Regional Denuclearisation — III
Nuclear Weapon-Free Korean Peninsula and East Asian Stability
Savita Pande,Res. Fellow,IDSA
The most interesting feature of Northeast Asian regional denuclearisation is that it centers around North Korean nuclear capability and attempts to deal with it. This is not to belittle the importance of either regional factors like South Korea or Japan, or external ones like US, China and Russia but to put the correct perspective of the strategic landscape of the region on the nuclear map. The two Koreas fought against each other to solve the problem of national division, but it only deepened it. Each refuses to recognise the other as a sovereign state and sees it as a major security threat. To solve this security dilemma, each resorted to external partners and even sought to develop weapons of mass destruction in order to deter any attempt by the other side to unify the peninsula by force. The US nuclear umbrella over South Korea has evolved from NATO-type first-use to a retaliatory nuclear deterrent. The US brought tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea from mid-1957 to offset North Korea's conventional force superiority over the South.
Since the 1970s, North Korea repeatedly proposed a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula with the aim to force the withdrawl of the US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. These proposals were ignored by the US and South Korea because they were directed against the military strategy of nuclear deterrence.1 Nevertheless, South Korea joined the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975.
In 1981, the Japanese Socialist Party and North Korea proposed a nuclear-free peace zone in Northeast Asia. The Japanese government dismissed the idea at the time as unrealistic.2 Subsequent attention to the region has focussed on Koreas. In May 1985, only two months after taking office, the then Soviet President Gorbachev proposed an all-Asia Forum to deal with security matters, conceived similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). He not only advocated a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons in Asia but also called for a pledge by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. In his speech at Vladivostok in July 1986, he specifically proposed three nuclear weapon-free zones in Asia: the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. Gorbachev's proposal was ignored by countries in the region as a renewed attempt to reduce the US engagement in Asia.
One of the probable reasons for an NWFZ on the Korean Peninsula is the centrality of the issue of nuclear programme of North Korea (as against the US nuclear weapons in South Korea). The North Korean security fears have been rooted in the nuclear threats it faced on two occasions. It is known that General MacArthur favoured using nuclear weapons against Manchuria and North Korea should Chinese intervention irrevocably pin back UN forces in the southern portion of South Korea. Once more, in 1975, as Vietnam fell, the then Secretary of State, James Schlesinger, bluntly stated that as America's position was declining in Asia, any aggressive action taken by Pyongyang could meet with a nuclear response by Washington.3
The precise origin of the North Korean nuclear programme is uncertain. Although initial moves were made in the 1960s and in late 1970s. In early 1980s it received help from the former Soviet Union. Negotiations also began with the latter on the supply of four reactors.4 As per the requirement at that time, the former Soviet Union was to ask for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards while supplying the fuel. It is also believed to have put pressure on North Korea for signing the NPT. What remains uncertain is whether it was aware that North Korea was pushing ahead with its nuclear weapons programme. North Korea joined the IAEA in 1977, and apparently on Soviet insistence it agreed to accede to the NPT in exchange for a 44 MW reactor. It acceded to the Treaty in 1985, though it did not sign the safeguards agreement with IAEA within the required 18 months period.5 It put forward several political conditions for signing it that were not directly related with the NPT.6
Since the Soviet threat had virtually vanished and owing to the fear of inadequate control and custody of nuclear weapons, the US announced the withdrawl of all US land-based, air-borne and sea based non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia in September 1991, and urged the Soviet Union to do the same. Following the decision of the US to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from Korea, the South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced in November 1991 that there were no nuclear weapons in Korea.
