Nuclear Disarmament in the 1990s: Finding Paths for the Future
- Manpreet Sethi, Assistant Editor, IDSA
The decade of the 1990s began with the end of the Cold War. Cataclysmic changes had begun to sweep across the globe from 1985 onwards when President Mikhail Gorbachev propounded his concept of perestroika and thereby opened up a Pandora's box of political and economic changes. These ultimately brought about the downfall of Communism and the break up of the USSR. Eight years into this last decade of the century and the world, as we have known it, has been radically transformed. The clear lines of bipolarity have blurred, and economic globalisation and liberalisation have become the new magic mantras.
In times as turbulent as these when nations, big and small, have been preoccupied in reformulating and reorienting their domestic structures and foreign policies, where has nuclear disarmament figured in their perceptions and what headway has been made in this direction? This paper attempts to highlight some of the major initiatives taken in this field as also the new thinking on the subject that has begun to pervade international politics and diplomacy. The purpose of the exercise is to emphasise the need to cash upon the available opportunity and build enough pressure on the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) to make an irrevocable, firm and time-framed commitment to nuclear disarmament.
Turbulence in Strategic Thinking
The 1990s began amid much cacophony over the imminence of a new world order. In fact, this concept had been doing the rounds of the Western strategic community from the late 1980s onwards as sweeping political changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe mesmerised experts on international politics. These were accompanied by a remarkable progress in previously intractable conflicts in nations as far flung as Afghanistan, Cambodia, South Africa and Nicaragua. The German unification further indicated the emergence of a new pattern of international politics. Doctrines and concepts related to international security are still in a process of flux as economic relations are gaining paramountcy, and geo-politics, a former major determinant of foreign policy, has receded to the background for now.
While the exact structure and semantic of the new world order is yet to be defined in terms of whether it is unipolar (US-dominant) or multipolar (with several nations exerting contradictory and complementary pulls and pressures), two factors that would determine and define future inter-state relations and possibilities of war can be identified. Firstly, with the break up of the USSR, Russia is now believed to lack the capacity, and even the intention, to threaten or attack Western territories. In fact, a few security analysts have even concluded that the likelihood of war has sharply decreased because the erstwhile Soviet Union had "lost the ability to maintain aggressive armies outside its borders."1 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, Robert Gates too told the American Congress in 1992, "The threat to the US of deliberate attack from [the former Soviet Union] has all but disappeared for the foreseeable future."2 The Russian Foreign Minister had echoed similar sentiments in the same year when he said that his nation "no longer views the US as a foe."3
The second major development of the past decade that cannot be disputed is the primacy of economics in international relations. Increasingly, economic factors and concerns are becoming the prime determinants of foreign policy. The ensuing economic interdependence, then, yet again undermines the possibility of a large scale war. John Mueller has pointed towards a long-term trend away from war amongst the developed countries. He writes that "warfare of all sorts seems to have lost its appeal within the developed world."4
Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order
Notwithstanding the fact that these assumptions might sound a bit too hasty in certain contexts, yet they have compelled national strategists, especially in the USA and Russia, to take another look at the relevance of nuclear weapons in contemporary times. Nuclear weapons have no military utility in the post-Cold War scenario where war between the superpowers, or even between other nuclear weapon states is no longer considered a possibility. And while some NWS have been restating their resolve to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) they are not actually expected to do so. States are thus deprived of harbouring any grand justifications or complex doctrinal needs to continue with their nuclear arsenals.
In any case, even during the height of the Cold War when wars had not yet been written off, nuclear weapons fortunately, had failed to prove their utility. The non-use of well stocked nuclear arsenals in the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf War or the Sino-Soviet border war, substantiates the fact that their accumulation has been of little help even in times of military confrontation. A formidable US arsenal of several thousand nuclear warheads could neither deter Saddam Hussein from waging the war, nor could it be used to defeat him.
Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher of the Stimson Centre have argued that the character of international relations "is undergoing an irreversible transformation that will eventually invalidate rationales for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." As per their presumptions, technological diffusion and economic interdependence have created a world order where a growing number of states share so many common interests that "the very idea of using military force in the settlement of disputes" has been delegitimised.5 This role has a two-fold implication for the future role of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, it reduces the perceived international prestige attached to the possession of these weapons. On the other hand, the futility of a nuclear arsenal adds to the domestic constraints of a nation on channelling scarce resources from much needed civilian programmes to cater for a seemingly unnecessary military build-up. The spirit of the changing times was caught by another international analyst, Lincoln Wolfenstein who wrote in 1991 that "these are the days of hope, not despair...It is time to strip away the complex and arcane strategic theory of the Cold War and start from scratch."6
Some of this new thinking was translated into reality in the second half of 1991 when President George Bush put forward a package that, among other initiatives, included an acceleration of the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons covered by START-I, putting an end to the ground alert for nuclear laden bombers, removal of ground-launched nuclear weapons from Europe and South Korea and a halt to the development of mobile land-based and new air-launched missiles. This proposal of the US President was seen by certain strategists to harbour a recognition of the fact that "the existence of nuclear weapons themselves was now the threat. They were detritus of the Cold War, no longer the instruments of the US-Soviet geopolitical struggle."7 The Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev responded positively a mere eight days later by proposing the elimination of all non-strategic nuclear weapons and ending nuclear testing and fissionable materials production.
Indeed, such initiatives being taken so early in the new decade, alongwith the conclusion of START I that enjoined a reduction of the total number of strategic warheads by 30 per cent, set the pace and contributed to creating a climate favourable for forging ahead on the path to nuclear disarmament. In 1993, President Clinton extended the US moratorium on nuclear testing for another 15 months. He also upheld the independent existence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency(ACDA), thereby squashing all fears of its being absorbed into the State Department, a move that would have deprived the ACDA of much of its punch and objectivity.8 More agreements with Russia on nuclear cutbacks followed. START-II was concluded in 1994 and marked another major measure of arms control. At the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, the US and Russian Presidents consented to begin negotiations for START-III to further reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads from 3,000 - 3,500 of START-II levels to 2,000 -2,500 on each side.
In another historic move, the US concluded an agreement with Russia for the purchase of about 500 tonnes of Russian bomb-grade material, obtained from the dismantled nuclear warheads. In fact, the USA has a Material Protection, Control and Accounting Programme (MPC&A) that is specifically aimed at preventing Russian nuclear material from falling into "wrong hands". The budget for the programme in this year is $137 million and is expected to total $800 million by its conclusion in 2002.9 US officials are working to improve security at virtually every major nuclear weapon facility in the former USSR, including in remote and once secret cities such as Chelyabinsk-65 and other weapon design laboratories.
Several other countries and international organisations too are already working for nuclear safety in Russia and other former Soviet nations. France is building a storage facility for lithium components; Britain is working on projects to account for nuclear material; and the International Science and Technology Centre, established by the European Union, USA, Japan and Russia, has spent about $145 million on programmes to employ nuclear scientists who otherwise might seek work in countries of proliferation concern.10
Emergence of the New Abolitionists
To a large extent, proposals of such nature may be attributed to the emerging group of professional strategists who have been brave enough to initiate and endorse a new thinking on the subject. Of course, there still are those who consider the talk of abolition of nuclear weapons to be "unrespectable and an indication of hopeless naivete." They have dubbed the nuclear abolitionists as "unindicted co-conspirators" and describe nuclear disarmament as a threat. A cartoon in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists of the early 1990s even showed a General remarking, "I would not wish disarmament on my worst enemy."11
Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and former Under-Secretary of State Arnold Kanter belong to this school of thinking. They have rejected the argument that "the world can be made safer in direct proportion to the number of weapons which are dismantled." Some other hardline recidivists have expressed a fear of Russia, China and Third World "rogue" states and have, therefore, branded the abolitionists as "naive peaceniks heading down a slippery slope that will lead to a squandering of the US nuclear deterrent."12 Like-minded thinking in Russia too has perceived a threat from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion and from the steady breakdown of the Soviet conventional forces. One Russian analyst, Nikolai Sokov has suggested the positioning of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad between Lithuania and Poland to counter any fresh round of NATO expansion.13 Such strategists have cautioned their respective governments against devaluing too much the importance of their nuclear arsenals.
