Japan's Nuclear Energy Quest

-Sanjana Joshi, Research Officer, IDSA


For Japan, a country plagued by a lack of natural energy resources, the civilian use of nuclear power is central to the viability and direction of the nation's entire economic strategy. As the largest importer of energy in the world, the government is realistically wary of unpredictable international energy markets. In this context, what can be characterised as a "Nuclear Quest" is underway to create a complete Japanese fuel cycle and thus virtual national independence in all aspects of nuclear power generation.1

Indeed, in recent years, pro-nuclear forces in Japan have come to see their task of maintaining faith in nuclear power extending well beyond national shores. They recognise that the country cannot pursue its "Nuclear Quest" in isolation, no matter how safe, reliable and necessary the atom might be for the nation's goal of security, independence and economic prosperity.

Although, achievement of national independence is a long way off and the national effort not without major uncertainties, Japan has become an international standard bearer for the development of nuclear power. And how Japan deals with nuclear power economics, long-term planning, the dangers of radiation, non-proliferation arrangements, reactor safety, management of radioactive waste, all have profound international implications.

Energy Security

Japan's level of energy security can be measured by making use of four basic indicators: dependence on imported energy, dependence on oil as a primary energy source, dependence on the Middle East for oil imports, and the share of oil as a percentage of total imports. As indicated in Tables 1 and 2 below, by all these measures Japan compares unfavourably with other major industrialised nations like Britain, France, Germany and the United States. Japan also comes out very poorly in terms of its reliance on imports for its oil supply, which is virtually 100 per cent.

Table 1. Indicators of Japan's Energy Security, Fiscal 1973-2010 (%)

1973 1983 1994 1995 2000 2010

Dependence on imported energy 89.4 83.3 83.2 81.9 81.0 80.0

Dependence on oil as a primary

energy source 77.4 61.5 57.4 55.7 53.0 50.0

Dependence on the Middle East for

oil imports 78.1 68.2 77.3 78.6 82.0 90.0

Oil as a percentage of total imports 18.1 37.6 11.9 10.6 14.0 18.0

Source: The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan Review of International Affairs, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall 1997.

Table 2. International Comparison of Energy Security

Britain Canada France Germany Italy United Japan


Oil import

dependence -52.2 -40.4 96.0 97.3 94.2 49.9 99.7

Energy import

dependence -9.6 -47.0 46.7 57.6 80.7 19.0 81.5

Source: Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, Energy Balance; Japan Review of International Affairs, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall 1997.

The decline in Japan's dependence on imported energy (as indicated in Table1) is mainly due to the growth in the use of nuclear power. The figures for 1995 provided by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ( MITI ) show that the share of nuclear energy in Japan's primary energy supply is 12.0 per cent, an increase of 11.7 per cent from the 1970 figure. Moreover, the long-term energy outlook published by the Advisory Committee for Energy in June 1994 suggests a target increase of 6.2 per cent, from the 1992 figure, for nuclear energy by the year 2010.

Since 1956 the Japanese Science and Technology Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission have been announcing "Long-Term Programmes for the Development and Utilisation of Nuclear Energy". In between, MITI also issues "Energy Demand Forecasts and Conservation Plans", thus justifying any need to revise the Long-Term Programmes, if necessary. In fact, consistency in pursuit of maximum autonomy in all aspects of nuclear power generation has been the main characteristic of the phased development of the nuclear industry in Japan—from the 1950s during which Japan paved a "nuclear road" by institutionalising legal arrangements and basic research systems through the 1960s during which Japan successfully acquired a technological base, to the 1970s and 1980s when it secured and commercialised key nuclear technologies.

The first Long-Term Programme for the Development and Utilisation of Nuclear Energy (1956-60) opened the road for development of the atomic industry through the Japan-United States Peace Treaty. It introduced foreign technology for the construction of indigenous power reactors and selected Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) as the final goal. The first Programme established a plan to acquire fusion technology, established the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), and enacted the Atomic Energy Basic Law.

The second Long-Term Plan (1961-66) established a 20-year nuclear power supply plan. The plan transfered the technologies nearing commercial use to the private sector for further R&D and diversified drastically the application of atomic technologies to other industries. Japan decided to acquire reprocessing technology and facilities and to develop indigenous FBRs. It also purchased a gas-cooled reactor from Britain.

