Sino-Indian Ties: Need for Bold Initiatives

Swaran Singh, Research Fellow, IDSA


According to most available estimates, the normalisation of Sino-Indian ties to their pre-Pokhran II process of rapprochement seems to be taking far too much time. This is primarily because, putting these tests in the backdrop of India's nuclear explosion of May 1974, most Indians had visualised this second series of India's nuclear tests as having only declared and demonstrated the capabilities that India was known to have had all these years. Accordingly, China was not only expected to be well aware of India's nuclear capabilities but was also believed to be fully prepared to deal with such an eventuality, as and whenever it arose. Besides, there were other reasons to doubt the credibility (as also the longevity) of China's harsh reactions against India's nuclear tests. First of all, China, in fact, had been an ardent defender of India's sovereign right to keep its nuclear option open. Therefore, the very motives of China becoming the torch-bearer for the nuclear weapon powers' anti-India campaign—that ironically still revolves around their old and ineffective prescription of "cap, reduce and eliminate" India's nuclear programme—were not only highly confusing and but even suspect right from the beginning. But the same seems to be the case with most Chinese officials and experts, many of whom have also continued to grapple with the actual impact of India's nuclear explosions of May 1998.

Most experts had brushed aside Beijing's initial reactions to India's nuclear tests as either a mere exercise in public relations or borne out of a knee-jerk panic reaction which was expected to subside with the passage of time. Even the Indian Prime Minister's letter to President Clinton was either completely ignored or defended or simply underplayed. The significance of this letter—which cited China's nuclear weapons and their proliferation to India's western neighbour as the reason for India going nuclear—was sought to be brushed aside by saying that the Chinese would have reacted this harshly with or without this letter. All, it was said, this letter had done was to provide the Chinese side with a perfect excuse to raise their anti-India clamour at various global and regional meets. In retrospect, this had not only pushed important issues to the margins but also caused further delay in both sides coming to terms with each other's misperceptions and apprehensions. Also, contrary to all expectations, this very letter was to gradually emerge to form the very core of China's critique of India's post-Pokhran II nuclear policy postures. The two sides have, of course, moved much further since then and this letter has gradually been allowed to move to the periphery as more substantive Sino-Indian contentions have come to the forefront. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this article that, apart from the confusion that was generated by the heat and dust of the nuclear explosion of May 1998 as also by the explanations that followed, it is either the faulty understanding of each other's security sensibilities or lack of willingness to appreciate each other's security needs that has been responsible for this lack of any major success in limiting the fallout of these nuclear tests on the future of Sino-Indian ties. And nothing reflects it better than their attempts at interpreting this post-Pokhran II new reality that has so far been painted simply as seen from either side.

Interpreting New Realities

No doubt, there was definitely an element of rhetoric and public relations in China's initial reactions to India's nuclear tests. However, with the passage of time, what has gradually come to the fore is the fact that the advent of two nuclear weapon states on its southern borders has perturbed China's leaders far more deeply than what has been either highlighted in China's official reactions or appreciated in most Indian commentaries. At the least, this new reality has completely upset Beijing's security paradigms for the 21st century world. Thanks partly to the assessments and analysis of China's India experts, the challenge to China's uncontested rise had been least expected from its southern frontiers where the most powerful country—India—was being dealt with their time-tested double-edged policy of slow-moving confidence building measures (CBMs) while simultaneously China also continued aiding and abetting Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities. But this constantly increasing proximity with both India and Pakistan was a contradiction in terms. And the nuclear tests in Pokhran and Chagai were perhaps the natural outcome of such contradiction. And now, with two of these South Asian powers going overtly nuclear, the new reality, unlike the past, does not seem to conform to Beijing's policy framework. This is simply because, despite its increasing engagements in the Near and Far East, greater resources and attention may have now be devoted for dealing with these new challenges from its southern frontiers.

