Bush Outlines New US Nuclear Policy

C. Uday Bhaskar, Deputy Director, IDSA

Abstract

The May 1, 2001, speech by US President George "Dubya" Bush that outlined a new framework for US nuclear weapons and related missile defence policy is the equivalent of setting the proverbial cat among the pigeons. In this case, his heretical formulations have challenged the orthodoxy subscribed to by strategic hawks, doves and owls alike-each group marinated in deterrence theology and lore over the decades. The big picture that has been evoked in broad brush strokes is akin to a tectonic shift in the basic underpinning of deterrence practice and the reverberations are still being felt in the cloistered strategic community the world over.

In yet another radical departure, the Indian government was among the first to welcome and endorse some elements in the new Bush initiative. Both these developments warrant scrutiny for their nuances and potential impact on the post- Cold War strategic landscape. This article argues that notwithstanding the anxiety about the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty the Bush initiative is a significant contribution in challenging the orthodoxy and inflexibility of the Cold War nuclear order. It also avers that three years after Pokhran II, there is need for a holistic review and that India could benefit in the long run by contributing thoughtfully to this debate.

Speaking at the US National Defence University in Washington DC on May 1, 2001, US President George Bush outlined a new nuclear weapons/missile defences policy that may well prove to be seminal in terms of post-Cold War deterrence discourse. The main elements of the Bush speech1 have a multiple relevance that range from the domestic debate within the US to the different bi-lateral relationships that obtain between Washington and its allies, friends and adversaries, on the one hand, and to the prevailing strategic balance at the global level, on the other. Embedded within this articulation are certain nuances that are of import to India and the swift response by New Delhi also merits scrutiny for the possible impact this may have on the nascent Indian nuclear deterrent, and the posture of the Vajpayee government on the nuclear weapons/missiles issue in the near future.

But the main elements of the Bush nuclear policy are indeed radical and breathtaking in their scope. Deterrence theology as deified in the Cold War decades was based on the offensive and apocalyptic destructive capability of the dreaded nuke. The mutuality between the erstwhile superpowers was based on a balance of terror, or the doctrine of mutually assured destruction aptly called MAD. And in what may be deemed heresy, Bush asserted, "Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation" and added that the post-Cold War world requires "new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces."

During the Cold War, the defensive strand was deliberately abjured and both sides remained vulnerable to each other. This was enshrined in the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that forbade the US and the former USSR from acquiring credible ballistic missile defences. However, Republican Administrations in the US, beginning with Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, have mooted the idea of missile defences in different forms but the technology required to neutralise incoming ballistic missiles proved elusive. The Cold War ended no doubt without a shot being fired in anger but neither was there any tangible movement as far as missile defences were concerned.

However, post the 1991 Gulf War for Kuwait, the whole issue of 'rogue' states and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) received intense focus within the US defence establishment. One could perhaps conjecture that the threat of use of Scud missiles by Iraq against US forces in Saudi Arabia was comparable to the 1941 Pearl Harbour episode in terms of the influence on US strategic culture. The US was determined that its forces and assets should not be held hostage by 'deviant' states that acquired WMD capability and hence the quest for theatre and national missile defences continued. The issue and the anxiety it generated in some sections of the US strategic community received further impetus with the 1998 North Korean rocket test.

This shift is reflected in the Bush articulation wherein it is averred that the major threat to the US and its allies comes from rogue or less than responsible nations. This is a significant shift in terms of defining where the post-Cold War WMD threat is likely to emanate from as far as the US is concerned. The speech notes that today's world is vastly different from that of the Cold War decades and makes positive reference to Moscow, noting, "Today's Russia is not our enemy, but a country in transition with an opportunity as a great nation, democratic, at peace with itself and its neighbors."

As regards the new threat, Bush adds: "Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world's least responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life."

