Arms Transfers to West Asia
-Rajiv Nayan, Research Officer, IDSA
West Asia has occupied an important position in world politics of the contemporary period, albeit it has been one of the centres of civilisational activities throughout history. The dynamics of power politics of the region itself is, by and large, shaped by the Arab-Israel tension and conflict. However, the nature of conflict has never been uniform. Often Arabs are divided over different issues. Nevertheless the region has one consistent phenomenon: incessant arms build up. But except Israel, hardly any country in West Asia has developed a substantial or even minimal technology base and industrial infrastructure to produce modern weapons indigenously. The urge on arming without an indigenous capability leads a country to buy weapons from outside. And West Asian countries facing the same situation have also to do the same. Even Israel has derived its present prowess from the American support. Relatively developed Israel is also unable to shake off its dependency.
Although some of the major studies have not separately dealt with arms transactions in West Asia, features of this region can still be discerned by taking into account data and details available for the Middle East. The category Middle East or Near East comprises the countries of West Asia as well as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. West Asia comprises Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. There are four main groupings/actors among West Asian countries. Israel is the most important actor of the region. The US-backed Arab states constitute another important group. The third consists of the so-called pariah or rogue countries minus Iraq. And Iraq is the fourth important actor in West Asia. The issue of arms trade in West Asia can be properly understood in the context of these four actors.
Since the end of the Cold War failed to ease tension in the region, the flow of arms towards it could not be ebbed. Rather, because of the Kuwait invasion and the subsequent Gulf war, the situation worsened. It bred apprehensions in this zone and consequently, the rate of arms transfers is supposed to have increased. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports transactions of arms worth $124.8 billion in current dollars for the period 1988-95.1 The arms trade in the region thus constitutes around 55 per cent of the total value of arms transfer agreements of all developing nations.2 It is estimated to be 40 per cent of the global sale of arms.3
Commentators on arms trade in the region have no unanimity of opinion on the rate of flow of arms into the region. According to Keith Krause, "A close examination of the data suggests that arms transfers to the Middle East actually declined in the 1990s, following similar patterns manifest around the world."4 Several other reports have also indicated towards decline in arms transfers to West Asia in the past few years due to numerous factors. At the same time, the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO), the overseas arm of the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, predicts a "slow steady upturn" in the Middle East market during the next five years, with continuous dwindling of the global arms market by about 2.5 per cent annually over this period.5 The market is also expected to remain stable over this period. The replacement of outdated equipment is put forward as the principal reason behind the anticipated rise in the region. There is yet another projection on the Gulf market. It states that in the coming five years, Gulf countries will spend $75 billion on defence.6 This paper will try to outline the feature of arms transfers to West Asia in the 1990s.
Almost all categories of weapons, which are in circulation in the international arms market, have been transferred to the region. If certain weapons of the arms bazaar are not transferred to the region, then there are also some weapons which have not been supplied anywhere else but to this region. Several categories of minor and major combatants like frigates, fast attack craft, corvettes, patrol craft, etc. along with submarines have been sold here. FFG class and La Fayette class frigates, Hudong class, Vita type and P-37BRL type fast attack craft, Saar 5 type corvettes, Vigilante 400 type patrol aircraft, Dolphin class submarine and so on are the important amphibious weapons which have been acquired by the West Asian countries. The purchase of three Russian submarines by Iran has made it the first nation in the Persian Gulf to possess deep water warfare capability.7 This purchase has made many other countries of the region consider advanced coastal-patrol aircraft, minesweepers and modern surface vessels which can meet underwater threats, albeit security needs of many a country are fulfilled with the presence of American submarines in the region.
Several modern and sophisticated aircraft like sophisticated versions of F-15, F-16, Mirage 2000-5, Mig-29 and the like have been sold in this region. In West Asia, the supersonic aircraft has been increasing its share in the market in comparison to the other types of aircraft.8 The CRS report highlights that among different regions of developing countries, it is in the Middle East where there is a rise in terms of number of aircraft transacted in contrast to the earlier period. All the main aircraft are being offered with auxiliary weapons. Operational missiles are the most important category. The United Arab Emirates has shortlisted French Rafale, American F-16 and Eurocopter.9 The US has proposed the sale of the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the High Speed Radiation Missile System which have not been transferred to any other country in West Asia.10 Some of the missiles are claimed to be simultaneously inducted in the armoury of the supplier countries. This is the one of the features of global arms transfers of the 1990s.