Joint Declaration and After
In December 1991, the two Koreas--the Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Korea--signed a "historic," agreement,(that is yet to be implemented) to ban nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.7 The official title of this agreement is the "Joint Declaration of the Korean Peninsula." The agreement, which was adopted almost simultaneously with the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and the North," consists of six points. It contains Tlatelolco and Rarotonga-style prohibitions against the deployment, development, acquisition and testing of nuclear weapons and provides for the creation of the bilateral verification structure. The creation of the South-North bilateral verification structure was intended in particular to complement the widely acknowledged shortcomings of the IAEA inspection regime--namely that IAEA inspected only officially declared nuclear facilities and thus was not effective in deterring clandestine nuclear activities.
The denuclearisation agreement between the two Koreas is said to be going "beyond the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and all other existing nuclear weapon-free zone agreements" by banning either side from possessing uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities.8 However implementation efforts of the denuclearisation agreement on the Korean Peninsula have been delayed because of disagreement between the two sides on such issues as the modalities of verification and necessity for "challenge inspections." For instance, while the Republic of Korea wished to inspect any facility, civilian or military, on a reciprocal basis, thus leaving the North no "sanctuary," the North insisted on the right to inspect all United States military facilities in the South in return for allowing the South to inspect its declared Yongbyon facilities.9 The Republic of Korea also believed that in addition to regular inspections, the so-called "special" or challenge inspections were essential to ensure meaningful verification. Such inspections would allow either side to inspect any suspicious site on the other's territory, whether declared or not, at short notice. North Korea opposed this proposal.
In 1992, North Korea agreed to comply with the NPT safeguards, and inspections were announced in January that year. The North Korean issue became a test case for the effectiveness of the verification system. During the inspections in spring 1992, North Korea admitted that it had separated 90 grams of plutonium in March 1990 from the spent fuel of the 5MW reactor, which was shut down at that time because of mechanical problems. The North also said it had not changed the fuel rods of the reactor since start up in 1987.10 Replacement of used or damaged rods makes it possible to extract weapon grade material from them.
According to Paul Bracken, the existence of different isotopes in different samples clearly indicated that at least two batches of plutonium had been separated, not one. Moreover, other samples taken from waste containers in the same facility contained various amounts of Americium, an isotope with known radioactive half-life. This revealed that plutonium was reprocessed in 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992.11
Based on "friendly intelligence" in 1992, the IAEA sought to visit the nuclear facility in the capital, Pyongyang. The North subsequently admitted that it had separated minute quantities of plutonium in 1975 in Pyongyang from hot cells provided by the Soviet Union as part of the supply to a research reactor. The facility is considered to be too small to be a pilot plant. The question that remains unanswered (if they separated plutonium that long ago) is: Did they separate any plutonium between 1975 and 1990?12
The US intelligence photos provided to the IAEA showed two facilities suspected of containing waste materials. The sites that are camouflaged were reportedly situated close to the plutonium chemical separation plant and covered over with trees in an attempt at concealment. The Koreans were either unaware of the physics of detection--the fact that the radioactive wastes would kill the nearby trees photographed by satellites, or were incapable of administering a deception programme. Bracken feels that in all probability, the latter proposition holds.13 Michael Mazzar says that North Korea did not expect the IAEA inspections to be as intrusive as they were. According to him, "North Korean leaders may have thought that like Iraq they could have kept some sort of nuclear programme going."14
The IAEA wanted to see if there was additional waste from plutonium separation at those locations. One of the sites was "almost same as the one found in Iraq," and was presumably the one that North Korea declared to the IAEA that it was constructed in 1992, just before the arrival of inspectors. The other facility was "Building 500." It used to be a two-storey building but was converted to one-storey. The North modified the building in late 1992 to give it the appearance of being in military use. This was the building into which North Korea refused to allow inspectors to enter.15
On March 12, 1993, during the peak of the crisis, North Korea decided to withdraw from the NPT. Subsequently however, it decided to suspend the withdrawal, a status that remains unchanged.16
However, this crisis delayed the realisation of the denuclearisation agreement. Direct dialogue between the two Koreas ceased, including negotiations of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission. During the period of crisis over North Korea's nuclear programme, both Koreas stopped short of nullifying the declaration.
