China's Naval Strategy

Srikanth Kondapalli, Research Fellow, IDSA

 

China's naval strategic doctrine (haijun zhanlue) has evolved out of its unique historical developments, contemporary internal debates and considerations and the international context. As all the components in the making of the country's naval doctrine have been dynamic, the doctrine itself underwent several changes in the 50 years of its existence. According to an official version of the naval strategy, it is formulated by the highest levels of the military establishment with necessary inputs from the units below and taking into consideration the factors related to the country's military, political, economic, maritime, and geo-strategic environment, level of science and technology, and the international situation.1

Several Chinese accounts have recounted the historical maritime activities of the country for the past more than twenty centuries. In the 3rd century, in 239 AD, the Kingdom of Wu sent a 10,000-strong maritime force to occupy the Taiwan and Penghu Islands, not far away from the mainland of China.2 In the 13th century, several Chinese maritime expeditions planned to control overseas territories, including the unsuccessful attacks on southern Japan in 1274 and 1281 by 4,000 boats. Later in 1283-88, Chinese forces launched attacks and successfully quelled rebellions to the Chinese rule in Champa and Tongking. Soon afterwards, in 1293, the 1,000-ship force occupied Java. In the 15th century, several important expeditions were carried out by the Chinese, including seven by the famous Ming Dynasty eunuch Admiral Zheng He in the period 1407 to 1433. He visited nearly 29 countries as far as the Indian Ocean and Africa.

The glory of the Chinese maritime power soon came to an end with internal socio-economic decay, like with most countries of the Third World, and the advances in naval technology, thanks to the industrial revolution in the West. The gun-boat diplomacy that followed the late Qing Dynasty's refusal to open up trade facilities in its coastal regions to the "barbarian" Western powers, resulted in a serious evaluation of the maritime strategy by the successive leaders of China. In 1842, Wei Yuan published an encyclopaedia of 50 volumes entitled Haiguo Tuzhi [Oceanic Countries with Illustrations] recalling, apart from others, the importance of the Nanyang (maritime Asia) doctrine to the maritime security of the country.3 This concept included most parts of maritime Asia and the need for the Qing rulers to actively pursue a policy of the tribute system to control the neighbouring maritime states of China.

The repeated onslaught of Western and Japanese imperialism on the coastal region of China from the time of the late Qing Dynasty played a part in the debates on maritime strategy. The modern colonial phase started overwhelmingly with the penetration of the Western powers through the seas. China was no exception to this phenomenon. According to one estimate, from the time of the Opium Wars in the 1840s to the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, foreign countries invaded China more than 470 times.4

When the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was established, the guiding strategic principle, adopted by the Chinese high command, for the "people's navy" (renmin haijun) was coastal defence (jinhai fangyu). The retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan on various naval vessels in 1949, and the failure of the Communist forces to retrieve the areas controlled by the Nationalists in the vicinity of Taiwan, led to the formulation of the naval strategy for the nascent naval forces of China. Chinese efforts to recover Dengbu Island and Quemoy in the month of the establishment of the PRC proved to be costly in terms of the number of casualties, though a number of other islands were captured from the Nationalists' control along the coast.5 At this juncture, in February 1953, Mao, while inspecting the naval fleet, called for "build[ing] a strong navy for the purposes of fighting against imperialist aggression" on China.6 The coastal defence strategy, which remained the guiding principle for the PLAN for well over three decades, stressed the principles of "safeguarding the waters, consolidating seashores, defending cities".7 In December 1953, while addressing an enlarged meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Political Bureau, Mao outlined three major assignments for the PLAN: to wipe out the pirates (Nationalists) in the coastal areas; to assist the army in taking over Taiwan when the time was ripe; to resist an imperialist invasion from the seas.8 Such a strategic formulation coincided with the overall national defence strategy of "People's War": the experience of the revolutionary wars prior to the establishment of the PRC when the land forces were extensively used to capture the state power; self-sufficiency as the economic and political strategy for the country that focussed mainly on the interior rather than the coastal regions and maritime trade; inadequate strength of the naval forces; and the effort to ward off Taiwanese naval and air assaults on the mainland, and counter the economic blockade of the US in the wake of the Korean War.9 Coastal operations and active defence, then formed the strategic guideline for the PLAN's operations and development with support from the marine militia and civilians (mostly fishermen) along the coast in what was termed as "People's War at Sea" or the PLAN acting as the "Great Wall at Sea".10

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese debates on naval doctrine intensified. While the Gang of Four were against developing and deploying strategic naval equipment on the high seas, the "centrists" and "rightists" in the CCP were for furthering these projects, though within themselves they differed on various aspects of this strategy. Citing the large-scale Soviet military exercises as an immediate threat to the security of the country, several CCP leaders called for increasing investment in such projects. Hua Guofeng supported the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine programme and the completion of the Dong Fang-5 long-range tests.11 Mao, himself, in May 1975 approved the modernisation programme of defence, including that of the navy, citing the menacing Soviet worldwide "Okean 75" exercises.12 The threat posed by the USSR, according to the Chinese, was enormous. In this period, China's fears of a possible Soviet blockade and an amphibious assault on its coast increased. It was reported that the USSR confronted the PLAN with one of its aircraft carriers–the Minsk—based near the Cam Ranh Bay of Vietnam, when China began its hostilities with Vietnam in 197913. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping, the emerging leader of China, while inspecting the exercises performed by the navy's hydroplanes, issued a call for "building a strong navy with modern combat capability."14

The then PLAN Commander, Admiral Liu Huaqing, stated in the early 1980s: "As the strategic position of the Pacific is becoming more important… and as China is gradually expanding the scale of its maritime development, the Chinese Navy will have to shoulder more and heavier tasks in both peace-time and war."15 Generally, this period is taken as the turning point in the history of the PLAN for the transition from the traditional task of coastal defence (jinan fangyu) to that of offshore defence ( jinyang fangyu )16 and a blue-water strategy of power projection into the high seas. It was reported that the year 1982 saw a change in the naval strategy of China when Liu increasingly used the term "offshore defence" strategy, and by 1986, the new strategy was reportedly implemented.17 Liu Huaqing, accordingly, with the backing of Deng Xiaoping and others, formulated three phases to develop the PLAN into a world class sea power by the year 2040.

