Indo-American Relations on the Threshold of the 21st Century
-Chintamani Mahapatra, Research Fellow, IDSA
What may be the shape of Indo-US relations as mankind enters the 21st century? Are they going to be friendly and cooperative or marked by tension and conflict? If they are going to be friendly, what will be the degree of intimacy? And what will be the areas of cooperation? If there is going to be politico-economic tension, what may be the intensity and impact of it on the overall bilateral relationship? What are the prospects of improved economic ties between the two countries? Will an improved level of economic interaction have some positive effect on other areas of divergence? Will persistent disagreements on political and security issues slow the pace of economic cooperation? Such are the questions that confront one while attempting an analysis of Indo-US relations in the context of a changing international geo-political and geo-economic landscape since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union.
Over the years, the power, influence and capabilities of both India and the United States have undergone substantial changes. For more than half a century, India has existed as a sovereign, independent, democratic nation-state. In less than two years, all of us are going to enter the 21st century. Certain things over this half a century have changed and certain other things have remained more or less immune to change. The entire world, except the United States, was in an economic mess when India emerged as an independent country in 1947. Several centres of economic power and areas of vibrant economic activities have emerged since then. India has not done badly, although things could have been much better. India, despite its demographic burden, is the fifth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. Despite the presence of millions of poor people in the country, according to an estimate, India has as many millionaires as Australia has people. India's per capita Gross National Product (GNP) has registered a growth rate of 2.7 per cent despite the population increasing at over 2 per cent per annum. It is estimated that there are 533 million Indians who form the broad market for manufactured consumer items, of which the size of the core ranges from 100 to 300 million, depending on the consumer items adopted as the standard of calculation. It has the third largest investor base in the world, after the US and Japan.
In terms of politics, India has proved itself to be one of the most vibrant democracies in the world. With a detailed Constitution, sophisticated legal system, free and vibrant Press and vigilant judiciary, and timely elections, except for the aberration of the emergency, India has shown to the world that democracy has enabled it to maintain unity in a country of extreme diversity at a time when nation-states are falling apart in Asia, Europe and Africa. India's political resilience is exemplified by the way the country overcame issues such as the Babri Masjid and the Bombay riots, the forces of separatism in the north-east and north-west, and managed to contain the Sri Lankan problem from spilling over into India.
In terms of physical security of the country, India has managed to stay away from armed conflicts for over a quarter of a century. Our country has been able to prevent war without going nuclear and without maintaining a very high level of defence expenditure in relative terms. At the same time, India refused to be part of any Cold-War based regional military alliance system and resolutely followed a non-aligned strategy in its foreign and national security policies. Although non-alignment came under severe strain at times, largely due to the aggressive neighbours, India continued to maintain relations with both the superpowers.
The US, on the other hand, emerged from the Cold War not as a country with unchallenged economic power and political influence, but as a superpower with unmatched military firepower but limited political and economic capabilities. Many in the US felt that the country had overextended itself in international affairs at the cost of domestic issues and argued in favour of reviving the country's economic competitiveness, educational excellence and law and order situation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US was regarded as the only remaining superpower. But this superpower was no longer in a position to do anything and everything anywhere it wanted to. Without the political backing of other countries and financial contributions from the well-to-do allies, it would not have been feasible for the US to get involved in the Gulf War. In other words, after the end of the Cold War, the US had relatively declined and India had relatively done better from their respective positions at the time of the end of World War II. The respective self-images and understanding about the emerging world order thus would, among other things, shape the relationship between India and the US in the post-Cold War era.
New World Order
How did the Americans perceive the US position at the time of the great transition that started in the late 1980s and early 1990s? The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the end of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the German unification and the Vietnamese troops withdrawal from Cambodia, along with several other similar developments, in a way marked not only the end of the Cold War confrontation but also ushered in a period of unprecedented cooperation between the two superpowers. That the old world order was collapsing was clear to all and sundry. But it was not yet clear whether the old order had given way to a new world order. Some analysts argued that the world order had given way to a new world disorder. Others viewed the unfolding developments as not very different from the old one and rather considered the end of bipolarity as the victory of the US and its Western allies in the Cold War. They argued that the triumph of Western liberalism over Communism had brought about a stable world order, although conflicts of other kinds would continue in the post-Cold War era. The debate in the US over the nature of the post-Cold War international system started soon after President George Bush announced his vision of a "New World Order" in the midst of the Gulf crisis in 1990.