The third Long-Term Plan (1967-71) established the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PAC) and set up a plan for Japanisation of the fuel cycle. It decided upon Light Water Reactors(LWR) as the main reactor type for commercial power generation and acquired contracts for development of overseas uranium mines and imports therefrom.

The fourth Long-Term Plan (1972-77) increased dramatically nuclear power generation goals, acquired an indigenous safety system and secured an international network for nuclear fuel supply. During this period Japan succeeded in local enrichment and began construction of an enrichment plant. A reprocessing plant at Tokkai was built and the Joyo FBR was test-operated.

The fifth Long-Term Plan (1978-81) implemented national level research projects for the "LWR, FBR" and "FBR Fusion Reactor" transition. It developed an indigenous down-stream fuel cycle and greatly strengthened Japan's international competitive edge.

The sixth Long-Term Plan (1982-86) set up a plan to develop a completely indigenous fuel cycle, sharply increased budget allocation for R&D, and constructed an atomic complex in Rokashomura.

The seventh Long-Term Plan (1987-91) completed comprehensive plans for treatment of enriched uranium, spent-fuel and low-radioactive wastes. It set 2020 as the goal year for the commercialisation of the Monju FBR.

The eighth Long-Term Plan revised the Japan-US atomic cooperation agreement thus increasing Japanese independence in plutonium storage and expanded international technological cooperation particularly with Russia and East European countries. It also envisioned operating the Monju FBR and established a comprehensive plan for full-fledged utilisation of plutonium.

Issues in the Post-Cold War World and Japan

Over the past few years, Japan's nuclear energy policy has given rise to a wide range of concerns and suspicions in both the domestic and international spheres, and to many the programme's future seems unclear. The main focus of these concerns is the protection of nuclear materials and the threat of nuclear proliferation, specifically, (1) the fear that other countries, taking advantage of the precedent set by Japan, will begin reprocessing spent-fuel and launch the development of breeder reactors without taking adequate safeguards; (2) doubts as to the sincerity of Japan's commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, particularly in view of its insistence on pursuing a relatively costly plutonium programme despite the long-term drop in uranium prices; and (3) possible problems inherent in guarding the nuclear materials—specifically, mixed oxide or MOX fuel and vitrified high-level nuclear waste—that are to be shipped between Europe and Japan on a long-term basis under the provisions of the current programme.2

Underlying these criticisms is the view that Japan would be better off if it abandoned a policy that has ceased to make economic sense. And, that the Japanese government has a responsibility to provide the international community with a convincing explanation of why it refuses to switch course.

However, it needs to be clarified that the plutonium strategy is not a recent development in Japan's energy policy. The idea was integral to the initial decision to use nuclear power, and it has been a consistent goal of Japan's nuclear energy policy since its inception. But the Monju accident in 1995, when sodium leaked from the cooling system of the prototype FBR Monju, has not only heightened anxiety regarding the plutonium programme but also called into doubt the safety and wisdom of all forms of nuclear power.

The government in response has implemented a two-pronged strategy. To hear and respond to the people's voice, it established "round table conferences on nuclear policy". At the same time, it undertook an ambitious internal review of Japan's nuclear energy's policy within the context of the country's overall energy policy.

The National Debate

The Japanese government's current nuclear power policy draws support from the following points:

* Although oil and uranium prices are stable at the moment, long-term forecasts indicate that both resources will be nearing depletion by the middle of the 21st century. Japan which is especially poor in such energy resources has no choice but to rely on nuclear power sustained by a fuel recycling programme.

* The use of nuclear power is an effective means of curtailing emissions of carbon dioxide to prevent global warming.

* While energy conservation and alternative energy sources are proposed as alternatives to nuclear power, these options are clearly limited in potential.

* Continuing economic development in China and other East Asian nations will inevitably boost demand for oil, while the source of supply is increasingly concentrated in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. Aware that oil prices must rise in the not-so-distant future, China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam are all aiming to increase their dependence on nuclear power. Japan should cooperate with those efforts.

The arguments of those who advocate abandoning or at least carefully reviewing current policy can be summarised as follows:

* Japan's nuclear energy management is secretive and opaque. The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PAC) which oversees the recycling of nuclear fuel has been sloppy in its handling of accidents and cannot be trusted.

* A moratorium should be placed on nuclear power until a safe policy has been formulated.

* The construction of new facilities should be dependent on the choice of the local residents, especially in view of the current political climate favouring the devolution of power from the central governments to the prefectures and municipalities.