Having defined the spectrum that constitutes the threat to the body politic of the post-Cold War global comity, the Bush prescription to deal with this challenge warrants reflection for its emphasis and mix. On the one hand, it is suggested that the world needs a new policy: "A broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counter proliferation and defenses." And, to assuage any anxiety about US unilateralism among the peer group of other nuclear powers, the consensual, collective approach is further emphasised. "We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror to those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use."

The paradigm shift from a competitive to a cooperative approach in strategic relations at the global level is packaged in what may be termed as the mixed metaphor that is characteristic of the new Bushspeak, but this does not detract from the conceptual gravitas of what is being mooted. The very existence of nuclear weapons with the major powers and their hair-trigger levels of readiness present a real threat to the safety and stability of the world at large. Yet it is a reflection of both the cynicism and the techno-strategic certitude that now prevails that this existential reality is taken as the norm on which global stability is predicated and accordingly deified. What Bush is hinting at is an alternate paradigm that is ostensibly normative, and almost idealistic in its conceptual underpinning-a characteristic that was often associated with India in the Cold War decades. The technological feasibility of the Bush missile defence proposals is currently at a less than proven and nascent stage and will have to be addressed separately. The Bush speech concedes this aspect and notes: "We recognize the technological difficulties we face and we look forward to the challenge."

In rich rhetoric, Bush asserts of the US and its allies and friends: "We must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us (MAD)". And then comes the Bush "googly" or curve ball when he adds: "This is an important opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable (emphasis added) and to find new ways to keep the peace." And central to the new orientation is the certitude that "deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation." This assertion is indeed revolutionary as far as deterrence theology is concerned and the enormity was captured effectively by the Economist with characteristic understatement when it noted editorially: "Do not underestimate the scale of the arms-control revolution that America's president, George Bush, plotted out in public this week."2

The Bush plot, as it were, thickens when it details the new road map about deterrence. "Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation" avers the US President, though many critics of the NMD argue that this is exactly what will happen, and then unveils the piece de resistance-the Bush team view on the 1972 ABM Treaty: "We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation. We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty."

While the focus is on the ABM Treaty, it is pertinent to note the salience being accorded to the medium of space in the new US security policy. Assets in space such as satellites and related surveillance capabilities will be the key to battle-field domination in the future and the Bush Administration is moving with determination in this regard. On May 8, a week after the Bush speech, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced a series of organisational changes to sharpen the Pentagon's focus on managing defence interests in outer space. And in response to a question, Rumsfeld added: "The missile defense announcements which were made by President Bush could be characterized as the first product of the studies that have taken place. This event today and the changes we are recommending with respect to space, could be characterized as the second."3 Thus, it would be misleading to see the entire Bush initiative as being driven by new found altruism. On the contrary, these changes are to be seen as part of the Republican determination to render US security plans and structures appropriate to the complexities of the post- Cold War world and retain the asymmetries favourable to the US.

As regards the apprehensions that this will be a unilateral move by the US, the speech goes the extra mile-particularly as far as Moscow and Beijing's sensitivities are concerned. It is evident that the Bush team is cognisant of the anxiety of both allies and adversaries in this matter and the Bush speech dwells at length on the consultative process and the visits to different capitals by special envoys. "These will be real consultations. We are not presenting our friends and allies with unilateral decisions already made. We look forward to hearing their views, the views of our friends, and to take them into account. We will seek their input on all the issues surrounding the new strategic environment. We'll also need to reach out to other interested states, including China and Russia. Russia and the United States (emphasis added) should work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 21st century."

China and Russia receive special mention as they ought to and implicit is the suggestion that in the post-Cold War world, the US, Russia and China can work together to ensure global peace and stability. The nuance as regards Russia and the special onus on Moscow is reflected in a mention that is unlikely to be ignored in the content analysis of the Bush speech that Beijing will no doubt undertake. Yet the determination to change the ABM Treaty is palpable though there is no assertion that this will be done unilaterally. "We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries. That's why we should work together to replace this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War."