Despite the presence of these hardliners, a strain has been evident in the 1990s indicating that those making nuclear decisions could no longer rely on the earlier bipolar confrontationist thinking alone to fuel public fears into giving them a free rein for continuing the nuclear weapons programmes. This is complemented by a reduction in the strategic significance of nuclear weapons, especially for managing the security relations of the great powers in the post-Cold War international environment. Evidence of this emerging trend was provided by none other than General George Butler, former head of the Strategic Air Command and an early proponent of the cuts in nuclear arsenals. In 1991 itself he had said, "We are going to be involved for some indeterminate period of time in strategic disengagement—disentangling ourselves mentally, bureaucratically and militarily from the habitual ways of thinking and acting of 40 years of Cold War animosity."14 Indeed, transformed international realities and changing domestic contexts have created a situation where each decision has come to be answerable to competing domestic forces, such as the large federal deficit in the case of the USA and the financial crunch and surging civilian needs in the case of Russia.
More recently, over the past year or so, the voice of the new abolitionists has begun to be heard even louder and clearer. It is a heartening trend that leading Cold War nuclear theologians such as Paul Nitze, Fred Ikle and others have begun to question the wisdom of retaining nuclear weapons. Former senior military commanders and Defence Secretaries too have come together to propose an elimination of nuclear weapons as not only a desirable option, but a necessary corollary which would enhance international peace and security. General Butler has advocated the elimination of nuclear arsenals on the basis of a moral imperative because, "Accepting nuclear weapons as the ultimate arbiter of conflict condemns the world to live under a dark cloud of perpetual anxiety."15 In December 1996, he and nearly 60 other military officials in Russia, the US and other countries proposed a statement calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In March 1997, the Henry Stimson Centre launched a Nuclear Future Forum providing an opportunity for people to discuss the future nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.16 These measures indicate the slow but steady proliferation of the advocates of nuclear disarmament.
NPT Extension and Nuclear Disarmament
In mid-1995, the member states of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) assembled in New York to consider the issue of the extension of the treaty as per the requirement stipulated in its Article X (2) that necessitated a decision to be taken after 25 years on whether the treaty should continue indefinitely or should be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. It was widely expected that the occasion would generate a fair amount of acrimonious debate between the NWS and the NNWS since the former wanted its indefinite and unconditional extension while some of the latter nations sought to link its limited extension with the larger issue of nuclear disarmament. However, the NPT Extension Conference concluded rather tamely with the NWS achieving their professed objective.
Thereafter, an analysis of the conference has led to the emergence of two viewpoints on its possible consequences for nuclear disarmament. As per the first opinion, since the NPT is now permanent, the NNWS have lost what little leverage they had over the NWS to force them towards nuclear disarmament. This analysis believes that the NWS can now ignore all pressures from the international community to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
A second viewpoint, however, perceives that the NWS have made an unambiguous bargain to implement a "step-by-step" approach to nuclear weapons reduction and their eventual elimination in exchange for the legal permanence of the NPT. It may be mentioned that the status of the NPT as a legal instrument does enjoin upon the NWS to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures" to end the nuclear arms race.17 According to the second strain of opinion, if these commitments are not met, an atmosphere of disillusionment would be created within the treaty leading to the risk of nuclear proliferation.
While both viewpoints seem to have some measure of truth, the NWS do need to be frequently reminded that the NPT commits them to pursue negotiations for the ultimate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, liquidation of their existing stockpiles, and the elimination of nuclear arsenals and their means of delivery. During this conference in 1995, a Study Group of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) comprising 50 experts from 17 countries had presented a report entitled "Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" (NWFW) which outlined the transformation of the traditional non-proliferation regime into an NWFW regime. On the same occasion, a statement was signed by more than 200 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) calling for "negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement."18 This statement became the basis for the founding of the Abolition 2000 Global Network in the Hague in November 1995. It now comprises more than 750 NGOs and citizen groups worldwide.
