Latin America and the United States: Negotiating a Bumpy Stretch

Manpreet Sethi,Researcher,IDSA


The bigger and more powerful Northern neighbour has always cast its shadow on the three score odd nations of the Southern hemisphere. US power projection in an area that it has considered its backyard has consistently influenced the Latin American nations, whether favourably or unfavourably. The American Administrations have always been vocal about their approval or disapproval of the actions or policies of the Southern countries. It was not surprising, therefore, that the US had let its displeasure be known at the authoritarian regimes that had been predominant in the region for the major part of the 1970s. Measured by the same yardstick, the political and economic volte face that was witnessed in country after country from the early 1980s onwards was naturally expected to bring the nations back into the good books of the United States.

Several analysts and experts on US-Latin American relations detected in this change the seeds of an opportunity to forge a new inter-American relationship. These expectations were not belied since the US did receive these new democratic governments and their first steps towards economic liberalisation and free market economies with more than just a benign smile. Diplomatic relations improved, cross-border official visits increased, inter-hemispheric trade surged, and psychological support systems on both sides were refurbished. The USA found in these newly opening economies not only markets for its exports and avenues for its investments, but also discovered in the democratic governments new allies that could lend, if not always ideological, then at least numerical strength for its foreign policy formulations in the international fora.

At the same time, the newly elected Latin American Presidents found in the USA a friendly big brother who was ready to wholeheartedly psychologically strengthen them, especially at a time when their democratic governments were still fragile. Hence, the US support fortified their stand at home and abroad. At the same time, the USA provided the much needed economic backing to their new initiatives by pushing forth their case before the International Monetary Fund (IMF)and the World Bank. Improved relations with the USA, therefore, out of sheer pragmatism became an imperative for all Latin American governments.1

However, the relationship has not seen as much smooth sailing as had initially been prophesied. The Clinton Adminstration has not always found it easy to pursue its agenda on Latin America and has often been reined in by Congress. A most recent instance of this was evident in the inability of the US President to secure the fast-track authority from Congress for negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). On the other hand, some Latin American nations too have not silently acquiesced and accepted all US initiatives and policy decisions. Disagreements have surfaced, especially on such issues as how to deal with illegal drug trafficking or on Cuba. Yet another indicator of a lukewarm relationship has been perceived in the absence of a rush amongst the Latin American countries for US defence supplies despite the lifting of the ban on the sale of arms to the region. This paper attempts to examine these issues that may be seen as speed-breakers in the relationship between the two. It can never be denied that there would exist a close relationship between the US and Latin America. Their geographical proximity imposes such a geo-political imperative. But the extent of closeness would depend on how these issues, amongst others, are negotiated and settled in the coming years.

The Fast-Track Fiasco

1997 saw the American President make two visits to the Southern Hemisphere. In May, he visited Mexico, Costa Rica and Barbados. Five months later, in October, he toured Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina. While carrying individual agendas relevant to each destination, during both his visits and at every stop, President Clinton did emphasise his desire to pursue free trade agreements with Latin America. He assured the nations that before visiting the region again in April 1998 to attend the Second Summit of the Americas, he would have secured the fast- track authority to negotiate an FTAA. The term fast-track refers to an arrangement in which Congress can approve or reject a trade agreement negotiated by the White House but cannot amend it. In fact, the major highlight of the summit, a gathering of leaders from all Western Hemispheric nations, except Cuba, was expected to be an impetus to the increasing importance of economic ties between the two regions through the launch of negotiations to produce a hemispheric free trade zone by 2005.

Unfortunately, however, the President was not able to keep his promise of attending the summit armed with the fast-track authority from Congress. In fact, Clinton became the first President since 1974 to be denied such authority.His inability to obtain the fast-track was widely perceived as a political defeat that would signify a sharp setback for US hemispheric credibility and leadership. Indeed, it was President Clinton who had inaugurated the first Summit of the Americas in Miami four years earlier, in 1994. At the time, Washington was beginning to talk about the dawn of a new era in the relationship between the two regions. The summit had then been hailed as a means to facilitate this based on the "quiet revolution" towards democratic governments and free-market economics in South America.