Accordingly, with the passage of time, as China's leaders revalue their expert analysis on these post-Pokhran II realities of Sino-Indian ties, this weakening of rhetoric has been gradually replaced by relatively hardened attitudes as also by far too well thought out expressions of their India policy. To give one example, while China has lately toned down its international campaign on seeking reversal of India's nuclear policies, it has simply shifted the pressure on bilateral policies.1 At the core of the current bilateral stalemate, as of now, the "hurt" caused by India's nuclear tests and their explanations remains at the core of the Chinese critique. They have since continued to stress that it is India which has to "untie these knots" in Sino-Indian ties. According to various official and non-official statements from China, Beijing perhaps expects India to demonstrate its sincerity in building rapprochement by taking what it calls some "concrete steps" in that direction. These "concrete steps", however, remain undefined, which has further complicated India's policy choices. Most interpretations, however, broadly hint that China perhaps wishes New Delhi to retreat from it position whereby it explained its decision to conduct nuclear tests in terms of China's nuclear weapons and their proliferation and described China as its potential threat number one. As a result, there are far too many important questions that have today come to the table. The problem, however, is that both sides have not yet been able to agree to sit across this table and take these issues one by one.

There is no doubt that India understands its responsibilities. Partly this is borne out of various initiatives that the Indian side has been taking at all possible levels and forums. However, all this does not seem to as yet assuage China's feelings. But, for some, that perhaps has been the normal, well-known refrain in Sino-Indian ties since the early 1950s. Notwithstanding all this, one thing remains very clear that, even today, New Delhi is not likely to be found wanting in taking positive initiatives provided there is an appropriate place and time for this as also a more or less positive response from the Chinese side. This is because by doing so, India will only be carrying further its time-tested tradition of taking bold political initiatives for improving Sino-Indian ties. However, such a policy may have its own limitations in the entirely new context of Sino-Indian nuclear stalemate following India's decision to exercise its nuclear weapon option. This proposition has also to be qualified by the following two conditions. One, that India does not need any certification for its nuclear weapon status but sees its efforts at reviving Sino-Indian rapprochement as part of its efforts at further strengthening India's image as a peace-loving country and to demonstate its commitment towards its long-standing disarmament policies. Secondly, any such decision to make the first move towards rapprochement will not mean any deviation from India's past record and, in fact, it fully conforms to the ethos of India's China policy over the last five decades.

Also, considering that historically Indian leaders have always sought security-in-peace and not peace-in-security, it falls in line with India's ethos, the current strategic thinking and future security needs. Therefore, to provide them appropriate atmospherics and meaning, India's policy initiatives vis-à-vis China would have to be viewed as very much part of India's larger policy objectives for international peace. However, compared with India's fire-fighting approach in responding to China's initial critical statements, dealing with China may now need a far more planned, integrated and piecemeal approach that should stress on areas of agreement while, at the same time, provide this long-term process a kick-start in the form of bold political initiatives from the highest level. While the results of such initiatives, as also the time-frame for achieving such results, may be difficult to predict, such a bold policy decision to be the first is not likely to have any adverse impact in terms of India's domestic politics. In fact, if anything, the impact of such bold political initiatives in the past has only been positive.

India's Track Record

In fact, going by the track record of the last 50 years, or even earlier, India's leaders have never been found wanting in taking bold political initiatives regardless of the fact as to who had tied the so-called knots and for what purpose. In fact, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, himself had been the first Indian Foreign Minister ever to visit Beijing in 1979. To recall a few of the major examples, India was not only amongst the first to recognise the new Communist regime but also at the forefront of defending China's membership of the UN Security Council while the Americans were sending feelers to New Delhi that India could well replace China as the permanent member at the UN Security Council. Even the 1962 war did not change New Delhi's policy stance on this issue and China was finally inducted into the United Nations in 1971. Later, during the second phase of Sino-Indian rapprochement as well, India was the first to announce as well as exchange Ambassadors (July 1975), and again the first to send its Foreign Minister (February 1979), Prime Minister (December 1988) and President (May 1992) to Beijing.2 This, of course, is not to say that China did not make any contribution to the process of Sino-Indian friendship. Nevertheless, China's reactions had often been long-drawn, reluctant and from the periphery of China's leadership, though the tenor in the end was invariably positive.

