Ethnicity, Its Causes and Possible Solutions: The Case of Sri Lanka

P.R. Rajeswari, Researcher, IDSA

 

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has swept a wave of ethnic conflicts across parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa. Belying early expectations, the disappearance of bipolarity and Cold War did not usher in peace and security in the world. Rather, it unleashed many critical issues like ethnicity, terrorism, environmental degradation and so on.

The issues of nationalism, social change and confrontational tendencies have encouraged not only national and supra-national movements, but also new trends, such as ethnic and sectarian nationalism. That is how one finds many countries facing internal instability from the two processes of politicisation of the issue of ethnicity and ethnicisation of politics.

Ethnic conflicts and fundamentalism--religious or otherwise--have spread all over from Europe to Asia. When one looks at one point of view, it is quite justified that conflicts are inherent to the processes of social development, state formation and nation building. And it is not possible to altogether prevent ethnic conflicts. Resolution of these conflicts comes at a stage when the conflicts lead to heavy loss, destruction of property and resources of the nation and create misery on a large scale.

It is quite possible to say that ethnic conflicts have been a product of this century. At the same time, it is not that hatred and enmity did not exist between various groups during earlier times. The problem is that it has crystallised into conflicts in this century. Is this to conclude that ethnic passions had been suppressed under various regimes, and have simply been let loose after the collapse of such regimes? Instead the improvement in information technology and educational levels of all sections of people make them aware of their rights and responsibilities, which make them agitate through demonstration and other movements.

The continued existence of ethnic violence and terrorist threats--coupled with the increasing availability of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies makes the world a much more dangerous place for all human beings.

The sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 is an example of the kind of problems the US and the whole international community could face. It is not anymore the danger of a missile from the Soviet Union; it is the danger of a terrorist bringing something in a suitcase, or injecting something into the water supply, and endangering large segments of the population.

It is here that the proliferation of nuclear weapons has become a matter of great concern to the US. The nations that do not have them as yet, or claim not to have them, have continued to be of major concern. None of the members of the 'nuclear club' are willing to see an increase in proliferation activities. A nuclear free South Asia or a nuclear 'frozen' South Asia are the reflective points that are floating around in the US-South Asia relations.

The Issue of Ethnicity

Multi-ethnicity has become a socio-political phenomenon in most civil societies. In the present century, inter-ethnic cleavages, competition and conflict seem to have acquired a higher intensity. As a result, ethnic mobilisation poses various challenges to many developing as well as developed countries. South Asia is no exception to this phenomenon. It is an intrinsic component of the socio-political realities of multi-ethnic states in South Asia as in other parts of the world. Today, ethnicisation of politics and politicisation of ethnicity have become very common and have diffused mutual toleration, and have thus, sharpened ethnic consciousness among various communities.

It may be necessary to dwell upon the factors that condition ethnic conflicts. The unequal power structure that exists in a state system could kick-off ethnic conflicts. In the event of the state structure being in the hands of a particular ethnic group, the dominant-subordinate group fights for power-sharing for societal rewards and goods manifest themselves in ethnic terms. However, inequality in power-sharing need not always lead to ethnic conflicts. Few preconditions exist for such conflicts; (a) a socially mobilised population; (b) the existence of a pool of symbols connoting its distinctiveness; (c) the selection, standardisation and transmission of such symbol pools to the community by the leadership; and (d) a reference group in relation to whom a sense of relative deprivation (real or imaginary) is aggregated.1 Also, the spatial and numerical components of an ethnic group condition towards ethnic conflict. The larger the number of people of a particular group in an area, the greater the potential for demand articulation and aggregation.

Ethnic conflicts also make their emergence because of accumulated fears about the future and after long experience in the past of various types. As Vesna Pesic, a professor at the University of Belgrade said, 'ethnic conflict is caused by the "fear of the future", lived through the past.'2

Besides several aspects, ethnicity could also be traced back to its economic linkages, social deprivation and political disadvantages, experienced by one particular group against the other. Political turbulence, including actions of ethnic social movements, can produce serious repercussions across national borders within a very short period of time. The formation of Bangladesh is a case in point.

