The Status of the Nuclear World at the Close of the Century
Manpreet Sethi, Research Officer, IDSA
The world that entered an age of nuclear weapons more than half a century ago has been through several phases of nuclear proliferation and control. Periods of concern over an unstoppable spread of nuclear weapons have alternated with years of relative lull when the problem of the Nth country has been dismissed as mere hypothesis. However, the ground reality has mostly remained somewhere in between.
One year short of entering the next millenium, it would be worthwhile to assess the status of the nuclear world as it is presently obtained. Mostly, the purpose of such assessments is to draw lessons from past experiences and present conditions to ensure a better and more secure tomorrow. This paper too has a similar objective.
The current status of the nuclear world can be gauged in a number of ways. It could be measured by counting the number of nuclear weapon states and near nuclear weapon states; by assessing the technological level of nuclear weaponry; by calculating the existing stockpiles of fissile materials; by identifying the number and scope of nuclear treaties now in place; or by assessing several other parameters.For the sake of convenience, the article has clubbed the various issues into four broad heads: nuclear proliferation; nuclear arms control; nuclear disarmament; and, nuclear treaties. By analysing the state of these four related issues, the paper seeks to determine at what stage the international community finds itself at present so as to chart out a course for the future.
In the immediate aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the world stood at the threshold of a new era in which the possession of nuclear weapons by several states could not be discounted. In fact, proliferation of nuclear weapons began soon after they demonstrated their awesome destructive potential and revealed their usefulness as weapons of deterrence and pressure. No amount of American effort to withhold technical information on the design and development of the atomic bomb could prevent the USSR from producing its own version of the nuclear weapon within four years. The British test in 1952 further drove home the point that despite its best efforts, the US could not hope to retain an American monopoly on nuclear weapons.
In the 1960s, two other countries successfully conducted nuclear tests with the explicit intention of building nuclear arsenals. France did so in 1960 and China followed suit in 1964. The five nuclear weapon states then devoted the next few years to negotiating a treaty for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) which would secure their nuclear status but commit the rest of the world to non-proliferation. The NPT entered into force in 1970 and was presumed to have foreclosed the opportunity for every other nation (except the five NWS, P-5) party to the treaty from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon status.
A short period of lull followed until May 1974 when India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion, once more focussing international attention on nuclear proliferation. The ensuing period then saw the P-5 scrambling to plug the possibility of more such attempts by crafting ad-hoc export control and technology denial regimes to further buttress the NPT and its safeguards mechanism. Yet, nuclear non-proliferation has remained elusive.
The last decade of this century has witnessed the emergence of a host of new proliferation concerns. A major nuclear shock was received in 1991 when IAEA inspectors authorised to inspect Iraq's nuclear establishments under the UN Security Council Resolution 687 stumbled upon an advanced unconventional weapons programme. It was revealed that Iraq, during most of the 1980s, had been engaged in a covert nuclear weapons programme, codenamed "Petrochemical 3." The project was so advanced that by the start of the Gulf war it had brought the country close to completing a fifth revision of a detailed design for an implosion-type bomb.1
What was most shocking in this discovery was the fact that Iraq had been an NPT signatory since October 29, 1969 whereunder it had pledged not to manufacture nuclear weapons and had placed all its nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards. Yet, the inspectors found the country in possession of significant amounts of unsafeguarded nuclear materials and constructing undeclared uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities. The level of advancement that Iraq had achieved before it was detected, naturally, dealt a blow to the assumed sense of security built around the NPT and IAEA safeguards.