Among weapon systems, numerically, like the global arms trade, the West Asian arms trade has also experienced the transfer of battlefield missiles in the largest number. These missiles are in non-prohibited categories, though from time to time, there have been reports of agreements among countries and companies to transfer weapons like Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).11 Although these missiles, generally, come in a package with the major weapon systems, yet countries do purchase extra missiles to augment the vigour of their armed forces. In the category of ship-to-ship missiles, ship-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, weapons such as Standard 1, MIM-23B Hawk, AGM-84A Harpoon, RIM-66B Standard 1MR, C-802, SS-N-22, AIM 9s Sidewinder, AM-39 Exocet, MM-40 Exocet, VT-1, Starstreak, Crotale, R-550 Magic 2, AIM-7M Sparrow, AS-15TT, AGM-65D Maverick, MICA, Rapier MK-2 and so forth have been supplied to West Asia. Of all missiles RGM-84A Harpoon, AIM 9s Sidewinder, MM-40 Exocet and AIM-7M Sparrow appear the most preferred. FIM-92A Stinger, Starburst, Mistral, SA-16 Gimlet, etc. portable surface-to-air missiles have also been acquired by the West Asian countries. Also, the purchase of anti-tank missiles like BGM-71C I-Tow, AT-10 Bastion, AT-4 Spigot AGM-114A Hellfire, and so on, have been made by the countries.
West Asia has been propagated as one of the most sensitive zones of the world because of its activities in the realm of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their highly dangerous carriers like ballistic and cruise missiles. Recently, Israel has blamed Russia for helping Iran in developing ballistic missiles. The US and Israel both have suspected former Russian state-owned laboratories and export companies for planning to supply SS-4 Sandal or SS-23 with technology, components, material and expertise.
However, Russia has denied this allegation. It has been claimed that Iran is increasing its efforts to develop Scud type missiles in the 1,200-to 1,300-km range.12 On February 6, 1997, George Tenet, acting Director of the Central Intelligence of the US testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that within ten years Iran would be capable of striking most parts of Israel and Saudi Arabia with longer range missiles tipped with WMD.13 There is a report alleging that Saudi Arabia is also either trying to modify its CSS-2 missiles or making fresh efforts to purchase new offensive missiles.14 This hyper propaganda has helped in selling anti-missile systems to a few countries of West Asia. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Israel have acquired the American Patriot system. Israel is already developing a joint anti-ballistic missile system--Arrow—in collaboration with the United States. Some countries have also acquired surface-to-air missile systems. For instance, Bahrain has got I-Hawk in aid from the US, whereas Kuwait has purchased Skyguard from Italy. These systems are utilised for air defence, including missile defence.
Similarly, AH-64A Apache, Bell 209/AH-1E, Bell 412 SP/AB-412 SP, AS-565 SA, SA-300 Puma, S-70/UH-60L Black Hawk, S-65A/CH-53D Stallion, C-130H-30 Hercules and so on are the most popular helicopters of West Asia. In the arena of armour and artillery, too, West Asia has received several types of weapons. M-60A3 Patton II, T-72M1, M-1 A2 Abrams, Challenger 2, etc are the most preferred Main Battle Tanks. Similarly, M-577A2 and Piranha 8x8 armoured personnel carriers, some versions of BMP and LAV-25, the Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles, self-propelled guns, Armoured Recovery Vehicles, Multiple Rocket Launchers and the like have been purchased by West Asian countries in the 1990s.
Even West Asian countries, in addition to the purchase of new weapons, have undertaken the task of refurbishment, modernisation and upgradation of the old weapon systems. This is done to economise and increase efficiency of the existing weapons. Sale of services is progressively becoming a notable feature in West Asia, too. The help of dual-use technology like satellite imagery is being taken by the countries of this region.