l Till 2000, the focus of the first stage will be on training and enhancing existing formations, renovation and improvement of the conventional naval vessels. (objective: to deter regional threats and to fight battles quickly and at low risk).

l From 2001 to 2020, the second stage will concentrate on the construction of several light aircraft carriers of 20,000 to 30,000 tonnes, purchasing several warships to supplement the carrier task force in order to improve the strength of the fleet and to bolster the PLAN's offshore combat capability (projection of the PLAN not only in the Western Pacific but exploring oceans around the world with aircraft carriers and high-tech equipment).

l From 2021 to 2040, the third phase will transform the PLAN as a major sea power with blue-water capability (capability to maintain surveillance, etc.).18

That the PLAN has played a supportive role for both the ground and air forces since the establishment of the republic, and that if sea power was to be built with any seriousness, the prerequisite for such an expansion has to be a break from the umbilical cord of the other services and making the naval forces independent, or preferably superior to other arms, is evident in the debates in China from the mid-1980s19. It was pointed out by the "sea power lobby" in China that if the PLAN is to conduct offensive operations offshore and on the high seas, the strategic principles of the development of the PLAN need to be revised20. Coinciding with this aspect were the overall changes that the 1980s brought about in the wake of the reform process launched at the end of the 1970s. The changes in the strategic environment of the Pacific are not lost on the top echelons of the Chinese military21. In September 1986, the then assistant Commander-in-Chief of the PLAN, Zhang Xusan, reportedly pointed out to such rumblings at the All-Services Seminar on Campaign Doctrine. He said, "Naval operations are usually carried out far from the land. Accordingly, the PLA army and the PLA air force can only provide limited operational support".22 Henceforth, statements calling for an increased development of the navy became the order of the day. In 1987, the official naval historian stated:

This [coastal defence] strategy doesn't mean in any way that our navy should only cruise the coastal seas, that the imperialist countries alone [!] [have the right to] build up their navies as "strategic armed services" for the purpose of seeking hegemony in waters far away from their countries. …China, of course, needs to build a powerful enough navy to match its international standing [!].23

Similarly, Senior Colonel Yan Youqiang, director of a Naval Headquarters research institute and author of Navy Developing Trends of Naval Battles and Their Impact on PLA Campaigns along with his colleague Navy Senior Colonel Chen Rongxing who wrote the Famous Foreign Naval Officers, argued in May 1997 that "…the rivalry for strategic mastery of the seas is no longer a 'patent' of the naval powers."24

Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, the then commander of the PLAN, and successor to Liu, continued to develop the naval strategy adopted by Liu Huaqing. Their intervention in the naval planning process resembled in various aspects the Soviet naval strategy, specifically that adopted by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, though these were several differences in the two contexts. In 1988, Zhang Lianzhong identified three main defence perimeters and the allocation of different naval forces to protect these lines. Zhang's systematic classification of the defence perimeters indicated a certain long-range preparation of naval operations that in the future could be used as a stepping stone for a blue-water naval strategy. He stated:

…the exterior perimeter is conceived as encompassing the seas out to the first chain of islands. This region will be defended by conventional and nuclear submarines (some of which will be armed with anti-ship missiles), by naval medium-range aircraft and by surface warships. The submarines will play a dynamic role to ensure defence in depth, including the laying of mines in the enemy's sea lines of communication. The middle defence perimeter extends 150 miles from the coast and comes within but, in most cases, does not reach the first chain of islands. Anti-ship aircraft, destroyers and escort vessels will carry the main burden in this area. The interior defence perimeter extends to 60 miles from the coast. This will be the theatre of operations for the main naval air force, fast-attack boats and land-based anti-ship missile units.25

Certain internal and external factors have fuelled naval competition in the region. Mention should be made of the rush to unilaterally declare the limits of territorial waters and the limits of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) by countries in the 1990s that have considerably increased the maritime threats26. In February 1992, the PRC passed the "Laws of Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone" that incorporated the controversial Paracel and Spratly Islands along with other areas like Diaoyutai (in Japanese, Senkaku) Islands that were disputed territories with neighbouring countries for a long time.27 Article 8 of this law stated that the PLAN "can order the eviction of foreign naval vessels".

In August 1995, the official PLA newspaper reflected at length on the definition of China's continental shelf by citing several international arbitration procedures. Citing the declaration of US President Harry Truman's "fairness principle" in setting up the maritime borders of the US, the Liberation Army Daily contended that "concrete circumstances," the "location of islets, and the geological and geographical structure of the sea bottom and its natural resources….[and] the basic fact of natural extension" should be the yardstick for the demarcation of the seas. It said: "The natural extension principle is a basic fact that must be considered and a basic principle that must be followed in demarcating the continental shelf. An equidistant center line is one method of demarcation that can be used only when it is in keeping with the fairness principle." If China adopts this "natural extension principle" a large marine territory can be incorporated into the Chinese sovereignty.28 Subsequently, as reported in early 1996, and following Japan, the PRC planned to declare a 200-nautical mile EEZ off its coasts, that could trigger disputes over jurisdiction over territory and fishing rights in the region.29

Liu Huaqing mentioned the area that is to be "safeguarded" by the PLAN as 200 nautical miles. Subsequently, he reportedly raised this figure to 600 nautical miles, thus, underscoring the long-range requirements of the PLAN.30 The control of some of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea by the PLAN effectively enlarges this range up to about 1,000 nautical miles from the mainland coast31. This jurisdiction roughly coincides within the scope of "green-water" naval strategy and the "first island chain" (diyi daolian) and encompasses areas from Vladivostok in the north to the Strait of Malacca, including Japan (Ryukus Islands), the Philippines and the South China Sea32. The "blue-water" (yuanyang haijun) capability coincides with that of the "second island chain"(di'er daolian), roughly encompassing the Kuriles in the north, and the Bonin and Mariana Islands and Papua New Guinea in the south33. Extension from Gorshkov's strategy to that of adopting Mahanian concepts of power projection and sea control, albeit with several modifications reflecting the Chinese situation and of relatively limited prowess, thus, has seriously attracted the attention of the Chinese naval planners34.