Over the years, the establishment of the FTAA stretching from Alaska in the North to Tierra del Fuego in the South had become the centrepiece of the summit. This was not surprising given that intra-regional trade has emerged as a major issue during the last five years in US-Latin American relations. According to the US trade representative, Charlene Barshefsky, US exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have grown more than three times as fast as US exports to the rest of the world. She revealed that "during the second half of 1997, we exported more to our hemisphere than to the entirety of the European Union."2 By 2010, Latin America is expected to be the world's primary market for American products and services, exceeding Japan and Europe combined.3

Yet, it is widely felt that the Clinton Administration has not been able to develop a focussed and sustained strategy on the trade issue. At a time when the entire Southern Hemisphere has embraced trade liberalisation and privatisation, virtues that the US has always been espousing and encouraging, much more had been expected from the US government on the trade issue than has been forthcoming. For instance, even though the USA sells more to Central America than to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union together, yet on several occasions Congress has voted down Clinton's Caribbean Basin Initiative enhancement legislation that would have accorded favourable treatment to the small Central American and Caribbean countries most affected by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).The fast-track fiasco now casts aspersions on the reliability of the United States as a hemispheric partner.

Of course, at the Santiago Summit of the Americas, President Clinton promised yet again to persuade Congress to grant him the authority he so desires to realise his dream of the FTAA. He stated, "I assure you our commitment to the free-trade areas of the Americas will be in the fast lane of our concerns."4 Alongwith his counterparts from 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries, the President formally launched the initiation of negotiations for the FTAA anyway. The negotiations for the FTAA are expected to start no later than Spetember 30, 1998, with nine initial negotiating groups covering such areas as market access, investment, services, government procurement, dispute settlement, agriculture, intellectual property rights, competition policy and subsidies, etc. However, the pace of negotiations and the actual progress would ultimately decide the fate of the FTAA and would naturally leave its mark on inter-American relations.

The Drug Dragnet

The issue of drug trafficking has remained a permanent fixture on the US-Latin American agenda for several decades now. Owing to a difference in perceptions on both sides, the matter has often struck a discordant note. Washington holds that the eradication of overseas sources of supply constitutes the key to the solution of the drug problem. On the other hand, the Latin American countries opine that Washington must take measures to reduce its domestic demand besides offering them economic assistance in their efforts to plant substitute crops for narcotics. In their view, only a combined effort on both these fronts could constitute a viable way to end the drug menace.

According to statistics revealed by the White House, 12.8 million people in the US use drugs. At the international level, the drug market is believed to generate annual profits worth $500 billion, and a major portion of these resources circulates in the US financial system.5 Therefore, the Latin American nations feel that the menace needs to be tackled more from the US end since it is more a problem of demand than supply. The Inter-American Commission for the Control of Drug Abuse of the Organisation of the American States (OAS) stated, "The demand continues to be a powerful force behind the production and trafficking of drugs."6

Both sides, consequently, have tended to blame one another for the slow pace of progress in this field. The US contends that the Latin American nations are not doing enough about the problem by way of enacting stringent legislation or an effective implementation of the laws that do exist. The affected nations, meanwhile, find the US allegations unnecessarily harsh and the American policies unacceptably intrusive. Therefore, at the San Antonio Anti-Drug Summit Conference held in Texas in February 1992, countries of the Southern hemisphere agreed to an exchange of information in the drug war, strict control over means of communication in their territorial supervision over production of drugs, and the timely investigation into money laundering. But they categorically rejected the US proposal for the establishment of a multinational anti-drug force. The Mexican President echoed the sentiments of other nations in the region when he said, "We hope for cooperation in the drug war, but it is the responsibility of us Mexicans to combat this crime on our soil."7

Yet another measure of the US Administration that the Latin American nations have found particularly offensive is the drug certification it annually issues before Congress. As per a 1986 law, the US government is required to certify every year that certain countries have adequately cooperated with the USA in combatting drugs. Countries that fail to get the certification are then subjected to sanctions and denied foreign assistance. Colombia, for instance, is one nation that has particularly suffered on this account since it was denied certification for two years. The unilateral move, however, has not helped in smoothening the relations between the North and the South.

The Latin American nations maintain that certification does not in any way help to solve the problem of drug trafficking. Rather, as Jorge Madrazo Cuellar, the Attorney General of Mexico put it, " gets in the way."8 In a similar vein, the Foreign Ministers of Central America and the Dominican Republic criticised the certification policy as being "counterproductive and [a move that] tends to weaken joint efforts against drug trafficking."9 Speaking at the 14th San Jose Ministerial Conference, they described the policy as "extraterritorial" and "unacceptable because it violates sovereignty."10

In the considered view of the Latin American governments, politicians, and specialists on illegal drug trafficking, the anti-drug struggle must be seen as a shared problem imposing a common responsibility and requiring a united global effort. If at all any certification is to be done then it should come from a multilateral organisation like the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, the OAS or the UN.

