US Policy towards South Asia:The Relevance of Structural Explanations

Rajesh Rajagopalan, Research Fellow, IDSA


One of the most important approaches to the study of international politics today is the Structural-Realist approach as represented by the writings of Kenneth Waltz.1 Waltz offers a parsimonious explanation of the fundamental structural forces that affect the behaviour of states in an anarchical international system. A number of scholars have used this Structural-Realist perspective to explain various aspects of state behaviour.2 On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that the theory as stated by Waltz is much too parsimonious and needs modification and/or elaboration to adequately explain specific state behaviour.3 Conclusions derived from the Structural-Realist perspective have also been used to predict instability in a multipolar Europe, as well as the eventual rise of other powers to balance American power, signifying the continuing relevance and centrality of this approach to the study of international politics.4

Structural-Realist theory as stated by Waltz suggests that states tend to form balances of power against each other to survive in an anarchic international system. As long as the system remains anarchic—a situation characterised by formal functional similarity of all states—balances of power will tend to recur. In a bipolar system—which is a system in which two states stand head and shoulders above the rest in terms of power and capability—the theory predicts that the two polar powers will tend to balance each other directly. As the other powers in the system are much weaker than the two polar powers, they add little to the existing capability of the two polar powers. Moreover, because of the vast difference in capability between the two polar powers, and the other states, the polar powers assume direct responsibility for balancing each other. This results in some positive effects: stability is ensured, for example, because the greatest losers in any war between the polar powers will be the polar powers themselves, thus reducing the incentive to go to war. Stability is also increased because the management of conflict is easier when fewer powers are involved, thus making stability easier to achieve in a bipolar system than in a multipolar system. However, bipolarity also has its negative side. As the two polar powers are solely responsible for their own safety through balancing each other, gains and losses in power and influence between the polar powers become a zero-sum game. Both polar powers are compelled to match any advances made by the other power. This leads to an arms race and to "over-reactions in the periphery."5 Over-extensions in the periphery refer to the involvement of both powers in trying to balance each other's influence in various corners of the world.

This imperative of over-reaction has been one of the primary causes for the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in various regions of the Third World during the bipolar Cold War era. Many of these involvements were in regions and countries that did not directly threaten or affect the security of either of the superpowers. The involvement of the superpowers in these regions, such as Southeast Asia and Africa, can be explained as the result of the efforts undertaken by the superpowers to balance each other.

Such a balance of power theory predicts that the Untied States and the Soviet Union will involve themselves in all major regions of the world because, as Waltz puts it, in a bipolar world, "there are no peripheries". The only logical limitation on their involvement will be the capability and the strategic reach of the two powers. Thus, the Soviet Union's relative lack of involvement in Latin America can be seen as a reflection of the limitations of Soviet power. In other words, the relative Soviet lack of involvement in Latin America was not due to any lack of interest in attempting to balance the United States in this region, but the lack of Soviet capability to effectively balance the United States in Latin America.

The above explanation for the involvement of the superpowers in the various regions of the world is attractively parsimonious, but not automatically valid. This essay will attempt to test the theory by looking at the involvement of the United States in one region, South Asia. Waltz suggests that the theory can only be tested by examining difficult cases: difficult cases are defined as those cases where there are strong reasons for states to behave in a manner that is not predicted by the theory.6 This essay will take a slightly different approach: the case examined is one where there are strong reasons for a state to behave in the manner prescribed by the theory but where actual behaviour appears contrary to the predictions of the theory. The case study is that of the United State's policy towards South Asia between 1965 and 1969. According to the theory, the United States should at the same time have attempted to balance Soviet influence in this region, as in other regions. The incentive for such American attempts to balance the Soviet Union in this region at this time was increased by the greater interest and activism shown here by the Soviet Union. Thus the prospects for the validation of the theory appear good. Any lack of American interest or reduction of American interest towards this region will present serious problems for the theory.

This paper has three parts. The fist section will examine the history of American involvement in the region; the second section will look specifically at the 1965—69 period and the concluding section will examine the theory in the light of the evidence from the case study.

United States, Involvement in South Asia, 1947-65

American involvement in South Asia began in the early 1950s. The United States adopted a two-pronged approach to the two major countries of the region, India and Pakistan. Pakistan was seen as an essential element of the Northern Tier strategy of containing the spread of communism, while India was seen as important primarily because of its size and power without being a direct participant in the containment strategy.

