicted Sudan as actively pursuing a chemical weapons capability had also not mentioned this site as a possible weapons complex. See " The Iraqi WMD Challenge- Myths and Reality", Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, US House of Representatives, Washington D.C 20515, February 10, 1998
13. More exactly by the Inter State Defence and Security Committee ( ISDSC) of SADC ( South African Development Cooperation). See for a review of these regional actions Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, Light Weapons and Civil Conflict Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 1999).
14. This came about after the arbitration between Portugal and Germany during World War I , over the German reprisal over Naulia—a Portuguese border post. (Portugal at the time was neutral). The three man tribunal gave its judgement that reprisals must be precipitated by a prior illegal act, preceded by an unsatisfied demand for peaceful redress of the injury , and in proportion to the initial action. See in this connection Neil C. Livingstone , Terrell E. Arnold (eds.) " Fighting Back : Winning the War Against Terrorism" (USA: Lexington:, 1984).
15. To this may be added factors like the Jewish lobby in the US, and the fact that Israel had the nuclear weapons while the others had not. The fact that the region is now acquiring missiles of a range enough to reach Israel, and the changing parameters across the world in the post-Cold War has led to a significant rethinking on security in Israel.
16. Commenting on the problem, a prominent daily notes " The scourge of the country's campus-armed cadres of student political parties- have vitiated the academic environment in campus after campus in the country " Editorial in New Nation (Dhaka) April 29, 1998.
17. Arshad-uz Zaman" Taleban in Bangladesh" http://www.dhakacourier.com/current.columns.doc5.html.
18. One instance is that of the Harakatul Jehad group and others which are assessed to base themselves in around 421 religious schools across Bangladesh, with funds channelled through various channels including Africa. Hong Kong AFP Report "Bangladesh on Alert for Bin Laden backed Terrorism" in FBIS (Internet edition) Near East and Southeast Asia, 28/1/1999
19. See Padmaja Murthy, article in Strategic Analysis , December 1999.
20. This is in particular highlighted by former ISI chief Gen. (retd) Hamid Gul where he notes that while the State Department threatened, the Pentagon often gave an assurance of support. He also notes that it had "direct" contacts with the army. Further he notes " This is a very dangerous trend. Two parallel organizations are being created in Pakistan with which the US wants to deal separately", Dawn, (Internet Edition) November 7, 1999.
21. See Protocol I to the Geneva Convention; http://www.icrc.org
22. Quoted in Colonel Craig S. Schwender, " The Geneva Convention Protocols and the Terrorist Threat" Military Review, December 1994—January-February 1995, pp. 31-37.
23. See for a commentary Reuven Paz "The Arabic Minister of Interior on Terrorism" http://www.ict.org
24. Text of the "Convention For the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings", United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/52/164, Fifty Second session. Agenda item 152.
25. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, speech to the UN Security Council Ministerial on Africa , New York September 24, 1998. secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980924.html
26. Foreign Terrorist Organisations , Designation by the Secretary of State, Madeline K. Albright, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, October 8, 1999.