The Agreed Framework
Following a series of working level contacts between US and North Korea after the second round of contact (in Geneva from July 14 to 19, 1993), the two sides reached an agreement on December 29, 1993. It called for North Korea's acceptance of IAEA inspections to "ensure continuity of safeguards" and the "resumption of working level contacts for an exchange of envoys between the North and the South." In return for these two conditions, the US and the South Korea would suspend the Team Spirit joint military exercises, and the US and the North Korea would announce the date for the next round of high level talks in Geneva. This, in turn, led to the negotiation process between North Korea and the IAEA. After a brief stalemate, the two sides reached an agreement on February 15, 1994. The US and North Korea reached an agreement ten days later on February 25, 1995 confirming their earlier agreement of December 1993.17 Hectic diplomatic activity followed which culminated in what came to be known as "Agreed Framework" signed on October 21, 1994. It mandated: (1) the freeze and dismantling of the suspect Yongbyon nuclear facility; (2) the creation of the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) to facilitate the replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactor (LWR) and to arrange the supply of 500,000 tonnes of fossil fuel in the interim to meet North Korea's energy needs; (3) IAEA verification of the freeze and eventual dismantling of the Yongbyon facility; and (4) IAEA verification of North Korea statements on past fissile material production.18 The implementation of the Agreed Framework has been the focus of activity in the region in recent years.
An effective denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula would take another five years. To this can be added North Korea's threat to withdraw now and then.19 Again, North Korea has agreed not to refuel the 5-MW experimental reactor at Yongbyon and not to reprocess the over 8,000 fuel rods removed from the reactor in May 1994. However, the IAEA Director General in October 1997 stated that the IAEA could not confirm the accuracy of the initial stockpile of plutonium as declared by North Korea because of DPRK's non-cooperation.20 According to an IAEA report, North Korea continues to be in non-compliance with the safeguard agreement.21 According to some other reports, North Korea is believed to have halted the construction of two larger reactors. Furthermore, North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent fuel from its graphite moderated nuclear reactors. The work is reportedly three-fourths complete.22 According to North Korean sources it has ensured sufficient inspection of the frozen status of the graphite moderated reactors on the part of the International Atomic Energy Agency.23 To fully implement the Agreed Framework, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation--known as KEDO--was established in 1995 as an international consortium which allows participation of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In return for the North Korean commitment to freeze its nuclear programme, but pending North Korea's full acceptance of its obligations as a member of the NPT, the US has agreed to manage the delivery of two 1000 MW proliferation-resistant LWRs. The Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO), a South Korean company, has been selected as the primary contractor to fulfill its obligation to supply light water reactor to North Korea based on the Ulchin-3 and -4 designs, currently being completed in South Korea. In July 1997, KEDO and North Korea signed the final agreement to allow construction of the light water reactors and KEDO opened its office in Kumbo, North Korea, in the same month.24 KEDO has also negotiated supplementary protocols on transportation and others with North Korea to deal with sensitive practical issues that will arise in the course of building the reactors. As a consequence ground breaking and site preparations were made in August 1997.25
Unlike the previously established nuclear weapon-free zones in other regions, all the major nuclear powers in the region have indicated their support for a denuclearised Korean peninsula.
Limited Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
In the wake of a rapidly changing security environment, the Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy (CISTP) of the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, US, put forward the proposal for a limited nuclear-weapon free zone (LNWFZ) in Northeast Asia in 1992. It started as a Track II endeavour. It was argued that the creation of a LNWFZ could change relationship from confrontation to interdependence by aiding to meet the obligations of the NPT as well as by building a much-needed security organisation and structure. The elimination of all nuclear weapons, not only from the zone but the globe, was seen as a long-term goal.26
The original CISTP concept for a limited nuclear weapons zone envisaged a circular area centered on the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) of the Korean Peninsula. It attempted to limit the deployment of nuclear weapons within a described zone of Northeast Asia--a circle of 1200nm in radius (with its center in the middle in the DMZ and extending outward). Initially, this concept called for removal of all nuclear weapons from this zone.