* It is both possible and necessary to curtail demand for electricity, consumers of electric power need to get serious about energy conservation.

* The governments should provide more support for development of alternative energy sources, particularly solar energy.

* The industrial countries of the West have long since abandoned plans for the breeder reactors, and the majority have retreated from their earlier commitments to nuclear power in general, saying there is no future in it. Why must Japan alone make nuclear power the mainstay of its energy supply and embark on a serious programme for recycling nuclear fuel?

* Instead of using nuclear energy as the trump card in its efforts to arrest global warming, the Japanese government should be stressing the central role of conservation and alternative energy sources.

Policy Review

The policy review was conducted over a period of about six months, begining in the spring of 1996, in the Sub-committee on Basic Policy Directions and the Nuclear Power Sub-committee of the Advisory Committee for Energy, a consultative body to the Minister for International Trade and Industry. The Sub-committee on Basic Policy Directions re-examined Japan's energy policy as a whole and re-affirmed the role of nuclear energy within that overall policy, and passed on its recommendations to the Nuclear Power Sub-commitee, which then reviewed the timetable and implementation of the government's nuclear fuel recycling programme.

The Sub-committee on Basic Policy Directions concluded its deliberations at the end of 1996 and emphasised the following points regarding nuclear power.

* Nuclear power should be regarded as one of the best energy sources from the two standpoints of attaining energy security and arresting global warming.

* Judged in terms of current and scheduled construction, the goal of boosting the amount of electricity generated by nuclear energy to 45.6 million kilowatts by the year 2000 is attainable.

* However, the Monju accident has fuelled public mistrust and anxiety regarding Japan's nuclear energy policy. As long as this situation persists, it will be more difficult than ever to find acceptable sites, and the goal of 70.5 million kilowatts by 2010 may be hard to achieve.

* The government must redouble its efforts to pursue a nuclear power policy that keeps the concern of the people in mind, improving its promotion programme by stressing full public disclosure and the long-term economic development of the locales selected as sites.

The deliberations of the Nuclear Power Sub-committee and the recommendations were released in January 1997. These are grouped under two headings: "Nuclear Energy Policy from the People's Perspective:Issues and Responses" and "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Issues and Responses".

Deliberations on the first topic were extremely intensive, owing to a shared sense of crisis among those involved in the planning and implementation of Japan's nuclear programme. Conscious of the fact that the Monju accident had seriously shaken the public's faith in the government's nuclear energy policy and that the nuclear power programme had no future unless that faith was restored, the committee emphasised policies toward the communities where nuclear plants are located. Discussions focussed on two points. The first was the need to enhance measures to build up the regional economy in such areas. The second was the consciousness gap between residents of the outlying regions where nuclear power sites are clustered, who faced a plethora of problems as a result, and energy consumers in major urban centres like Tokyo and Osaka, who take their stable energy supply for granted and lack any awareness of their debt to the outlying areas.

The second point is especially important, for people living near nuclear power plants continually ask why these are never built near Osaka or Tokyo, where most of the energy is consumed. Indeed, this simple complaint is a powerful argument. In fact, outlying communities have begun to raise the same sort of objection regarding the location of industrial waste disposal sites. These complaints can hardly be dismissed. Moreover, the political discourse today strongly favours a historic transition away from the highly centralised state that has developed over more than a century. In August 1996, the residents of the town of Maki, in Niigata prefecture, voted down the government-planned construction of a nuclear power plant by referendum—the first such instance in Japan. The vote sent the government and the electric power industry reeling, and its impact continues to be felt.

Opinion polls indicate that while 70 per cent of the people acknowledge the need for nuclear power to one degree or another, more than half harbour concerns about its safety. Even more important than these figures, however, is the strength of what is termed the "not in my backyard" sentiment that invariably emerges wherever the government tries to build new reactors, notwithstanding the general recognition that such construction is necessary for the nation as a whole. As a result, negotiations with local authorities have become deadlocked at every potential site.

The second topic deliberated by the Nuclear Power Sub-committee was the nuclear fuel cycle, specifically, the recycling of nuclear fuel.

The basic objective was to bolster support for the so-called pluthermal programme, that is, the use of MOX fuel containing extracted plutonium in light water reactors. Had it not been for the Monju accident, this programme would have gone forward without a hitch.

