US and Russian TMD Systems and the ABM Treaty

-Kalpana Chittaranjan, Researcher, IDSA

 

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was signed on May 26, 1972, after about two-and-a-half years of negotiation, by the United States of America and the Soviet Union and which entered into force on October 3 of the same year, has been the subject of heated debate before, during and after its signing. The treaty was amended in a Protocol in 1974 and entered into force in May 1976.1 In the latter half of 1993, ballistic missile defence (BMD) became a part of the arms control agenda when the Clinton Administration quietly sought to persuade Russia to join a reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty in order to clarify the dividing line between strategic BMDs, which are covered by the treaty and tactical defences, which are not. The issue was the testing and deployment of a new family of advanced-capability theatre missile defence (TMD), or anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM), systems. These systems are designed for protection against non-strategic (i.e., theatre or tactical) missiles which are shorter in range than strategic ballistic missiles.

Main Features of the ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty banned nationwide defences against ballistic missile and was intended to prevent the development of an offence/defence arms race. The close link between strategic offences and defences was recognised by the signing of the treaty as was the fact that deployment of defences would only encourage increases and improvements in offensive forces in order to overcome them. The treaty was designed to prevent either side from building a nationwide or "territorial" defence against strategic ballistic missiles. This was accomplished through a series of quantitative and qualitative limits on development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components. The USA and the Soviet Union were allowed two 100-interceptor ABM sites, one to defend the national capital and the other to defend an international ballistic missile field (ICBM). The 1974 Protocol reduced the number of permitted sites to one--this could be either the national capital or an ICBM field. While the Soviet Union maintained its single permitted ABM site around Moscow, the US abandoned its Grand Forks, North Dakota, site in 1975 because it was judged that the protection provided by its 100 interceptors to the adjacent missile field was not worth the cost of maintaining the system. Each side could change the system location once.

The treaty contained detailed provisions designed to prevent either side from gaining the capability to "break out" from its limitations and deploying a nationwide defence. Strict limits were placed on the deployment of large phased-array radars (LPARs) since these were then the critical guiding eyes of ABM systems. ABM radars could only be deployed at the single permitted site or at agreed ABM test ranges, and new early-warning radars could only be constructed along the periphery of the country and oriented outward. In the same way, since mobile ABMs had an inherent potential for rapid deployment to protect broad areas, the development, testing, and deployment of all sea-based, air based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components was banned. Only research on mobile systems and components could be conducted. Under the traditional view of the ABM Treaty, this ban on mobile systems applied equally to both traditional-technology ABMs, such as interceptor missiles and radars, and those based on "other physical principles," such as lasers and particle beams. Such new-technology ABM systems and components could be developed and tested only if they were fixed and land-based but they could not be deployed unless the treaty was amended.

Additionally, the development, testing, and development of multiple-warhead or rapidly reloadable ABMs was banned, to protect the limit on ABM firepower implicit in the 100-interceptor limit at the single permitted ABM site. The treaty also prohibited giving non-ABM systems and components (eg. air defence missiles or anti-satellite weapons) an ABM capability, or testing them in an ABM mode. While the treaty only applied to the signatories, neither side was permitted to give ABM systems and components (or the technical descriptions to build them) to other countries to deploy them outside its national territory. To facilitate verification of these provisions, the treaty prohibited interference with national technical means of verification, which included such intelligence systems as radars and photo-reconnaissance satellites, and barred deliberate concealment to impede verification. The treaty also created a bilateral forum, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which was established on December 21, 1972, to resolve details of implementing the accord, clarifying compliance questions, and discussing possible means of strengthening the treaty.2

The chief US negotiator of the ABM Treaty, Gerard C. Smith, commenting on it in 1987 said that it was "a document of historic significance. It is a comprehensive, precisely drafted contract to govern ABM relations of the superpowers into the unlimited future. For as long as it endures, it rules out a race for defensive missile which had threatened to be a major new and dangerous form of arms competition."3 Currently, the ABM Treaty continues in force.