Especially seen in the backdrop of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's decision to surrender India's historic "presence" in Tibet followed by the Dalai Lama's arrival in India in 1959 and the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the visit by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988, had marked the most critical historic initiative by New Delhi that was aimed at building Sino-Indian rapprochement. During this visit, New Delhi virtually took a U-turn and agreed to the Chinese position that asked both sides to concentrate on areas of agreement and put aside difficult issues until the two sides had generated the required level of mutual confidence to resolve those disputes. The strength of such bold political initiatives has also to be seen in the face of the fact that there was a historic November 1962 resolution of India's Parliament that bound successive ruling regimes in India to open relations with China only after taking back "every inch" of India's sacred territory that was either claimed by, or under the occupation of, the Chinese. Accordingly, this was perhaps the most important instance when India's leaders so clearly demonstrated its commitment to making all possible efforts towards improving ties with China.

To appreciate the fact that this strategic U-turn by India was not an aberration, one has to see this historic visit as the culmination of the log-term initiatives that were started during Mrs. Indira Gandhi's regime. This piecemeal approach that had already begun to improve Sino-Indian ties since the early 1970s, raised diplomatic ties to Ambassador level in 1975, and carried out border talks from 1981. It is in this backdrop that the November 1988 resolution of the All India Congress Committee was seen as technically enabling Rajiv Gandhi's government to open formal negotiations with China. This resolution briefly urged the Rajiv Gandhi government to seek a settlement with China through "peaceful negotiations" based on "mutual interests" and "acceptable to the people of both countries", even if it took time.3 Even the Chinese scholars have recognised the importance of India's initiatives in building Sino-Indian rapprochement. For example, when, following the Tiananmen Square incidents of June 1989, most Western powers had imposed sanctions and isolated China, the period between the second half of 1989 and 1990 witnessed 10 high-level visits exchanged between India and China. These included visits by Vice Premier Wu Xueguian in October 1989 and by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in March 1990.4 Moreover, barely five weeks following the historic incidents at the Tiananmen Square, the annual meeting of the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question was held as scheduled for July 1, 1989. What more could have demonstrated India's sincerity in improving Sino-Indian ties?

China's Policy Options

While India has always been at the forefront of making initiatives, China, on the other hand, has been generally slow and reluctant, though its belated response was nevertheless always positive and made India's initiatives workable. However, this has not been necessarily the result of some ill will on the part of Beijing. Instead, it is partly the outcome of policy perceptions from both sides which, of course, continue to be varied. Due to their respective historical legacies, compulsions and priorities, while China has perhaps been relatively higher in India's list of foreign policy priorities, the same has not been true of India's place in the case of China's list of priorities. In line with China's so-called "Middle Kingdom" syndrome, China's leaders have always sought to compare themselves with big powers like the United States and the former Soviet Union (now Russia). Accordingly, while China viewed itself in the larger global context, it has historically tried to deal with India in a smaller regional framework of either Asia or, lately, in the still smaller context of the South Asian subcontinent. And, in this case, Beijing's policy towards India simply aimed at the following two objectives: (i) propping up India's smaller neighbours to keep New Delhi tied down to the South Asian region; and (ii) continuing the rapprochement efforts by accepting an extremely slow-moving process of CBMs. But China's ever expanding indulgence, aimed at enabling Pakistan to be a counter-balance against New Delhi, was to gradually lead New Delhi to lose patience with China's slow pace in the process of CBMs. These contradictory policies were finally to result in India breaking out of China's traditional low-cost India policy by finally exercising its nuclear weapon option, and India's capabilities today can no longer be dealt with by China in that old framework of the Indian subcontinent.