As Iraqi President Saddam Hussein sent his troops to occupy the oil-rich Kuwait in August 1990 and created a crisis that threatened to affect practically all the corners of the globe, President George Bush, faced with a serious crisis in the Persian Gulf that could be resolved only with the help and cooperation of the traditional allies as well as the former adversaries, announced his vision of a New World Order in September 1990. He said: "We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment.... Out of these troubled times...a new world order can emerge.... Today the new world order is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the weak."1 On January 16, 1991, as the Gulf War started Bush made another speech referring to the need for the creation of a new world order "where...the rule of law governs the conduct of nations" and in "which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the UN's founders."2
Bush did not give a detailed blueprint for the creation of a new world order, although the White House announced that he would give four commencement addresses in the spring of 1991 on his vision of a new world order. In fact, "the president gave only one of the addresses and then pulled back, returning to a more comfortable, day-to-day management of foreign affairs."3 There was, however, one major outcome of Bush's speech. An intense public debate over a new world order and the meaning of Bush's concept and the US role in shaping the new order started and it was soon spinning beyond control. The Gulf War came to an end with a resounding victory for the US-led coalition and several months later the Soviet Union disintegrated. The United States at this time was also preparing for the 1992 national Presidential election. The debate over the new world order further intensified with these developments.
On one extreme, one could see the return of isolationist sentiments during the US Presidential campaigns. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative syndicated columnist and former aide to Ronald Reagan, had entered the race for the Republican Presidential nomination. He attacked the US foreign aid programme, appealed for a new focus on US interests and presented himself as a latter-day "America-Firster". He wanted the US to retreat from its global presence and commitments, as the Soviet menace no longer existed.4 Buchanan was, of course, not alone in expressing such sentiments. There were Republicans, Democrats, Conservatives, Liberals as well as Centrists who sounded variations on the theme "Come home, America."5 Bush himself criticised the "liberal Democratic carping," which he characterised as the belief that "we should retreat into an isolationist cocoon." And then there were internationalists who thought it unwise and impractical to retreat from global affairs.
The editor of Foreign Affairs, William G. Hyland, wrote: "The end of the Cold War has liberated the debate about foreign policy; ideas that would have been anathema only five years ago have to be entertained....There is also America's traditional bias against foreign 'entanglements'. Economic troubles are easy to blame on foreign countries, especially with a political campaign on the horizon. After decades of internationalism, there is nostalgia for a more 'normal' foreign policy. Even some of the old isolationists slogans have been revived.... But times have changed.... Those days are long gone. The United States is deeply entangled by the world's economy, by global technology, by international politics and institutions, and by half a dozen security alliances."6
Besides the isolationists and the internationalists, there were those who debated the place of the US in the emerging international system. There were many in the US who were basking in the glory of the US-led coalition victory over Iraq and called for a unilateral US move to shape a new world order. Charles Krauthammer, for instance, wrote: "The immediate post-cold war world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The centre of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.... American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political, and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself...."7 There were others who understood the limitation of the US power and capability. David Green, editor at large of US News and World Report, argued: " An influential American columnist, Charles Krauthammer, wrote a year ago in this journal that a unipolar moment had arrived and that a confident United States should learn to accept its new role, aggressively imposing its own vision. What a difference a recession makes. Few outside the White House talk any more of creating a 'new world order,' unless in jest. The United States cannot achieve order in its streets or even in its capital, much less in the rest of the world. Staggered by an economic downturn that has taken a deeper psychological toll than expected and frustrated by a paralysis in its politics, the United States towards the end of 1991 turned increasingly pessimistic, inward and nationalistic."8 Hyland reminded, "For the first time in its history, America sought foreign aid to fight a war" and that "The gatherings of the Group of Seven industrialized nations are a more accurate reflection of contemporary power realities, than, say, a NATO meeting or an East-West summit."9
Henry Kissinger also understood the limits of US capability. He warned, "United States policy makers must recognize that the new world order cannot be built to American specifications" and then went on to suggest a balance of power approach to deal with the issues and problems of the post-Cold War era which "will be infinitely more complex" than the Cold War era.10 John J. Mearsheimer, professor at the University of Chicago, did not visualise a "unipolar moment" and was of the view that "Bipolarity will disappear with the passing of the cold war, and multipolarity will emerge in the new international order."11 Lawrence Freedman, professor at London's King College, contributing to the American debate commented incisively: "Bipolarity is an obvious victim of changed circumstances, but so also is the representation of the international system upon which it was based—that of a magnetic field governing the political behaviour of the individual state units..... Its continuing influence is suggested by the attempt to proclaim a 'unipolar' world led by the United States. The United States remains a superpower in military terms, but it occupies a less than commanding role in the international economy. Hence the unipolar model is dubious; it mistakes the implosion of the Soviet Union for the rise of the United States. But nor do we have multipolarity of the sort mooted in the 1970s, which posited Chinese and possibly OPEC additions to the power structure, with Japan and Western Europe increasingly asserting themselves independently of the United States.