The extension in the scope of the naval strategy by the PRC leadership was emboldened by a certain "power vacuum" in the region with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cam Ranh Bay and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, partial withdrawal of American forces from Subic Bay in the Philippines, and other related developments in the region. Specifically, though the then superpowers withdrew several of their troops in the region, Chinese naval strategic thinkers point out to an imminent threat to their country, in this case, through the seas. According to Yu Guoquan, director of the Naval Equipment Technology Department in 1995, several countries pose military threats and challenges to China's maritime interests. Yu pointed basically to two major threats: one from the Western countries "strengthening their naval forces" in the Asia-Pacific; and the other from China's neighbours, including Japan, Vietnam and Taiwan35. While advocating building of a strong marine force and marine awareness to make the country a "great nation", he predicts that in the next ten years, the role of the PLAN will "grow stronger with the rapid rise in value of the seas" to counter the "increasingly more intense, and armed conflicts and regional wars" on the seas36.

In the coming decades, the PLAN was given "three major directions" in which the thrust of its development and operations was to be carried out in the coming years. Outlining these principles, Jiang Zemin reportedly pointed out, in the wake of Taiwanese President Li Teng-hui's visit to the United States, and while reviewing the largest ever naval landing exercises conducted by China in 1995, that the navy should shoulder the responsibility of "promoting reunification of the motherland". The CCP laid down certain broad tasks of this service arm of the PLA as:

l Place naval building in an important position and accelerate the pace of naval modernization;

l ensure the security of China's coastal defense;

l and promote the accomplishment of the great cause of reunification of the motherland37.

Against this backdrop, Jiang pointed out that the "current situation has placed new demands on building the navy."38 Speaking on the occasion of this "multi-arms coordinated maneuver" of the PLAN, and in the presence of the then four vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (viz., Liu Huaqing, Zhang Zhen, Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian), Jiang set forth the "sacred mission of the Navy", that smacked of Malthusian solutions, thus:

China is a continental power, and a coastal power as well. The Chinese coastal region has a dense population, with its scientific, technological, and economic levels far higher than the interior, and its place in the national economic life is very important. The ocean as a natural protective screen covers this region of strategic significance. It is also necessary to see that China's per-capita possession of land resources is far lower than the world average. With the passing of time, the shortage of land resources will make itself keenly felt, and will inevitably restrict economic development. On the one hand, we must advocate saving and protecting resources in a big way; on the other hand, it is imperative to look for and develop new resources. We can be sure that the development and utilization of the ocean will be of increasingly greater significance to China's long range development. This being the case, we must see the ocean from a strategic plane, and strengthen the whole people's concept of the ocean. …we must soberly see that the new situation has set out new and higher requirements on navy building. We must put navy building in an important place and step up the pace of navy modernization to meet the requirements of future wars.39

Though population explosion, increasing energy and marine food requirements for the burgeoning economic growth were cited as the raison d'être for overhauling the naval strategy, these plans clearly indicate an expansionist programme.40 Jiang's speech, thus, clearly specifies the importance of the navy in the overall defence strategy of China and the necessity for furthering the naval programmes in the future, though such logic borders on similar sentiments expressed in a different era to justify the Western European lebensraum at the beginnings of the modern colonial phase.

According to the Chinese naval thinkers, future naval warfare, generally speaking, is pregnant with several possibilities. However, certain observations can be made following the application of the overall defence strategy of "local war under high tech conditions". As a result of the "strategic transformation" in the defence doctrine of China from the mid-1980s, the naval strategy has also undergone a sea-change. The PLAN officials do not, on the whole, agree on the possibility of large-scale naval warfare in the foreseeable future. "Total sea warfare" of World War II, according to the Chinese, is a thing of the past. All-out submarine warfare, attrition campaigns, and strategic bombing characterised World War II. It was followed, according to the Chinese assessments, by about 300 military clashes and local wars. Many of these conflicts spread to the oceans but these did not transform into "large-scale naval warfare". Instead, future naval conflicts would be confined to the local areas. According to a Chinese naval officer, Li Yaqiang,

The main focus of naval battles is on obtaining sovereignty over islands, controlling ocean areas, and competing for mastery of the seas. The next several decades will not be an era for naval warfare on a worldwide scale. At the very least, it will not be a period for large-scale, total war, but rather a period of preparing for war. … Since the role of the ocean in international warfare is constantly increasing, regional hegemonist forces will seek to control local sea domains. This intention will have a substantial affect on future sea warfare. Rivalries by individual countries for territorial sovereignty, for demarcation of ocean territories, and for maritime rights and interests will become the main causes of military clashes at sea and local wars. This applies particularly to rivalries for islands of strategic significance and control of ocean territory. Their outcome involves regional dominance and even changes in the world pattern. They can easily ignite fairly large-scale sea warfare.41

Vice Commander Rear Admiral Lin Zhiye predicts the possibility of the outbreak of localised warfare in the seas around China sometime at the fag end of this century or the early 21st century, based roughly on the causes mentioned briefly above. The necessity to beef up the naval equipment to counter these threats is visible from the late 1980s. For Lin, "Only when a country possesses a mobile fleet can it hope for political and diplomatic solutions whereby one 'vanquishes the enemy without striking a blow'. When the threat fails, there is the option of delivering an actual strike."42

It is interesting to note the assessments of the Chinese naval officers on the possible conflict scenarios in the future and their impact on the requirement of naval equipment. According to the assessment of Shen Zhongcheng, director of the Chinese Naval Military Research Institute and his colleagues, broadly the scope of future naval warfare would expand to encompass space, under-sea, and electromagnetic space. They feel that the use of high-tech arms on naval battlefields will increase. Improvement in the long-distance mobile combat capacity at sea will expand the control and attack range of naval warfare. Future naval warfare, characterised by enormous destructiveness with extensive spatial limits, diversified participation of service arms and rapid naval warfare development, would, according to their prediction, show the following engagement conditions:

In land-sea combat, naval surface ships, submarines, carrier-based aircraft, and possibly other new service arms will generally have the capacity to conduct strategic offensive attacks in great depth and even against intercontinental land-based targets. And as land-based arms will be sharply improved in reaction capacity, hit precision, and range, they will be able to powerfully strike and intercept formations at sea, and even individual warships and cruise missiles. In sea-air combat, electronic warfare and missile strikes, particularly long-distance strikes by warships, their carrier-based aircraft, and aerial combat fighters, will become the essential forms. Submarines will be capable of making missile strikes on air targets. Sea air combat will also develop in the direction of low and super low-altitude engagements. In surface-undersea combat, as submarines have resolved technically the obstacles to very deep operations, their higher capability in very deep communications and ability to monitor and reconnoiter submarines and surface ships will sharpen surface-underwater confrontations. While the submarine will rise in status to become a major naval warfare force, the development of antisubmarine reconnaissance and combat methods will sharply restrict the future activities of submarines in shallow-water zones, underwater levels, and continental shelf zones. The appearance of underwater aircraft carriers and undersea mine-laying robots, and even the construction of seabed military bases, will sharpen surface-undersea combat. In seas-space combat, space-based methods and forces are going to have a very conspicuous status in future naval warfare.43

Specifically, developments in the naval arms for the 21st century would include nuclear technology, microelectronic technology, personal technology, infrared technology, precision guidance technology, satellite technology, the development and use of superconduction technology, new materials technology and laser technology.44 The manifestation of the "new naval-warfare weaponry" would be in the following six categories:

(i) Its reconnaissance and observation equipment will be improved, with long-range observation, precise target discovery, and integration with guidance systems, for an improved weapons-system reaction rate.

(ii) The anti-personal force of arms will be sharply higher, with a significant improvement in destructive form.

(iii) Naval combat forces will have rapid mobility, expanded operational scope, and shortened success time.

(iv) There will be a marked improvement in protective and survival capabilities.

(v) Emphasis will be placed on developing electronic jamming and attack systems.

(vi) All-dimensional space will be brought into naval warfare service.45

Assessment

The above analysis of the Chinese naval defence strategy indicates that there has been a transition in the overall guiding principles governing the naval forces of China. Implications of the naval strategy are felt broadly in two areas, viz., in the specific overall tasks that the naval forces are to carry forward considering the country's maritime threat perceptions, opportunities; and the direction in the country's naval development programme to buttress these goals. The maritime threat perceptions of China varied from the 1950s to the present: Taiwan and the US in the early years of the PRC, to the USSR in the 1960s and 1970s, which, in turn, after its disintegration in the early 1990s, gave way to the US and Taiwan currently, despite normalisation in their relations. In addition, of late China has also come into conflict with Japan and the South-East Asian countries, specifically Vietnam and the Philippines. Several causes, as mentioned above, indicate sharp contrasting views on the maritime interests in the region that could possibly lead to a confrontation in the near future—a "local war" or a major confrontation involving most of the actors in the region, unless diplomatic efforts are made to diffuse the situation. The revision of the naval strategy by China, in a way, meant fuelling as well as gearing up for, such conflict in the region, along with other countries. The fact that the "coastal defence strategy" of China has not changed, completely despite several changes in the internal and international geo-strategic situation, and a quick change, as a response to the open door policy and economic reform, to that of an offshore and blue-water navy, indicate the maritime ambitions of the "new period." The "strike first" policy of the Chinese, as embedded in the revised naval doctrine, as against the policy of letting the enemy strike first and fighting him by the tactics of wearing him down, has offensive elements.

Several theoretical and practical solutions were offered by the Chinese to solve maritime conflicts. However, at the same time, the resolve to be prepared for conflicts is indeed the most noticeable one in the recent years. A careful study of the Western ideas on future naval warfare by the Chinese and the serious efforts to achieve such a capability at present and in future indicate such a resolve. Though some aspects of futuristic high-tech equipment are not, entirely, within the Chinese reach as yet, the intention to acquire the same, even in a long-term perspective, need not be doubted, if the goals of becoming a global sea power are to be achieved.

The sea power mentality that has been pervading the entire naval and political establishment of the PRC, the like of which was witnessed during the late Qing Dynasty's revival plans, thus, has considerably increased fears among the maritime neighbours of China. If the anticipated conflicts have not materialised as expected, the reasons lie elsewhere. Considerable restraint in the face of economic reforms as the main agenda of the PRC, reported American revival in the region, with naval exercises with the Philippines, inability to counter the US militarily in the region despite considerable progress in its capabilities, the Japanese and Vietnamese roles and so on, have so far postponed such a conflict.

 

NOTES

1. Two concepts indicate naval strategic issues in China. One, as mentioned above, is haijun zhanlue that connotes the broadest possible aspects of the maritime strategy of the country. However, as "zhanlue" is generally reserved for the entire strategic issues of the country, more often than not the second concept in used. The second term haifang is literally translated as "coastal defence". This term is generally referred to as the naval strategy of China. This should not be confused with the "coastal defence strategy" of China that is generally rendered from jinhai fangyu, which restricts the defence responsibility of the Chinese Navy to the 200 nautical mile limit. More of this aspect below. See, for the broad parameters set by the Chinese to denote their naval strategic formulation, Liu Daosheng, "Naval Strategy" in Zhongguo dabaike quanshu: Junshi [Chinese Encyclopaedia: Military Affairs] 2 vols. (Beijing: Chinese Encyclopaedia Publications, 1989) [hereafter, Zhongguo dabaike quanshu] vol. I, pp. 322-333.

2. The historical section is based on Haijun shi [Naval History] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1989); Zhu Yide, ed., Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Haijun fence [Chinese People's Libration Army Officers Handbook: Navy Part] (Qingdao: Qingdao Chubanshe, 1991) [hereafter, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Haijun fence] pp. 422-424 and 429; and Bradley Hahn, "Third Ranking Maritime Power—And Growing", Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. XV, no. 4, October 1998, pp. 46-49 and 52, (p. 46).