Since the 1972 ABM Treaty is essentially a treaty between the USA and Russia as inheritor of the former Soviet strategic mantle, the Bush exhortation appears to encourage Moscow to explore the potential of a cooperative framework for the future that is premised on "openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area for missile defense." And the most alluring aspect is contained in a pithy one-liner: "Perhaps one day we can even cooperate in joint defense." It would be fair to ask if the US is going back to the 1946 Baruch Plan that envisaged a consensual approach to managing the nuclear weapon with a greater degree of sincerity and commitment after about six decades. However, the contrasting strategic cultures that now obtain in Washington DC and Moscow ought to temper any excessive optimism in the matter.

The initial response from Moscow to the Bush speech has been cautious but mildly favourable, notwithstanding some reservations about the 1972 ABM Treaty. This was evident in the first reactions from Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov. Noting the fact that the US President had stressed consultations with Russia, Ivanov added: "We welcome this statement and believe that it sets the stage for constructive dialogue on issues of strategic stability in the interests of our two countries and the international community at large."4 And in an unintended juxtaposition perhaps, the Russian foreign minister was in Delhi a few days after the Bush speech and the correspondences in the positions of Moscow and Delhi were discernible. While both nations welcomed some elements of the Bush speech, they also cautioned against any unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

Among the elements of the Bush speech that have enthused both Russian and Indian interlocutors is the reference to deep cuts in the US nuclear arsenal. The new blueprint refers to encouraging "still further cuts in nuclear weapons", though it notes, "Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies." However, there is a note of radicalism when it is added: "We can and will change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over." One may infer from the above that the alert status of US nuclear weapons will be altered to lower levels of readiness and that this may prompt a matching Russian response. Moscow has already responded positively to the reductions in the US arsenal and Ivanov noted that the Bush proposal was "consonant"5 with Moscow's intent to slash the strategic weapons on either side to 1,500 each from the 3,500 and 3,000 mandated under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). The cut in weapons went even further with Bush adding that the US may well make unilateral reductions to "lead by example."

It is China that has been most vocal in voicing its concern and has warned of dire consequences that will follow if the ABM Treaty is tinkered with. This is understandable for Beijing is the subaltern power in the Washington-Moscow grid and the recent tension with the US over the spy plane incident has only served to heighten the anxiety about American hegemonism and the sensitivity over Taiwan. The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded to the Bush speech by warning the US that discarding or tinkering with the 1972 ABM Treaty would jeopardise world peace and stability. Critical reference was also made to the contested nature of the Bush election victory that elevated him to the White House.6 However, it is likely that more substantive talks will be held between the US and China when senior US officials visit Beijing in mid-May 2001 to resolve the current WMD turbulence.

The Sino-US relationship is complex and straddles many dimensions i.e. political, economic and security. The two-way trade/FDI relationship is robust and neither China nor the US is likely to endanger the current economic progress over the National Missile Defence (NMD) issue as long as the Taiwan issue remains within the limits of Sino-US engagement. Thus, the bilateral relationship may be more testy than tranquil but is unlikely to lead to any alarming breakdown. One could make a case to suggest that Beijing would increase the quality and quantity of its current WMD arsenal irrespective of any US initiative. But it is also evident that if China feels left out of a potential US-Russia consensus on WMD, it may visibly increase its offensive capability in respect of nuclear weapons. The substantive and putative impact of this exigency would have to be studied carefully to arrive at the degree of direct relevance to India.

In yet another development that merits notice, Islamabad has also opposed the Bush initiative and supported the Chinese position. It is instructive that this stand was conveyed when Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji was visiting Islamabad on May 12. The Pakistan Chief Executive, General Musharraf, noted that there was a commonality of views between Beijing and Islamabad on the issue of NMD. The Sino-Pak convergence on WMD issues acquires greater salience in the regional grid and will be of abiding relevance to India. However, Beijing refrained from indulging in any US-bashing on Pakistani soil and the possibility that Islamabad may later modify its position cannot be ruled out.