Deliberations ranged from a re-affirmation of the need for Japan to establish its nuclear cycle to a discussion of the rationality of the MOX option, coupled with a consideration of storage problems. Policy makers felt that the two key points to consider in this regard were: first, the almost complete lack of understanding in other countries of Tokyo's emphasis on nuclear fuel recycling as the cornerstone of its efforts to achieve energy security and, second, the widespread misconception that recycling of nuclear fuel is virtually synonymous with immediate commercialisation of fast breeder reactors, when in fact such plans have been inevitably delayed in the wake of the Monju incident.

With regard to the issue of energy security and the government's plan to establish a sustainable nuclear fuel cycle, the following points were emphasised.

* Rapid economic development in China and other East Asian countries has boosted energy demand sharply. This means that some uncertainty in the international energy supply-and-demand situation, centred on oil, is unavoidable over the medium term. At the same time, sources of East Asia's oil supplies continue to be concentrated in the Middle East. As long as the prospects for peace in that region remain uncertain, Tokyo has no choice but to intensify its long-term policy of weaning Japan from dependence on the Middle East particularly and oil in general. This requires boosting the nation's dependence on nuclear power.

* Ecological considerations will play a major role henceforth. There is strong resistance on environmental grounds to the direct geologic disposal of uranium and plutonium-rich spent nuclear fuel. Japanese society is more likely to tolerate a policy of reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium and uranium and compacting and vitrifying the remaining high-level radioactive waste for safe disposal.

* Although a number of Western countries have perfected the technology for reprocessing spent fuel and using plutonium in reactors, Japan has yet to reach that level.

The new framework nevertheless amounts to a drastic revision of the government's recycling programme. The development of nuclear power is generally broken down into three developmental phases. In the first period, where Japan has been for the past 30 years, uranium is the major source of nuclear power. In the second phase, which Japan is just entering, the key processes of nuclear fuel recycling—enrichment and reprocessing—are carried out domestically on a commercial basis, and the recovered plutonium is used as the main component in MOX fuel for light water reactors. In the third and final phase, fast breeder reactors allow for a still more efficient use of uranium resources and eventually account for most electric power generation. Although the government has proposed no fundamental change in this scheme, it has revised its estimation of the duration of phase two. According to the report of the Nuclear Power Sub-committee, "Based on a reassessment of trends in medium to long-term energy supply and in the development of fast breeder reactors, this stage should continue for several more decades." What this amounts to is a declaration of the government's intent to drastically postpone the transition to phase three. Needless to say, the factor most directly responsible for this policy turnaround was the Monju accident.

In January 1997, on the basis of this report, Prime Minister Hashimoto formally requested the cooperation of the Governors of Fuchsia, Fuqua, and Niigata prefectures in implementing the pluthermal programme. Policy makers were convinced that the policy review was complete and that the pluthermal programme was finally on track. But shortly thereafter, on March 11, a fire and explosion occurred at the power Reactor & Nuclear Fuel Corporation's (PNC's) fuel reprocessing plant in the village of Tokai, Ibaraki prefecture. The public outrage triggered by this incident far exceeded that following the accident at the Monju reactor.

Both accidents pointed to a common problem: the veil of secrecy shrouding the PNC's operations. Worst of all, officials deliberately covered up aspects of the Tokai incident that reflected badly on the organisation, in flagrant violation of the principle of full disclosure. The pluthermal programme, therefore, is once again under a cloud, and its prospects for implementation uncertain.

The government's policy following this second setback has been, first, to adhere to the basis policy of fuel recycling affirmed after the Monju accident, and second, to dissolve the PNC and create a new apparatus to manage the country's fuel recycling programme. By accomplishing this as quickly as possible, the government hopes to quell public fears regarding nuclear fuel recycling and move forward with its pluthermal programme.

At the heart of these plans, however, lies the security dimension of the nuclear regime.

The Nuclear Option

In the post-Cold War era, as the role of nuclear weapons becomes less clear, questions about the credibility of the extended deterrence provided by a nuclear power for its allies arise. This credibility continues to be a serious issue for Japan, which relies on the United States' strategic nuclear weapons as an element of its security system. Considering that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has not been totally abandoned and that the end of the Cold War has increased uncertainty with respect to nuclear proliferation.

The credibility of the nuclear umbrella depends on the following three sub-policies:

(1) There should be expression of clear political commitment by both a government providing extended deterrence and a recipient non-nuclear weapon state.