Strategic Defence Initiative

The controversial Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), popularly known as the "Star Wars" system, which was introduced in the 1980s by the Reagan Administration again made the ABM Treaty a subject of heated debate both within the USA as well as between the USA and the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan, as an initiator and ardent proponent of the SDI, announced his speech on the Star Wars programme to the world on March 24, 1983. The SDI had been set out in a 175-page document, brought out by the Heritage Foundation and prepared by the former Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Daniel Graham. In it, Graham recommended the setting up of a system of 400 satellites and space platforms which would constantly stay in orbit, equipped with a number of beam weapons capable of destroying Soviet missiles or enemy missiles as soon as they took off and also in all subsequent sections of their trajectory. Such weapons included systems using light beams and lasers operating on fluorinated hydrogen, or using beams of nuclear explosions and directed impulses released by nuclear explosions. In addition, Graham recommended that the Pentagon place into orbit combat satellites capable of destroying Soviet satellites in outer space and deploy ground-based "energy guns" capable of shooting down enemy missiles before they had a chance of reaching the USA.4

In the USA, the SDI had its diehard proponents and opponents amongst the scientists, defence personnel and the lay people. Nobody was sure whether the system was feasible and would work the way it had been projected. Besides, the programme was still in the drawing board stage and laboratory-testing stage. It was an outer-space shield system which was extremely expensive and highly technological, requiring an intricate set of designs and computers. It would have required billions of dollars of Congressional sanction before it could have become fully operational. By the time the Clinton Administration took over, the SDI budget was drastically cut and then withdrawn.

Post-Cold War US Threat Perceptions

Retaining the credibility of US intervention capabilities by denying an adversary the option of using ballistic missiles that could inflict a small number of US casualties in the early stages of a US intervention and counting on US public pressure to abandon the operation led to an interest in TMD.5 Ballistic missile proliferation and regional conflicts are seen as the major US threat perceptions and concern has shifted to these issues since the end of the Cold War. The Secretary of Defence's Report to the President and the Congress (1994) stated, "Today, more than 15 nations have ballistic missiles. By the year 200, perhaps 20 nations may have them." The report went on to add that "more than 25 countries, many of them adversaries of the United States, possess or may be developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons."6

A list of perceived potential US adversaries that possess ballistic missiles in the context of nuclear proliferation are Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria and Yemen. This list could be expanded to include Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in case anti-Western regimes are brought here.7 Some of these states are suspected of either having developed or being in the process of developing nuclear weapons and in the context of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), many of them have stockpiles of, or production capacity for, chemical weapons.8 Several are believed to be working on biological weapons, the example of Iraq being the most recent.

Table 1. Three Tiers of Ballistic Missile Proliferators, 19949

First tier: Second tier: Third tier:

Developing indigenous Capable of developing Dependent on

long-range ballistic long-range missiles with foreign-supplied

missiles foreign assistance ballistic missiles

India Argentina Afghanistan

Israel Brazil Algeria

North Korea Egypt Chile

Indonesia Cuba

Iran Libya

Iraq (pre-1991) Pakistan

South Korea Syria

Serbia Yemen

South Africa Iraq (post-1991)

Taiwan

Though a direct threat to the continental Unitied States is not posed as these countries do not have missiles of intercontinental range, they could present a threat to US allies in Europe and the Far East as well as to US forces operating overseas. The capability of sustaining forces for simultaneous involvement in two regional wars on the scale of Operation Desert Storm (eg., in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula), is the present US strategy postulate. When Iraq launched about 100 conventionally armed, modified theatre-range Scud missiles (which were of 1950s Soviet design) during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, against UN Coalition forces and against cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia, some of these missile were intercepted by Patriot PAC-2 tactical air-defence missiles--though the effectiveness of the latter-named missiles still remains a subject of controversy in the USA.10