At the NPT Extension and Review Conference, three measures were emphasised as steps towards the final goal of nuclear disarmament. These included the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the "determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."19
Amongst the intended objectives, the CTBT has since been concluded. It claims to put an end to nuclear testing. However, its effectiveness is in question since despite its presence, the USA, the country with the largest nuclear arsenal, has continued with its sub-critical tests meant for weapons refinement. It is open knowledge that American and Russian military nuclear scientists have not stopped working on newer types of nuclear warheads. The FMCT is yet to grapple with many issues before it can take any concrete form. As far as the third goal is concerned, determined efforts in that direction will be possible only through the realisation, especially on the part of the NWS that an isolated emphasis on horizontal non-proliferation in the absence of disarmament would never succeed in removing the spectre of nuclear war from the globe. Nuclear disarmament by NWS must, out of sheer necessity and common sense, be a logical complement to non-proliferation by NNWS.
More significantly, at the Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) Meeting of the NPT in April 1997, a group of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts presented a draft "Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Elimination" (Nuclear Weapons Convention—NWC).20 The public release of a citizen initiated model NWC indeed indicates an international campaign that is slowly gaining momentum to stimulate negotiations on a possible draft for a comprehensive regime for nuclear disarmament. In fact, given the complexities involved in the practical implementation of nuclear disarmament, there is utmost need for coordination across state boundaries and political bodies. This can be made possible by drafting a model NWC and then working on it to make it universally acceptable. The process was, at least, initiated in 1997.
The Canberra Commission
In another initiative towards nuclear disarmament, in November 1995, an independent commission was instituted by the Australian government to propose practical steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was also mandated to look into the related problem of maintaining stability and security during the transitional period and after the goal of complete disarmament had been achieved. Identifying proliferation as the most immediate security challenge facing the international community, the Commission acknowledged that despite the NPT, and often in spite of it, several states have made clandestine efforts to develop nuclear arsenals. Therefore, it emphasised the attainment of general and complete nuclear disarmament through a series of phased and verified reductions that would allow states to satisfy themselves that further movement could be made safely.21
The Commission enumerated several "immediate" and "reinforcing" steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament. It called upon the NWS to commit themselves "unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons" and advised the NNWS to support this commitment by "join[ing] in cooperative international action to implement it."22 It believed that this commitment,made at the highest political level, would change the tenor of the disarmament debate and the thrust of war planning.
The steps recommended by the Commission for immediate action included taking nuclear forces off alert; removal of warheads from delivery vehicles; ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons; ending nuclear testing; initiating negotiations to further reduce US and Russian nuclear arsenals and a no first use undertaking by the NWS and a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the NNWS. Besides these steps enumerated for immediate action, the Commission also outlined three more steps to reinforce the commitment, viz. actions to prevent further horizontal proliferation; developing verification arrangements for a nuclear-weapon-free world; and the cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes.
However, the Canberra Commission did not specify any precise time-frame for the proposed steps and neither were the delineated measures for nuclear disarmament anything more than recommendatory proposals specifying no guarantees for their implementation. Yet, irrespective of their acceptance or non-acceptance, at least their formulation through an independent commission highlights the changed political context in which disarmament debates are now being conducted. It definitely compels the international comity of nations in general, and the NWS in particular, to take another look at the concepts of extended nuclear deterrence and the futility as well as the heightened danger of the possession of nuclear weapons.
Ruling of the International Court of Justice
In July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in response to a request from the UN General Assembly, pronounced the use of nuclear weapons as unlawful and against the principles of humanitarian law. It concluded that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict international control."23
The judgement is not binding and its violation can lead to no punitive action being taken against the violating state, but for nations that claim to uphold the rule of law and humanitarian principles, it does contribute to creating an environment in which nuclear weapons are treated as abhorrent and must be abolished. To that extent, the court ruling has been welcomed and and has helped to formulate a world opinion in favour of nuclear disarmament.