The Rio Group, one of the main political fora in the continent after the OAS, leads the debate against US certification. Its main argument is built on the premise that certification has not remained a technical evaluation as had been originally conceived in 1986. Rather over the years, it has been turned into a political instrument by the White House to play favourites and exert pressure.

The unanimous rejection of Washington's certification by Latin America can be seen to have induced a change in the policy position of the US Administration. During his visit to Mexico in May 1997, President Clinton did refer to the drug problem as a "shared responsibility". Subsequently, the Director of the National Drug Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey, too described it as a "common problem" that needs to be tackled through global strategies. Further evidence of a shift in the US counter-narcotics policy was provided in Santiago at the Summit of the Americas in April 1998 when the summit partners decided to set up an Alliance Against Drugs to better coordinate the war on drugs within the Americas. As part of this new initiative, national governments agreed to let the OAS evaluate their efforts to fight narcotics. Therefore, this system seeks to replace the annual blacklisting that had earlier been carried out by the USA. It now remains to be seen how effective the new system would be in grappling with a problem that has troubled US-Latin American relations for so long.

The Cuban Conundrum

Divergent policies towards Cuba have come to pose another source of disagreement between Latin America and the US. The latter continues to impose economic sancions against the Communist regime of Fidel Castro. The economic embargo was first clamped by the American President Dwight D. Eisenhower at a time when Cuba was seen as a Soviet base. It was further strengthened with the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Law of 1996.

In contrast to the American stance on Cuba, the Latin American countries have shown greater tolerance in their relationship with the country and have refused to break off diplomatic,economic and humanitarian links, however tenuous, with their regional neighbour. Virtually every Latin American and Caribbean government has rejected the 1996 Helms-Burton Law that mandates penalties against foreign firms investing in or doing business on Cuban property. The most recent instance of a country of the Southern hemisphere coming to the aid of Cuba in times of crisis was evidenced when Brazil donated food worth $3 million to Cuba in an attempt to compensate for the damage caused by Hurricane Lili.11

US efforts to isolate Cuba suffered their biggest setback in April 1998 when the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) voted down a US-backed resolution critical of Cuban human right policies by 19 against and only 16 in favour, with 18 abstentions. Such a development had not been seen in the last seven years and indicated the waning support for US policy towards the Caribbean nation. What was most alarming from the US point of view was that countries that had previously supported the American position changed tack at the last minute. The most prominent among them were Chile and Uruguay who had voted in favour of the US resolution till last year but chose to abstain this time. Amongst the other South American nations, Brazil, Mexico Peru and Venezuela also abstained and only Argentina voted in favour. This was seen as being doubly surprising because just a few days before the vote, President Clinton had been in Santiago, Chile, to attend the Summit of the Americas where all the leaders had voiced their support for greater human rights protection in the hemisphere. Marc Thiessen, spokesman for Senator Jesse Helms, the conservative Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opined, "It is a stunning defeat for the Clinton Adminstration, coming just days after the President met with many of the Latin American leaders in Santiago."12

Amongst the several implications of the vote for the Clinton Adminstration at home, it did seem to reflect a growing disenchantment with the US policy towards Cuba. Many international analysts, several of them American, have begun to criticise the 40-year-old embargo that has contributed to bitter hardships for civilians. A most recent report released by the UN places blame on the US saying that its long running embargo contributes to the rigidity of the system.13

For Cuba, the vote vindicated Castro's decision to invite Pope John Paul II to the country in January 1998. In fact, the visit proved to be a sort of victory for both. Fidel Castro revelled in the Pope's denunciation of the US embargo. In fact, he found the Pope echoing his own sentiments when he appealed for a lifting of the economic sanctions because, "...the imposed isolation strikes the population indiscriminately, making it ever more difficult for the weakest to enjoy the bare essentials of decent living, things such as education."14 At the same time, the Pope also lashed out at the human rights abuses in the Communist regime and requested the release of some 600 political prisoners languishing in Cuban jails. Refusing to be cornered into making any concessions, the Cuban President,nevertheless, hailed the importance of the visit. Before the Pope departed after five days in Cuba during which he conducted four outdoor masses, Castro said, "We have given the world a good example. You, by visiting what some choose to call Communism's last bulwark; we, by receiving the religious leader who had been ascribed responsibility for the destruction of socialism in Europe."15