3. This encyclopaedia was later, in 1847, enlarged to 60 volumes and further to 100 volumes in 1852. At the same time, Xu Jiyu of Fujian province published ten volumes entitled Yinghuan Zhilue [An Outline of Oceanic Countries]. See, for details on the events related to the publication of these texts and the interest that these generated on oceanic aspects, Hu Sheng, From Opium War to the May Fourth Movement (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991) (tr. Dun J. Li) 2 vols, vol. 1, pp. 116-120 and 404. See for one of the best accounts on Maritime Asia. Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984).

4. For this estimate, see Yang Guoyu et. al. eds., Dangdai Zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1987) p. 5. Out of these 470 violations of the Chinese coastline, 84 were large-scale invasions. From 1930 to 1939, nine nations including Britain, France, Japan, the US, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain sent a total of 14,697 warships into Chinese ports. See Chen Wanjun, "Naval Power Through an Expert's Eyes: An Interview with Yu Guoquan, Director of the Department of Naval Equipment Technology, Warships Division," Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval & Merchant Ships], no. 7, July 8, 1995 pp. 2-3 in FBIS-CHI-95-169, August 31, 1995, pp. 29-31 (p. 30). See for the ravages of the Opium Wars and the subsequent Western exploitation, Zhongguo dabaike quanshu, vol. I, n. 1, pp. 13-14; Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Haijun fence, n. 2, pp. 436-438, 439-442.

5. See Mao's letter to Chen Yi, commander of the PLA forces in the region, Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong] vol. 6 (Beijing: Academy of Military Science and Central Documents Publications, 1993) [hereafter, Mao Zedong junshi wenji] vol. 6, pp. 262-263.

6. See Liao Wen-Chung, "China's Blue Water Strategy in the 21st Century: From the First Islands Toward the Second Islands Chain", Occasional Paper Series (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, September 1995) pp. 2&5. David Muller argued that the naval doctrine of China in the earlier decades was influenced by the Soviet principles. See David Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 44-56. However, though there had been a steady flow of naval arms and technology from the Soviet Union at least till the late 1950s and subsequent Chinese development of the naval equipment based on these models left by the Soviet technicians, several changes took place in the doctrinal sphere. Though Soviet naval doctrine was studied seriously by a section of the Chinese naval planners, this does not mean that the Chinese naval doctrine has remained static and that there are no contending schools of thought in the naval sphere. Indeed, there have been several debates within the Chinese establishment on the relative importance of the "Young School" of Soviet naval strategy vis-à-vis the specific Chinese conditions and naval requirements. Soon after the establishment of the PLAN headquarters, in August 1950, 23 senior military officers in Beijing, while acknowledging the importance of the Soviet doctrine, called for its adaptation to the Chinese conditions. They subsequently adopted the concept of "modern coastal, small-sized naval combat force". See John Wilson Lewis & Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernisation in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994) p. 220.

8. Xiao Jingguang, Xiao Jingguang huiyilu [Memoirs of Xiao Jingguang] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1988) 2 vols, p. 114 as cited in Jun Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, September 1994, pp. 180-208 (p. 184).

9. See John Jordan, "The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)", Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 6, June 1994, pp. 275-282 (p. 275).

10. In case of a naval conflict with one of the adversaries of China, this naval strategy called for similar principles of the "People's War" strategy and tactics. That is, lacking, as it were in sophisticated naval equipment and technology, the PLAN was to adopt the "attrition concept" of harassing enemy vessels from the source of re-supply and by employing its overwhelmingly large number of conventional combat ships and fishing boats to "drown the enemy". Such tactics appealed to the PRC leadership even in the recent period before advanced weaponry started trickling in to strengthen the PLAN. The contradiction between an overwhelmingly outdated equipment and infusement of a small amount of advanced equipment in the naval inventory was to haunt the Chinese military establishment, which was, subsequently, compelled to make suitable amendments to the strategic and tactical principles in the past, present and most probably in the future too. This partly explains the tensions in the evolving naval strategy and its capabilities to fight according to the current strategic and tactical principles.

11. See Lewis & Xue Litai, n. 7, pp. 223-226 for these debates. Incidentally, Deng Xiaoping who is closely associated with the "sea-power lobby", advocated in April 1979 for a continental navy. He was quoted as having said: "Our navy should conduct coastal operations. It is a defensive force. Everything in the construction of the navy must accord with this guiding principle". (Ibid., p. 224).

12. See, for this information, Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1987), pp. 89-91. See also Jordan, n. 9, p. 275.

13. See for this information, "Navy Reportedly to Buy French Aircraft Carrier", Eastern Express, October 11, 1995, p. 14, in FBIS-CHI-95-197, October 12, 1995, p. 28, citing Taiwanese intelligence sources.

14. Deng Xiaoping cited by Cha Chun-ming, n. 6.

15. Admiral Liu Huaqing cited in Bradley Hahn, "Navy Pursues Major Maritime Role", Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. XVI, no. 8, February 1990, pp. 38-40. Quotation on p. 39. Liu reportedly stated soon after taking charge of the PLAN, that the Chinese Navy is "an organisation to handle the issue of 'maritime rights' in struggles of manipulation, plunder and counter-plunder, which have always existed between maritime nations." Liu cited in Hahn, n. 2, p. 47. Hahn cited several statements of Liu that are of considerable importance to the changing strategic dimension of the naval establishment in China in the mid-1980s: "The scope of sea warfare operations has extended from the limited space or air, the surface, the water, and coasts, to all space from under the sea to outer space and from the sea inland. The concept of naval battle has been extended from the traditional decisive warship engagement and tactical offensive of shallow coastline targets to the launching of strategic nuclear attacks against internal targets on an opposite shore." "With the perfecting of reconnaissance technology and means, and the greater accuracy and destructive power of ballistic missiles, the security of the coastal launching silo and other important facilities will be seriously threatened, whereas security below the sea and in deep water will be futher guaranteed." (Ibid.) Subsequently, he was instrumental in setting up several think-tanks to further the naval strategy of the country, including the Naval Academic Research Commission, Naval Scientific and Technological Commission and Naval Scientific, Cultural and Educational Research Commission. (Ibid.)