US TMD

Three programmes constituted the core of US TMD procurement efforts and these were identified in the Department of Defence's 1983 Bottoms-Up Review (BUR).11 The US Army's Patriot Advanced Capability Level-3 (PAC-3) is the first of these and it is a significantly improved version of the Patriot missile deployed in the Gulf War. The PAC-3 is a "lower-tier" system, i.e. one which intercepts incoming targets in the lower atmosphere and is designed to defend important sites in a limited area. The Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) has been chosen as the missile for this programme. Deployments are scheduled for 1998 and plans call for the procurement of 1,500 missiles and the modification of 180 launchers and 74 radars.12

The Aegis/Standard Missile II Block IV A, which is also known as the Navy Area Defence programme, is also a lower-tier system and is being developed jointly by the US Navy and the BMDO. By upgrading existing Aegis radars and Standard SM-2 air-defence missiles to give ships a sea-based anti-ballistic missile defence capability, ports and coastal areas can be defended. To accommodate 1,820 interceptor missiles, about 50 ship-borne launchers and radars will be modified. The first of these are scheduled to be deployed in 1999.13

The third programme is an upper-tier defence system known as the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) interceptor which is being developed by the Lockheed Corporation for the Army. THAAD has drawn on concepts developed for the SDI. THAAD uses a heat-seeking homing system and fragmentation warhead to hit ballistic missile targets at ranges of up to 150 km at altitudes which exceed 100 km. This plan calls for the procurement of approximately 1,400 missiles, 80 mobile launchers and 14 associated mobile ground-based radars.14 The Clinton Administration had informed Russia that THAAD would begin the two-year demonstration/validation (dem/val) phase in the first quarter of 1995.15

A number of longer-term projects are also under way which are in addition to these three core programmes. These include the Navy's sea-based Theatrewide Defence Programme which is a high-altitude, long-range interceptor designed to provide significant area protection; the air-defence system for the Army's Corps SAM, which would have some capability to defend against short-range ballistic missiles (i.e. with ranges that are less than 600 km).16

A number of space-based tracking and early-warning systems which could be used as components in a TMD system are being developed by the USA. The US Air Force (USAF), in conjunction with the BMDO is developing the "Brilliant Eyes" system (which is now known as the Space and Missile Tracking System, SMTS), which had its origins in the SDI programme. Equipped with infra-red and other sensors, this satellite is designed primarily to perform post-boost phase acquisition and to track ballistic missile warheads and decoys in the mid-course phase of the trajectory against the background of outer space. This tracking information which is called cueing data, can greatly enhance the range and effectiveness of interceptors such as THAAD and the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP). The low-earth-orbit component of the USAF Space-Based Infrared (SBIR) system is now Brilliant Eyes which is now in the engineering and manufacturing development phase. An early-warning satellite system is expected to be produced by this programme in the next decade.17

Russian TMD Programmes

Unlike the USA, Russia has never officially excluded the possibility of developing nuclear-armed ATBM systems and again, in contrast to the USA, many parts of Russian territory are already within the range of the missiles of Iran, Israel, North Korea and Saudi Arabia. Any of these states or the others in the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East could hypothetically become Russian military adversaries with the ability to launch missile strikes on countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or on Russian troops abroad, including those in the post-Soviet Union area or in other areas while operating as part of multinational forces.

As a result of the long tradition of secrecy as well as the current inconsistent process of democratisation, including limited Parliamentary control over defence spending and only occasional public access to military information, very little is known about the Russian TMD programmes. Another reason is the ongoing Russian economic and budgetary crisis, which has both limited development and defence procurement and introduced great uncertainties in the planning, programming and budgeting process, including that for TMD systems.18

From information available publicly it is known that there are two competing Russian TMD systems, known as the S-300 VM (US sources know it as SA-12) and the S-300 PMU (the West knows it as SA-10). The former is a mobile system designed for the protection of troops, developed by the Antei Research and Production Corporation while the latter is a transportable system designed for site defence and developed by the Almaz Corporation. While the S-300 VM is deployed in limited numbers, about 1,000 launchers of the S-300 PMU type are operated by the Russian Air Defence. The 1st Air Defence Army, covering the Moscow area, uses the S-300 PMU as its principal system.