"If the magnetic field has been transformed, it is because there are now a number of poles, but grouped closely together so that for many parts of the globe their pole is only faint. The critical consequence of the decline of the Soviet pole is that there is now nothing to attract those states once oriented in its direction; there is no counter pull for those states hitherto suspended somewhere between East and West. All these states must now reorient themselves toward the West, but the Western poles may not be strong enough to provide the necessary sense of direction and political purpose...."12
In India too there was a debate over the nature of the post-Cold War international system. While some analysts suggested that the international system today is marked by a multipolar power structure, there are others who believe that the world is neither unipolar nor multipolar. Jasjit Singh, for instance, argues, "The bipolar world formally ended with the demise of the Cold War, although it was showing signs of change for quite a many years before that. But the evolving international order is neither unipolar nor multipolar. The former assumes that the solitary 'pole' (in this case, the United States) possesses the requisite capabilities, and is willing to exercise control and influence over the remaining 183 states in the world. But the world has been witnessing a diffusion of power for more than two decades. The concept of multipolarity assumes the dominance of three or more powers, of near equal capabilities, and who develop control and influence over a set of countries to which it acts as a 'pole'. The reality is that there is a marked asymmetry in power capabilities of the leading countries in the world. The world order has been evolving into a polycentric system and this trend is likely to continue for the next two decades or before the system starts (if at all) to polarise into a multipolar system."13
The debate over the nature of the emerging international system was taken note of by the policy makers in the US as well as in India. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in its 1991-92 annual report, said: "The perception that the world has become unipolar needs to be taken note of in the context of the strategic, political and economic interdependence among countries. Unified Germany and Japan are on the road to becoming still more important centres of economic power. The rapid progress of integration of the European Economic Community is likely to enhance its importance as yet another major important centre of economic power."14 The following year, the MEA report, noted: "Though in the aftermath of the Cold War the world was perceived as unipolar with the United States becoming the most influential politico-military power, India perceived that the international situation cannot be defined in uni-dimensional terms. There were and are other emerging centres of influence which would have long-term influence on, and implications, for international relations. An economically resurgent China, technologically and economically dominant Japan and Germany, a politically assertive Europe integrating itself in socio-economic terms were and are to be acknowledged as potent influences in the conduct of foreign relations. The emergence of regional cooperation arrangements in the ASEAN and Asia-Pacific region and North America are other factors to be reckoned with. The emerging world, therefore, is multipolar and Indian foreign policy aimed at establishing equations with these emerging centres of influence in international relations."15
In the midst of the debate over the nature of the emerging international order, there has been general agreement that no new pattern of international relations and no new international system has yet taken shape and that uncertainties in international relations prevail. A definite pattern of international relations will take quite some time to take shape. And until that happens, all nations around the world would have to take steps to deal with the fluid international political and strategic affairs. In this uncertain world, the US, which undoubtedly is the only complete power, will try to stem the further erosion of its power and influence. India, on the other hand, would seek to strengthen its capabilities to enable it to maintain its independent stature in international affairs and to enhance its resilience as one of the important centres of power in the world. To that extent, the nature of Indo-US relations is not going to alter much in the post-Cold War environment. The US would strive to contain the growth of independent centres of power, since it would have less control over such power centres than, for instance, over a Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. The 1992 Pentagon report that envisaged containment of "hegemonistic" ambitions of some regional powers, particularly India, in a way has set the trend of post-Cold War Indo-US relations.