16. The change in the naval strategy has also been phrased by the Chinese Press as "active defence, offshore combat." However, "active defence" has also figured in the previous strategy, essentially as a defensive posture. Its connotation in the latest phase has offensive elements. Tang Fuquan writing in the Liberation Army Daily of September 15, 1989, contended that the PLAN needed such an offshore defence that would extend the Chinese oceanic frontier to the north-west Pacific. See, for details, Gene D. Tracey, "China's New Military Doctrine", Asian Defence Journal, March 1990, pp. 22-28. See p. 28. See also, on the phenomenon of Chinese offshore defence strategy, A.C. Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defence Strategy: Conceptualisation and Implications", Naval War College Review, Summer 1994, pp. 7-32. See also the excellent work of Jun Zhan, n. 8.

17. See Jun Zhan, n. 8, pp. 190 and 193 for details on the evolution of this concept and its application.

18. This is based on Liao Wen-chung, n. 7, pp. 1 and 14. See also Shigeo Hiramatsu, "China's Naval Advance: Objectives and Capabilities", Japan Review of International Affairs, vol. 8, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 118-32. See p. 121 on the projections for the development of the PLAN. See also John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy: Part 1: Restructuring Begins," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 8, no. 3, March 1996, pp. 129-133 (p. 130) for the time-frame to be achieved by the PLAN to fulfill its green and blue-water capabilities. See Rizal Sukma, "China's Defence Policy and Security in the Asia-Pacific", The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. XXII, no. 1, First Quarter, 1995, pp. 76-87, specifically pp. 82-83. According to Liu Huaqing, the offshore defence strategy contains two ideas: first, the PLAN will be ready to fight virtually wherever its capability allows it to; second, maritime interests will be a major cause of future naval combat. Liu as cited in Jun Zhan, n. 8, p. 191.

19. To recall the secondary position of the PLAN in the defence establishment of the PRC, the CMC in the 1950s specified the primacy of the ground and air forces over the navy. In the Sino-Soviet Treaty of the 1950s, naval equipment and technology transfers are limited in comparison with those allocated to the ground and air forces. The Korean War also meant diversion of funds for forces other than the navy. Indeed, on February 24, 1952, Mao told the then PLAN commander: "Today I came here to talk about one issue: to resist the Americans and to assist the Koreans, we need aircraft. We plan to allocate our foreign currency to solving the problem of the air force first. We have allocated some hundred million rubles for the navy to purchase several destroyers and dozens of torpedo boats. But, if so, we will run out of foreign currency. Is it OK that you postpone purchasing warships and let the air force buy aircraft first?" Mao cited by Xiao Jingguang in his Memoirs, as cited by Jun Zhan, n. 8, p. 186. Subsequent allocations of the defence budget clearly showed the bias against the navy. On June 9, 1956, the navy's First Party Congress, accordingly, called for the building of the navy that gives precedence to national economic development over its own development and that "must accord with the guiding principle that emphasizes the development of air force and air defence forces and provides for the development of an appropriate-sized navy". See Academy of Military Science and Mao Zedong Military Research Institute Chronology Group ed., Mao Zedong Junshi Nianpu [Chronological Military Life of Mao Zedong] (Nanning: Guangxi renmin Chubanshe, 1994) p. 865 on this conference and its deliberations. See also Lewis & Xue, Litai, n. 7, p. 220. In the 1980s, with the maritime trade rebounding, the PLAN planners vied for a full-fledged naval force and not just an "appropriate-sized navy" that the three decades of the early history of the PRC connoted.

20. The 1980s witnessed several professional studies on the naval strategy, tactics and the requirement of the PLAN as a part of the preparation for the naval transformation. From the mid-1980s, the Navy-Military Academic Research Institute has contributed several such inputs into the growth of the navy. For instance, in 1989, a study titled "The Navy in the Year 2000" dealt at length with the direction of the naval strategy till the end of the 20th century. Other commissioned studies, like the "Balanced Development of the Navy in the Year 2000," reportedly focussed on long-range strategic issues of the navy. This study is to include several topics, including "The Tactics of Various Naval Arms", "The Naval Art of Command", "The Science of Naval Operations", and so on. Information on this aspect is based on the report of the Liberation Army Daily of September 21, 1989, as cited by Tracey, n. 16, pp. 27-28.

21. See "China's Borders: Tranquility and Tension", China News Analysis, no. 1486, June 1, 1993, pp. 1-9.

22. Zhang Xusan quoted by Liao Wen-Chung, n. 7, p. 8. Zhang Xusan suggested further changes to the PLAN strategy so that offensive measures could be undertaken in future campaigns at sea. He stated: "Centralise the employment of mobile combat groups of high combat effectiveness in order to conduct limited attack operations so as to gain the earliest possible superiority and conclude the fighting rapidly" (Ibid.) According to his statement in March 1989, the reason for adopting a coastal defence strategy in the past lies in the limitations of the country's economy that remained essentially inward-looking compared to the latest phase of the open door policy. The reform programme has increased the role of maritime trade, resulting in the search for a strategic shift in the naval policy. Henceforth, "protection" of the sea lines of communications, territorial waters, maritime resources, etc., according to him, needs to be addressed. (Ibid., p. 9.) Interestingly, Zhang Xusan participated in guiding China's rocket experiments conducted in the South Pacific in 1980, commanded the PLAN's first ocean-going training on Zengmu Ansha of the Nansha Islands, and held a number of key posts in the PLAN, including deputy chief of staff of the navy, commandant of the Navy School, and navy chief of staff. See, for details, Liu Hsia-hua, "PLA Navy Commander Zhang Lianzhong", Kuang Chaio Ching, January 16, 1996, no. 280, pp. 44-49, in FBIS-CHI-96-029, February 12, 1996, pp. 26-32. See p. 27. See also Jun Zhan, n. 8, pp. 182-183.