Thus, the trend towards diffusion of sophisticated weapons and advanced technology continued in this area. There is only one difference: the old models of sophisticated weapons transferred during the Cold War are increasingly being replaced by the new models available in the international arms bazaar. Several types of night fighting equipment, flak vests and grenade launchers have also arrived in the West Asian market. It is visualised in certain quarters that many of these countries are not capable of absorbing such a sophisticated level of technology as they have already shown their incapability to absorb high technological items transferred in the post-Cold War era.
The US is the biggest supplier of arms in the region, although there are many other Western countries active here. France, Germany, the UK and Canada are some important names. It is speculated that European countries are going to increase their share in the coming years. Because of the Al Yamamah programme of 1985, the UK has already captured a large share in the West Asian market; the DESO believes that the British industry will bag arms contracts worth $24.3 billion from Persian Gulf countries in the next five years.15 The Netherlands, for the first time, in the Persian Gulf, is transferring two of the Navy's used frigates to the UAE.16 Russia has been an important supplier throughout the Cold War and the situation has not changed much after the end of the Cold War. According to Mikhail Timkin, the Deputy Director of Rosvoorouzhenie, Russia sold arms worth $1 billion to Iran in 1996.17 Iran has emerged the third largest market of arms for Russia. The top two are India and China. Some other old Warsaw Pact countries like Poland, Slovakia, Czech, etc are also supplying arms to the region.
North Korea has been featuring as a controversial figure in West Asia. Its name is basically associated with the supply of WMD and related equipment and technology. North Korea along with China has been approached by some parties of this region for WMD. Interestingly, even the allies of the US are reported to have acquired such weapons from these two countries. The April 1996 report of the Defence Intelligence Agency entitled "Proliferation: Threat and Response," among different reports, has been highlighting this aspect.18 Several earlier reports of different US agencies have also been highlighting this phenomenon. However, companies of Western nations and Japan have also been indicted for supplying nuclear and missile components and technology.
South Africa is also entering the West Asian arms market. Recently, it has signed an agreement with Syria for supplying arms worth $641 million.19 This has been strongly resented by the US.20 But South Africa has ignored the US utterances that it should not supply arms to the pariah countries. According to South Africa, the country has its own perception of friend and enemy countries and it will take decisions with that perception.21
In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia has continued to be the largest buyer of arms in West Asia, according to data obtained from the study conducted by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).22 Iran occupies the second position in the ACDA study.23 Israel, UAE and Kuwait are the third, fourth and fifth largest recipients of weapons respectively. These five largest recipients figure in the study of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),24 though their rankings are changed. Saudi Arabia remains the largest recipient in this study, too. The DESO notes that Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain stayed as the principal arms recipients in 1996 by signing contracts together worth over $4 billion in that year.25 In the 1990s, the position of Iraq, Iran and Syria has declined in comparison to the earlier period. Iraq is under embargo, whereas an intense Western campaign has been launched against Iran and Syria after declaring them rogue states.
Motives of the Suppliers
In the earlier period, ideology had a greater role in shaping the arms business. The US, Russia and to a lesser extent, China were important players in the region with the instrument of arms transfer policy to shape the politics of the region. Arms sale was an important component of foreign policy. At present, there is a combination of motives of suppliers on display in West Asian countries. Commerce, the predominant motive to sell arms in the post-Cold War era, is the main driving force in the West Asian region, too. All major suppliers—the US, West European countries, Russia and China—are under tremendous pressure from their defence industries to allow arms business in oil-rich West Asia. The countries of Western Europe treat arms transfers primarily and basically as an economic and commercial activity and West Asia is not accorded any different treatment. Channelisation of overcapacity of arms industries is the core motive of the European countries.
However, the instance of separation of politics and economics does not operate in the case of the US. In the region, it has not abandoned its earlier policy, namely, arms sale as an instrument of foreign policy. At present, the task appears to be isolating the so-called rogue states. In this venture, it has made certain Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc, apart from Israel, its allies. These countries are provided arms to balance the power struggle in the area. Moreover, Israel has been supplied arms and technology which are otherwise not supplied to many countries. It is clear the Kissingerian idea of establishing regional policemen for American interests in West Asia has not been dumped, though a country like Iran is no longer a policeman for the Americans. It is now a rogue for them.