It is beyond doubt that some of the core security issues would put the two countries on the opposite sides of the spectrum. The US policy approaches to nuclear and missile proliferation contrast sharply with those of India. While the US set a "critical priority" to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems, India's worries have been different. Indian defence policy makers have clearly articulated that ".... the second tier nuclear weapons states have not shown willingness to engage in a corresponding process of dialogue for the reduction of the nuclear weapon. The modernisation process of nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states continues unabated..... Proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems continues to be a source of concern for our national security. Existing international instrumentalities have proved inadequate in dealing with the problem."16 In the backdrop of these developments, India has to deal with "(a) The increasing and collective pressure on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. (b) International trends generated by some countries to control, and to the extent possible, deny access to sophisticated technologies in the spheres of space exploration and satellite development and other civilian end-uses. (c) To adjust to emerging new global regimes affecting international trade, trans-border movement of technologies and those related to environment."17
There is little doubt that the proliferation issues will continue into the 21st century and constitute an important aspect of Indo-US relations. India's complaint against the US policy is based on its perception that while the US government does not even accept in principle India's position on the need to establish a nuclear free world and champions the doctrine of nuclear deterrence for the defence of the continental United States, it simultaneously seeks to take away India's right to keep its nuclear option open which is one of the least expensive security guarantees in the light of the country's security requirement. Moreover, while the United States talks the least of its own nuclear and missile programmes barring the ones dismantled with cosmetic effects on disarmament efforts, it seeks to influence New Delhi into accepting its partial arms control and non-proliferation proposals with no consideration of India's strategic compulsions. India is all for comprehensive global non-proliferation measures, which the United States is not at all prepared to accept at the moment. And if it wants India to participate in regional measures, the region should be accordingly defined to avoid making only an India-Pakistan arrangement to prevent proliferation. There is a belated understanding of India's position that any regional non-proliferation arrangement must include the Chinese weapons. But the understanding needs to be implemented into concrete policy. The Clinton Administration has reportedly amended its earlier policy of "cap, reduce and eliminate" the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan. But it would continue to work for "nuclear restraint." If the new approach, if any, would once again be based upon the India-Pakistan nuclear programme, it would be a non-starter. In addition, the US policy vis-a-vis Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, China's nuclear modernisation and Sino-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation will continue to be irritants in US-India relations in the foreseeable future.
Stepping into the 21st Century
There is little doubt that notable improvement in Indo-US security ties and understanding has occurred after the end of the Cold War in comparison to earlier years. The positive trends in the security understanding between India and the US are off and on overshadowed by the divergent views between the two on proliferation issues. At the same time, the strategic community in both the countries appears to have developed an understanding over the need for cooperation for maintenance of international peace and security and to deal with some of the trans-national security challenges of the post-Cold War era, such as international terrorism, drugs trafficking and international organised crime. Such cooperation is likely to be intensified within the limits of convergence of security perceptions. Moreover, the balance of power in Asia is undergoing considerable shift. There are new developments, such as the economic and political activism of the Association of South-East Nations (ASEAN) group, and there are uncertainties such as the future evolution of China and Russia, the potentiality of conflict in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, and the probability of tension when the fast growing Asian economies give rise to a scramble for energy resources. The Indo-US relations, among other things, will be shaped by the re-alignment of forces in Asia which is still in a transitional phase. There are opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, but differences over the terms and conditions of such cooperation will have to be resolved and a suitable compromise has to be worked out.