While there has been some debate about the swift endorsement by India, the essential elements of this position were clarified by Prime Minister Vajpayee. He reiterated the Indian response to the Bush speech during the visit to Delhi by Richard Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State, who came as a special envoy of the US President. Vajpayee welcomed the Bush suggestion for "steep reductions in (US) nuclear arsenal and a move away from further development of offensive nuclear technologies."7 He further added, "We have never subscribed to concepts of military dominance or MAD doctrines. We welcome every move towards lightening the shadow of nuclear terror under which we live today."8

Notwithstanding the correspondences that the Bush speech reflects with the Indian sensitivities on the nuclear issue, the contradictions and the gray areas must also come into focus. The Bush articulation is no doubt bold and perhaps beautiful for it talks about rewriting deterrence and lifting the nuclear thralldom that has enslaved the world since Hiroshima-Nagasaki. The Holy Grail is inspiring in its symbolism for it is predicated on consultations and consensus among responsible nuclear weapon states. That India is seen, albeit modestly, as part of the management is significant, yet the contradictory devil is in the detail. How will the US and the world get to this promised land? The technology for missile defences is still far away and it is pertinent to ask if the certitude of deterrence, as we know it, can be recast. Yet if disarmament is to be pursued, some radical steps must be taken and this is the dialectic that must be grappled with.

For India, the dilemma is even more palpable. Equitable global disarmament and the protection of core security interests in the interim remain the abiding goals of India's reluctant nuclear quest. India would also aspire to acquire appropriate relevance in the ensuing global nuclear deliberations. Yet, the Bush formulation makes no reference to disarmament as a US goal, though arms reduction is identified and India's nuclear weapon status is still contested by the non-proliferation zealots in the Washington Beltway.

It would perhaps be misleading to read too much into the Bush speech as far as arms control and the US non-proliferation agenda is concerned. A certain degree of continuity with earlier policies prevails and it is relevant that US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, recently in Paris as a special Bush envoy on the NMD issue, clarified the US position, and while there is no direct reference to India, the extrapolations can be made. In response to a question on the ABM Treaty per se, Wolfowitz added: "We are certainly not trying to throw arms control aside. I mean, let's take the very important subject of non-proliferation, which we have indicated is one of the three pieces of this overall framework. We believe that the non-proliferation regime has had major successes, and those successes should be preserved; if anything, they should be strengthened."9

But, simultaneously, the India-US dialogue is progressing satisfactorily in the Clinton-Bush transition post-May 1998. In an instructive assertion, Mr. Vajpayee dwelt on the nuclear issue when the US envoy Armitage, was in Delhi, since the latter's visit also coincided with the third anniversary of the May 1998 nuclear tests. Highlighting the fact that India was a 'responsible' state in nuclear matters since it was neither a proliferation threat, nor an exporter of sensitive WMD technology, the Indian Prime Minister made a significant observation, "But we do believe that a credible minimum nuclear deterrent is a basic security umbrella which we owe to our people. At the same time, we retain our firm commitment to universal and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament."10 Can these positions be reconciled with the reverberations triggered by the Bush speech?

May 11 and 13, 2001, mark the third anniversary of the Pokhran II nuclear tests of 1998 that dramatically heralded the emergence of India as an SNW-or a state with nuclear weapons. This assertion challenged the existing global nuclear order enshrined and legitimised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that divided the world into five NWS (nuclear weapon states) and the remaining non-NWS.

