Treaty of Pelindaba:How Different?
Dr. Savita Pande,Research Fellow, IDSA
The first proposal for a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Africa was made in 1960 after the first nuclear test explosion in the Sahara Desert by France. That year marked "the true beginning of the genesis of the proposal to establish an African NWFZ."1 At that time, eight African countries raised the matter in the United Nations but did not press it. The following year, 14 African states formally proposed in the UN General Assembly a resolution for preventing the extension of the arms race to Africa and for making Africa a "denuclearised" zone. The resolution was approved by the General Assembly. It called on all member states to refrain from conducting nuclear tests in Africa, and from using the area for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons, and asked them to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearised zone.2 The Soviet Union supported the proposal but the United States and its allies found the proposal unacceptable on the ground that prohibition on testing meant an uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium.
Nearly three years later, the first African regional document, the direct forerunner of the Treaty of Pelindaba, was adopted. In July 1964, at the first Summit Conference of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the heads of state and government of African countries issued a solemn "Declaration on Denuclearisation of Africa."3 They announced their readiness to undertake "through an international agreement to be concluded under the United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons," and requested the General Assembly to take the necessary steps to convene an international conference for the purpose of concluding an agreement to that effect. This declaration was endorsed at a Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries held in October of the same year.
The General Assembly, however, did not convene an international conference as requested by the OAU declaration.
In 1965, 28 African states submitted a proposal in the General Assembly to endorse a declaration on the denuclearisation of Africa issued at the Summit Conference of the OAU the previous year. The resolution was overwhelmingly approved by the General Assembly in an almost unanimous vote, including all the nuclear powers except France. In addition to endorsing the declaration on denuclearisation of Africa, the General Assembly:
1. reaffirmed the call on all states to respect the continent of Africa as an NWFZ and to abide by the declaration;
2. called on all states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in Africa;
3. called on all states not to test, manufacture, use or deploy nuclear weapons in Africa or to acquire such weapons or take "any action which would compel African states to take similar action";
4. urged the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons, information or technological assistance to the national control of any state in any form which could assist in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa; and
5. expressed the hope that African states would initiate steps through the OAU with a view to implementing the denuclearisation of Africa.4 In the same resolution, the Assembly also requested the United Nations Secretary General to extend to the OAU the facilities and assistance that it might require to achieve the aim of the resolution.
No concrete action was, however, taken to implement the declaration or resolution.5 Nine years later, in December 1974, 26 African countries again proposed a resolution in the General Assembly which was unanimously adopted by all the countries, including France, which had some years earlier shifted nuclear testing from Algeria to the Pacific Ocean island of Muruora. The resolution reaffirmed the previous resolution and again called on all states to refrain from testing, manufacturing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on the African continent.
The subject of an NWFZ in Africa was again discussed by the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1975. On this occasion, 34 African states, led by Nigeria, introduced a resolution similar to that adopted in 1974, under the agenda item "Implementation of Declaration on Denuclearisation of Africa" supporting the establishment of an NWFZ in Africa. The resolution was again adopted by a unanimous vote, including all the nuclear powers, on December 11, 1975.6
At the 1976 session of the General Assembly some new elements were brought into the discussion. The African states were becoming increasingly concerned about the growing capabilities of South Africa in the field of nuclear energy, which gave it the potential of making its own nuclear weapons. The resolution, which was adopted by consensus, without a formal vote, dealt specifically with this aspect for the first time. Among its provisions were the following:
"Concerned that further development of South Africa's military and nuclear weapon potential would frustrate efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zones in Africa and elsewhere as an effective means for preventing the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons and for contributing to eliminating the danger of a nuclear holocaust...
"Appeals to all states not to deliver to South Africa or place at its disposal any equipment or fissionable material or technology that will enable the racist regime of South Africa to acquire nuclear-weapon capability."7
It has been rightly stated that the "African states, for their part, did not plan the strategy that would have been necessary to capitalise on the historic OAU resolution 2033 (XX)."8 From 1974 to 1990, the Assembly continued to adopt resolutions annually (sponsored by the African states) whose focus shifted from concluding a treaty on an African NWFZ to matters considered be obstacles to its achievement.