The divergent approaches to the key security issues like the nuclear and missile proliferation and the US efforts to deny technology to India will undoubtedly set limits on overall defence and security ties between India and the United States. The military-to-military interactions, holding of joint military exercises, regular dialogues by the defence policy groups consisting of the officials of the Pentagon and the Indian Ministry of Defence, seminars and conferences on strategic issues at the second track level will continue to improve mutual understanding between the two countries notwithstanding the tension over the US approaches to the proliferation issues. The proliferation concerns are also unlikely to adversely affect the rising economic interactions between the Indian and American business houses and investors. As Robin Raphel remarked: "I also think that although the nonproliferation issue is one that we have focussed on because of India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme [India has never had a nuclear weapons programme!], it's also important to remember that India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but hasn't done so since. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear device. Neither country has big, flashy, widely publicized nuclear arsenals; there is restraint there. We would like them as signatories to the NPT and give up the nuclear option altogether, but, under the circumstances, I think there's been a fair amount of restraint."18 It is this understanding, if it persists, which will enable India and the US to continue economic and other cooperation notwithstanding their differences over the proliferation issues. In the foreseeable future, increased economic cooperation rather than defence cooperation will be the hallmark of relations between India and the United States. Both India and the US seem to have learnt over the years not to allow single issues, political or security-related ones, to negate positive cooperation on other issues. It is a reflection of maturity in the relationship. In addition, tension between the two countries on economic, trade and investment matters will also be part of the normal interactions. Conflicts of interests over such issues are found among the best of allies. It will be unrealistic to expect Indo-US relations to be insulated from them.
Some of the recommendations made in the reports of American think-tanks, if implemented by the US government, can substantially contribute towards enhancing the climate of friendly political ties and increased economic interactions between India and the United States, as we step into the 21st century. The study, entitled South Asia and the United States After the Cold War, prepared by the Asia Society Study Mission, in 1994 suggested that economic relations should be the focal point of US engagement in South Asia because "successful economic reform and deregulation in South Asia will offer extensive commercial opportunities for the United States, especially in India." And then it went on to suggest that the nuclear non-proliferation issues in the Indian subcontinent should be approached from a global, rather than regional, perspective; and that the Cold War era export control rules and regulations should be reviewed and revised "to ensure that sales of US technology and know-how to South Asian countries are not unnecessarily restricted."19
Another recommendation made in the report prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is equally significant. The report said:
"While acknowledging the dangers of continued nuclear development in the subcontinent, the Study Group distinguishes between US efforts to force India to give up its nuclear option, which would prove both ineffective and counterproductive to American interests, and efforts to discourage and deter Indian programmes to produce and deploy nuclear weapons.
"No Government in New Delhi could survive if it abandoned the nuclear option for India in a regional and global environment in which nuclear weapons continue to be the ultimate coin of power. Notwithstanding the significant steps taken by Washington and Moscow to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, the existing nuclear powers show no readiness to phase out nuclear weapons.
"Instead of seeking to induce India to give up its nuclear option, the United States should shift from a focus on non-proliferation in South Asia to a policy designed to maintain nuclear restraints. Such a policy would seek to freeze the stockpiling of fissile materials for weapons purposes; and the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan....
"For the proposed five-power meeting to be productive, all participants would have to be prepared to accept restraints on their own nuclear posture as it affects South Asia. China's willingness to accept such restraints would be of special importance in encouraging India to
"The United States should continue to deny licenses for sale of US technology that would contribute directly to Indian efforts to develop missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Study Group recognizes that the Agni and Prithvi missile programmes are far advanced.They enjoy overwhelming domestic support and are not likely to be reversed by external political and economic pressures. The focus of US, efforts, therefore, should be to persuade India not to transfer its missile technology to others."20
There are clear trends of Indo-US relations on the eve of the 21st century that would continue to hold good in the foreseeable future. The two countries are likely to have a type of relationship that would be marked by increased cooperation in the trade, investment and other economic areas, modest cooperation in the field of defence cooperation, continuing divergent approaches towards the proliferation problem and differing perceptions and priorities over the new security challenges of the post-Cold War world. One can, however, conclude with little hesitation that Indo-US relations will be relatively more stable than, for instance, US-China relations. But at the same time, the closer a relationship becomes, the greater may be the number of disputes of various kinds. One of the closest bilateral relationships in the world is perhaps the US-Canadian one. But even this relationship is not without disputes. But then such disputes are managed in a relatively cordial atmosphere than the ones between adversaries—potential or real.
In this context, it may be pointed out that it is extremely important for India to understand the complex policy making process in the US in order to be able to play the political game within Washington's beltway. Particular importance should be given to the changing complexion of the executive-legislative relationship. Unlike in many other countries, in the US, the Congress plays a key role in foreign affairs; first, as the body that authorises funds and, secondly, as an important part of the US government with certain constitutional powers in the matters of foreign and defence policies. Local actors on US foreign policy issues include the 435 Congressmen, 100 Senators, 26 Standing Committees in the Congress, including the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; about 100 Sub-committees and several other special, joint, oversight and investigative committees that may be set up from time to time. In addition, there are about 12,000 Congressional staff members who are more permanent than the State Department officials who keep changing their chairs. And then there are the Party Caucuses, Party Policy Committees which are divided along liberal, conservative and radical lines.