The original concept was presented and tested in US government and academic circles as early as February 1992. A month later, the concept was taken to Beijing, where individuals from Canada, Hong Kong, China, North and South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Russia, and the United States met for the first time to discuss the idea of a limited nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia. While the meeting had a large agenda, the concept was discussed in general terms. It soon became apparent that a total ban and removal of nuclear weapons from the suggested zone would not be acceptable. This would be the first nuclear weapon-free zone that actually included nuclear weapons possessing states; and, thus, the removal of weapons would have to be a much more gradual process, allowing the states to adjust and maintain their security.27
Central to the idea was the creation of a multinational verification agency based in the Vladivostok that would oversee implementation and execution of the agreement. Its responsibilities would be to ensure that Russia, China and the US have removed their nuclear weapons as promised. The verification organisation manned by specialists from all the areas in the zone would be authorised to inspect the nuclear power and research programmes of the non-nuclear weapon states--Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia, and Taiwan. However, it is doubtful if a total ban and removal of all nuclear weapons from the zone would be acceptable to Russia and China.
In March 1992 when the proposal was first presented to a conference co-sponsored by the Institute for Global Concerns and CISTP in Beijing, the Chinese response was negative. However since March 1993, a positive change has taken place. China is willing to discuss such a concept with the aim of minimising its impact on deterrent forces in order to be assured that the other nations would not take a full nuclear option in the future.
The change in Chinese attitude was seen to be linked to the North Korean announcement in 1993 that it would withdraw from the NPT. It is also believed that China began to feel threatened (read concerned) by the possibility of a North Korean programme to obtain nuclear weapons. As North Korea refused to be involved in further discussions of the limited nuclear weapon free zone concept; China became an active participant.
During the next two years, the idea of a limited nuclear weapon free zone was presented by CISTP to authorities and specialists throughout the region. Academics, government officials, and experts from all involved states were briefed. From January to March 1995, a group of five senior individuals from China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States met in Georgia to consider the feasibility of NWFZ for Northeast Asia. After four weeks of intense negotiations, the members drafted an "Agreement of Principles."
Accordingly, it was agreed that the LNWFZ could be utilised to create a new cooperative security system in Northeast Asia. It was also stated that the zone would not be directed against any particular state. After examining the structure of the zone, it was decided to review the elliptical and general area zone, in addition to the circular zone.28 It was clear that the zone needed to actually include all states as principle members and that a circle--'as originally proposed'--was unacceptable to several parties.
It was also agreed that a time-phase approach for the removal of weapons would have to be followed to provide against threatening the security of the weapons associated with non-strategic missiles and nuclear warheads of "tactical" applications during the initial phase. Restrictions against peaceful applications were not seen as being necessary, but safeguards inspections were to continue. The creation of a verification agency was seen critical to the success of the concept.
So far no government in the region has endorsed the concept. However retired ambassadors, senior government officials, generals and scholars from the US, China, Russia, Japan, Mongolia and South Korea meet regularly to continue consideration of the concept.29
Assessment and Prospects
The zone is very complicated. There is still too much legacy of the Cold War in South Korea, and North Korea lacks contact with the outside world. While the United States has played a more active role than others in the Agreed Framework, for the simple reason that it involves two of its very close allies--South Korea and Japan, other nuclear powers are also supportive of a denuclearised East Asia. Thus, China has expressed support for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula and for an independent, peacefully reunified Korea. China has said that North Korea's calls of US withdrawl from South Korea were "justified."30 China supports the proposal for a four-party conference (put forward by South Korea in April 1996).31 Russia allowed its military mutual assistance pact with North Korea to lapse in 1996 and was looking for a relationship with both Koreas. The former Soviet Union supported mutual reductions of armed forces and creating a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.32 Russia has proposed an eight-party conference on regional security.33 North Korea has urged Russia to join KEDO.