The illusion of non proliferation being achievable through the NPT became even more ephemeral when North Korea's nuclear intentions became clear in 1992. This country once again cast a shadow on the efficacy of the NPT of which North Korea had been a signatory since 1984. However, it had not signed the mandatory safeguards agreement with the IAEA uptil 1992. Thereafter, when IAEA officials initiated their inspections, discrepancies were detected in the plutonium stocks officially disclosed to them. While North Korea had stated that it had separated only some grammes of plutonium in a one-time experiment, IAEA results hinted that Pyongyang might have carried out reprocessing of its spent fuel over at least three other occasions since 1989.2 It was therefore, feared that it might already have recovered fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Immediate and urgent action was needed to end the buildup of the country's nuclear capability. When the IAEA called for a special inspection North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT. The US then initiated negotiations with Pyongyang to ultimately reach an "Agreed Framework" in October 1994. Thereunder North Korea undertook to stop further development of its nuclear capability and dismantle the military related part of its programme in exchange for two much more advanced but proliferation resistant light water reactors (LWRs) and some other energy and security related benefits. The LWRs to be completed by 2002 are being financed and supplied by an international consortium comprising of the US, European Union, South Korea and Japan. Over the last couple of years though during which the agreement has been in operation, Pyongyang has not hesitated to threaten a pullout whenever there has been a delay in supply of oil from the US or over the start of the construction of the two LWRs.
Another major proliferation threat has recently emerged from the possibilities of leakage or smuggling of nuclear material. While illicit nuclear commerce is not exactly a new phenomenon, it has assumed frightening proportions after the demise of the USSR. The break up of the Soviet empire left Russia with an inheritance of a reported 32,000 nuclear weapons located throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union.3 The political and economic upheaval that accompanied this fracture and the collapse of central economic planning heightened the danger of illegal transfer of nuclear materials/weapons.
The large quantity and scattered locations of the nuclear material has made its stocktaking a difficult task. Moreover, the continuing socio-economic crisis has raised the possibility of nuclear commerce being illegally conducted to raise easy money. According to Russian authorities, there were 900 trespass attempts to gain illegal entry into nuclear installations in 1993 alone. There were an additional 700 cases of workers trying to smuggle nuclear material out of these installations.4 A very telling remark of a Russian expert can be quoted in this context. He has said, "The economic, political and social crisis in society has eroded this foundation and clarified the inadequacy of the current technical and organisational procedures to safeguard nuclear materials."5
The problem is further compounded by the weaknesses inherent in the Russian system of security. The Russian Minister of Interior had admitted in 1995 that 80 per cent of the country's nuclear sites lacked basic control mechanisms and portal monitoring equipment.6 There is also an absence of reliable border controls. An ill-manned and ill-equipped customs service is not capable, nor competent enough to cope with the detection of the movement of nuclear materials.
In view of these facts, it is not an alarmist viewpoint to fear proliferation through the illegal acquisition of nuclear fissile material. Between 1992-94, at least seven confirmed cases of diversion of weapons usable nuclear material from Soviet sources had been detected. Between 1995-1997 dozens of such cases were reported. Though since then, there has been a relative lull but it may be attributed to international assistance programmes or an increased awareness and readiness to tackle the problem. At the same time it cannot be overlooked that the lull could also have arisen from the cases going undetected because of an increased sophistication of smuggling or because of a backlash against Western intelligence services' investigations.7
Whatever be the reason, the risk of nuclear smuggling cannot be expected to be over as long as nuclear material is available and as long as individuals, groups or nations are interested in illegally obtaining weapons usable materials. At the same time it cannot be said with any certainty that smuggling of fissionable materials is a problem that is and shall remain restricted to the CIS region alone. In fact in March 1998, the Italian police had seized a 10 kg uranium fuel rod, probably manufactured in the US for use in a nuclear research reactor in Zaire.8 Therefore, the only conclusion one can arrive at in this matter is that potential areas in which nuclear smuggling can take place exist all across the globe and the potential consequences of such proliferation are too serious to be dismissed.
It is abundantly clear at this present juncture that the NPT and its paraphernalia, full scope safeguards, technology denial, export controls, threats of sanctions or the provision of incentives have not been able to satisfactorily arrest the march of nuclear proliferation. India and Paksitan have been the last, uptil now, to test nuclear weapons. There is no guarantee that other states might not venture along this path. Therefore, at the threshold of the 21st century, the world comprises of five declared NWS, two self proclaimed NWS, one widely accepted NWS though with an untested nuclear weapons capability and a host of others who for the time being have apparently accepted the constraints of international treaty obligations, lack of resources, lack of indigenous capability or simply the lack of political will to give up their nuclear option. However, they could reverse their positions if they so desired at any time in the future. Nuclear proliferation, therefore, is far from a closed chapter that could be confined to the history of the 20th century. Rather, it remains a very live prospect and a real danger.