Often in the past, mere statements in the US Congress created unnecessary worries and concern in India. To cite an example, reactions in the Indian Press and sometimes even by government officials to India bashing in the US Congress, particularly on the human rights issue, were extreme and unwarranted. While Congressional reactions have certain validity, as what the Congressmen and Senators say does sometimes matter in political circles, political statements on certain issues, especially the one on the human rights situations, do not ultimately hamper the concrete bond between nations in the areas of economic and security relations. As such, during the twelve years of the Republican Administration, the human rights issue did not find a place of priority in the US foreign policy agenda. The Tiananmen Square incident in China was an exception. And the way the Bush Administration sought to build up ties with Beijing despite the poor human rights record in China, and the Clinton Administration, notwithstanding the election promises, delinked the human rights issue from the trade issues should be an eye opener for those who give undue emphasis to such matters. Before making our responses to political statements in Washington, it would be necessary to weigh the pros and cons.
While India has of late begun to make use of the lobby groups to protect and enhance India's interests, there is a growing demand within the US to limit the role of lobby groups. India has to prepare itself to face a policy making process in the future where the role of lobby groups would be circumscribed. In addition, the vast Indian community in the United States is a great asset for India. The Government of India has to tap this resource in a more coordinated and sophisticated way not only for political but also for economic advantages. It will not be enough to understand the US policy making process. One has to be aware of the civilisational traits of a nation. It was way back in 1917 that Rabindranath Tagore said that the Western civilisation "is the civilisation of power, therefore, it is exclusive, it is naturally unwilling to open its sources of power to those whom it has selected for its purposes of exploitation."21 It may not be appropriate now to suggest that the US seeks to exploit other nations. But it seems to be a "civilisation of power," it seeks to keep its power and sources of power exclusive and tries to deny these sources to others. The history of Indian civilisation indicates that it has never been a "civilisation of power", it did not believe in subjugation and colonisation of other peoples and that the Indian history "has been the history of continual social adjustment and not that of organized power for defence and aggression."22 But the realities of today would demand that India in order to maintain a respectable position in the "polycentric" world, would not only have to make internal social and political adjustments and focus on economic growth but also would have to enhance its organised defence capabilities for defensive purposes. It is in the latter effort that India has to find out the means and ways of managing the US which seeks to contain the emergence of independent centres of power in various parts of the globe.
1. Quoted in John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy; Carter to Clinton (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 163.
2. Henry Kissinger, "Balance of Power Sustained," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton, ed., Rethinking America's Security (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992), p. 238.
3. David Green, "America's Missed Opportunities," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 199/92, p. 12.
4. Strobe Talbot, "Post-Victory Blues," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1991/92, p. 55.
5. Ibid., p. 54.
6. William G. Hyland, "The Case for Pragmatism," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1991/92, p. 39.
7. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," in Allison and Treverton, n. 2, pp. 296-97.
8. Green, n. 3, p. 1.
9. Hyland, n. 6, p. 44.
10. Kissinger, n. 2, p. 241.
11. John J. Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Allison and Treverton, ed., n. 2, p. 227.
12. Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at London's King's College, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1991/92, p. 26.
13. Jasjit Singh, "India's Strategic and Security Interests," Discussion Paper for the Sixth IDSA-INSS Strategic Symposium, New Delhi, January 24-25, 1996.
14. Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1991-92, p. i.
15. Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1992-93, p. 2.
16. Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992-93, p.2.
17. Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1993-94.
18. Robin Raphel, "Indo-US Relations: On the Road to an Enduring Partnership," Speech at the American Centre, New Delhi, March 25, 1994.
19. "South Asia and the United States After the Cold War," Asia Society Study Mission, New York, 1994.
20. Selig S. Harrison and Geoffery Kemp, India and America After the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993).
21. Rabindranath Tagore, "Nationalism in the West," in A. Appadorai, Documents on Political Thought in Modern India, vol. 2(Bombay, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 702.
22. Ibid., p. 694.