On the whole, ethnic groups use peaceful means to pursue their interests. But in cases where ethnicity was linked with acute social unrest, past history of conflicts between groups, and fear about the future, ethnic groups could adopt violent means and ways to achieve their objectives. Fear about the future could result from a group's past experience with certain other groups within the nation. Also, when the group feels that the government or state machinery has not been able to provide protection and safety to various ethno-religious and minority groups, it could create a sense of fear in their minds and result in ethnic conflicts. This situation, explained by Barry Posen as "Emerging Anarchy" occurs when central authority declines and groups become fearful of their very survival. In at least all the cases, state weakness becomes an essential prerequisite for violent conflicts to happen.

Ethnic conflicts, in most of the cases, have their roots in colonial and post-colonial rule. Colonial powers ruling a country through many administrative and political units divide and segregate the people into many groups and isolate them from one another. Also certain sections of the society may be given special privileges and entitled to higher professions and authority, which gives them a superiority complex, ignoring the fact whether they belong to a majority or minority group. Other groups in the societies then develop resentment and enmity towards these privileged groups. This goes deep down into the psyche of the people and even after the colonial powers leave, the stigma of minority versus majority and privileged against the non-privileged lies in the human minds. Thus, what happens is that when the colonial powers withdraw, independent states emerge with seeds of enmity and hatred already sown dividing the population into privileged groups and others. This could be suggested as a cause for the eruption of ethnic conflicts.

One good illustration of this is the case of Sri Lanka. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is basically the fall-out of the long colonial rule, which first inducted the idea of divide and rule into the island nation. The British divided the whole island into five different provinces and districts, all of them subject to a single, English-speaking administration in Colombo. The British rule had also somewhat favoured the Tamils who were brought into the island primarily for plantation work. The emergence of this plantation owners' group created a vast difference in the societal order. Under the colonial rule, the Tamils had a comfortable life, but once the British left, some drastic changes took place. The majority group in the island, the Sinhalas became conscious of their numerical superiority and started agitating against the disfavourable attitude towards them. Also, most of the top level professions were occupied by this numerically fewer people. This economic disadvantage had been the basic cause of the prolonged ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Other reasons would include issues like who had occupied the island primarily in the beginning.

In all the South Asian cases, there is a commonality. Sundeep Waslekar identifies these common factors in various ethnic conflicts in South Asia. The colonial legacy has created certain privileged special classes--landlords in Pakistan, plantation owners in Sri Lanka, royalty and aristocracy in Nepal, the westernised upper middle classes in urban India--who assumed the control over the state authority after independence.3 The policies pursued by them were basically directed towards certain privileged groups and not towards the landless farmers or even the large mass of people. The influence of this special privileged class of people is very visible in the political parties--at the national, state and district levels.

Such distortion in the development policies result in inequalities in the society and in turn, cause violent conflicts. It is then that one realises the importance of state power. To gain an entry into the state power structure becomes a competitive exercise and the dominance of the institutions of state by certain groups, and the use of artificial entry through the use of money, organised crime and kinship make it further difficult for others to enter such power structures. This creates aloofness and frustration among large sections of people. Once such conflicts take shape, then even neighbouring states get in by offering some political support, complemented by weapons and military training.

Competition for scarce resources is another major cause for conflict between groups. Property rights, jobs, educational policy, language rights and other development allocations confer certain benefits on individuals and groups. When these resources are scarce and/or directed favourably towards certain sections of the society, moves toward attaining them begin in organised groups on the lines of religion, caste, class and such other divisions of the society. In societies, where ethnicity is an important basis for identity, group competition is often formed along ethnic lines, though this need not be the case always.

In the context of 'modernisation and development', one is caught up with its own dynamics; combating ethnic loyalty on the one hand, and stimulating ethnic consciousness on the other. As a result of this, whatever be the state of development, ethnic conflicts need to be viewed as part of an ongoing process which needs to be accommodated in the society, but which cannot be resolved once and for all, except through either assimilation or elimination of a particular group. Assimilation is seen more as a successful process as compared to the other.