23. Yang Guoyu cited by Lewis & Xue Litai, n. 7, pp. 679-680.

24. See Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing, "On Maritime Strategy and the Marine Environment", Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China Military Science), May 20, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-197, October 14, 1997, at http://wnc fedworld/gov. They listed five kinds of rivalries among countries: rivalry over ocean islands; sea space jurisdiction; marine resources; maritime strategic advantage; and over strategic sea lanes. Of the 130 straits in the world that can be used for navigation, the US has declared openly that in war-time, it will control 16 strait waterways of strategic significance. (Ibid.)

25. Admiral Zhang Lianzhong cited by John Downing, "China's Maritime Strategy Part 2: The Future", Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 8, no. 4, April 1996, pp. 186-191. Cited on p. 188. See Han Huaizhi et. al., eds., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de jianshe gongzuo [China Today: The Military Affairs of the Chinese Army] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1989) p. 65n. See also Fred Burlatskiy, "The Chinese Navy in Focus", Asian Defence Journal, March 1990, pp. 67-72 (pp. 70-71); Lewis & Xue Litai, n. 7, p. 230. John Jordan gives a similar picture. In the first line, the "maritime militia" defends the coastal areas such as ports and harbours with HY-2 missiles, etc. The second line is defended by the fast patrol craft with surface-to-surface missiles or torpedoes and sub-chasers armed with anti-submarine rocket launchers and depth charge mortars. Frigates of the Jianghu class and destroyers of the Luda class, etc would defend the line just beyond the inner defensive perimeter. The outer perimeter would be defended by submarines and PLANAF bombers. See Jordan, n. 9, pp. 278-79. Lewis & Xue Litai cited a 12-character operational guideline of the navy adopted in the late 1980s for the control of the total defence perimeter: "kuaisu fanying, guangfan jidong, zhengti zuozhan" [quick reaction in case of need, manoeuvre swiftly in vast sea areas, and conduct combined operations by various arms]. (Lewis & Xue Litai, n. 7, p. 323n). See for a slightly different version of the three-ring ocean combat zone, Liao Wen-chung, n. 7, pp. 13-14.

26. See for a background for this topic, Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxiang, n. 24. They contend, "With the defence of, and rivalry over, maritime interest now having come to the sharp attention of the policymakers of all countries, the struggle for the seas has become a key factor affecting the current trends of international strategy". ibid.

27. See Liao Wen-chung, n. 7, pp. 2 and 10. Two months later, in April 1992, the commandant of China's Naval Command College, Li Dingwen, stated that China's sovereignty extends to about three million sq. km. Li cited in Ibid., p. 10. Coinciding with the formal unilateral delineation of the maritime boundaries, China quickly moved into installing relevant measures to include these territories effectively into its jurisdiction. One of these pertains to the deployment of the navigation aids. Such a preparation, in fact, according to Chinese sources, started as early as August 1985, the year when a "strategic transformation" of the defence doctrine of the country was effected. Since 1985, naval navigational aid units have conducted "comprehensive reform of navigation marks in China's territorial waters". As a part of this, new equipment and technology have been gradually adopted in navigation marks' lamps and illuminants. According to a Xinhua report, in equipment, incandescent oscram lamps, neon lights, and bromie were employed to widen the distance between navigation marks; in illuminants, such equipment as radar responders, radar directional beacons, and navigation mark radio remote control and measurement were adopted. Soon, by 1989, "Changhe II" medium-range radio navigation system, the first of its kind in China, was adopted, which ensures the navigational positioning of vessels within a range of 1,300 nautical miles. By 1995, the Chinese navigational aid units had deployed some 3,000 navigation marks along the coast, which is ten-fold the number at the founding of the PRC. These navigational marks are characterised by such merits for the PLAN as "explicit functions, distinctive features, and being easy to understand and remember". These marks reflect the length of the sea-lane, determining its orientation, and marking its undersea obstruction, thus, aiding safe navigation of the Chinese vessels. These marks also "safeguard" Chinese oceanic rights and privileges, supporting shipping, fishing, habour-building, developing oceanic resources, maritime salvage, and maritime scientific research. See, for details on these navigation marks, Wang Guangxin and Huang Caihong's report, "Navy Deploys 3,000 Coastal Navigation Marks", Xinhua Domestic Service, April 18, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-107, June 5, 1995, p. 37.

28. Ye Xinrong, "Managing the Oceans-Continental Shelves, Increasingly a Focus of World Attention", Liberation Army Daily, August 22, 1995, p. 6 in FBIS-CHI-96-025, February 6, 1996, pp. 26-27. According to Ye, the depths of the Bohai and Yellow Seas "are entirely continental shelf. Two-thirds of the East China Sea bottom is continental shelf, which is nearly 400 nautical miles wide at its widest point. More than one-half of the South China Sea bottom is continental shelf". (Ibid.) Ye cited several cases of "infringement" of Chinese territory by several of its neighbours and argued that it would not be recognised by the Chinese government. He referred in this article specifically to the January 30, 1974 Japan-South Korea Agreement on the Joint Development of the Continental Shelf, the 1970 South Korean promulgation of a law demarcating the continental shelf, the 1977 and 1982 notifications by Vietnam declaring its territorial seas, adjacent areas and EEZs. At the end, Ye, warning against these "encroachments", advocated "defend(ing) our marine territory for the sake of the national interest". (Ibid.).

29. See "China Reportedly Preparing to Declare 200-Mile Exclusion Zone", Kyodo, February 13, 1996 in SWB/FE/2536 G/1, February 15, 1996. This coincided with the race among countries trying to declare unilaterally the limits of their EEZs following about 85 nations approving or acceding to the UN Maritime Law Treaty of November 1993, which became officially valid on November 16, 1994. See, for the influence of the UN treaty on maritime strategy, Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxiang, n. 24.

30. The Chinese distinguish between three levels of the sea measurements: jinhai (inshore/coastal areas of) upto 200 nautical miles; zhonghai from 200 to 600 nautical miles; and yuanha measuring outside the 600 nautical miles area. For this, see Han Haizhi, ed., n. 25, p. 65n and for an exact delimitation of maritime boundaries according to the Chinese version, see Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junguan shouce: Haijun fence, n. 2, p. 2-6. See also Liao Wen-chung, n. 7, pp. 8-10 for details.