China, as a result, is in a difficult position today to continue to pay lip service to its desire to solve problems with India, as it is now required to respond to the new hard realities of a nuclear India. Beijing is accordingly required to move from its traditional approach of abetting Pakistan towards a more substantive nuclear policy towards South Asia in general and India in particular. No doubt, China's best interests will be served by making sure that India gives up its resolve to develop the nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis China and that Pakistan remains subservient to Beijing's piecemeal transfers in these sensitive technologies. But since that status quo has already been challenged by the nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan, the second best option available to China is to make sure that India's nuclear weapons remain focussed or even equated with those of Pakistan and, therefore, never visualised or actually deployed for dealing with China's nuclear capabilities. And here, assessing the inevitability of the new realities, China has already moved away from seeking their roll-back or total elimination to stressing more and more on containing their negative fallout for Beijing. What makes China's policy options all the more limited is that, even after its decision to go nuclear, India continued to swear by its commitment to general and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. New Delhi believes that it is in a non-nuclear environment that its national interests will be best served. Also, even after demonstrating the capability to design and develop fairly sophisticated nuclear weapons, New Delhi has already announced its commitment to the doctrine of no-first-use and minimum deterrence that has further weakened China's credentials in raising anti-India campaigns at various global and regional forums.

But this should, in no way, obtain India any more leeway, for continued failure to open a dialogue with the Chinese can only further increase New Delhi's difficulties in sustaining such pacific postures. This is because leaders in New Delhi have to constantly seek approval for their policy postures from the masses who, thanks to the television era, have become much more aware and vigilant. Accordingly, New Delhi may come under domestic pressures for persisting with the olive branch for far too long, especially if the attitude in Beijing remains one of apathy or negation. It is not understandable to most Indians as to why China has been so averse to holding talks at established forums like the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question. The very ideal behind creating such a forum was to sort out all such differences under difficult circumstances. Sitting across the table, the two sides are sure to be in a much better position to explain their policy postures. This will any day better be than holding negotiations through the media or through third country forums where India is not even present. This confidence that talks will do only better is borne out of the good working relationship that the two sides have so assiduously evolved during the last three decades of Sino-Indian rapprochement.

Enhancing Areas of Agreement

To recall their cooperation before India's nuclear explosions last year, both India and China had evolved, over the years, a fairly good working relationship at various bilateral, regional and international forums. So much so that their cooperation at forums like the UN Human Rights Commission annual session at Geneva had come to be a major irritant in the Western powers' campaign to censure China (and India) on the question of human rights. While there is no dearth of examples on India's initiatives and many of these have already been listed under the aforesaid section on "India's Track Record", the important fact is that the 1990s had witnessed even the reluctant Chinese making an eloquent contribution to the Sino-Indian rapprochement. To give some examples of China's major conciliatory initiatives, Kashmir perhaps forms one good example where China had become increasingly objective in its assessment even at the cost of its closest ally, Pakistan.5 Though it was from the early 1980s that China had gradually evolved a more neutral tone in its statements on the Kashmir question, it was the Narasimha Rao-Li Peng Joint Statement of 1991 that provided the most favoured expression from the highest level of China's leadership. The statement clearly described Kashmir as a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan and urged both sides to resolve it under the framework of the Shimla Agreement. By doing this, China in fact had nearly endorsed India's own position with relation to Jammu & Kashmir province.