However, it is clear that American decision-makers did not see South-Asia as a region of great strategic importance in the Cold War. According to one early study of US policy towards South Asia, American decision-makers saw India and Pakistan as "countries following rather dubious policies at home and abroad, whose leaders were viewed with many misgivings, and whose people lived strange lives in terrible conditions…".7 Even though this perception would change and US involvement in South Asia increased throughout the 1950s, South Asia was never seen as crucial to American global concerns.

The United States and India

Indo-American relations have always been rocky. Early relations between the two countries suffered from differing perceptions on a number of different issues.8 As a country that had just gained independence after two hundred years of Western colonialism, India was instinctively suspicious of the West and therefore of the US. However, this suspicion was also balanced by the knowledge that President Roosevelt had personally intervened with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to propose independence for India during the Second World war, though without much success.9

As US relations with India progressed, the only constant in the relationship was its unevenness. Though the Indian government voted with the US on the first two resolutions sanctioning United Nations use of military force in Korea, Indian support was lukewarm and India refused to send combat forces to Korea to fight alongside the US. Indian and American perceptions of the Korean war went in opposite directions after the US decided to cross the 38th parallel. Indian officials had passed on a message to the US from the Chinese leadership that crossing the 38th parallel would lead to direct Chinese intervention, a warning that US decision-makers ignored.10

In this early phase, from the perspective of the theory, the lack of American interest in India was clearly the result of more pressing global concerns that the US faced. American efforts to balance the Soviet Union focused on Europe (in Greece, Turkey and Berlin) and in East Asia (China and Korea). These were areas of more immediate concern than South Asia. Moreover, American unfamiliarity with South Asia and a reluctance to complicate relations with Great Britain—which considered South Asia to be its area of influence and expertise—all played a part in the lack of American interest in this region. Also, the Soviet Union had till that point shown no interest in this region. The American approach was typified in a Joint Chiefs of Staff memo, of March 1949, which stated that:

The inaccessibility of the area from the north…And the fact that more remunerative objectives exist in Europe, Middle East and the Far East, make it unlikely that, in the event of war, the USSR would expand (sic) any substantial military effort in South Asia…11

American interest was not totally absent, however. Indian and American diplomats did hold some early, if unfruitful, discussions on cooperation against "external totalitarian influences" in the region.12

A chance for a fresh start came in early 1951 when India asked for American grain to meet critical food shortages in India. Even though the Truman administration granted the request immediately, the US Congress tied up the grant bill for several weeks and eventually turned a portion of the grant into a loan agreement. Though the shipment was delivered, Indian gratitude had cooled considerably with the bitter debate in the Congress. In fact, a much smaller Soviet food shipment received far greater favourable attention in India.13 By the summer of 1951, differences over the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty had created further problems in the Indo-American relationship.14

The relationship between the two countries was further strained when Pakistan was invited to join US sponsored defence pacts such as the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) , originally, the Baghdad Pact and started receiving American weapons. Even though India was assured by the US that these weapons would not be used against India, the Indian leadership remained skeptical of Pakistani intentions and critical of the American decision. Throughout the Eisenhower administration, relations between the two countries were lukewarm. Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pursued containment of the Soviet Union with messianic zeal and held cherished Indian conceptions of non-alignment as short-sighted at best and immoral and dangerous in the Cold War context.15 Indian leadership under Nehru also persistently attempted to evolve friendly relations with its northern neighbour, Communist China, which was also looked upon with distaste by the Republican administration.

This phase in Indo-US relations exhibits a clear change from the earlier phase. While the Truman era relationship was primarily the result of a lack of American interest in the region as a whole, the lukewarm relations between India and the US in the Eisenhower era were due to the importance given to Pakistan in the containment strategy. Pakistan's geographical position made it strategically of greater importance to the United States, and consequently reduced the importance of India.16

The election of John F. Kennedy as President in 1960 improved Indo-American relations considerably. Kennedy was a well known advocate in the Senate of greater aid, support and attention to India and many of his liberal advisors were also more sympathetic to Indian concerns.17 The highest point in Indo-American relations were reached when the United States promptly dispatched military aid to India in the aftermath of the border war with China in October 1962. However, expectations that this would lead to some kind of long term security arrangements between India and the US proved to be short-lived, as American military aid quickly dried up. A number of factors were responsible for the failure to build a long-term security relationship between India and the US at this point: the cost of building up the Indian defence establishment to meet the Chinese challenge was considered too heavy, the traditional US-Pakistan military ties limited how far the US could carry the relationship with India, and finally, American pressure on India to settle the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan led to resistance among Indian decision-makers.18 After war broke out between Pakistan and India in 1965, the US stopped all military assistance to India as well as to Pakistan.