Perhaps, an important outcome of this visit was the US decision of March 1998 to make a few "humanitarian" concessions towards Cuba. These included permission to resume direct charter flights to Cuba, allow Cuban-Americans to send money to relatives in the country and to make it easier to sell medicines and medical supplies to it. These moves, in the words of the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, were in response to the Pope's call for help for the Church to carry out "humanitarian and religious activities that do not benefit the Communist government."16 Naturally, Fidel Castro described this move of the Clinton Adminstration as "helpful and conducive to a better climate."

Yet another boost to Cuba's image was provided by the two-day visit of the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, to Havana in April 1998. The visitor to the island openly stated that the US policy of isolationism went nowhere and that he believed in a "policy of engagement and dialogue" as the best way to help the people of Cuba.17 Canada is presently doing trade with Cuba worth US $500 million, becoming thereby Canada's fourth largest trading member in Latin America after Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela.

Several Latin American Presidents received the news of the Canadian Prime Minister's visit as a positive development. They hoped that Canada could help to reintegrate Cuba into the Western hemisphere. At the Santiago Summit of the Americas too, several leaders from the region had expressed the hope that Cuba would be able to attend the next such meeting.

In fact, several major Latin American nations and regional fora have been advocating the inclusion of Cuba. The OAS General Secretary, Cesar Gaviria has been known to have said more than once that the conditions were now conducive to allow Cuba to rejoin the OAS. According to him, "the subject of Cuba is still being viewed within the context of the Cold War which should be left behind."18 But, of course, the US is still not ready to do so despite many Latin American countries refusing to toe its line on Cuba.

The Arms Affair

In August 1998, one year will have elapsed since the Clinton Adminstration lifted a long-standing ban on arms sales to Latin America. The decision taken in August 1997 had overturned a two-decades-old proscription on the sale of arms to the region. At the time, the lifting of the ban had raised fears on the possibility of triggering an arms race amongst the major nations of Latin America. It had been extrapolated that militaries in the region that had long been deprived of modern weaponry not just because of the ban but also because of the adverse economic conditions, would now jump at the chance since the economic situation in most of the countries had also begun to look up. However, a year later, many US analysts are surprised at the apparent lethargy in the South American markets for US defence exports. Of course, the reasons for this are several and they do seem to reflect an overall loosening of the US hold over the region.

In 1978, President Jimmy Carter had imposed the ban on the sale of defence items to Latin America. The decision had then been hinged on the rationale that the militaries of the region faced no credible external threat to necessitate arms purchases. More importantly, the proscription was an indictment against the military regimes that were in power in almost all the countries of the region. The US policy-makers feared that the weapons acquired by the military dictators would only be used to strengthen the illegitimate political authority at the cost of investing in developmental or modernisation projects. Therefore, the US Adminstration in its profound wisdom had decided to make the arms supplies to the region contingent upon freer and stabler economies and more democratic political institutions.

While its objective was laudable, the restrictive policy, however, could do little by way of motivating South American nations to free themselves from the combination of authoritarian regimes and a corrupt and inefficient economy. Progress on both these fronts slowly began from the early 1980s onwards, but there were a number of other factors that were responsible for the wave of redemocratisation and economic liberalisation.

Meanwhile, the lacuna in arms procurement created by the US ban was gradually filled by other competitors from Europe, Asia, Israel, Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) Republics. During the long 20-year period when the US suppliers stayed away, arms suppliers from these countries moved in and have so entrenched themselves in the region today that despite the lifting of the ban, South American governments are not in any sort of hurry to turn towards the US.