Later, in December 1996, President Jiang Zemin, in fact, went a step further and suggested in his address to Pakistan's Senate that both sides should set aside their pending problematic issues left over by history and build a stronger network of ties in areas of mutual agreement. Also, it was the persuasion by China (and Iran) that resulted in Pakistan withdrawing its resolution on Kashmir at the UN Human Rights Commission's annual session at Geneva in March 1996. Similarly, in January 1995, when the Western powers had withdrawn the promise of supplying fissile fuel for India's Tarapore nuclear power plant, it was China that had come forward and supplied one instalment of enriched uranium. Similarly, the two countries had evolved a strong working relationship at various regional forums, be it in the Indian Ocean or East Asia. Most scholars have seen this goodwill as a result of expanding interactions between these two countries. India, for example, hosted the the China Fair in 1991 and later China hosted the India Fair in 1993. The two sides in 1995 became Asia's first two countries to actually implement disarmament as both of them agreed to pull out four military posts in the Wangdong region in the Eastern Sector where troops had been deployed at alarming proximity to each other. But the most important factor expanding their mutual stakes had been perhaps their bilateral trade since the early 1990s. By 1994, India had actually become China's largest trading partner from South Asia, thus, crossing Beijing's closest ally, Pakistan. This boosted their mutual confidence in such a way that the Joint Sino-Indian Business Council, in fact, declared in the 1997 meeting at Beijing that their bilateral trade would increase by at least five times during the 1990s decade, thus, crossing the $ 4 billion figure by the year 2000. And especially the fact that the post-Pokhran II confusion in Sino-Indian ties has not really affected their bilateral trade all that much makes it the strongest as also the most reliable (and most agreeable) pillar of Sino-Indian rapprochement during the 1990s. And this is perhaps one area that promises to bear dividends for the future as well.

Bilateral Trade: Positive Trends

Going by the experience of the last two decades, Sino-Indian trade has been one aspect of their bilateral ties that has shown constant improvement. According to recently released statistics by the China State Statistical Bureau for the last 20 years—1978-1997—while China's total international trade has gone up by 14 times, the Sino-Indian trade has gone up by 16 times during the same period. Also, despite the apparent reluctance in India's business community to invest in China, both China and India have already established over 50 big and small joint ventures in various areas.6 Over two dozen Indian companies are today doing business with their Chinese counterparts with most of them being success stories.7 But the importance of Sino-Indian trade cannot be gauged from statistics alone. In fact, the value of Sino-Indian trade does not really lie in terms of its total volume, which, however remains limited. Instead, its value has to be seen in terms of its intangible benefits in resolving Sino-Indian ties and these have made an important contribution. Viewed as a CBM, Sino-Indian trade has led to greater (a) mutual confidence; (b) mutual commitment; and (c) greater transparency (i) in the interactions of their border communities and (ii) in the willingness to collaborate on the part of their national elite from both sides.

Their border trade may have remained extremely low as a percentage of their total bilateral trade volume yet, considering the freedom and interaction that it has brought for the border communities from both sides, it has greatly improved mutual trust on both sides. The two sides have, for example, free trade in 15 local items which include yak-tail, salt, borax, China clay, China silk, etc. Obviously, transactions in these items are not capital intensive and are not going to be correctly reflected when seen in terms of their monetary value. Nevertheless, increased border trade during the 1990s has resulted in the revival of various related cottage industries. In Pithoragarh district of India, for example, this has resulted in the revival of the carpet-weaving industry which had been completely shut down as it depended entirely on Tibetan wool.8 And finally, this border trade has also to be seen in the backdrop of the poor road and communication infrastructure and generally backward conditions of these border communities. And, in that context, this increased activity has resulted in generating momentum leading to improvement in these remote regions which ensures peace and stability in these otherwise disputed borders between China and India. Apart from improving the interactions and living standards of the border communities, their border trade has also facilitated the border management activities by both countries' personnel deployed for maintaining peace and tranquillity in the Sino-Indian border regions.