The United States and Pakistan

Pakistan had consistently sought US military assistance and ties to balance the Indian military superiority in the subcontinent. The Pakistani search for such ties started as early as 1948, after the first Kashmir war. However, despite effusive Pakistani support for various international issues of importance to the US, such as the Korean war and the Japanese Peace Treaty, the US interest in Pakistan remained limited during the early years. At this time, Pakistan suffered the same fate as India: South Asia as a region was considered the preserve of Great Britain, a preeminence that the US was unwilling to challenge. The importance of other regions like Europe and East Asia in the American strategic calculus also limited the attention that the US paid to Pakistan. By mid-1949, the attitudes of some American strategists, at least towards Pakistan, began to show signs of change. Pakistan alone in South Asia was seen to have some military utility in balancing the Soviet Union, "in spite of tremendous logistic difficulties" of conducting operations from Pakistan. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some countries in South Asia, especially those contiguous to the Soviet Union such as Pakistan and Afghanistan offered "the possibility of ideological and intelligence penetration of the USSR". Moreover, some areas in Pakistan could "under certain conditions, become of strategic importance…as a base for air operations against central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in defence or recapture of Middle Eastern oil areas."19

The election of Eisenhower to the presidency changed the extent of US involvement in Pakistan. The new administration adopted as an early goal the Northern Tier strategy that aimed at building up the indigenous defence capabilities of a number of "frontline states" such as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey in order to contain the spread of Soviet influence.20 This suited Pakistan's goals perfectly, and the US announced a military assistance programme to Pakistan in early 1954. In September the same year, Pakistan joined the SEATO alliance and a year later also joined the CENTO alliance, both sponsored and supported by the US and Great Britain as part of the Northern Tier strategy. In return for military aid and political support, Pakistan also allowed the United States to lease a military base in Peshawar for launching U-2 spy flights over the Soviet Union and to set up electronic listening posts.21 During the Eisenhower era, American efforts in Pakistan were explicitly concerned with the balancing (or containment) of Soviet and Chinese power and influence in the region.

By the late 1950s, American military support for Pakistan began to slow down as the Congress repeatedly raised objections over the amount that Pakistan was receiving as military assistance. By late 1959, a number of different factors such as the death of John Foster Dulles, the Eisenhower Khrushchev meeting and the resultant "Spirit of Camp David" had all reduced the importance of Pakistan in the eyes of American decision-makers. In October 1958, Ayub Khan had taken over as the first of a series of military dictators. Even though the US and Pakistan had signed an important defence agreement in March 1959, Ayub Khan had already started talking about American betrayal and "broken promises".22 During this phase, US actions reflect what Waltz suggests is the growing conservation in the policies of polar powers in a bipolar world. As the two powers constantly interact with each other they gradually learn to understand each other's behaviour, changing the quality of the relationship perceptibly, even though uncertainties about each other continue to drive balancing efforts.23 In South Asia, the United States in the late 1950s was beginning to question the utility of Pakistan as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, especially after the Eisenhower Khrushchev meeting.

The election of Kennedy was viewed with dismay in Pakistan as Kennedy was known to have a "soft-spot" for India.24 The American reaction to the 1962 war between India and China also shocked and surprised the Pakistanis. The US rushed military aid to India, while pressuring Pakistan not to take advantage of India's trouble. Pakistan, now increasingly distrustful of the American commitment, began turning to China to counterbalance India. As India began to rearm after the war with China, Pakistani leadership decided that the Kashmir dispute had to be settled before the Indian rearmament made India too strong. The decision to go to war in 1965 was made primarily in order to settle the Kashmir dispute while Pakistan was still a match for Indian power.

US Policy and the 1965 War

In April 1965, India and Pakistan fought a brief border war over the undelineated boundary in the marshy wastelands of the Rann of Kutch. No major exchange of territory took place in this brief war. By the end of the month, a cease-fire was arranged and the dispute was eventually submitted to arbitration by an international tribunal.

This brief conflict was apparently a Pakistani test of Indian intentions and resolve. The Indian willingness to submit the issue to arbitration was seen a sign of weakness by the Pakistani leadership. This perception led directly to a more serious conflict in September the same year, when Pakistan started a war over Kashmir. After infiltrating thousands of troops to start an independence movement in the Kashmir valley, Pakistan hoped to respond by attacking and "liberating" Kashmir.25 The plan was proposed by the then Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and was based on the belief that any Indian response would be confined to the disputed Kashmir sector of the Indo-Pakistani border, where Pakistan believed it had a military advantage.26 However, the Indian response was to launch a counter-attack all along the frontier, which took Pakistani military leaders by surprise.