Nuclear Arms Control
Control of nuclear arms began soon after they first made their appearance in the field of international war and diplomacy. USA that held the sole monopoly over nuclear weapons in 1945, being the first to have developed and used them, made several attempts to retain control over the weapon and the secrets of its fabrication. But the nuclear arms race did happen and the world during the Cold War years lived in the shadow of nearly a 80,000 strong stockpile. While USA recorded a high of 32,193 nuclear weapons in the late 1960s, the Soviet arsenal had 45,000 weapons by the mid-1980s. The remaining few thousands were stocked in the UK, France and China.
Serious efforts at, at least slowing if not halting, the nuclear arms race began in 1969 with the inauguration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). By 1972 it had produced the ABM treaty that halted the defensive anti-missile race and the offensive missile launcher race. But it did not constrain the growth in the number of nuclear warheads. Subsequently, 12 years after negotiations began and more than three years after it was signed , the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) entered into force on December 5, 1994. It envisaged the reduction of deployed strategic warheads in the two nations to 6,000 each. Meanwhile, only a year and a half after completing START I, Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed START II, reducing the deployed strategic nuclear warheads to roughly half the size of START I levels.
Such progress was made possible by the changing nature of relationship between the two superpowers from a conflictual to a cooperative one. Consequently, strategic doctrines and military practices were undergoing revision and these treaties embodied attempts at a rationalisation of the bulk of nuclear hardware accumulated during the Cold War.
However, after 1995 until now, there has been little progress, if not a gradual deterioration in international nuclear relations. The still uncertain fate of START II which was concluded and signed by the two Presidents with such urgency and enthusiasm provides evidence of this. The Russian Duma is still denying it ratification, mired as the country is in its own political and economic troubles.
Therefore, while it is true that the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers have shrunk severalfold, yet mutual suspicions and distrust have not withered away enough. In fact, the primary reason why arms control has stalled is the fact that thinking on nuclear weapons has not changed much. In the US, a departure from the past was expected from the Nuclear Posture Review conducted in the mid-1990s and it was hoped that it would provide some fresh insights on nuclear weapons and what military role they should play in the future. But the review essentially endorsed the status quo at somewhat lower strategic levels because it perceived the Russian threat to be somewhat less. At the same time, it led to the evolution of a new counter-proliferation strategy, which was actually a step backward, since it was predicated on the assumption that nuclear non-proliferation efforts could fail and to counter the new threats nuclear weapons were important. Recently the US government has strengthened its commitment to theatre missile defence (TMD) and has begun to stress upon nuclear weapons as deterrents against attacks from chemical and biological weapons. In turn, the US stance has predictably heckled Russia and China and the chain can be extended right down to India and Pakistan also, if not further.
On the other side, Russia has begun to exhibit a renewed attachment to nuclear arms, especially with its increasing awareness of the serious loss of its former political clout, economic strength and military power. The Russian vulnerability has been even more apparent when seen against the reinvigoration of the US and China—individually and jointly, and with the expansion of NATO. Consequently, the Russian dependance on its nuclear arsenal as a source of power has increased.9
Another factor that has bogged down nuclear arms control is the forthcoming requirement to include the other NWS into the process of negotiations. Until now, nuclear arms control had largely been conducted bilaterally between the USA and Russia. But as their arsenals will get reduced and come more on level with those of other NWS, there would be the need to involve the three others as well as India, Israel and Pakistan to construct universal norms and treaties that can equally apply to all.10 This eventuality has been unwelcome to the two superpowers because it would bring down their status to equalise it with the others. Nor do the three other NWS seem to be prepared to reign in their weaponisation plans. The two new entrants, and at what stage they need to join the others poses another problem. Moreover, since the situations faced by the eight NWS are different and their nuclear arsenals are highly asymmetrical with regard to their scale, quality and deployment capabilities, common nuclear arms control approaches that may have to be evolved in the next century are not going to be easy.
Nuclear disarmament has been the avowed objective of the international community including the NWS for several decades now. While the US had first tried to push it through in the late 1940s, but the sequence in which it proposed to do so was unacceptable to the USSR. It therefore, pursued its own weapons programme. Once the Soviet nuclear bomb had been produced, nuclear disarmament was put on the back burner as an arms race began in earnest.