What perhaps most clearly brings out the strength of positive trends in Sino-Indian trade is that nothing of the recent temporary political problems following the nuclear tests of May 1998 seems to have affected the normal pace of improvement throughout last year. For example, even in the post-Pokhran II context of nuclear stalemate between India and China, scholars from China have continued to advocate for concepts like sub-regional cooperation between China's south-western and India's north-eastern regions which have remained relatively neglected in terms of building infrastructure for development.9 Though the symbolic cancellation of the China Commodity Fair in Mumbai and China's low-profile presence during last year's India International Trade Fair in New Delhi did create a flutter amongst businessmen on both sides, the projections for 1998—based on half yearly trade statistics compiled by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)—clearly project how Sino-Indian trade does not even seem to notice India's nuclear tests at all (see Chart 1). Especially, compared to China's recent trade statistics vis-a-vis East Asian countries this, in fact, shows encouraging signs for the future of Sino-Indian ties. In the long term, therefore, making efforts towards expanding mutual trade and investments can be one sure way of enhancing mutual stakes for building peace and security between India and China. But, looking at the continued stalemate in Sino-Indian ties, this would perhaps require some sort of a kick-start by bold political initiatives.

Atmospherics for Political Initiatives

Apart from these positive trends in Sino-Indian trade and commerce in the post-Pokhran II period, the first indicator of positive atmospherics in terms of bilateral relations was witnessed in the month of October (1998) when the first delegation of Indian academics visiting Beijing at the invitation of the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) which organised a seminar on the future of Sino-Indian ties. In response, a 16-member Chinese delegation (academics from the provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Beijing) travelled to the Indian cities of Calcutta, New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Chennai where it participated in seminars and meetings on Sino-Indian ties during November-December 1998. Besides, various other Sino-Indian businessmen and experts, continued to exchange visits at their normal, earlier pace. All this portends more positive interactions at the formal level as well, and indications are that Sino-Indian ties may gather greater momentum during 1999.

Equally important initiatives have also been taken at the highest level of India's leadership. Jaswant Singh (then as the Prime Minister's special emissary) held a meeting in September 1998 with China's Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, during the Asean Regional Forum's (ARF) annual meet at Manila. This had generated speculations that Jaswant Singh may be leading another high-level dialogue with China, just like the one he has been holding with Strobe Talbott of the United States. Such ideas have been further strengthened by the Prime Minister's statements in Parliament as also by repeated statements by the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, Brijesh Mishra, echoing sentiments in favour of improving Sino-Indian ties. In fact, following Jaswant Singh's taking over as Foreign Minister during December 1998, the possibilities for an early Sino-Indian dialogue are understood to have increased manifold. This is partly because, according to Press reports, in his letter of congratulations to Jaswant Singh, China's Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, expressed the hope that under his stewardship of India's Ministry of External Affairs, China and India should be able to further "consolidate and develop" the friendly and good neighbourly relations between their two nations. An equally positive response was reportedly provided by Jaswant Singh's reply to Tang Jiaxuan's letter. Also, addressing his first formal Press conference after taking over as Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh reiterated India's commitment to "further improving" ties with China and he urged China's leaders to help India "untie the knots" through frequent consultations and dialogue.10 And going by the current whispers-in-the-wind, the official Sino-Indian dialogue is now expected to begin some time early next year.


To conclude, therefore, it is only a matter of time for the Sino-India rapprochement to come back to its normal equilibrium. Looking at China's own example, India can perhaps afford to wait or even ignore China's criticism. In the face of China's own nuclear explosion in October 1964, the Kennedy Administration had even thought of physically eliminating China's nuclear facilities. In such adversity, Beijing had, however, continued to denounce American reactions to its nuclear weapons and Washington had to finally give up its policies and build détente with the Chinese. And going by their interactions during 1990, the two sides have since evolved into strategic partners. So much so that, in the case of the Indian tests, China seems to be speaking the language of the United States, and President Clinton seems to have given China a free hand in leading the anti-Indian campaign on behalf the Five Nuclear Weapon Powers. However, it is not the outcome but the time involved that is important. And here, New Delhi may not feel the need for a Chinese certification of India's nuclear weapon power status and also it may be in position to wait and watch until China decides to come around and recognise the new reality of India's nuclear weapons; yet, there are reasons why the two sides should hasten to open their official dialogue.