Russian military sources claim that the two systems are similar and in some respects superior, to the US Patriot PAC-2 system, mainly because they can track and intercept aircraft, theatre missiles and cruise missiles.19 In the development and testing stage is a follow-on system to the S-300 PMU. However, future plans for modernisation of the existing system, development of a follow-on to the S-300 PMU or of other TMD weapons and support systems, including space-based sensors are unavailable.

Challenges to ABM Treaty Restrictions on TMD

US and Russian interest in anti-missile systems at the theatre level has again called into question the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. As has been stated earlier, the main aim of the ABM Treaty was to curtail the missile defences of both sides in order to leave them vulnerable to relaliatory nuclear strikes which would thus ensure and codify the strategic mutual assured destruction (MAD) capability. It was believed that not only would this preclude a strategic nuclear first or pre-emptive strike to disarm its opponent but it would also avoid or reduce one's own damage from retaliation. This was because in the early 1970s, huge ABM systems were believed to be unable to defend, in an effective manner, against a massive first strike but these could provide significant protection against a weakened retaliatory strike. This would tip the balance in favour of a pre-emptive strike. Also, missile defences were believed to encourage a destabilising offensive-defensive arms race and jeopardise nuclear arms reduction agreements.

Currently, the focal point of controversies with regard to the ABM Treaty is the demarcation between strategic and theatre defences. In 1972, during the US Senate ratification hearings, John Foster, Director of DoD Defence Research and Engineering had stated that "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles" and "testing in an ABM mode," which were prohibited by the treaty, meant testing against a target with a re-entry speed greater than 2 km/sec or at an altitude exceeding 40 km.20 For a long time, this so-called "Foster-box" was widely accepted in the USA as a practical criterion for distinguishing between tests against strategic and non-strategic missile targets, i.e., tests of BMD systems were permitted against targets travelling at an altitude below 40 km with re-entry speeds of less than 2 km/sec. Though it was presented to the Senate by Nixon Administration officials during the ratification hearings as an "authoritative representation" of the US policy, it neither became a provision of the ABM Treaty nor was it a formally adopted policy of the USA. The US Congress explicitly required that any changes in the US interpretation of the ABM Treaty had to be considered by the Senate, by the US Defence Authorisation Bill of FY 1994.21

The mid-1980s witnessed Soviet tests of the S-300 VM air defence system against ballistic targets with re-entry speeds of 2.7 km/sec which the USA challenged in the SCC as not being in compliance with the treaty.

In October 1993, the Clinton Administration made a proposal to Russia in the SCC, in line with US official policy that a demarcation between strategic and theatre ballistic missile defence systems be based solely on the demonstrated, i.e. the actual tested capability of the systems. Negotiations started on permitted TMD parameters, with the participation of the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan--following the break up of the Soviet Union, the last three states have conferred with the US in the SCC (Latvia took part as an observer). The "inherent capability" criterion which the USA insisted on during the treaty negotiations, later incorporated in Article VI, would be effectively eliminated by the proposal. The USA proposed that an ABM system would be defined as a theatre rather than as a strategic defence according to a technical performance criterion--specifically if it were not tested against a target vehicle with a re-entry speed greater than 5 km/sec. As has been pointed out by Arbatov, the payload range of a ballistic missile is closely related to its speed as it re-enters the atmosphere. The speed of 5 km/sec for a TMD test target corresponds to a ballistic missile of about 3,000-km range. Such a missile would qualify as intermediate-range (1,000-5,500 km). Non-strategic missiles usually have a range below 1,000 km which corresponds to a re-entry speed of less than 2.9 km/sec and most of them have ranges of less than 300 km (1.5 km/sec speed). US and Russian strategic missiles have ranges of 8,000-10,000 km and re-entry speeds of 6-7 km/sec.22

Treaty "Demarcation"

The Clinton Administration initiated the demarcation negotiations in November 1993 claiming that the ABM Treaty needed clarification to accommodate TMD systems in the post-Cold War era. The SCC had completed and prepared for signature the texts of four agreements by October 1996. These texts included an agreed statement pertaining to "lower velocity" TMD systems (those with interceptor velocities of 3 km/sec or less); an agreement on TMD confidence-building measures (CBMs); a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on ABM succession; and an agreement outlining new SCC operating regulations.