There is yet another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration while analysing the causes of ethnic conflicts. Today, modernisation is taking place in every nook and corner of the world. As a result of this modernisation, an uneven level of development has spread into cultural differentiation. The expansion of markets and improved communications increases contacts and generates competition among communal groups. As people aspire to the same social and economic rewards, competition intensifies and communal solidarities become very important--or rather the most significant vehicle for mutual support and promotion, especially in urban areas. The competition, thus created by economic development politicises ethnic pluralism and makes it even more salient than in earlier periods. Thus, as per this idea, modernisation does not eliminate communal solidarities, but modernises them, and sharpens them into much more effective instruments for group projections in a state system. Hence, in relation to development, ethnic competition may be unleashed by regional uneven development, cultural bias in capital accumulation, and the effects of migration flows.4

Thus, one could say that the colonial legacy, misgovernance with distorted economic policies, violation of human rights, corruption and crime, and the involvement of neighbouring states have caused most of the violent conflicts in the world today, where ideology, religion, or ethnicity have been used as a pretext in the competition for power. Weakness of the state system has always been a crucial factor in changing the nature of conflicts into violent ones.

Case of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is a multi-racial, multi-lingual and multi-religious country with Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Sri Lankan Moors or Muslims as major ethnic groups. A fifth group, the Veddhas, only a few thousands are descendants of original inhabitants of the island.5 Their traditional culture has disappeared due to their contact with the Sinhalese and Tamils. The huge migration process not only created a bulk of Sri Lanka's population, but also had provided the majority-minority component of its social structure.

Majority of the Sinhalese are Theravada Buddhist and the remainder are mostly Roman Catholics. Their areas of habitation are western, central, and southern provinces, where they are politically and economically dominant. The Sri Lankan Tamils are mostly Hindus and a small minority belongs to Protestants and Roman Catholics. They live primarily in the eastern and northern provinces, with cultural and political activity centered on the Jaffna peninsula.

The roots of insurgency lie deep in the social, political and economic situation at a given point of time. The insurrectionary movements took shape due to the existence of sharp divisions within the society owing to regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious and communal differences alone with issues of legitimacy and authority. There are different versions on the question whether the Sinhalese or the Tamils were the ones who came to the island first.

Under the British rule till 1948, the Tamils had enjoyed a comfortable position in the system. They were not discriminated or treated as a minority group of people. But once the British left, the Sinhalese became obsessed with their numerical superiority and started a cruel process of racial discrimination interspersed with periodic violence against the Tamils. Under the colonial rule, the relations between the two communities had been relatively harmonious. It was only in 1958 that the Sinhalese-Tamil resentment turned bloody when some Sinhalese rioted against Sri Lankan Tamils in the south. In the following two decades, the Sri Lankan economy began deteriorating and the unemployment rates also shot up.

Thus, it was only to ascertain their survival and progress that the Tamils in 1976 decided to demand a separate and sovereign state. There was a kind of justification in this demand for a separate state as the July genocide had amply demonstrated the vulnerability of the Tamils to the frenzy and fury of the Sinhalese. If the Tamils were not considered as equals to the Sinhalese, it became quite understandable on the part of Tamils to organise themselves for having a separate and sovereign state.

The current strife in Sri Lanka is thus, a violent, ethnic separatist movement that mainly involves the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese.

Hence, it appears that the issue is rooted in a long-felt economic and cultural grievance of a Sinhalese-Buddhist majority against an articulate Tamil minority, who as a minority have fared far too well under the British and have acquired a sound base after independence. What makes the situation even worse is that the Tamil minority make up an overwhelming majority--95.6 per cent of one province, situated on the Jaffna peninsular, and also constitute significant minorities in the district of Trincomalee (33 per cent), and a large majority in Batticola (70 per cent).6 Both of these districts are situated in the eastern province. While the distribution of economic wealth and employment availability make up much of the reason for grievances on both sides, the problem of the role that cultural and religious symbolism play within Sri Lankan society and within the structure of the state also constitutes a sore point in their relations.