Since then, nuclear disarmament has remained on the international agenda, though not necessarily as a top priority. The NPT that came into force in 1970 stipulated it as an obligatory objective of the NWS in return for the NNWS remaining non nuclear. But, the concept has remained only a cherished desire with all exercises being conducted to assess its desirability, practicality and achievability being relegated to the realm of academics. Even after half a century of surviving in the shadow of the nuclear spectre, the world is yet divided over the very basic issue as to whether complete nuclear disarmament should be the long-term goal of arms control or whether only a "low-salience" environment should be aimed at.
Therefore, while the international community is poised at the threshold of the 21st century, certain fundamental questions still loom large on the nuclear horizon. Would nuclear disarmament increase or decrease regional and global security? Would it be practical and feasible to get to a state of zero nuclear weapons and stay there? Within the NWS these questions are still being debated and the hawks appear to have taken a lead over the doves, atleast for the moment.
On the other hand, as far as the other NNWS of the NPT and India are concerned nuclear disarmament has been pursued as a realistically achievable goal and as the only way out of the nuclear mess. In fact, the NNWS have often accused the NWS of being in violation of the NPT by not taking any concrete measures in this direction.
In fact, over the last half a decade, one has been able to discern a heartening trend in the form of a growing participation of the non governmental organisations (NGOs) and even government officials, often retired and representatives of international organisations throwing their weight behind the argument in favour of disarmament. During the NPT Extension and Review Conference in May 1995, a Study Group of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) comprising 50 experts from 17 countries had presented a report entitled "Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" which outlined the transformation of the non-proliferation regime into an NWFW treaty. On the same occasion a statement was signed by more than 200 NGOs calling for "negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement."11
Leading nuclear theologians such as Paul Nitze, Fred Ikle and others have begun to question the wisdom of retaining nuclear weapons. Former senior military commanders and defence secretaries too have come together to propose the elimination of nuclear weapons as not only a desirable option but as the means of enhancing international peace and security. In December 1996, nearly 60 military officials from Russia, the US and other countries proposed a statement calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In March 1997, the Henry Stimson Centre launched a Nuclear Future Forum providing an opportunity for people to discuss the future of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.12
More recently, at the Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) Meeting of the NPT in April 1997, a group of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts presented a draft "Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of use of Nuclear Weapons and on their Elimination."13 Referred to as the NWC in short, it outlined a multi-step proposal to reach the zero level. Whether it is eventually accepted or not, what is most significant is the emergence of such a citizen initiated document.
At the same time, at another level several nations too have been individually and jointly striving for this goal. Only about six months ago, eight nations (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden) had issued a joint declaration entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The need for a New Agenda." Declaring that they could "no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States and the three nuclear weapons-capable States," they called upon the P-5 to "commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement."14
While the finalisation of a treaty to this effect cannot be expected to be concluded with great ease or in haste, it is at least evident that voices of sanity have been gathering momentum in the last few years of this century. Yet, it shall take an effort of great magnitude and a show of great magnanimity by the nations to tilt the scales in favour of nuclear disarmament in the coming millenium.
A host of international treaties have been concluded on the nuclear issue ever since the problem first cropped up. The NPT was amongst the first few major steps in this direction and as far as its status today is concerned it has a total membership of 184 states. The only holdouts include, Cuba,India, Israel and Pakistan. If the efficacy of a treaty could be judged in terms of its membership then, indeed, the NPT has proved its mettle. But on scraping the surface, one finds that the mere number of adherents cannot be a true measure of the success of the treaty. It is no secret that nations desirous of acquiring a weapons capability have done so even while being NPT signatories. At the same time, even the NWS have not let the treaty provisions hamper their nuclear weapons-related technology transfer deals as and when it suited their designs. Neither have they felt any remorse at the violation of their obligation under Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament.