The obstacles related mainly to different aspects of the policies of the Government of South Africa:
South African Nuclear Programme
The South African nuclear weapons programme originated in the 1970s although the decision to establish an indigenous nuclear research and development programme for peaceful purposes was taken much earlier. The South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) was set up in 1949, as a result of passage of the South African Energy Act of 1948.9
The first research reactor acquired from the US, Safari-I, went critical in 1965. The indigenous reactor, Safari-II, did so two years later. In 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster informed Parliament of the government's intention to build the pilot enrichment plant (the Y-plant).10 The construction of the pilot enrichment plant began in 1971, and full scale cascade of the entire operation plant commenced in March 1977. The first quantity of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was drawn from the plant in January 1978. According to Newsby Frazer, the project, which was three-phased and codenamed "XYZ" predated 1970. It was made public in 1970 because it was no longer possible to keep it a secret.11 The plant which was closed temporarily in 1979 and resumed production in 1981, continued to do so till 1991.
Suspicions about South Africa's nuclear capability and intentions were dramatically heightened when in August 1977 it was revealed that a Soviet satellite had photographed installations in the Kalahari Desert which appeared to form a nuclear explosion test site. Confirmation from a US reconnaissance satellite aroused vehement international protest. Following diplomatic pressures from the United States and the Soviet Union, South Africa abandoned the site.12
The other incident which aroused much speculation was the "Vela satellite" incident. In October 1979, the US government announced that one of its Vela satellites had detected signs of a nuclear explosion of approximately two to four kilotons yield in the atmosphere over the South Atlantic, off the Cape. Subsequent opinion on the issue was divided.13
Formally approved in October 1978, the strategy was to consist of three phases. The first phase called for strategic ambiguity in which the government was to neither deny nor confirm possession of nuclear-weapon capability. In the second phase, should the South African territory be threatened, covert acknowledgement to some international powers was be made. Should phase two fail to persuade the international community to intervene to alleviate an armed attack from outside South Africa's borders, in phase three, South Africa would publicly disclose its nuclear arsenal, either by official acknowledgment or an underground nuclear test.14 In practice, the strategy never advanced beyond phase I.
In July 1979, an Action Committee appointed by President P.W. Botha recommended the manufacture of six additional nuclear devices, to make a total of seven. It also advised that development and manufacture of nuclear weapons be transferred to ARMSCOR, the South African arms manufacturing corporation.
The first device built at the new ARMSCOR facility was completed in December 1982 and thereafter further devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year, matching the production schedule of the enrichment plant. The devices were never stockpiled in assembled form; the nuclear and non-nuclear components were stored separately in concrete and steel vaults. Three senior officials held one code each and only the head of the government knew the fourth code.
The programme was reviewed in 1985 and it was reconfirmed that the extent of the programme would be limited to fission gun type devices. In the end, only six were completed. It was reconfirmed that these devices would not be employed for offensive purposes and the three-phase deterrent strategy would be maintained. The Kalahari site was revisited in 1987, as an underground test still formed a fundamental part of phase three of the strategy.
Regional and international anxieties were mounting about South Africa's growing nuclear weapons development and capability. That in fact prompted the General Assembly to adopt a resolution in 1979 which mandated a group of experts from France, Nigeria, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Venezuela, to prepare a study entitled "South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field."15 Another study, entitled "South Africa's Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability" was released by the United Nations in 1990, on the basis of a General Assembly resolution.16
Following assumption of office by President F.W. de Klerk in 1989, South Africa with the aim of acceding to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) decided to dismantle the six weapons. The announcement of South Africa's past deterrent capability was also classified as a top secret.
The devices were dismantled by July 1, 1991. The dismantling took place under the joint control of the AEC (in 1982, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation was merged with the AEB into a single state corporation, the present Atomic Energy Corporation) and ARMSCOR, with independent supervision by a professor of nuclear physics, W.L. Monton. The process involved accounting for all nuclear material and destroying all available technical weapon design documents, drawings, computer software and other data and transferring them to the AEC for peaceful use. South Africa acceded to the NPT on July 10, 1991, and to the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 16 the same year. On October 30, 1991, in accordance with the NPT commitment, South Africa gave the IAEA an inventory of all nuclear material as of September 30, 1991.