The Sinhalese community, in order to give more official colour to their activities created a leftist youth movement, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) or People's Liberation Army as a powerful political force. And the Tamil community went ahead with the formation of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Political events in Sri Lanka had been quite contradictory in their nature. On the one side, there are periodic parliamentary elections between competing parties on both sides of the communal divide--including the socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the conservative United National Party (UNP) among the Sinhalese, and a kaleidoscope of groups within the Tamil minority. But on the other side, there is violence, murder, torture, secessionist claims, revolutionary demands, state repression. Thus, despite a parallel history of constitutional parties, elections and parliaments, it continues to be a tale of murder, torture and bloody destruction.7

The first violent attack between the two communities occurred in 1958 and thereafter such attacks became much more frequent. The years 1958, 1977, 1981, 1983 witnessed increasing fights between the warring groups.

If Sinhalese national identity seemed to be problematic, based upon an elusive link between religion and language, the concept of an independent Tamil state was even less pronounced. The language had failed to provide the basis for agreement within the Tamils even though it had provided the basis of opposition against the Sinhalese majority. What had featured prominently as the pattern of communal violence in Sri Lanka's eastern and northern provinces since 1983, had been the killing of various Tamil groups on the basis of different ideological orientations and thus, a rise in factionalised rivalry.

The matter further worsened when the Muslims began demanding significant autonomy of the community and the territory they occupied. Many a time, India had to mediate a settlement and the significant Indo-Sri Lankan accord of 1987 was an outcome of that attempt. The accord provided a framework for the restoration of peace and normalcy in the area. It stipulated the surrender of arms by the militants followed by amnesty, the formation of an interim administrative council in the northern and eastern provinces and also the holding of elections in the area. In 1987, 60,000 Indian troops--Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were placed in Tamil regions to control the violence.8 However, the Indian troops left the island in 1990 at the request of the Sinhalese government, and EPRLF (Eelam Popular Revolutionary Liberation Front), who had contested the provincial elections in 1988, faced the wrath of the Tigers. With the presence of Indian Army in the area, much of the violence was controlled, but the Indians were accused of killing thousands of Tamil civilians and allegedly destroying much of their property.

In 1987, later former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in the state of Tamil Nadu. It has been argued in the political circles that Rajiv Gandhi's assassination was committed at the behest of the LTTE leadership. In fact, Prabhakaran was identified as the main accused in the criminal design. This fact has continued to be the main point of acrimony between India and the warring Jaffna LTTE leaders.

Attempts to satisfy demands from the moderate and extremists of both communities squeezed out the middle path. It suggested that Tamil demands should be settled within a federal constitutional structure. The Sinhalese majority was to accept a significant degree of political devolution in the process.

The devolution of powers to the provinces was attempted three times. The first attempt, the so-called 'development council' plan of 1982 did not succeed as it failed to satisfy Tamil demands since it was based upon district and not provincial autonomy. The second attempt was the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 which developed significant powers to the provinces, and merged the northern and eastern provinces into one. This policy was severely opposed by radical Sinhalese and the JVP as well as members of the government, including Premadasa. The third attempt followed from the government's decision to embark upon a plan to adopt the Indian federal system and grant the nine provinces significant powers of devolution--although it remained unclear what these powers were and which Tamils actually supported the initiative.

The two consecutive elections (parliamentary and presidential) held in 1994 in which Chandrika Kumaratunga's People's Alliance (PA) emerged victorious showed that people largely supported Chandrika's initiative to end the country's protracted ethnic problem. In the beginning, Chandrika was able to put the LTTE on the defensive and gained international reputation, but the changing stance of the LTTE making new demands stood in the way of the peace process. Also, their main contention was that they were never considered a 'serious political party' but were seen as 'guerilla group'. This seemed to be one of the major constraints to the easy passage of political dialogue.

Despite all the efforts for a peaceful and agreeable settlement of the ethnic crisis, it was a clear fact that without the participation of the Tigers, such settlement would be in vain. LTTE supremo, V. Prabhakaran, on his part, claimed that hostilities had restarted because the government failed to live up to the demands and promises of the Tamils. The prospects for peace with the Tamils did not appear very bright even if there was a change of govenment in Sri Lanka. It was a fact that unless and until both the parties made some compromises, it was going to be difficult to attain peace.