The NPT was deemed to have taken a major test in May 1995 when its extension was debated and decided. In the months preceding the crucial Conference, it was feared that the treaty could crumble under the weight of the grievances of the NNWS on the lack of progress towards disarmament by the NWS. However, the US and other NWS were able to steamroll the rest into granting the NPT an indefinite and unconditional extension. Yet, cracks within the edifice do exist and are beginning to make themselves apparent. For instance, the second Prepcom for the NPT review conference to be held in 2000 ended with "no agreement on substance, recommendations or rules of procedure."15 Even within the NPT, its loyalists, including Canada, Egypt, Germany, Japan and the new converts such as Argentina, Ukraine, and South Africa are beginning to express their annoyance at the "NWS obstructive behaviour on disarmament." In view of such undercurrents, the NPT Conference in the year 2000 would prove to be a significant one.
Another landmark treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded in 1996 after three years of intense negotiations. Negotiations on the CTBT had begun in 1993 when the members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) had agreed on a mandate for an ad hoc committee that allowed negotiations to begin for a "universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which contributes to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects."16
The treaty was finally opened for signatures on September 24, 1996. Its conclusion marked the culmination of the debate that had started in the mid-1950s with a growing awareness in the general public on the harmful effects of radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests. Worldwide public protests had led national governments to pursue a global ban on nuclear weapon tests. During the Cold War, three treaties on nuclear testing were concluded, though none of them were comprehensive in nature. These included the multilateral Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, the bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests in 1974 and another bilateral Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes in 1976.
India had participated actively and constructively in CTBT negotiations, especially since it had perceived the treaty as an important piece in the larger disarmament framework. But when the final treaty took shape without promising anything much for disarmament, India chose to withdraw. In fact, divergence of views arose during the negotiations between the nuclear and the non-nuclear weapon states in the treatment of nuclear disarmament in the Treaty. Reservations were also expressed on the scope of the Treaty since it was perceived to have left open the option for the technologically advanced states to continue to improve their existing arsenals by conducting laboratory and non-explosive (subcritical) nuclear tests.
As far as adherence to the Treaty is concerned, 71 states had signed the treaty on the first day, including the five NWS and 32 of the 44 states required by Article XIV to ratify it to allow it to enter into force. However, the fate of the treaty yet hangs in balance. The road to securing ratifications of the NWS seems to be as rough as that leading to getting India, Pakistan and Israel to subscribe to it. Rather, India and Pakistan after conducting their nuclear tests in May 1998 have expresed their willingness to sign the treaty to allow it to come into force in September 1999, provided the US can extend to them certain concessions in exchange for their signature. For the moment however, it remains uncertain as to whether the world shall be entering the next century with a universally accepted CTBT or not.
A third major international treaty on the anvil is one that would proscribe further production of fissile material. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is presently under negotiation in the CD. However, there is much at stake for the participating nations, especially India, Israel and Pakistan and the negotiations are going to prove to be a long drawn process.
The FMCT has yet to grapple with a number of contentious issues. These range from differences on the perceived objectives of the treaty to disagreements over its very scope and terms of reference. India, Israel and Pakistan, the three states that have nuclear weapons capability but are outside the purview of the NPT have perceived the FMCT as an attempt at trying to rope them into accepting international safeguards. Given their consistent opposition of the NPT the three are not expected to join it, thereby continuing to keep their nuclear facilities and activities beyond the IAEA safeguards mechanism. The FMCT then is seen as another tool to prise open their nuclear facilities to international safeguards.
The delimitation of the scope of the treaty poses another problem. Should it be confined only to future production or also include existing stockpiles? In fact, the conclusion of a mandate for negotiations on the FMCT was delayed for more than a year on this subject. Countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Iran and Algeria have been pressing for the inclusion of existing stockpiles also into the Treaty purview. Other NWS have understandably been opposed to any such move since it would not only impinge upon their nuclear weapons production but also because with the kind and scale of military nuclear establishments that they have had, it would not be an easy task to account for every gram of fissile material.
However, Ambassador Shannon, placed in charge of preparing a report after considering different viewpoints attempted in 1995 to break the impasse on this particular issue by broadening the mandate for the establishment of the ad-hoc committee to include consideration of the issue of existing stockpiles as well besides that of a future cut-off of fissile material.17
Another issue on which the FMCT shall find itself in deep waters is on how and how much to establish a linkage with the larger question of nuclear disarmament. Most NAM states have emphasised its linkage to time bound global nuclear disarmament. But other NWS have not been in favour of such a linkage.