South Africa may have tried to project the changed circumstances brought about by the withdrawal of the Cuban backed forces, the Namibian independence and the fading of Soviet military power as reasons for dismantling and denuclearisation but the fact is that it had more to do with the fears of the black majority coming to power and gaining control of the nuclear button than anything else that made South Africa take the decision. In fact, a South African official had been quoted as having said that South Africa's decision to sign the NPT was in fact "motivated" by the concern that it did not want any undeclared nuclear material or infrastructure "falling into the hands of Nelson Mandela and the ANC."17
The reasons notwithstanding, the dismantling removed a major hurdle in the way for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. On September 17, 1990, just before the fourth NPT Review Conference and start of the 34th annual General Conference of the IAEA, South Africa declared that it was prepared to accede to the NPT" in the context of an equal commitment by other states in the Southern African region." The statement also supported the decision to make Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone.18
Group of Experts
In 1990, the African states at the United Nations met in a strategy session on how to transform the OAU 1964 Declaration into a treaty format. Following that, a draft resolution sponsored by the African states was approved by the General Assembly.19 The resolution adopted a measure, which was later to prove decisive for the success of the African NWFZ idea—the creation of a group of experts specifically instructed "to examine the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a convention or treaty on denuclearisation of Africa." The mandate of the group was later expanded in 1992 to include "drawing up a draft treaty or convention on the denuclearisation of Africa."20
As mandated, a group of experts was constituted in 1991, composed of experts from the various sub-regions of Africa, the OAU, the United Nations and IAEA. Representatives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco were invited to participate as observers in the work of the group so that Africa could benefit from the experience gained by the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Representatives of the five nuclear-weapon states and Spain and Portugal were invited to participate as observers in the work of the group. The special meetings provided an opportunity to ascertain the views of extra-regional states regarding the protocols to the Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, also called the Treaty of Pelindaba, which are addressed to them.21
The group of experts held a total of six meetings between 1991 and 1995, the last of which took place five years after its creation, in Johannesburg/Pelindaba, from May 29 to June 2, 1995. The Pelindaba text of the African NWFZ Treaty, as adopted by the group of experts, was submitted to the OAU Council of Ministers at its 62nd session held in Addis Ababa from June 21 to 23, 1995. After considering the Pelindaba text, the OAU Council of Ministers made some amendments and thereafter adopted the resolutions.22 The Pelindaba text, as amended, was then approved by the 31st ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. On December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly, welcomed the Treaty of Pelindaba and on April 11, 1996, the treaty was opened for signature.23 The treaty will establish an African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) to supervise the implementation of the treaty, with headquarters in South Africa.
Scope of Obligations and Verification
The Treaty of Pelindaba prohibits the manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or acquisition by any means as well as possession and control of any nuclear explosive device. In Article 1, dealing with the definition and usage of the term, "nuclear explosive device" is defined as any nuclear weapon or other nuclear weapon device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. This is exactly the way it is defined in the Treaty of Rarotonga also.
The renunciation of nuclear explosive devices is dealt with in Article 3. It covers every aspect from research, which does not occur in any other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, to development, manufacture, stockpiling or control. Thus, each party commits in this Article not to undertake those activities by itself, not to seek or receive assistance, nor to assist or encourage others in undertaking them.
Article 4 prevents the stationing of nuclear explosive devices. After much discussion it was decided that the issue of allowing foreign ships or aircraft that might be suspected of carrying nuclear explosive devices to visit its ports or airfields was left to each party to decide for itself under Article 4 paragraph (2), but the exercise of the right should be without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty.24 Not prohibited in the African zone is the establishment of facilities serving nuclear strategic systems of the nuclear powers.25
Article 5 prohibits the testing of any nuclear explosive device by a state party. It also forbids the states parties from assisting or encouraging the testing of any nuclear explosive device in any state anywhere. Read in conjunction with Article 1, the treaty thus prohibits peaceful nuclear explosions.
In a clear allusion to the past South African nuclear weapon programme, Article 6 requires each party to declare any capability for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of the treaty, and to destroy the facilities for production. All such operations must take place under the supervision of the IAEA.
Dumping of Waste, Physical Protection, Verification, etc.
Like the Treaty of Rarotonga, The Treaty of Pelindaba prohibits the dumping of radioactive matter anywhere within the African zone, but it also contains, in Article 7, an undertaking by parties to implement or at least use as guidelines, the measures contained in the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within African in so far as it is relevant to radioactive waste.
Article 8 says that nothing in the treaty should be so interpreted as to prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. Under paragraph 2 of the Article, parties undertake, individually and collectively, to use nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. They also undertake to establish and strengthen mechanisms for cooperation at the bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels. Article 8, paragraph 3, encourages the parties to make use of the programme of assistance available in the IAEA.
Under Article 9, each party undertakes to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and undertakes not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment to any non-nuclear weapon state unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with the IAEA.
Article 10 provides for maintenance by parties of the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear materials, equipment and facilities to prevent theft or unauthorised use and handling. Article 11 prohibits armed attacks on nuclear installations within the zone. It reassures parties that other parties will neither launch such an attack nor assist others in doing so.