Ethnic conflict in the form of terrorism, riots, government-sanctioned attacks on civilians, destruction of property and assassinations have caused more than 3,00,000 deaths since the early 1980s, and the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of Tamils and others.9 And so far, a political or any other kind of solution to the issue of Sri Lankan autonomy remains elusive.

It is against this background of having lived with the problem for three decades that ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka must be understood and evaluated as a spill-over in the South Asian context. The Tamil population, as well as, the Sinhalese component, along with religious variables suggest that there has been a considerable intermeshing of communities, races and religions. A long history of Sri Lanka, in terms of the racial composition of the island, does not lend a rigid identity to each one of these groups.

However, the identity in terms of Tamils, Sinhalese and others are now based on the basis of separate religious adherents. Sometimes, it has also been argued that the question has been not so much of racial cum religious identity, but that of economic disparity among different classes. One group accuses the other of enjoying the supremacy in bureaucracy, governmental patronage, and running the elite-based institutions.

On the other hand, Sinhalese population, which constitute majority, feel that the root cause of Tamil belligerency against them is buttressed by the southern part of India. The sanctuaries of Tamil rebels are to be found in Tamil Nadu. The government of India has strongly prevented any such congregation of LTTE--more particularly after the death of India's late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, but all is not under control.

The mounting pressure of the military against LTTE has also brought countless deaths to the rank and file of the LTTE groups. They have been subjected to rigorous attacks by the Sri Lankan government wth a decisive advantage in their favour. The fight, however, persists.

The ethnic conflict, thus, in Sri Lanka, assumes significance in the context of what was appeared to be a malady of its kind. Political, social turmoil with a desire to have a decisive mileage in these affairs has remained a guiding spirit in this case. The economic disadvantage and insecurity cause further distance between the LTTE and the Sinhalese and hamper their rapprochement.

Possible Solutions to Conflicts

Finding a solution to ethnic problem presents itself as a serious question. However, the attempts that can possibly lead toward solutions must be examined. It could be said that most of today's violent conflicts are basically internal in nature, but their possible solutions come from either international peace keeping bodies or other dominating powerful states, an action by a special task force of a group of states, or the neighbouring states, thus giving it an international dimension. As mentioned earlier, most of the violent conflicts today are caused by the divisions that exist in a pluralist society. Hence, if the conflicts are caused from such differences, the solutions must come from power sharing among the various ethnic or other sectarian groups. That is how in the recent years one finds an increasing significance of minorities and their rights and demands.

Managing ethnic or sectarian violent conflicts and finding solutions to them is not an easy task, given the multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies all over the world today. Instead of a disappearance of individual and group differences, these are only becoming sharper and deeper with the pace of development and competition. If some mutual arrangement can be made for power sharing or regional autonomy at the local level, conflicts will not get prolonged nor result in the wastage of human and other resources of the nation. For this, a few other conditions must exist. There must be mutual respect for other parties and their demands, as part of a confidence building measure. Unless each side views its opponent as honourbale and having legitimate demands, relations cannot improve between various groups, which are characterised by widening fears and gaps.

Another significant step towards managing conflicts would be through power sharing. A certain share needs to be kept for the minority groups in cabinet, civil service, military, high party positions and such other important areas which will give some kind of satisfaction to individuals and groups. The power sharing arrangements are not permanent solutions, but very temporary and fragile. The use of power sharing arrangements between ethnic or sectarian groups has a limited appeal. In the case of India, the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had negotiated peace accords with the All Assam Student Union, the Sikh leader Sant Longowal, the Mizo leader Laldenga and the Gorkha leader Subhash Ghisingh. In Belgium, the cabinet represents two ethnic groups on an equal basis. In Cambodia too, the government comprises two of the three main factions that had been engaged in a protracted civil war. Therefore, this arrangement would bring some improvement in the relations between various competing groups, as they would provide a certain amount of psychological security to these groups.

Also the competing/conflicting parties do not like to get into power sharing arrangement while they have adequate support for their survival. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are in no way going to accept autonomy as a solution to their demands so long as they have control over vast resources. In Cambodia too, some Khmer Rouge groups refuse to accept a place in the coalition government so long as they have control over pieces of land and trade. Even if the parties agree to this kind of an arrangement, it will not last too long. It would only give a temporary respite from the problem and not result in a long-term settlement.