The USA and Russia had entered negotiations in the SCC to make clear the distinction between ABM and ATBM systems. The two sides had already reached a Phase I agreement covering lower-velocity TMD systems, i.e., those with interceptor velocities of up to 3 km/sec. Negotiations for a Phase II agreement covering higher-velocity TMD systems, i.e., between 3 and 5 km/sec took place in the Geneva-based SCC for a little over three-and-a-half years.23

On March 21, 1997, during their two-day summit meeting at Helsinki, Clinton and Yeltsin reached consensus on the framework of a Phase II agreement. The two leaders issued a joint statement asking their respective experts to "complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher-velocity TMD systems,"24 which would include the following elements:

* Testing of TMD being permitted against target missiles with a velocity up to 5 km per second, and a range of 3,500 km.

* The sides not developing, testing or deploying space-based non-strategic ABM interceptor missiles, or components based on other physical principles capable of replacing such missiles.

* The sides exchanging detailed information every year on their plans and programmes regarding non-strategic ABM defence.

Among a series of non-binding commitments, the two countries also stated in the joint statement that neither side had any plans to:

* Carry out flight tests prior to April 1999 on interceptor missiles of non-strategic ABM systems against ballistic target missiles.

* Create non-strategic ABM systems with interceptor missiles with speeds in excess of 5.5 km/sec for ground-and air-based systems, and 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems.

* Test non-strategic ABM systems on target missiles equipped with individually-targetted multiple warheads or on warheads deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The two sides also agreed that their SCC Commissioners would discuss any matters of concern to monitor TMD developments. It was also agreed that they would study "securing" early warning for TMD, technological cooperation, and expanding the current cooperation in TMD exercises.25

On August 21, 1997, the five participating states of the USA, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine completed the agreement on the higher-velocity TMD systems. Resolving the issue of which states would assume the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under the treaty, the MOU on ABM designates Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as the only parties to the ABM Treaty. These four would collectively be limited to ABM deployment at a single site.26

Conclusion

Speaking to reporters on March 24, 1997, Robert Bell, NSC arms control specialist, was of the view that because of the Helsinki agreement, "we can maintain the highly effective TMD systems that we need to deal with this growing phenomena of missile proliferation throughout the world." Regarding whether the ABM Treaty does or does not cover TMD, Bell stated that the DOD had internally agreed that TMD used against targets with velocities above 2 km/sec, or above 40 km in altitude, should be referred to the Pentagon treaty compliance group and noted, "We're now saying that...it's okay as a TMD as long as you don't shoot at a target that goes faster than 5 kms per second or farther than 3,500 kms. In other words, there's an elasticity in this treaty..."27

Speaking on the accomplishment of the ABM Treaty of 1972, Gerard Smith wrote that the "treaty prevented what might have been a ferociously expensive and dangerously destabilising competition between offence and defence" and continued, "The real way to reduce the nuclear threat is not to seed space with hundreds of weapons, or to ring our nation with radars and rockets. Rather, it is to the nonproliferation regime and sharply reduce the nuclear arsenals left over from the Cold War competition--a task for which the continuance of the ABM Treaty will be essential."28

Some analysts and specialists are of the view that both US and Russian advanced TMD development programmes and proposed allowances in the ABM Treaty seem excessive in comparison to the avowed current threat or the unclear, hypothetical future threat.29 However, Aaron Karp, during his recent presentation stated that the BMD is coming into its own and that there is consensus in the West that the TBMD should be used. Also, the TMD is tailored to specific needs, is meant for meeting different threats and does not deal exclusively with nuclear weapons. An important innovation was that TMD does not have to deal with strategic logic anymore--while the strength of deterrence was the greatest aspect of the ABM system, TMD systems can now deal with deterrence failures like Saddam Hussein of Iraq (who has not been deterred).30

TMD systems do not provide a complete defence of the territories of the USA and its allies and Russia against a limited strike by nuclear-armed missiles. However, due to the asymmetric threat perceptions and defence requirements of both these countries, it would be extremely difficult to incorporate such systems in the ABM Treaty, which may thus have to be fundamentally revised. Though the fate of the ABM Treaty hangs in the balance, the TMD systems of the USA and Russia are here to stay.