Also, the domestic politics of the US has a greater role in arms transfers in the region. Israel is the sole beneficiary because of the strong Jewish lobby but now the Muslim lobby is also trying to assert itself. The Muslim lobby has not become as powerful as the Jewish lobby is. Nevertheless it is making its presence felt. The petro-based industrial sector of the US is also helping some Arab countries.
Rationales of the Recipients
In other parts of the world, security is cited as the main and in a way the sole reason for acquisition of armaments. In the context of West Asia, security as the reason behind procurement of arms is espoused more vehemently. The interpretation of security in both ways--threats from other states and threats to the survival of the regime in power--is considered more valid for the countries of West Asia, which are believed to be facing multi-dimensional problems. Other factors such as prestige, influence, hegemony, aggressive intentions and the like are generally not admitted and when some of them are admitted, quite naturally, they are not projected as the real, principal factor of arms purchase.
Some writers on arms trade dwell on the phenomenon of reverse engineering associated with the transfers of weapons and technology. They say many countries put sophisticated weapons and high technology in the shopping list so that they can utilise these technologies for the development of their indigenous industries. In West Asia, it does not appear that barring Israel other countries can think in those terms, although countries like Iran have rudimentary industry. As discussed, many of these countries, even if try to absorb these borrowed technologies will not succeed in their efforts. Iraq is another country that could have accomplished this task, but it is under heavy sanctions at the moment. So any such thinking on its part is not possible.
A few countries have reportedly supplied arms purchased from outside to third countries. Such supplies are generally made to embargoed countries or big insurgent groups. A country like Israel sells some weapons purchased from abroad after upgrading and modifying them. It also purchases technology and equipment to mount on its indigenous systems and exports these thereafter. Israel has not only been accused of transferring sensitive technology to countries like the earlier racist South Africa and China but is also targetted for selling weapons claiming that they are indigenous while in many cases most of the technologies used are borrowed and adapted from outside weapons.26 Several agencies of the US, the chief supplier of weaponry, equipment and arms technology to Israel have indicted Israel for such activities.27 In the region, on numerous occasions weapons have been purchased to please the US by its Arab allies. The US is actively involved in the region and many of the purchases are for all practical purposes useless.
In the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the US were two main arms suppliers. In the post-Cold War era, these two actors did not cease to exist, only the Soviet Union has been succeeded by Russia. In the region, the US supplies arms to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan, etc, whereas Syria, Iran and the like have been the Russian clients. The dismantling of the socialist bloc which heralded the end of the Cold War created a new situation. Cross-bloc diversification of sources of arms was visualised to grow popular in the future.28 Rightly so, even Israel, the most reliable ally of the US in West Asia, started looking for cooperation beyond America. Russia has supplied BMP-3 armoured fighting vehicles to the UAE.29 Russian arms are being considered by Israel. Presently, many West European countries are increasing their share in the West Asian market. Several American clients are preferring these countries on the basis of the changed principle of the weapons acquisition. The principle, quality, not politics, is expected to become more popular in the coming years.
Nonetheless, the entry of the European countries in the West Asian market is not a new phenomenon. The UAE has been traditionally close to France and the UK has had the famous Al Yamamah deal with Saudi Arabia. Already, a multiple-source, cross-bloc pattern had been noticed in the countries of West Asia during the Cold War period. The blurring of bloc boundaries has not altered the traditional supplier-client relationship in a substantial way in West Asia. The so-called pariah nations are still being supplied arms by the ex-Warsaw Pact countries. Now, the US is successfully pressurising many ex-Warsaw Pact countries to stop the supply of arms to the so-called pariah countries. The membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has emerged as one such lure.30 However, the ex-Warsaw Pact countries have not made much headway into the Western zone. The expected change in the supplier-client relationship has not taken any dramatic dimension. Whatever change is witnessed reminds one of the situation in Latin America after the Falklands war. Argentina, which was dependent on the UK for arms, diversified the sources but the new sources of arms were found within the Western bloc. The intra-old bloc diversification as the new pattern continued in West Asia in the 1990s.