To think about the power sharing aspect in a realistic way, who will be sharing the power? To look at the case of South Asia, there are about 200 languages spoken and ten different religions practised, not to mention the various distinct tribal groups. Here, if power sharing is to be done to the satisfaction of all different ethnic, religious, caste, tribal and linguistic identities, millions of people would have to be accommodated in various state structures. Hence, power sharing does not seem to offer any viable solution at all.

Yet another step would be to inculcate regional autonomy and federation into the state system which would enable local and regional authorities with a degree of autonomous power and authority. Decentralisation, regional autonomy and federalism have been tried as part of conflict negotiations in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Angola and South Africa, with quite a success.

Another way to bring out some amicable solution to these conflicts is through external intervention. The response of states involved in conflicts to external intervention varies from state to state. South Asian states have not been so appreciative of the whole idea of state intervention. Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, India or Pakistan have not allowed foreign organisations or countries to find a solution to their internal conflicts like those of the Chakma tribals, Bhutanese separatists of Nepalese origin, Kashmiris and Assamese in India, or Sindhi nationalists in Pakistan. Among the South Asian states, only Sri Lanka has been open to a partial mediation by international community in its Tamil-Sinhala problem. The response from the whole of South East Asia, except for the two Koreas and Cambodia has been quite similar to that of South Asia.

With the number of ethnic conflicts increasing in the present times, opportunities for international organisations and other states to intervene in the internal problems of a state have gone high. External interventions have two primary effects. First, intervention can alter the internal balance of ethnic power and lead groups to moderate their demands. The second primary effect of intervention is to provide guarantees for new ethnic contracts between the warring parties, at least during an interim period.10

There is a serious problem in third party intervention or any type of external intervention. The problem is that the preconditions for ethnic war are generally difficult or almost impossible for outsiders to understand and influence. And third parties cannot change ethnically divided societies and their grievances or symbolic disputes, or even their past history which has led them in to this situation. But what possibly could be done is to avert militarisation of the nation and go into war.

Division of states will also not be a viable solution to these conflicts. In the present century, many states have been created on the basis of the Wilsonian principle of "self-determination". The key element in this approach has been division of territories and this has invoked ethnic principle for the equitable distribution of territories. Yet, changing the territories of states to give each community a state of its own can not solve most of the national and ethnic conflicts that remain today. India was split in 1947 into India and Pakistan. In 1971 Pakistan was split into Pakistan and Bangladesh. Within all these nations again, there are many separatist tendencies and if countries are to be further divided, there can be no end to this phenomenon, as this is based on the principle of the satisfaction of human greed in the name of accommodating ethnic and minority aspirations.

Another step towards conflict resolution could be to build regional organisations which would take care of these conflicts on a regional basis and solve them. At an international level, the United Nations exists and it has developed several instruments to deal with conflicts. They include preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building, sanctions and peace enforcement. Experiences from some of the organisations like the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organisation of African Unity and the Economic Community of West African States etc. will be quite relevant. Rivalry between governments in a region will make it difficult to reach an agreement on any issue.

 

NOTES

1. Gonzalez Casanova, 'Internal Colonialism and National Development,' Studies in Comparative International Development 1 (1965): 33, quoted by Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 27.

2. Vesna Pesic, "Remarks at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Working Group on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, October 1, 1994, quoted by David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, vol. 21, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 43.

3. Sundeep Waslekar, South Asian Drama: Travails of Misgovernance (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), pp. 228-230.

4. Jan Nderveen Pieterse, 'Deconstruction/reconstructing ethnicity?', Nations and Nationalism, vol. 3, part 3, March 1997, p. 378.

5. n. 6, p. 214.

6. Vernon Marston Hewitt, The International Politics of South Asia (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 142-143.

7. Dennis Austin, Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), p. 63.

8. n. 6, p. 215.

9. Syed Anwar Hussain, "Internal Dynamics of South Asian Security: Ethnic Dissonance", paper presented at the International seminar on Ethno-Sectarian Conflict and Internal Dynamics of Regional Security, September 2-4, 1996.

10. David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security, vol. 21, no. 2, Fall 1996, pp. 66-67.