The US as well as the Soviet Union put an embargo on all aid to the warring states in the hope of forcing both countries to accept a cease-fire. The American action was criticised by both India and Pakistan. India objected to being equated with Pakistan, especially because India considered itself the victim of Pakistani aggression. Moreover, India called attention to the fact that the aggression was committed by Pakistan using weapons supplied by the US for self-defence against communist threats. India had objected to these arms supplies since the mid-1950s. Pakistan objected to the American actions as it felt that the action would hurt Pakistan more than India, because most of Pakistan's weapons came from the US while India had few weapons of American origin.27

The Soviet response to the crisis was predicated on a number of different factors. One important factor was the Chinese response to the crisis. China issued a statement on September 7, 1965, which pledged full support for Pakistan. In subsequent days, China charged India with border violations and other similar infringements on the disputed Sino-Indian border and threatened "grave consequences" if India did not heed the Chinese warnings.28 Because of these Chinese warnings, the Soviets were faced with the delicate task of joining the Western powers in supporting India against China. The second factor that complicated Soviet policy was Soviet-Pakistan relations, which Moscow believed could be improved if Indo-Pakistan differences were removed. This necessitated taking as neutral a position as possible by the Soviet Union on the Indo-Pakistan dispute. The adoption of this relatively neutral position on the Indo-Pakistan conflict brought the Soviet Union rich dividends, if only for a few years. Moscow's good offices were used to effect a cease-fire between India and Pakistan, and eventually to sign a peace accord at Tashkent.29 This significantly improved Soviet-Pakistani relations which remained warm throughout the late 1960s, with the Soviets even selling limited quantities of weapons to Pakistan.

The 1965 war signalled a breakdown in American policy toward South Asia. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, admitted the failure of American policy in a candid report to the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 8. Speaking about the American objectives in South Asia, he stated.

Our problem has been, and obviously we have not succeeded, to pursue policies with Pakistan and India related to matters outside of the subcontinent and at the same time try not to contribute to the clash between the two within the subcontinent.30

The realisation of this failure to settle Indo-Pakistan differences so that India and Pakistan could cooperate on policies "related to matters outside of the subcontinent" was reflected in the actions taken by the Administration. During the war, all aid, both economic and military, was cut off to both India and Pakistan. By the end of the war, the US was in the unenviable position of being trusted by neither India nor Pakistan. Thus the American capacity to influence either India or Pakistan and bring out a peaceful settlement was virtually nil. The other major Western power, Great Britain, had brokered the peace between India and Pakistan during the war over the Rann of Kutch earlier in the year, but Prime Minister Wilson had criticised the Indian action in extending the September war beyond Kashmir. That removed any chance of his playing the peacemaker again in the subcontinent. Thus the Soviet Union was presented with a golden opportunity to expand its influence in the subcontinent by offering its good offices to settle the dispute.

US Policy towards India: After the 1965 War

However, all ties were not cut off between the United States and India. Once tempers had cooled down on all sides, the new Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was invited by President Johnson to Washington. The state visit, in March 1966, was a great success, with Prime Minister Gandhi and President Johnson establishing a personal rapport.31 After the visit, a number of different issues, of little consequence by themselves, began once again to sour relations between the two countries. On a state visit to Moscow a few months later, India's signed a joint communique that called attention to the "imperialists" in Southeast Asia, a clear reference to the US intervention in Vietnam. Predictably, it did not go down well with President Johnson, even though it was soon realised that the joint communique had not been cleared by anybody other than a junior officer of the Indian foreign service.32

Indian criticism of the American involvement in the Vietnam war was taken by President Johnson as a personal affront. When India requested American assistance to overcome severe food shortages in 1966-68, President Johnson decided to use American food assistance to force changes in a number of Indian policies, both internal and external. Towards that end, he implemented what came to be called the 'short-tether' policy. It involved holding back food shipments to India till the very last possible moment.33 Moreover, food aid was changed from long-term assistance to a monthly one, with approval for shipments being held up personally by President Johnson till the very last possible moment. It threw Indian relief efforts into considerable difficulty, and did not in any way improve the American image in India. In fairness, this policy was adopted and implemented over the considerable objections of not only the American Embassy in New Delhi and the American Ambassador, but also over the objections of sections of the State Department and the American media. By 1968-69, the Indian agricultural situation had improved considerably, and American assistance was no longer needed, but the experience created a reservoir of bitterness on both sides. Despite the 'short-tether' policy, American economic assistance to the region remained high till 1968. India received hundreds of millions of dollars in economic assistance, which included the emergency food shipments. After 1968, however, the economic assistance package encountered increasing opposition in the Congress and was reduced to much smaller levels.34