Nature of Market
Many commentators on arms trade have announced that for a long period a buyer's market has been in operation in the international arms bazaar.31 And West Asia is not excluded from this conception. The presence of deals, associated phenomenon--package containing auxiliary weapon systems as well as some other concessions--the claim of simultaneous induction of many "frontline" technologies such as AMRAAM in the buyer and the seller countries, offsets, and so on, in West Asia are cited to prove the point of existence of such a market. If the concept of a buyer's market is a myth in the global arms trade, the same negative conditions like oligopolistic market, reserve technology line to maintain superiority once frontline technology is transferred, non-functioning of the offset system, etc. prevail in this region, too. These conditions do not allow a case for a buyer's market. No doubt, arms suppliers are giving certain concessions to buyers of this region because of the pressure of commercialisation and the buyers are operating in a more businesslike manner, but this situation is still not sufficient to state that the buyers' market has come into vogue.
Mode of Exchange
In this oil-rich region, occasionally suffering from a cash crunch, sellers, who prefer cash transactions, have to accept the alternative barter system. Arms for oil is a common feature of the region. For example, in a reported agreement between China and Iran, it is believed that China would supply new weapon systems worth a total of US $4,500 million. Out of this, $2,000 million is to be paid in oil deliveries by 2001.32 Similarly, owing to the debt situation, the UK-Qatar arms deal involves payments in kind. It is assumed to be made in natural gas from the huge newly developing fields of Qatar.33
Relationship with Peace and Stability
As per conventional wisdom, an increase in arms sale has immediate repercussions on peace and stability. In West Asia, peace and stability has been a major issue but, shockingly, the country which has been in the forefront of waging such a campaign is the largest arms supplier to this region. The reason for the arms supply by this country is counter-balancing of the arms build-up of the rogue countries and providing a state of deterrence in the region so that peace and stability can be maintained. The policy in place is the dual containment of Iran and Iraq. The statement of John White, the Deputy Defence Secretary, in Bahrain, further illustrates this policy. He said, "We want to continue to keep Iraqi President Saddam Hussain in his box. With respect to Iran, we see them as a long-term threat and a major exporter of terrorism in the world."34 Undoubtedly, in a conflict situation, there will be unpredictable and incredible damage because of the nature of sophisticated arms acquired by the countries of the region. However, any threat to peace and stability in the region with the purchased arms is yet to be witnessed and perceived. It is politics that has been providing the moments of worry in West Asia.
Relationship with Restraining Factors
Two very important countries, Iran and Iraq, received arms from the Western countries. Iran's supply was stopped after the 1979 revolution, whereas Iraq, which got arms to counter Iran, was denied arms after the invasion of Kuwait. Now, it is under embargo. Nonethelss, it extensively used arms supplied by the West and threatened to use weapons developed from the Western technology in Operation Desert Storm. The experience with these two countries has led to a thinking in the Western supplier countries that sophisticated advanced offensive weapons like the ones used in Operation Desert Storm should not be supplied in the future. This has, ultimately, resulted in the enactment of all types of laws based on unilateral, bilateral and multilateral decisions and agreements for all types of weapons, nuclear, chemical and conventional, as well as special carriers like missiles. More important and noteworthy among the efforts are the United Nations Arms Register, beginning of the process of replacement of the Coordination Committee on Multilateral Exports (finally resulting in the setting up of the Waasenaar Arrangement), amendments in the Missile Technology Control Regime, conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, tightening of the Arms Export Control Acts in countries like the US, and so forth.
Though transfers of weapons and related equipment of all categories are scrutinised, high technological munitions and dual-use technology are paid extra attention. Besides, a set of countries has been made specific targets. These countries are Iraq, Iran, Syria, and so on. However, other countries, including the American allies, have not been completely spared. Even they are subject to restrictions, obviously, not as rigorous as the so-called rogue countries are subjected to. Definitely, the entire endeavour has blocked sale of some weapons at times. Countries are denied weapons like ATACMS.35
However, as discussed, the pressure of commercialisation very frequently forces a country to circumvent laws to allow transactions on different pretexts. This was the reason for resistance to the Waasenaar Arrangement by Russia as it could have affected its traditional clients like Syria, Iran, etc. which were, and in a way still are, being targetted by the US and some of its allies. Owing to the market factor, Russia is reluctant to give a clear-cut assurance to stop the supply of arms to Iran after 1999. Clandestine transfers further make the laws redundant.