Positive Developments on the Question of Feasibility
International conferences have extensively debated the subject and innumerable studies have appeared on the feasibility of nuclear abolition. Doubts have been raised on two accounts: firstly, on the possibility of some key nations not being honest enough to truly implement abolition even after committing themselves to nuclear disarmament; and secondly, on the practical difficulties of achieving the required standards of verifiability of implementing disarmament measures.
The first issue questioning the feasibility of nuclear disarmament assumes that the elimination of nuclear weapons would leave the world more vulnerable to nuclear violators. It cannot be denied that cheating could be a problem. But a law illegitimising the possession or use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances would definitely establish a legal international norm. This coupled with an effective verification mechanism could prove to be sufficient to safeguard against probable nuclear proliferators. A multinational, universally acceptable regulatory authority could be instituted to undertake verification and fire-fighting activities in case of any contingency. Only when a law is laid down can the violators be penalised through economic sanctions, social ostracism or military intervention, if necessary. The problem is surely not insurmountable if there is enough political will to grapple with it. However, to advocate the continuance of nuclear weapons only because violators could exist is like not wishing to have a law against theft because some thieves could anyway exist.
Various proposals have been put forth by scholars researching the means of making nuclear disarmament a feasible option. For instance, Kosta Tsipis and Philip Morrison expounded the development of a "permanent international armed force."24 This was proposed to be created through the contribution of advanced and intricate weapon systems and the organisations to deploy them, including transport, command, control and communications, reconnaisance and intelligence as well as special air and naval forces. Ground troops could be supplied by other UN members. The authors articulated a need for all govern-ments to "dedicate, equip, support, train, honor (and eventually pension) a portion of their armed forces as part of the common security force."25
Of course, the proposal may be considered radical by today's standards. Governments cannot be expected to forego reliance on their national Armies and such a combined force cannot win instant acceptance. However, through the formulation of such proposals, and their refinement through more inputs from the strategic policy makers, some viable options can surely be worked out.
As regards the second obstacle undermining the feasibility of nuclear disarmament, scepticism flows from the new nuclear problems of safely storing and destroying warheads in a verifiable manner, accounting for all nuclear material, as well as storing and destroying fissile materials. The task of destroying some 1,500-2,000 warheads every year is indeed a daunting new challenge that would require intrusive verification and substantial cooperation.
A solution to this second problem was offered by the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). It conducted an 18-month study in 1993-94 for the US government to study different options for managing the surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) obtained from the dismantled nuclear warheads. It concluded that plutonium could be diluted with natural uranium to a form unusable for bombs and diluted HEU could be used as reactor fuel. To manage these materials, CISAC suggested the establishment of a reciprocal regime of monitored net reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear explosive material, an agreement on the methods and locations of secure interim storage of plutonium, an international monitoring mechanism and the imposition of radiological, chemical and logistic barriers.
Therefore, while the feasibility of nuclear disarmament does pose a problem, ways could be devised to get around it in the presence of the requisite political will. In fact, with technological advancement that has been made over the last few decades, the world was never more equipped to further research and develop technical ways and means of ensuring feasibility. This development is further complemented by the recent global political transformations. The changes that have taken place in the international security and foreign policies in this present decade do seem to have provided a favourable setting for moving ahead in this direction.
Since the end of the Cold War, the demand for an NWFW has steadily grown in popularity that has in turn enhanced its feasibility and credibility. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, something like a political chain reaction has been seen to have emerged. This is manifested in such diverse forms as international protests against nuclear testing; the conclusion of the CTBT; the hype over the 50th anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the Nobel Peace Prize for Pugwash and Joseph Rotblat; the report of the Canberra Commission; the advisory opinion of the ICJ; the foundation of the Abolition 2000 Global Network; and a statement by 60 international military leaders calling for an elimination of nuclear weapons.