 

NOTES

1. For the text of the ABM Treaty; the Agreed Statements, Common Understanding and Unilateral Statements; and the 1974 Protocol, see W. Stutzle, B. Jasani, and R. Cowen, SIPRI, The ABM Treaty: To Defend or Not to Defend? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), appendix, pp. 207-13.

2. Arms Control Association, Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction (Washington, DC: ACA, 1989), pp. 71-72.

3. Quoted in: The Arms Control Association, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, DC: ACA, 1990), p. 21.

4. Telegraph, December 16, 1986.

5. J. Pike, "Theater Missile Defence Programmes: Status and Prospects," Arms Control Today, vol. 24, no. 7, September 1994, p. 11.

6. Quoted in S. Keeny, "The Theater Missile Defence Threat to US Security," Arms Control Today, vol. 24, no. 7, September 1994, p. 4.

7. R.G. Nagler, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat (Arlington, Virginia: System Planning Corporation, 1992).

8. S. Fetter, "Ballistic Missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?," International Security, vol. 16, no. 1, Summer 1991, p. 14.

9. Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 17.

10. A. Arbatov, "The ABM Treaty and Theater Ballistic Missile Defence," in Sipri Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 683.

11. US Department of Defence, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era (Washington DC: DOD, September 1, 1993), pp. 45-49. See also Pike, n. 5, pp. 11-14.

12. D. Moshe, and R. Hall, "The Clinton Plan for Theatre Missile Defences: Costs and Alternatives," Arms Control Today, vol. 24, no. 7, September 1994, pp. 15-20.

13. Arbatov, n. 10, p. 684; and Moshe and Hall, Ibid., p. 16.

14. Moshe and Hall, Ibid., and Pike, n. 5, pp. 12-13.

15. "THAAD Dem/Val Set to Take Off," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 21, 1995, p. 9.

16. See B. Opall, "BMDO Switches Focus from Lab to Field," Defense News, vol. 10, no. 6, February 13-19, 1995, pp. 4, 34. Corps SAM is to be integrated in a 4-nation US-European programme called Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEAD).

17. Arbatov, n. 10, pp. 685-686.

18. Ibid., p. 686.

19. For a fuller account of the two Russian TMD systems, read Ibid., pp. 686-687.

20. Congressional Record, Senate, August 8, 1972, p. S27231.

21. S. Keeny, "The Theater Missile Defence Threat to US Security," Arms Control Today, vol. 24, no. 7, September 1994, p. 7.

22. Arbatov, n. 10, p. 690. Also, see pp. 690-693 for account of SCC negotiations upto end-1994 and for US and Russian experts claims that the advanced US TMD systems and components would provide them with a substantial strategic ABM capability.

23. For chronology of demarcation proposals, see The Arms Control Reporter: A Chronicle of Treaties, Negotiations, Proposals, Weapons & Policy, 1997, (Massachusetts: IDDS, 1997), pp. 603, A.3-603, A-4.

24. For full text of Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, see Ibid., pp. 603, D.43-44.

25. Ibid., pp. 603, B.295-296.

26. C. Cerniello, "SCC Parties Clear Final Hurdle for ABM-TMD 'Demarcation' Accords," Arms Control Today, vol. 27, no. 5, August 1997, p. 20.

27. See n. 23, pp. 603, B.297-298.

28. Quoted in P. Warnke, "In Appreciation of Gerard Smith," Arms Control Today, vol. 24, no. 7, September 1994, p. 2.

29. For example, read Keeny, n. 6, pp. 3-7, which examines whether the theatre missiles threat justifies the high cost of TMD programmes and diminishes US security that would result from weakening of the ABM Treaty.

30. Aaron Karp's presentation of From MTCR to ABMD: The Evolving Priorities of the American Missile Policy, delivered at the India International Centre, New Delhi, on November 19, 1997.