India and later Pakistan, both non-signatories to the NPT added a new category to the nuclear lexicon-the SNW-and there was little doubt that the two estranged South Asian neighbours were churning the nuclear pot. The substantive implication of the May 1998 nuclear tests was that India had moved from opaque or non-weaponised deterrence to one of overt nuclear weapon capability by exercising an option that till May 11 had been kept 'open'. However, the nuclear tests of May 1998 were overtaken by events as disparate as the Lahore bus trip of Prime Minister Vajpayee and the subsequent 'betrayal' in the craggy heights of Kargil. Three years down the road, India's nuclear trajectory merits scrutiny and the resultant inferences are anomalous to the extent that it may well appear to the external deterree that there is little substantive change in India's deterrent profile before and after May 1998.

India carried out the nuclear tests to protect core security interests and ensure a degree of strategic autonomy in the post-Cold War world, and there was a degree of inevitability about this development. However, acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and the practice of deterrence is a complex task and to a considerable extent influenced by the strategic culture that characterises the elite of a nation. India, with its distinctive strategic culture and systemic traits, identified a modest set of objectives. First, to acquire a minimum credible deterrent and to simultaneously reiterate and pursue the commitment to global nuclear disarmament.

India also sought to assuage global opinion by adopting a no-first-use policy that has a conceptual resonance with missile defences per se, as the bedrock of its nuclear doctrine. Having carried out the last set of tests on May 13, 1998 New Delhi accepted a self-imposed moratorium on further nuclear testing. In effect, India was willing to conform to the spirit of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) even while remaining outside the treaty. And in good faith, India extended the olive branch to Pakistan through the Lahore bus that Vajpayee boarded at great political risk, and it is instructive that the majority of the accords contained in the February 1999 Lahore Declaration11 refer to confidence building measures on the nuclear and missile front.

However, the Lahore bus was punctured in Kargil in the summer of 1999 and paradoxically it is here that India's nuclear profile underwent a positive transmutation in contrast to the perception that was attached to Islamabad. India exercised commendable restraint in dealing with the intrusions on its territory and Pakistan's attempt to indulge in nuclear brinkmanship led to negative returns at the global level. India had demonstrated its credentials to play the nuclear game by the rules and this rectitude has stood it in good stead to date.

In retrospect, it appears that while India has made some positive progress on the politico-diplomatic front as far as its nascent nuclear capability is concerned, the operational aspect of deterrence remains as blurred as it was before May 1998, and this is an anomaly that must be redressed at the earliest. The practice of deterrence has a genealogy that goes back to the early decades of the Cold War and it is averred that the tenets of this strategic statecraft are cast in stone.12 Nuclear deterrence is a complex art that harmonises technology and strategy with the political and military capability of states and is predicated on appropriate levels of credibility and transparency.

In other words, during the Cold War, while there existed an intense ideological divide between the two superpowers, they recognised and respected each other's WMD capabilities - more so after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Political differences notwithstanding, both sides ensured that an acceptable degree of mutuality was arrived at as far as nuclear weapons were concerned. Mutuality in deterrence parlance is not synonymous with symmetry and a case in point is how China in the post-Cold War world, with about 20 long range missiles that can reach the mainland of the USA, has arrived at a degree of stability with a nation that has 3,500 warheads - that is, a ratio of 1:175.

The challenge for India in the immediate aftermath of May 1998 was to move swiftly to an appropriate level of operational credibility as far as the nuclear weapon was concerned. But there has been the equivalent of dithering ambivalence that is symptomatic of the diffident strategic culture of the Indian elite that is uncomfortable with macro military power - a trait that is manifest across the board. The nuclear doctrine is still a draft that awaits governmental sanction, and the realisation of the minimum credible deterrent is still elusive.

While there is emphasis on the fact that India's nuclear capability is under civilian control, this appears to be confined to the scientific and diplomatic spectrum alone. As is well known, the Department of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of External Affairs are the lead agencies within the government loop while the defence/military involvement is still peripheral. But the credibility of deterrence is derived from its operational contour and this is an amalgam of the force level, the command and control, and the doctrinal underpinning. Stability is ensured by the right mix of credibility and transparency so as to arrive at the requisite level of mutuality with the interlocutor in question - in this case, China and Pakistan.