(2) The credibility of the deterrent is enhanced if troops of the nuclear power are stationed on the territory of the non-nuclear weapon state i.e. a nuclear attack on that country would affect the nuclear power's own security.

(3) It is necessary for the nuclear power to have specified in advance which of its strategic nuclear arms are intended to serve as the actual means of implementing extended deterrence.3

In terms of the above three conditions, the US and Japanese governments have made their joint stance fairly clear. For example, the maintenance of extended deterrence is explicitly mentioned as an area of peace-time cooperation in the Interim Report on the review of the US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines.

At the same time, Japanese nuclear policy continues to be implemented under a kind of "asymptomatic strategy".4 This refers to a sort of nuclear armament process through which a nation, without revealing any military intention, proceeds to acquire all nuclear capability except the possession of nuclear warheads. In the words of a 1969, Ministry of Foreign Affairs document "...although Japan did not need nuclear weapons for the time being, it should keep the economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will not be interfered with in this regard."5

In this context, a great deal has been written about Prime Minister Nakasone's role. As the youngest member of the Diet, in 1951, he played a primary role to prevent the San Francisco Peace Treaty from prohibiting the Japanese atomatic industry. It was also Nakasone who for the first time suggested in 1956 the construction of three power reactors, and in 1966, initiated a plan for self-sufficiency in fast breeder reactors and reprocessing technology. In 1970, the head of the Japanese Defence Agency, General Nakasone published a white paper indicating that possession of nuclear weapons would not be unconstitutional. Later in the 1970s, the Defence Agency produced a report entitled "Concerning our Nation's Independent Defence and Its Potential Power" that recommended Japanese possession of tactical nuclear weapons.6

Clearly it was Prime Minister Nakasone who in the early 1980s paved the way to revise the US-Japan Atomic Cooperation Agreement in Japan's favour. Under the new bilateral "Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy" that came into force in 1988, Japan can now store plutonium on its own soil quite freely. The previous obligation to gain US approval batch by batch for the right to reprocess US-origin uranium fuel and to use the resulting plutonium was replaced by a 30-year advance consent, thus giving Japan programmatic approval to bring back the plutonium extracted from Japanese spent fuel reprocessed in Europe.

It is, however, important to note that other Japanese leaders have not been much different from Nakasone when it comes to nuclear farsightedness. It is with this farsightedness that Japanese leaders have pushed ahead with surprising consistency in spite of changes in government. Indeed, the Japanese acquisitions of reprocessing technology and facilities constitute a shining example of the Japanese tenacity in pursuing key technology.

It was in 1959, under Prime Minister Kishi that Japan first separated plutonium. Under Prime Minister Sato, in 1964, the government decided to construct indigenously a reprocessing plant with an annual capacity of 210 tons in Tokai. It was due to the farsightedness of the Japanese leaders that Japan acquired enriched uranium by centrifugal separation as early as 1966, and later constructed a pilot enrichment plant in Ninkyotoke. Another plant in Rokashomura which became operational in 1984 with an annual capacity of 150 tons per year, has been enlarged to 600 tons capacity and is slated for eventual further expansion up to 1,500 ton capacity.7

Combine this advanced nuclear technology with the country's potential in material, electrical, and aerospace industries and increasing international paranoia about Japan's nuclear intentions becomes evident. For example Japan's impending laser enrichment technology deserves particular attention. Laser technology in which Japan is by far the front-runner, makes it possible to produce weapons-grade 90 per cent enriched uranium very quickly in a small plant. Also, in February 1994, Tokyo successfully launched the H-2 rocket which could provide not only long-range missile capability but also an independent reconnaissance capability (an initiative recommended by the recent Prime Minister's Review Commission).

Japan's professed nuclear goal is to close the fuel cycle, moving away from light water reactors to breeder reactors in its nuclear energy quest. But cost overruns, delays and the accident at the Monju facility have led to pushing back the programme. Japan's most recent revision of its long-term energy plan puts back the initial date for the use of plutonium by commercial breeder reactors until about 2030.

Yet Japan continues to accumulate fissile material. Statistics revealed by the Science and Technology Agency show that within five years Tokyo will have buffer stocks of 5-10 tons of plutonium at any given time. Japan continues to pledge that it will not accumulate excess plutonium and will seek to absorb much of its surplus plutonium by having it converted to MOX nuclear fuel for its light water reactors and its existing breeder reactors. However, sceptics argue that Japan's best case plans for absorbing its plutonium will not be realised and it will be sitting on a significant amount of excess. To assuage such concerns, prominent Japanese nuclear specialists like Ryukichi Imai have tried to argue that reactor grade plutonium is not suited for weapons production. International nuclear experts refute this saying that it can be converted with little difficulty.