So far as North Korea is concerned, it has agreed to the Agreed Framework more for personal gains rather than any other reason. There are some obvious economic benefits, for example, it has got light water reactors free which otherwise would have cost it $4 billion. Japan and South Korea are to pay 90 per cent of the cost, although the former has insisted on European contribution.34 It has also got heavy oil as an interim measure and trade barriers with the US in the field of telecommunication are to be reduced. According to Mansurov, the US allowed North Korea to "apply for International Monetary Fund, World Bank, ASEAN Development Bank, etc.35 North Korea has thus been accused by some to have exploited the American non proliferation campaign to its advantage and used its nuclear weapons to blackmail the world community.
What kind of denuclearisation it will lead to at the end of five years remains to be seen. The North has not shown any keenness to extend the agreement to a more comprehensive regional denuclearisation. It is by implication that it has been estimated that the agreement will promote the Joint Declaration. The North is anyway more interested in discussing the issue with the Americans rather than the South Koreans, an indication of its intent. This also reflects on the prospects of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Korean peninsula, considering North Korea is the key player. Nevertheless, lasting peace and regional stability will not be assured until normalised relationships on the Korean peninsula have been developed.
Despite the intense international scrutiny applied to North Korea, Japan's ambitious nuclear power plans have not gone unnoticed. Once suspicions and problems related to North Korea are sorted out, the basic conditions for a nuclear weapon free zone covering Japan would emerge. Including Japan in a carefully crafted regional nuclear weapon free zone would not only enhance the security of Japan and Korea but also stabilise the nuclear status quo in the region and help consolidate and reduce Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons. For more than thirty years Japan has maintained the so-called three non-nuclear principles: not possessing, not manufacturing, and not introducing nuclear weapons into the Japanese territory. And yet Japan's huge plutonium stockpile continues to be a cause of concern, its being party to the NPT notwithstanding. Japan explains its decision to have a large-scale plutonium-recycling programme on the basis of national energy security and environmental protection. Japan's plutonium stockpile by the end of 1995, including that contained in the spent fuel sent to the UK and France for reprocessing, amounted to as much as 16 tons by the end of 1995.
According to Shinichi Ogawa, if carefully visualised, a nuclear weapon free zone is not incompatible with the US policy of extending nuclear deterrence to Japan and South Korea. Under a nuclear weapon free zone, it is natural that Japan, South Korea and North Korea (or a united Korea) would be required to abstain from developing, producing receiving, possessing, storing, deploying or using nuclear weapons. "However," says Shinichi, "the zone that bans using and deploying nuclear weapons should be limited to territorial spaces of Japan and two Koreas, since this would ensure the flexible deployment and operation of US nuclear armed Tomahawks SLCMs, the nuclear tipped Tomahawks carried by SLCMs are the only sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons that are planned to be redeployed in a US-designated "crisis" and are suitable weapon systems for retaliatory deterrent--deterring an adversary's first use of weapons of mass destruction."36
It is also believed that South Korea and Japan would have to maintain, with US help, conventional military capabilities strong enough to deter their militarily powerful neighbours. If either of them fails to do so, the function of the US nuclear shield would change from retaliatory to first use, thereby necessitating the end of the nuclear weapon free zone and the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on its own soil. Although it is a formidable task for both Japan and South Korea, the nuclear weapon free zone would bestow them with security advantages. They would, for instance, be able to get legally binding security guarantees from China and Russia. In view of the potential capabilities of Japan, North Korea and South Korea and the suspicion in China and Russia about their nuclear intentions, the two may not hesitate in giving such guarantees. Besides, in case a reunified Korea is not a remote event, a mutually verifiable non-nuclear Japan and unified Korea would ease the task of managing relations between them.37
Undoubtedly the most urgent security issue facing East Asia is the future of the Korean Peninsula, where the interests of all four major powers intersect. The impact of political change in South Korea early this year remains to be seen. Much would depend on how far the two Koreas may accommodate each other and implement the 1991 Basic Agreement while negotiations for a peace treaty are under way. The denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula requires not only an international dimension but also destruction of tension and building of confidence between the two Koreas based upon the agreements they have already adopted.
1. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, "Progress and Prospects of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in East Asia," Paper presented at the Pugwash Workshop on Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, held in New Delhi, March 1-3, 1998, p. 4.
2. Arms Control Reporter, 1981, p. 850. 103.
3. Bruce Cummins, "Spring Thaw for Korean Cold War?" The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April 1992, pp. 18-19.
4. John Simpson, "Nuclear Capabilities, Military Security and the Korean Peninsula: A Three-tiered Perspective from Europe," The Korean Journal of Defense Analyses, vol. IV, no. 2, Winter 1992, p. 18.
5. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, "The Denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects," Arms Control Today, vol. 14, no. 2, August 1993, p. 68.
6. Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones: A History and Assessment," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 24.
7. Seo-Hang Lee, "Denuclearisation Efforts on the Korean Peninsula: Recent Developments," in Pericles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone ed., Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1997), p. 99.
9. Ibid., p. 100.
10. Arms Control Reporter, 1993, p. 457B137.
11. Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival, vol. 35, no. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 140.
12. David Albright, "A Proliferation Primer," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1993, p. 16.
13. Bracken, n. 11, p. 4.
14. Michael Mazarr in "North Korea at Cross-Crossroads: Nuclear Renegade or Regional Partner?" (Debate), Arms Control Today, May 1993, p. 5.
15. David Albright, n. 11, Arms Control Reporter, 1993, p. 457, B.148.
16. For details see, Savita Pande, The Future of the NPT, (New Delhi: Lancers, 1995), pp. 238-39.
17. Larry Niksch and Zachary Davis, "North Korean Nuclear Controversy: Defining Treaties, Agreements and Terms," CRS Report for Congress, September 16, 1994, p. 10.
18. For details see Savita Pande, "Towards US-North Korea "Agreed Framework" and Aftermath," Strategic Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 7, October 1995, pp. 915-930.
19. See for instance Washington Post, April 15, 1997, North Korea accused the United States of working hand in glove with South Korea and Japan and US officials dismissed it as usual rhetoric.
20. International Atomic Energy Agency, Press Release IAEA PR 97/28, October 3, 1997.
21. IAEA report implementation of Safeguards in 1996 cited in Press Release IAEA PR 97/12, June 11, 1997.
22. Arms Control Reporter 1997, p. 457 B.375.
23. Kim Chan Sik, "The South of Asia and the Korean Peninsula" in Gaspariani Alves et. al. ed. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in the 21st Century, n. 7, p. 104.
24. Arms Control Reporter 1997, p. 457 B.378.
25. Kim Chan Sik, n. 23, pp. 104-105.
26. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, n. 1, p. 6.
27. For details see Center for International Strategy Technology and Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, The Border Protocol of the Limited Weapon Free Zone for Northeast Asia, (Georgia Technology Research Corporation), and March 1997.
28. Ibid., p. 11.
29. Mark Byung Moon Suh, n. 1, p. 7.
30. Arms Control Reporter 1986, p. 850. B.103.
31. Arms Control Reporter 1997, p. 457. A.6.
32. Arms Control Reporter 1997, p. 805. B.102.
33. Arms Control Reporter 1997, p. 457. A.6.
34. International Herald Tribune, October 26, 1996.
35. Alexander Y. Mansourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Programme," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 1993, p. 33.
36. Shinichi Ogawa, "The Nuclear Security of Japan and South Korea: A Japanese View," The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. IX, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 46.
37. Ibid., p. 47.