The entire security apparatus and infrastructure has received a detailed review post-Kargil and a higher defence structure has been mooted. The need to acquire the necessary degree of operational readiness as far as the deterrent is concerned cannot be over-emphasised and, to that extent, perhaps the rearranging of the semantic and striving for a 'credible' minimum deterrent, as opposed to the minimum credible deterrent, is a silver lining. Whether India stabilises its deterrent on the aircraft or the Agni missile is a matter of operational detail but the central issue is that deterrence stability can only be predicated on credibility and transparency leavened by politico-military sagacity.

The efficacy of strategic capabilities of states cannot be divorced from the strategic culture that permeates the ruling elite and India is no exception. It is a nascent and reluctant nuclear weapon state and marked by many distinctive traits and qualities. India is still committed to total global disarmament and while this Holy Grail may be elusive, it needs to calibrate its strategic capabilities more astutely. May is a month of multiple nuclear relevance, and apart from May 1998 when India declared itself an SNW, on May 18, 1974, the first nuclear test was conducted in Pokhran. This was termed a peaceful nuclear explosion and India refused to weaponise this capability. This reticence may be ascribed to the diffident strategic culture of the ruling elite which was ambivalent about the nuclear weapon.

India, at the time, defied conventional wisdom, and unlike every other state that took this route before it, demonstrated a nuclear capability but refrained from becoming an SNW. It paid a high price by remaining an outcaste in the Cold War nuclear order and this stance was akin to trying to cross a chasm in two leaps. May 1998 was the second leap but India is yet to reach the shore of credibility. Is India trying to defy conventional wisdom again and cross the chasm in three leaps? In short, India's nuclear grapple confounds the external interlocuter.

The US-India relationship continues to flounder over the nuclear issue and the reality is that despite all the bonhomie at different levels, both official and otherwise, India remains under US sanctions imposed in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests. While the Bush speech no doubt contains many welcome elements that are reflective of long held Indian positions, they cannot be seen in isolation. To that extent, it would not be prudent for India to either totally endorse or reject the Bush formulations on the nuclear issue. The complexity that attaches to the subject needs to be reviewed in its entirety and a distinction drawn between what constitutes nuclear diplomacy and nuclear deterrence. The former cannot substitute for the latter. India has to evolve a calibrated approach to matters nuclear that would nurture the national interest in the long term with the right mix of principle and pragmatism even as it strives to stabilise its multi-faceted relationships with the major post-Cold War states and the imperatives of globalisation.

NOTES

1. "Bush Calls for Nuclear Cuts, Missile Defence Development", Official Text of Speech, Public Affairs Office (PAO), US Embassy, New Delhi, May 2, 2001. Also available on Website: usembassy.state.gov/delhi.html. Where cited in the article, references are in inverted commas without any end note number.

2. "Bush Nuclear Umbrella", editorial comment, The Economist, May 5, 2001, p. 11.

3. "Secretary Rumsfield Outlines Space Initiatives", Official Text, PAO, n. 1, May 9, 2001.

4. "Russia Hails US Offer of Talks", Hindu, May 4, 2001.

5. Ibid.

6. "Bush Plan a Threat to World Peace: China", Hindu, May 4, 2001.

7. "PM Welcomes Bush Plan", Times of India, May 12, 2001.

8. Ibid.

9. "Transcript: DOD's Wolfowitz has Consultations in Paris on Missile Defence", Wireless File, May 14, 2001, PAO, n. 1, p. 19.

10. TOI, n. 7.

11. For full text see "Involving India and Pakistan: Nuclear Arms Control and Non-proliferation after the Nuclear Tests" BITS (Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security) Report 99.2, September 1999, p. 66-68.

12. For a more detailed treatment see Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence in the 21st Century", Comparative Strategy, vol. 19, no. 3, July-Sep 2000.