That there was a distinct commercial undertone of the US decision to lift the ban now cannot be ignored. Its timing was most significant because with the economic situation improving in the region, the militaries had begun to clamour for a modernisation of their forces. During the period of economic turmoil, as military budgets had shrunk, investments in modernisation had virtually disappeared due to the large, fixed expenditure for personnel and pensions. Therefore, with an improvement in the economic situation, it was inevitable that the militaries begin to seek a long overdue modernisation of their forces. Consequently, many nations had entered into negotiations with arms suppliers and were in the process of finalising deals. For instance, by mid-1997, Chile had begun considering the purchase of 12-20 multi-role combat aircraft, the potential value of the deal expected to be around a billion dollars. The major contenders included the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen and French Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft. It had nevertheless, expressed its preference for the US-made F-16s. Therefore, it was not surprising that Lockheed Martin Corporation, the manufacturer of F-16s lobbied strongly for the lifting of the ban. Meanwhile, Peru had purchased a squadron of MIG 29s from Belarus. In another instance, the USA had stalled South Korea's proposed sale of the 155mm M109A2 self-propelled artillery system to Brazil. Since 40 per cent of the components were of US origin, though the weapon was manufactured in South Korea under a co-production programme, US approval for the sale was mandatory and the US Administration denied the same to scuttle the deal. Brazil has expressed its desire to acquire a new fighter to replace its ageing Mirages and even Ecuador has expressed an ambitious desire to purchase upto 50 fighters.

Given the possibility of an arms acquisition drive by Latin American nations, the USA naturally did not want its competitors moving in to reap the benefits of a multi-million dollar industry. Having established itself as the world's biggest weapons merchant, with the US share in the weapons market up by 23 per cent last year, the Clinton Adminstration definitely did not want to deprive its defence industry of another opportunity for growth. Of course, the decision was also intended to gain political mileage. A military analyst in Santiago put it bluntly : "The reasons for lifting this ban are purely commercial and political. The US wants the economic benefit of selling these weapons and also the political influence that goes alongwith servicing and supplying them."19

Strangely though, these benefits have not automatically begun to accrue to the US after the lifting of the ban. Firstly, there has been no arms race amongst the Latin American nations or any particular scramble for acquiring the latest weaponry available. Economic conditions have constrained an irrational arms build-up since the focus has continued to remain on unemployment, inflation and a need to provide adequate social infrastructure in terms of education, health and housing. Moreover, defence budgets all across Latin America have been drastically cut as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In Argentina, for instance,it has dropped to 10 per cent from 17 per cent since 1990. In Brazil, the defence budget amounts to only 0.3 per cent of the GDP.20 With the region's economies still very much dependent on foreign investments, the budgets have to be kept in order and military expenditure cannot be expected to rise dramatically.

Secondly, the period during which the ban was in place did see an estrangement of defence relations between the USA and South America. Moreover, the lifting of the ban has not been followed up by any definitive government policy towards broadening the market for defence sales. There has been no coherent policy for direct industrial arms exports to South America or any directives to US Embassies to lend administrative assistance to US suppliers looking for buyers in Latin American countries. A lack of government leverage has led to potential US suppliers having to fend for themselves against the other arms suppliers.

The present situation in which the South American governments have not gone overboard over the American defence equipment supplies now being available, does seem to reflect a lessening of their dependence on the US. No longer do their militaries have to depend solely upon the "hand-me-down" surplus equipment that the US government had occasionally doled out to them. With the economy in a better condition and competitive deals becoming available from a diverse range of arms suppliers, the Latin American countries are rediscovering a leverage power. As Joel Johnson, Vice President, International Programmes, US Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) put it, "The only South American nations that can afford to buy big-ticket US items are also nations that cannot afford to be beholden only unto Washington."21

Moreover, despite having a relatively better purchasing power for procuring defence items, these nations are not in any particularly urgent need to do so. Intra-regional relationships are cordial, if not friendly, and no country seems to feel territorially threatened by another—the only exception being the as yet unresolved border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Consequently, the arms affair that had widely been predicted between the US and Latin America has not taken off.

Yet, the American arms suppliers have not given up on the region. Far from it. In fact, most of them tend to look at Latin America as a "big piece of our long-term strategy."22 According to a US based aerospace market intelligence firm, Latin America does present a market for 150-270 single engine fighters, but no more than 30 are likely to be new.23 In the opinion of the Vice President of another Washington based management consulting firm specialising in aerospace and other technology areas, "Foreign military sales in Latin America will not start a production line, but they have the potential to keep one going."24 Consequently, for American defence equipment manufacturers, no competition is going to be small. For instance, Lockheed Martin is doing no more than $50-100 million worth of business in Latin America now, but the company expects the potential to increase to about $5-8 billion within the next five years.