In the post-Gulf war situation, the idea of transparency for checking buying sprees has not succeeded much in the West Asian region. Nor have exports control regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Waasenaar Arrangement, and so on. The export control laws have had just a microscopic impact on the arms sales to the region. Whatever control is witnessed, is in fact, because of the declining purchasing power of the countries of the region. The impact of purchasing power is witnessed not only in the case of not-so-resourceful countries but also in the case of oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, West Asia and other extra-regional powers belonging to the Middle East have emerged as an important point of arms transfers, though some believe 1993 was the peak year in which arms sales to the region reached the saturation point. Arms of apocalyptic and non-apocalyptic nature are still being purchased by the countries of West Asia. If in the 1980s the Iran-Iraq war propelled the arms race in the region, in the 1990s, definitely, the Gulf war provided the thrust towards this direction. Unlike South-East Asia, West Asia witnessed the emergence of regional powers because of such transfers, especially in the sophisticated category. The economic factor is just playing a secondary and supporting role in this military-dominant power system.
As discussed, in the market, the US has continued to maintain its hegemony but its clients are giving orders to countries like France, the UK and Germany. Similarly, the US is also trying to cut others' share. The recent endeavour to get a share out of the Al Halalah programme can be a case in point. Undoubtedly, the suppliers will step up efforts to increase their shares in the market and, in the process, export control laws will keep getting flouted. Russia will be in the forefront in circumventing and thwarting Western legal designs, although the past experience and the present utterances indicate that, on different pretexts, even Western countries will not resist the temptation to circumvent laws to benefit their defence industries. As a result, there might be a further rise in clandestine activities. Already, many countries are believed to have vigorously renewed their activities to acquire prohibited missiles and related technologies. The plutonium smuggling had a few West Asian countries as its destination. In comparison to the last decade, the acquisition of such items and technologies has to confront a more rigorous Western blockade. Otherwise, the features of arms transfers of this decade are merely a continuation with a marginal difference that reflects the new environment.
1. US, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress on Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1988-1995, August 5, 1996, 96-677F, p.11.
3. Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 1997.
4. Keith Kruase, "Middle Eastern Arms Recipients in the Post-Cold War World," in Richard D. Lambert, ed., The Arms Trade: Problems and Prospects in the Post-Cold War World. The Annals, vol. 535, (Philadelphia: Sage Publications Inc., September 1994), p. 73.
5. Defense News, March 3-9, 1997, p. 28.
6. n. 3.
7. David Isenberg, "Chaotic Arms Control; Decision Making for the Post-Cold War," http.//www.au.af., mil/au/database/research, April 1, 1997.
8. n. 1, p. 72.
9. Defense News, March 17-23, 1997, p. 8.
11. For reference, see Defense News, February 17-23, 1995, p. 18.
12. Defense News, February 10-16, 1997, p. 40.
14. Defense News, March 17-23, 1997, pp. 3 & 42.
15. Defense News, March 3-9, 1997, p. 4.
16. Defense News, April 8-14, 1996, p. 6.
17. n. 12.
19. Internet, http;//biz.yahoo.com/upi, January 16, 1997.
20. Internet, http://biz.yahoo.com/UPI, January 13, 1997.
21. Khaleej Times, January 16, 1997.
22. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 1996), pp. 53-178.
24. SIPRI Yearbook 1996, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (Solna: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 463-486.
25. n. 15, p. 28.
26. Duncan Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorised Arms Transfers," Foreign Policy (99), Summer 1995, pp. 89-109.
27. For reference, see, "A Missile Under Fire," US News & World Report, June 28, 1993, p. 40.
28. Ian Anthony, "Current Trends and Developments in the Arms Trade," in Lambert, n. 4, p. 25.
29. Steven Erlanger, "Moscow Insists It Must Sell the Instruments of War to Pay the Costs of Peace," New York Times, February 3, 1993.
30. The Washington Times, February 20, 1997.
31. For example, David Mussington, Understanding Arms Transfers: An Analysis of the Post-Cold War Arms Trade and Supplier Strategies for Limiting Conventional Weapons Proliferation, Adelphi Paper, 291. (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 4.
32. Military Procurement International, vol. 6, n. 19, October 1, 1996, p. 1.
33. Defense News, November 25-December 1, 1996, p. 3.
34. n. 7.
35. n. 11.