However, these comparisons from history have their own limitations. First of all, the non-proliferation lobby seems today far better organised and far more coercive in nature. Its leader, the United States, is also no longer either deterred by a parallel superpower (like the Soviet Union) or embroiled in any Vietnam War type protracted quagmire. China, on the other hand, happens to be the most adversely affected party from India's decision to exercise its nuclear option, and its disaffection is clearly being used by the non-proliferation lobbies to wedge further distrust between India and China. But, at the same time, India's nuclear tests happen to be a reality which cannot be "dis-invented", and all parties involved have to come to terms with this basic fact. In such as a scenario, any hardened attitude by China (and other nuclear weapon powers) will only make India stick to its guns and become far more defensive and perhaps inflexible in any unduly delayed negotiations. The only way to evolve mutual understanding, therefore, is dialogue and deliberation at an early date.

Considering the fact that it is the evolution of Sino-Indian good neighbourly relations and not browbeating that happens to be India's objective, any indefinite delay will only further weaken the prospects for peace between India and China. This will also further reduce their options in opening talks and make matters far more difficult for both sides. All this makes it imperative for both Beijing and New Delhi to put a premium on time and try to resolve their ties as early as possible. However, opening a serious official dialogue may, once again, require, some bold political initiatives. As regards India, this should not deter New Delhi from taking initiatives like proposing a Foreign Minister's visit to Beijing for this would well conform to India's China policy of the last 50 years. But the Chinese side will also have to, once again make a contribution by positively responding to India's initiatives for opening a high-level official dialogue.



1. See, for example, China's initial statements during May-June 1998 like Statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, May 14, 1998 and China's more recent statements like the speech by Ambassador Zhou Gang at the Indian Association for International Affairs in New Delhi on October 20, 1998. These are printed in News From China, June 10, 1998, and News From China, October 28, 1998.

2. For details, see Swaran Singh, "Building Security and Confidence with China" in Tan Chung ed., Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China, (New Delhi: Gyan Publishers, 1998), pp. 519-534.

3. Surjit Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the post-Cold War Era", Asian Survey, vol. xxiv no.3, March 1994, p.289.

4. Zhen Ruixiang, "Shifting Obstacles in Sino-Indian Relations", The Pacific Review, vol. 16, no.1, 1993, p.66.

5. Mao Siwei, "China and the Kashmir Issue", Strategic Analysis, vol.xvii, no.12, March 1995, pp.1572-1597.

6. Rajesh Kadian, Tibet, India and China: Critical Choices, Uncertain Future, (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999) p.176.

7. Some of these names include the following: India - Infosys Technologies Ltd., Sun Pharmaceuticals, Greaves Ltd., TISCO, RPG, Ranbaxy, Wockhardt, Unichem Ltd., Indian Rayon, Sterlite, Larson & Toubro, National Engineering Co., Bry Air (India) Ltd., Milestone International Ltd., Gujarat Poly-Avx Ltd., Sear International Pvt. Ltd., Godrej & Boyce Mfg Ltd., Global Projects & Services, Genus Overseas Electric Ltd., Footwear Design & Development Institute. Some Chinese companies doing business in India include the Shanghai Fortune High Technology Co. Ltd., CMC International Advertising & Exhibition Co., Konka Group Co. Ltd., Deng Xing Enterprises Group Co. Ltd., Beijing Hengdian Tech Co.Ltd., and Shanghai Smiec (Restart Co. Ltd.).

8. n.6.

9. Che Zhimin, "Formation of Sub-Regional Cooperation Zone of China, India, Myanmar and Bangladesh", paper presented at a seminar on "China and India: Regional Developments" held by the Institute for Chinese Studies in New Delhi, during November 26-28, 1998.

10. "India Ready for Talks with China: Jaswant", The Hindu, December 25, 1998, p.1.