In fact, an important aspect of the re-examination of security imperatives that has been gaining ground in Japan is the "nuclear option". In July 1992, at the Tokyo Summit of the G-7 nations Tokyo exhibited marked reluctance to support "indefinite and unconditional" extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) due to come up for extension in 1995. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials objected that indefinite extension would tie the hands of future governments in Japan if new security threats arose. Since then, the Japanese government has expressed support for indefinite extension but the ghost of a nuclear weapon-armed Japan refuses to go away. Fears of a nuclear-armed North Korea together with growing Chinese military strength and a new mood of national assertiveness drive a continuing debate over post-Cold War Japanese nuclear policy.

Recent public statements by senior Japanese officials and disclosures further erode confidence in benign Japanese intentions. On August 1, 1994, Mainichi Shimbun reported that a top-secret Foreign Ministry report stated that Japan should make sure it could acquire nuclear weapons if needed. "For the time being," said the report whose authenticity has not been questioned, "we will adopt a policy of not possessing nuclear arms. But we will maintain the economic and technical potential of producing nuclear weapons." Similarly, in July 1993, Asahi Shimbun reported that the Foreign Minister, Kabun Muto, referring to the North Korean threat said, "If it comes down to the crunch, possessing the will that 'we can do it'—to make nuclear weapons is important."

Japan's plutonium policies thus figure prominently in worst-case scenarios for East Asia—that is, a nuclear arms race between Japan and China, and quite possibly with a unified Korea. This is not to imply that such an arms race is either unfolding or even imminent; rather the point is that Japan's neighbours see a connection between Japan's fuel cycle activity and regional secuirty.8 Such perceptions may shape the behaviour of certain regional actors.9

Japan's neighbours, both Beijing and Seoul, view its nuclear agenda in conjunction with the bitter history of its colonial behaviour in the 1930s and 1940s. In the context of Japan's reluctance to confront fully its past, its fuel cycle appears rather different, particularly if viewed as part of a larger picture including H-2 rockets, reconnaissance capability, world class capability, large quantities of plutonium and a large defence budget.

A Regional Initiative

Lately, some in the Japanese nuclear establishment have suggested creating an "ASIATOM" or "PACATOM" organisation, under which individual nations can reprocess fissile material for energy, as a means of regionalising closed fuel-cycle activities. Officials of Japan's Power Reactor & Fuel Development Corporation have apparently begun preliminary discussions with Russian and Chinese officials, with the goal of developing cooperative fuel cycle programmes, though no formal talks have taken place.10

Japan also held a conference in November 1996 on Nuclear Safety in Asia that officials of nine Asian states attended, with G-7 countries as observers. Although exploratory in nature, the meeting appears to be a first, incremental step toward cooperative efforts at managing the peaceful use of nuclear power.



1. Michael W. Donnelly, Japan's Nuclear Energy Quest, in General L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change, (Studies of the East Asian Institute, An East Gate Book, 1993), p. 179.

2. Mitsuo Kono, "The Future of Nuclear Power in Japan," Japan Review of International Affairs, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall 1997, p. 189.

3. Yasuhide Yamanouchi, "Nuclear Energy and Japan's Security Policy," Japan Review of International Affairs, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall 1997, p. 209.

4. For a definition of "asymptomatic" see George Quester, "Some conceptual Problems in Nuclear Proliferation," American Political Science Review, 1972, pp. 490-97.

5. Alan Tonelson, "Time for a New US-Japan Security Relationship," Comparative Strategy, vol. 16, no. 1, January-March 1997, p. 3.

6. Malcolm McIcntosh, Japan Rearmed (New York: St. Martin's Press), 1986, p. 64.

7. Taewoo Kim, "A New Nuclear Policy for Japan: The Korea That Can say No," The Korean Journal of International Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, 1994, pp. 214-215.

8. Robert A. Manning, "PACATOM: Nuclear Cooperation in Asia," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2, Spring 1997, p. 219.

9. See for example Selig S. Harrison, ed., Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment 1996).

10. Mark Hibbs, "Japanese say US Blocking Efforts to Build Regional Fuel Cycle Links," Nuclear Fuel, November 4, 1996.