The treaty establishes the AFCONE, under Article 2, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with its provisions. Elected by a Conference of Parties, the commission is responsible for operation of the treaty. With headquarters in South Africa, AFCONE will have 12 members elected by the parties for a period of three years, bearing in mind not only the principle of equitable geographical distribution but also advancement of members' nuclear programmes. It is supposed to receive and collate the reports that parties are obliged to submit annually on their nuclear activities; it shall implement complaints and dispute settlement procedures as elaborated in Annex IV of the treaty; it shall review application of IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities, as elaborated in Annex II; and it shall promote and encourage sub-regional, regional and international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the zone.
The Chairman and Vice-Chairman are to be elected by AFCONE, while the Executive Secretary is to be designed by the Secretary General of the OAU (Annex III). The commission may request the IAEA to conduct an inspection on the territory of a party suspected of violating its obligations and designate representatives to accompany the agency's inspection team, but it may also set up its own inspection mechanisms. Established breaches may be referred to the OAU, which, in turn, can refer the matter to the UN Security Council (Annex IV).
The highest body created by the treaty is the Conference of Parties. However, its functions are mainly to elect members of the commission, to adopt the commission's budget, and, occasionally, to convene an extraordinary session to receive and deliberate on the commission's findings regarding complaints against a party.
Zone of Application
The Treaty of Pelindaba bans nuclear weapons in the territory of the continent of Africa, island state members of the OAU, and all islands considered in the OAU resolutions (presumably also resolutions that may be adopted in the future) to be part of Africa. For the purposes of the treaty, territory may be land territory, internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters and airspace above them, as well as seabed and subsoil beneath (Article 1). A reference is made to the freedom of the seas (Article 2), identical to that appearing in the Treaty of Rarotonga; it is clearly intended to preclude restrictions on the presence of nuclear weapons beyond the territorial sea limits of zonal states. Under Protocol III of the Treaty of Pelindaba, open for signature by France and Spain, the signatories should apply, in the territories for which each one of them is de jure or de facto internationally responsible and that are situated in the African zone, the denuclearisation provisions contained in Article 3 to 10 of the treaty, and ensure the application of IAEA safeguards there.
Annex 1 of the treaty contains the map indicating the zone of application of the treaty, to which reference is made in Article 2. The negotiations for the wording for Article 2 as well as nature of the map in Annex 1 comprised a laborious task because of the many disputed territories within the zone. The extra-zonal powers that are in disagreement with African states also happen, in the most important cases, to be nuclear weapon states whose support for the protocols to the treaty is crucial for its effectiveness. In most of the cases, the expert group was able to arrive at an understanding. However, one major issue remains unresolved within the formula agreed upon.
In the light of special peculiarities of the African zone, it was not considered feasible to describe the zone in longitudinal and latitudinal terms. The illustrative map in Annex 1 shows all the states which, by the decisions of the OAU, appertain to Africa, with the understanding that inclusion in the map is without prejudice to the issue of sovereignty. An exception to the general understanding relates to Chagos Archipelago, which, in the view of the United Kingdom should not be reflected as being part of the zone. For Africa, however, the Chagos Archipelago is part of the territory of Mauritius, whose claim has been endorsed by the OAU. It was made clear that the resolution of the sovereignty issue would have to take place outside the framework of the treaty.
The United Kingdom, however, stated that it did not accept the inclusion, without its consent, of the British Indian Ocean Territories, of which Diego Garcia is part, within the African NWFZ, and that it did not accept any legal obligations in respect of the territory. In a related statement, the United States noted that neither the treaty nor Protocol III applies to activities of the United Kingdom, the United States or any other state party to the treaty on the Island of Diego Garcia or elsewhere in the British Indian Ocean Territories, and that, accordingly, no change was required in US armed forces operations there.26 Russia, however, pointed out that, as long as the military base of a nuclear power was situated on the Chagos Archipelago Islands and as long as certain nuclear powers considered themselves free from the obligations under the protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba with regard to these islands, Russia could not regard them as meeting the requirements of nuclear-weapon-free territories.27
The treaty has three protocols. Protocol I deals with security assurances, whereby the nuclear weapon states undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any party to the treaty or against any territory within the zone. However, in signing this protocol, the United States, the United Kingdom and France declared that they would not be bound by it in case of an invasion or any other attack upon them carried out or sustained by a party to the treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. Russia made a similar statement, but added it did not consider itself bound by obligations under Protocol I in respect of the Chagos Archipelago Islands. Protocol II, addressed, like Protocol I, to the nuclear-weapon states, prohibits them from testing or assisting in the testing of nuclear explosive devices anywhere in the zone. Protocol III, addressed to the extra-zonal states with territories in the zone, calls upon them to apply the provisions of the treaty to such territories.