American military involvement in India also remained low throughout this period. Though the embargo on arms was lifted by April 1967, US arms sales policy towards the region was changed so that only non-lethal items such as trucks and communication equipment and spare parts for weapons already held by both countries would be sold.35 As India had few American-built weapons in its armoury, this meant in effect that Indo-US military relations continued to remain at a low level. American military policy in the region had earlier favoured the building up of Pakistani military power. After the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, however, the US stepped in to provide India with what was initially believed to be massive amounts of military aid. A United States Military Supply Mission to India (USMSMI) was set up in New Delhi to match the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Pakistan. The early expectations of the amounts of military aid were not met: of the more than five hundred million dollars originally promised, less than $83 million was actually delivered.36 India from this point onwards became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for its weapons.

The US Policy towards Pakistan after 1965 War

American policy towards Pakistan also exhibited all signs of this "disengagement".37 The US was appreciative of Soviet efforts to patch up Indo-Pakistan differences at the Tashkent summit, and the US willingly stayed on the sidelines. Disenchanted with closer Sino-Pakistan collusion, which was clearly exhibited during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the US reduced its military commitments to Pakistan. After the 1965 war, US military sales policy towards both the region in general and Pakistan in particular underwent significant changes. The policy of building up the Pakistan military was given up. According to one study of the policy, American decision-makers reached a number of major conclusions that determined policy towards South Asia during this period:

i. Pakistan would never match Indian capabilities in the subcontinent.

ii. The US had few if any direct or bilateral military interests in the region.

iii. Cold War importance of the region should be based on non-military grounds such as humanitarian relief and economic development.

iv. The US had no need to make an either/or choice between India and Pakistan.38

This more neutral, even-handed approach was reflected in the decision to stop military aid to both states as also in the 1967 decision to supply only non-lethal aid on an equal basis. Thus even though the US lifted the arms embargo in April 1967, it closed down the MAAG offices in Pakistan, saying that no further weapons sales to Pakistan were expected.39

Clearly, during the post-1965 war (till 1969) period, the US reduced its commitments and its efforts in the region. Comparing this period with the 1950s makes clearer this change in policy towards the region. In the 1950s, the South Asian region, or at least Pakistan, was seen as a crucial link in the global balancing efforts of the US. The Northern Tier strategy was explicitly devoted to the containment of the communist states, the Soviet Union and China. Even though India was not part of this strategy, the containment strategy was designed to protect all of South Asia, not just Pakistan. On the other hand, in the post-1965 war period, the importance of the whole region was reduced in American strategy. Though there was a greater appreciation of India's power, stability and utility—which accompanied a more realistic and comparatively reduced place for Pakistan—there was little desire for involving India in American global strategy.

This period, between 1965 and 1969, also saw determined Soviet efforts to advance its interests in the region. India was pressured by the Soviet Union to make concessions during the Tashkent talks. After the agreement was signed, the Soviet Union actively pursued a policy of attempting to improve relations with Pakistan, which included an agreement to construct with Soviet aid Pakistan's first modern steel mill. In 1968, the Soviet Union also agreed to supply arms to Pakistan, even though the quantities were rather limited.40 These efforts, apparently aimed at reducing Pakistan's dependence on China, did not succeed. This did not mean reduced importance for India, though: Moscow provided about one billion dollars in economic assistance during India's Fourth Five Year Plan (1968-71). Moscow also agreed to build the Bokkaro steel plant after the United States backed out of the deal.41

Conclusion: Theory and the Case-Study

The Structural-Realist predictions of "over-reactions in the periphery" by polar powers in bipolar competition is a more valid predictor of US policy towards South Asia in the 1950s than it is of the post-1965 war period. This raises some questions regarding the applicability of Structural-Realism to explain specific policies, a weakness that others have also noted.42

The American disengagement from South Asia in the post 1965 period can be explained in a number of ways. There are both substantive and theoretical answers. Waltz himself provides a possible theoretical solution. He suggests that one reason for the stability of bipolar systems is the fact that only two states are involved in the balancing efforts. As these two states interact on a regular basis, they grow more conservative in their relationship, and learn how to deal with each other. A certain basic level of confidence regarding each other is established. This leads to better relations between the polar powers.43 If this is a valid hypothesis, then the lack of any American reaction to the increased Soviet involvement in South Asia can be explained away: the United States probably decided that Soviet activities in South Asia were designed to prevent the increase of Chinese influence in the region, rather than an attempt to keep the US out. Moreover, keeping the Chinese out of South Asia was probably an objective that the United States could sympathise with.