Therefore, despite the fact that US companies have enjoyed only a modest success selling into Latin America, they are stepping up their efforts in the hope of a large potential market. However, how far they would be able to succeed in their marketing strategies would ultimately depend on the overall relations between the USA and Latin America in the coming years. It remains to be seen whether liberalised trade arrangements and geographic proximity would be able to edge out the competition from other suppliers of defence equipment from across the globe.


Historically, Latin American relations with the US have largely gone through cycles of protracted discord followed by periods of relative harmony. Given their geographical compulsions, both have remained major considerations in each other's policies. Immediately after their return to democracy and groping their way around new economic initiatives, the Latin American nations detected a pragmatic necessity in adopting a positive attitude towards the USA. This was natural given that for them Washington is a main source of foreign capital and the largest trading partner, not to mention its influence over such multilateral institutions like the IMF, World Bank and the Latin Ameircan Development Bank. Naturally then, expansion of economic relations with the USA was of paramount importance for the region.

At the same time, the Latin American nations have exhibited a streak of independence in domestic and foreign policy. On several issues that have an inter-American undertone such as the formulation of an FTAA, illegal drug trafficking, and Cuba, these nations have dared to voice their viewpoint even if it has been in divergence with that of the US. Even on arms purchases for military modernisation and weapons upgradation, the countries of the Southern hemisphere appear to be following a more considered approach instead of rushing to the American suppliers only because they have now become available.

However, in the long run, the ability of these nations to stand up, speak for themselves and be counted individually in their relations with the US would largely depend on the strength of their economy, the extent of their regional solidarity and the room for manoeuvrability that they may muster up through a conscious and coherent drive for diversification of their external relations. The US could and should remain an important helpful partner. The actual parameters of the partnership, however, will depend on how the issues detailed above are dealt with.


1. For instance, the Argentine President Carlos Menem is believed to have said: "It sounds absurd to say that the pre-requisite for a successful economic plan at home is good diplomatic relationship with the US. But when one takes into account the enormous influence this country has on international credit organisations, the impossibility of having a coherent economic policy unaccompanied by an efficient foreign policy is self evident." Carlos Menem, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem (Buenos Aires: Editorial Ceyne, 1990), p. 57.

2. Thomas W. Lippman, "Chile Visit By Clinton Will Press Free Trade," International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1998.

3. Michael Shifter, "United States-Latin American Relations : Shunted to the Slow Track", Current History, vol. 97, no. 616, February 1998.

4. "Americas' Trade Zone Reaffirmed," International Herald Tribune, April 20, 1998.

5. "OAS, Rio Group, Venezuela, Colombia Reject US Certification Process," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)-Part 5, AL/3158, February 23, 1998, p. L/1.

6. Ibid.

7. Wang Yulin, "Latin America : Post- Cold War Diplomatic Trends," Contemporary International Relations, vol. 5, no. 2, February 1995.

8. "Attorney General Rejects Certification as Solution to Drug Trafficking," SWB, AL/3147, February 10, 1998, p.L/5.

9. "Central American Foreign Ministers Criticise US Anti-Drug Certification Policy," SWB, AL/3155, February 19, 1998, p. L/1.

10. Ibid.

11. "Donation of Food Worth $3 million to Cuba," SWB, AL/3186, March 24, 1998, p.L/2.

12. Brian Knowlton, "Human Rights Body Snubs US on Cuba," The Asian Age, April 23, 1998.

13. "Castro Hails US Easing of Sanctions As 'Helpful'," International Herald Tribune, March 21-22, 1998.

14. Molly Moore and Serge F. Kovaleski, "Castro and Pope Both Come Out Ahead," International Herald Tribune, March 14, 1998.

15. Ibid.

16. n. 13.

17. Sridhar Krishnaswami, "US Resents Chretien's Havana Visit," The Hindu, April 27, 1998.

18. "OAS Secretary General: Cuba No Longer a Threat but Still A Political Problem," SWB, AL/3164, March 2, 1998.

19. Marvin Leibstone, "US Defence Sales and South America," Military Technology, vol. 3, 1998.

20. David A. Fulghum, "Latin America Faces Tough Military Aircraft Decisions," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 16, 1998, p.48.

21. Leibstone, n. 19. Emphasis added.

22. Anthony L. Velocci Jr., "Commercial Markets Emerging As Paramount in Latin America", Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 16, 1998, p.50.

23. Ibid., p. 50.

24. Ibid., pp. 50-51.