Parties to the protocol would undertake not to contribute to any act constituting a violation of the treaty or the relevant protocol. This undertaking, however, is unverifiable without transparency of the nuclear powers naval and air deployments in the nuclear NWFZ as well as in the areas adjacent to the zone.
Entry into Force
The Treaty of Pelindaba is not subject to reservations. Article 18 envisages that the treaty will come into force on the deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification, that is, on the deposit of the instrument ratification of a simple majority of members of the OAU. The treaty is of unlimited duration, but any party may withdraw from it at 12-hours notice, if some extraordinary events jeopardise its supreme interests. The clause is thus less rigorous than the Treaty of Rarotonga, which permits withdrawal only in the event of material breach of the treaty.
While the nitty-gritty of the treaty provisions have been discussed above, it is essential to look at the effect the treaty would have. In that respect it can be stated with confidence that the treaty at best formalises a situation already existing in the continent. The fact is that the only countries in the region that have any nuclear capability are Zaire and Algeria who have a research reactor each. In any case, with South Africa's accession to the NPT, the entire continent was anyway committed to denuclearisation. Although the treaty offers a proper definition of the terms explosive device, nuclear installation and nuclear material, and prevents dumping of wastes anywhere in the zone and thus is an improvement upon both the Rarotonga and Tlatelolco Treaties, the net value of the treaty is limited. It should also be noted that the issue of permitting visits of ships or aircraft suspected of carrying nuclear explosive devices is left to the home country.
Then there is this "novel" clause requiring declaration of capabilities a party may have for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device, to dismantle and destroy any such device in its possession and to destroy or convert to civilian use facilities for making such devices. It also provides for verification by the IAEA of all such activities. Not addressed, however, is the problem of ensuring that international verification of the dismantlement process does not disseminate information about the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons.
As for the treaty value in setting a precedent for other regions of the world, it is as good as nothing. This is due to the simple reason that an NWFZ in South Africa could be realised only after South Africa decided to give up nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. The latter in turn was possible only when power was slipping out of the hands of the white government to those of the black majority government. Even if the South African reasons of reduction in threat to its security because of withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the demise of the Soviet Union and its expansionist designs in South Africa's neighbourhood are taken to be viable, they are again specific to the region and not universally applicable.
Even then, as discussed above, the zone is fraught with the problems of delimitation of boundaries and territorial disputes involving the nuclear weapon states, further undermining the value of the treaty.
1. Sola Ogunbanwo, "History of the Efforts to Establish an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone," Disarmament, vol. xix, no. 1, 1996, p. 14.
2. UN General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI) November 24, 1961.
3. OAU Document AHG Resolution 11(1), July 21, 1964; A/5975.
4. UN General Assembly Resolution 2033, December 3, 1965.
5. Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 24.
6. William Epstein, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa?" in David Pitt and Gordon Thompson ed., Nuclear-Free Zones, (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 115.
7. Ibid., p. 116.
8. Ogunbanwo, n. 1, p. 15.
9. Savita Pande, Future of the NPT, (New Delhi: Lancers, 1995), p. 206.
10. Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Programme: From Deterrence to Disarmament," Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996, vol. 25, no. 10.
11. Newsby Frazer, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research and Development in South Africa, (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979), and pp. 116-118.
12. Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Programme: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6.
13. J.D. Moore, South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation (Macmillan, 1987), pp. 116-117. Even the experts on the panel set up by President Carter were divided on the issue.
14. J.W. de Villers, Roger Jardine, Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb?" Foreign Affairs, November-December, 1993, p. 99.
15. Resolution 34/76 B of December 11, 1979, A/35/402.
16. Resolution 44/113 of December 15, 1989 A/45/57 and Corr, annex.
17. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: the ANC and the Atom Bomb," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April 1993, p. 33.
18. GC (XXXIV) INF/290 (IAEA Document, Vienna: IAEA, September 1990).
19. Resolution 45/56A of December 4, 1990.
20. Resolution 47/76 of December 15, 1992.
21. Ogunbanwo, n. 1, p. 18.
22. OAU/CM/RES 1592 (LXII) Rev. 1).
23. UN General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI).
24. Olu Adenji, "The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty: The Pelindaba Text and its Provisions," Disarmament, vol. XIX, no. 1, 1996, p. 5.
25. Goldblat, n. 5, p. 25.
26. PPNN Newsbrief, 2nd Quarter 1996.
27. Letter from Russian Ambassador to the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa, November 5, 1996, cited in Goldblat, n. 5, p. 26.