However, in order to be effective, nuclear disarmament must essentially meet two pre-requisites : firstly, there must be a consensus that it is necessary. Fortunately, this is slowly crystallising and it makes it even more imperative to capitalise upon the favourable conditions prevailing today and formalise the pro-abolitionist views and options; secondly, the desire for nuclear disarmament must be founded in, and supported by, an effective enforcement mechanism. Therefore, it is essential that an international disarmament treaty be freely negotiated and that it proceeds in phases with adequate verification provisions and confidence building measures.
Already half a century has elapsed since we started cohabiting with nuclear weapons. Their deterrent value in an ideologically polarised world continued to justify their existence during this phase. But now as this rationale has disappeared, it is time to move towards their total elimination. This might be claimed as a drastic step in the present strategic landscape but its soundness cannot be faulted. It might be worthwhile to remember that when the abolition of slavery was being demanded, there were some recidivists who believed that the economic system and society would not be able to survive the drastic change. Similarly, when aparthied was outlawed, few had thought it possible. Nuclear abolition too can be realised provided there is a strong political will created through the pressure of a favourable public opinion. Nuclear disarmament will have to originate from the reorientation of strategic and foreign policies of the NWS. In this context it would be appropriate to quote the attempt made by Leo Szilard to redirect the strategy of the disarmament movement right in the very beginning. He had cited the story of a drunkard who had lost the key to his house in Soho and was looking for it in Trafalgar Square for the simple reason that there was light at the Square while Soho was in darkness. Therefore, Szilard's point was that "the key to the control of atomic bombs does not lie in the narrow area of atomic energy on which spotlights of public discussion are focussed, but rather in the dark fields of our overall foreign policy."26
In contemporary times, when senior military officials and national strategists have begun to moot the need and efficacy of the continuance of nuclear weapons, this is the moment for countries not possessing nuclear weapons to cash upon the existing opportunity and insist on the attainment of general and complete nuclear disarmament.
1. Don Oberdorfer, "New World Order Galloping into Position", Washington Post, February 25, 1990, as quoted in Wallace J. Thies, "Rethinking the New World Order", Orbis, Fall 1994, p. 622.
2. Tom A. Zamora, "Put a Safety Cap on Testing", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, no. 2, March 1992, p. 25.
4. John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World", International Security, Fall 1988, pp. 55-79.
5. Robert A. Manning, "The Nuclear Age : The Next Chapter", Foreign Policy, Winter 1997-98, p. 76.
6. Lincoln Wolfenstein, "End Nuclear Addiction," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 47, no. 4, May 1991.
7. William Arkin, Damian Durrant and Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Weapons Headed for the Trash", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 47, no.10, December 1991, p. 16.
8. The possibility of ACDA being absorbed into the State Department had been floated when Thomas Graham, acting head of the Agency, had opposed the State Department by supporting the nuclear test ban.
9. Jeff Erlich, "Energy Department Seeks Funds from Non-Proliferation Partners", Defense News, vol. 13, no. 4, Jan 26 - Feb 1, 1998, p. 10.
11. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, no. 2, February 1992.
12. Manning, n.5, p.76.
13. Ibid., p.77.
14. Arkin et al, n.7, pp.17-18.
15. Manning, n.5, p.74.
16. Deng Hongmei, "The Chemical Weapons Convention and Its Lessons for A Future Nuclear Weapons Convention", Agni, vol. 3, no. 1, p.27.
17. Article VI of the NPT.
18. Jurgen Scheffran and Merav Datan, "Nuclear Weapons Convention—The Treaty is Out of the Bottle", Agni, vol. 3, no. 1, June-September 1997.
19. John Simpson, Darryl Howlett and Emily Bailey, "1997 and All That: Multinational Diplomacy and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime", Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 17, no. 3, December 1996, p.336.
20. Scheffran, n.18.
21. Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons", Internet edition, http://www.dfat.gov.au/dfat/cc/cchome.
22. Ibid., p.5.
23. Legality of the Threat of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Communique no. 96/23, July 8, 1996, International Court of Justice, The Hague.
24. Kosta Tsipis and Philip Morrison, "Arming for Peace", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 1994, pp.38-43.
26. As quoted in Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953, vol.1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).