31. See Liao Wen-chung, n. 7, p. 14. See also, for a similar assessment, John Downing's article of Part I, n. 18, p. 130. However, the capability of the PLAN to control all this territory has been inadequate. Specifically, the thrust in the development programme is expected to be in ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines, a mobile task force built around aircraft carrier combat groups, and a defensive force of fast and light patrol boats. (Ibid.)

32. See Downing, n. 18, p. 130.

33. See Ibid. See also Lewis & Xue Litai, n. 7, pp. 229-30. For Liu Huaqing's views on the two lines, Jun Zhan, n. 8, p. 190.

34. See Ehsan Ahrari, "China's Naval Forces Look to Extend Their Blue-Water Reach", Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1998, pp. 31-36.

35. Yu Guoquan elaborated further the maritime threat posed by these countries to China. He cited figures of the US Seventh Fleet comprising 2 to 3 aircraft carriers, 5 to 7 cruisers, 15 to 30 destroyers, 11 submarines, 6 to 10 land and sea boats each, 10 to 15 auxiliary vessels, of a total weight of about 600,000 tonnes. On the average, they conduct over 20 practices and joint exercises annually with the navies of Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. On the other hand, Russia's Pacific fleet has doubled its total number of warships and their weights in fewer than 20 years. Japan's Marine Self-Defence Force has over 49,000 troops, and 170 warships. Director Yu contended that Japan would build four small-scale aircraft carriers capable of carrying 6-8 VTOL aircraft and would transform into a "far oceanic attack" fleet. Vietnam has a force of about 50,000 troops and more than 110 combat warships. Taiwan, according to him, has a "highly modernised" navy with 570 warships and a total weight of 190,000 tonnes. See, for Yu's views, interview by Chen Wanjun, n. 4, p. 30.

36. See Yu Guoquan in Chen Wanjun, n. 4, p. 30.

37. This is based on the column of Jen Hui-wen, "Communist China Meticulously Plans Simulated Offensive Exercises Targeted at Taiwan", Hsin Pao, December 1, 1995 in FBIS-CHI-95-236, December 8, 1995, pp. 22-23. Quotation on p. 23.

38. See for Jiang Zemin's statement, Xinhua, October 18, 1995 in FBIS-CHI-95-202, October 19, 1995, pp. 21-22. For this purpose, according to this report, the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress of the CCP outlined the blueprint for the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and up to the year 2010, and "new requirements for national defence".

39. For Jiang Zemin's speech while reviewing the naval manoeuvres in autumn 1995, see Huang Caihong, "Witnessing Maritime Exercise of the Chinese Navy", Liaowang, no. 45, November 6, 1995, pp. 6-7, translated in FBIS-CHI-95-235, December 7, 1995, pp. 32-35. Quotation on pp. 34-35. Jiang, while visiting the coastal Shantou Special Economic Zone in Guangdong province in 1996, similarly underlined the importance of the navy. He told the South Sea Fleet commanders to "strengthen the military's capabilities to respond to a sudden outbreak of hostilities" in the Taiwan Straits. See "Jiang Urges Southern Fleet to be Alert", Kyodo report of January 4, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-004, January 5, 1996, p. 15.

40. For an excellent consideration of this issue, see Downing, n. 18. Jiang Zemin's statement during a naval exercise in October 1995 indicates that resolve of the current leadership of China. Stating that the "new situation sets new and higher requirements for the navy", he told Captain Bai Yueping of a new missile destroyer, "The navy is a high-tech branch of the armed forces, you should earnestly study and master modern technology and become a crack maritime force with a high degree of political consciousness and technical competence." See Huang Caihong, "Jiang Views Exercise, Speaks on Coastal Defence", Xinhua, Domestic Service, October 18, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-201, October 18, 1995, pp. 25-26.

41. See Li Yaqiang's statement in his "Will Large-Scale Naval Warfare Recur?" Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval & Merchant Ships] no. 8, August 8, 1995 in FBIS-CHI-020, January 30, 1996, pp. 24-27. See p. 26 for the quotation. However, at the end of this article, Li cautiously stated: "Warships were never intended to be tourist boats. So long as there are navies, there can be war. So long as large naval forces exist, the outbreak of large-scale naval warfare is possible". (Ibid., p. 27.) See for Liu Huaqing's views on this subject, Jun Zhan, n. 8, p. 190. See also Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing, n. 24, for a similar assessment on the suitability of naval battlefields to "local wars on modern technological, particularly high-tech terms."

42. Xiao Jun, "Zhongdian vu junheng: Li Zhiye Shaojiang dui Zhongguo haijun jianshe fangzhen di tantao" [Balance and Priority: Rear Admiral Lin Zhiye's study concerning the basic policy for building the Chinese Navy] Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval & Merchant Ships] no. 11, 1989, as cited in Hiramatsu, n. 18, p. 126.

43. See, for the views of Shen Zhongchang et al., "A Rudimentary Exploration of 21st Century a Naval Warfare", Zhongguo junshi kexue [Chinese Military Science], no. 1, February 20, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-113 Supplement, June 13, 1995, pp. 26-32. The above quotation is on p. 27. Interestingly, as the Chinese military cannot fully cope with highly modernised enemy forces, certain Chinese strategic thinkers have also come out with several options of fighting with less modernised weapons and under conditions of relative military weakness. Su Zian's essay on "Strategies to Minimise the High-Tech Edge of the Enemy" in Xiandai Bingqi [Modern Ordnance] addressed such problems. Firstly, as quoted by Ehsan Ahrari, he suggests that the low-tech country should develop long-range precision interception weapons to target the transport ships of the high-tech enemy. Secondly, he recommends the use of saturation tactical ballistic missile strikes on an enemy's fleet of aircraft carriers and its high-priced air defence missile systems and other large-scale equipment. He states: "For a [low-tech] country on the defence, surface-to-surface tactical ballistic missile are a fine offensive weapon in that they present a major threat to the enemy and could pin it down." Su Zian quoted by Ahrari, n. 34, p. 36.

44. Shen Zhongchang, et. al., n. 43, pp. 27-28.