Therefore, the questions confronting the FMCT negotiators are many and complex. That the debates will be lengthy is inevitable. In fact, realising this reality, the US has begun to propose the idea of a "multilateral moratorium" on the production of fissile material which can predate the FMCT. The US urgency in this regard stems from its desire to deprive the new nuclear states, India and Pakistan of much time to accumulate fissile material stocks. It has also been suggested that the failure of American intelligence to accurately estimate the fissile material stocks in the sub-continent have provoked such a proposal so as to get the two states to disclose their stocks and then cap their nuclear weapons programmes.18 In any case, the stockpiles of fissile material will continue to trouble the international community in the coming years and until a universally acceptable and verifiable solution can be found to the problem.
The overall picture that emerges from the analysis carried out in the four sections is undoubtedly smeared with shades of black and white. On the one hand it is disappointing that despite several attempts to stem proliferation, it is still a problem to reckon with. On the other hand, however, hope persists that the voices in favour of general and complete nuclear disarmament will eventually at some opportune time in the next century succeed in orchestrating themselves into a convention for the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction.
As for the short term, it can largely be expected that the nuclear world would remain more or less as it is today. An FMCT or any other partial measure that claims to be another milestone on the path of disarmament cannot be expected to make too much of a difference. If at all any substantial transformation is to come about it could only happen if the international community in toto marches ahead towards a nuclear weapon free world. Mere non-proliferation, whether attempted horizontally through the NPT or vertically throught the CTBT or FMCT can make no difference. It must be understood that as long as nuclear weapons are available with even one nation, the rest can never be at peace and can be expected at some time or the other to strive for a similar capability to equalise relations.
The status of the nuclear world at the threshold of the 21st century may be comparable to a bird about to take flight. But whether it flows into the wilderness of nuclear weapons or into a world relieved of the nuclear spectre shall depend on how the international community utilises the opportunities available to it now, and in the future, to steer itself into a nuclear weapon free world.
1. Leonard S Spector, Mark G McDonough and Evan S Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation : A Guide in Maps and Charts (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment and International Peace, 1995), p. 125.
2. Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapon and State Survival in North Korea," Survival, vol. 35, no. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 140.
3. International Conference on Dealing with the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, The Hague, May 19-20, 1995 (Conference report published by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1995), p.1.
4. Ibid., p.2.
5. O. Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards and Security in former Soviet Union," Survival, vol. 36, no. 4, 1994-95, p. 57.
6. See n.3, p.3.
7. Emily S Ewell, "NIS Nuclear Smuggling Since 1995 : A Lull in Significant Cases?," Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1998, p. 123.
8. "Uranium Bar seized in Nuclear Trafficking Gang Bust Made in US," FBIS-WEU-98-079, March 20, 1998.
9. For more details see, "The US-Russian Strategic Arms Control Agenda", Arms Control Today, vol. 27, no.8, Nov/Dec 1997, pp. 12-16.
10. On this 2 + 3 + 3 + 183 (USA, Russia + UK, France and China + India, Israel and Pakistan + the rest of the nations) see William Walker, "International Nuclear Relations After the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions," International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3, 1998, pp. 512-513.
11. Jurgen Scheffran and Merav Datan, "Nuclear Weapons Convention—The Treaty is out of the Bottle," Agni, vol. 3, no.1, June-September 1997.
12. Deng Hongmei,"The Chemical Weapons Convention and Its Lessons for a Future Nuclear Weapons Convention," Agni, vol. 3, no.1, p.27.
13. Scheffran, n.11.
14. Joint Declaration Adopted on 9 June 1998 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. United Nations General Assembly, A/53/138.
15. Douglas Roche, "An Analysis of the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2,000 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty," Geneva, April 27-May 8, 1998. www:http:11watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough
16. Nuclear Proliferation News, July 11, 1995.
17. See Report of Ambassador Shannon to the Conference on Disarmament, March 23, 1995.
18. Chidanand Rajghatta, "US Wants Inventory of N-Materials," Indian Express, Noember 11, 1998.