Other substantive explanations could also be offered. By 1965, the US had realised the limits of its influence in the region; the war only made this clearer. Thus the US faced a policy dead-end: it could neither continue its former relations with Pakistan, nor strike up a new one with India, because of the distrust of both India and Pakistan towards the US. Only a massive military and economic commitment would have provided the United States with any leverage, but this was not a feasible option considering American commitments in Vietnam. The American commitment to Vietnam itself probably was a significant factor in the reduction of American efforts in South Asia.

From the point of view of this paper, what is most important is that the Structural-Realist notion of "over-reactions in the periphery" is not an accurate predictor of American policy towards South Asia during the post 1965-war period. Other theoretical and substantive factors have to be used to explain American policy.


1. Structural-Realism is known more popularly as Neorealism, and I use these terms interchangeably in this essay. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

2. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrines, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1987) are the best examples.

3. See Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance patterns in Multipolarity", International Organisation, 44(2), Spring 1990, 137-67.

4. John Mearsheimer, "Back To The Future: Instability In Europe After the Cold War", International Security, 15:1, Summer 1990, 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structures of International Politics," International Security 18:2 (1993): 44-79.

5. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 171-72.

6. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 123-26.

7. Norman Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, (Boston, Mass.: Houghton-Miffin, 1966), p. 2.

8. Harold A. Gould, "US—Indian Relations: The Early Phase", in Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly (ed.), The Hope and the Reality: US—Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992).

9. Ibid., p. 18.

10. Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India: Dimensions of Influence, (New York N.Y.: Praeger, 1984), p. 21.

11. As quoted in M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982) p. 66.

12. Shivaji Ganguly, US Policy Toward South Asia, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 20-21.

13. Palmer, The United States and India, p. 22.

14. Ganguly, US Policy Towards South Asia, p. 22.

15. Jane Wilson, "The Kennedy Era" in Gould and Ganguly, The Hope and the Reality, pp. 43-44.

16. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, pp. 61-94.

17. William Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1972) pp. 167-68.

18. Wilson, "The Kennedy Era".

19. All above quotes are as in Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, pp. 65-66.

20. Shirin Tahir—Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship, (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1982) p. 2.

21. Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp. 91-106.

22. Tahir—Kheli, The Untied States and Pakistan, pp. 7-8.

23. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 173-75.

24. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, p. 27.

25. Ganguly, US Policy Towards South Asia, pp. 120-26; Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp. 201-204.

26. Tahir—Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, pp. 20-22.

27. Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp. 204-05.

28. Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 206.

29. Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp. 210-12.

30. Quoted in Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 205.

31. Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 78-79; Chester Bowles, Promises to keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969, (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 512-516. Bowles was then the US Ambassador to India.

32. Ganguly in Gould and Ganguly, Ambassador Bowles suggests that Indian officials were "duped" by the Soviets into signing the communique. Even though it appears ridiculous, most accounts suggest that the wording was not intentionally used by the Indian side.

33. James Warner Bjorkman, "Public Law 480 and the Policies of Self-Help and Short-Tether: Indo-American Relations, 1965-68", in Lloyd I. Rudolph and Sussane H. Rudolph, (ed.), The Regional Imperative: The Administration of US Foreign Policy Towards South Asian States Under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, (Atlantic Highlands, J.J.: Humanities Press, 1980).

34. Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 225.

35. Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 224.

36. Pran Chopra, India's Second Liberation, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1974), p. 28.

37. 'Disengagement' is the usual characterisation of United States relations with South Asia during this period by most scholars. See, for example, Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, p. 23; Brands India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 222.

38. Stephen P. Cohen, "South Asia and US Military policy", in Rudolph and Rudolph, The Regional Imperative, pp. 107-08.

39. Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, p. 24.

40. Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh, (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1990), p. 238.

41. Brands, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp. 228-32.

42. Snyder and Christensen, "Chain—Gangs and Passed Bucks".

43. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 173-75.