Power Struggle in China: The Post-Deng Scenario and Jiang Zemin as the "First Among Equals"

-Deba R. Mohanty, Research Assistants, IDSA


Two successive mega events in China within a period of six months have brought into focus the challenges of China's dramatic changes in the socio-economic and politico-strategic spheres that the third generation leadership has to address. The first was the Fifteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which was held in the second half of 1997 and the second, a more recent one, was the Ninth National People's Congress (NPC) which was held in February 1998. Though a comparative analysis of both is not desirable here, some core issues along with several queries have come into the open. These issues, in many ways may determine the course of history not only in China but also in relation to a broader international scenario. The fact that China is undergoing a tortuous transitional phase with hindrances coming especially from within and less from outside,1 it is the political leadership which is assumed to play a major role in shaping the course of future events in China. In this article, I have tried to examine various facets of a China in transition and its far-reaching implications. The subject is too complex and vast. Hence, I have tried to confine it to some specific political and strategic issues. Central to these issues are, of course, the current leadership question and the shaping of the next generation or what is commonly called the "fourth generation" leadership. In this regard, I have tried to study the processes of the power struggle in China, especially after the last paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's demise, and the apparent victory of the present President Jiang Zemin, who, though being a novice in politics not too long ago, seems to have secured his position as the "core" of the third generation leadership. In brief, analysis of Jiang's style in politics is the theme of this study, which, it is hoped, will eventually answer many central queries associated with it.

Building a Power Base

During and after the biggest ever student demonstration in China in May 1989, China was in the midst of significant internal disruption and impending external isolation, a situation which called for a man with great charisma and abilities to control contemporary as well as future events. It was during this time that the process of selecting a replacement for the CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang began. In such a situation, it was indeed surprising that a relatively unknown personality like Jiang Zemin was elected by the Fourth Plenum of the CCP's Thirteenth Central Committee. He was a technocrat, not a revolutionary. He was an outsider to Beijing. Importantly, not being a member of any particular faction, he was also committed to economic reforms. And significantly, his apparent lacklustre performance2 in his previous roles, especially as the Mayor of Shanghai, did not interfere with his accession. Taking all these into account, it was not surprising that there was a fear that Jiang's limited abilities would limit his tenure at the zenith. But, as subsequent developments show, Jiang has not only strengthened his position in the Party but also in the military, especially after he was elected President and also head of the Central Military Commission (CMC) for a second time in early 1998. Jiang's clever manoeuvre at the top by not including any serving People's Liberation Army (PLA) member in the recently reconstituted Standing Committee of the Politburo and the coterie being designed in such a way as to be dominated by "manager-economist-technocrat" groups amply demonstrates that he has apparently consolidated his position at the top. The herculean task has not been achieved without ceaseless effort. Jiang's ascendance commenced with a lot of difficulties. He had to create a power base independent of Deng in order to survive. It is necessary to study the nature of this power base that eventually made Jiang Zemin the most prominent figure in post-Deng China.

Understanding the power base in Chinese politics is of fundamental importance to this study. Unlike other political systems, China's cultural tradition of rule by man rather than rule by law has significantly contributed to the Chinese political system's relative lack of institutionalisation. It is not enough for a leader to be at the top of the formal hierarchy of power. In addition, a leader with the highest authority must have unchallengeable informal power.3 According to Tang Tsou, the system needs a "core," meaning a leader at the centre of the web of formal and informal power.4 Also, existence of a "core" is essential.5 The pre-1980 scenario had been dominated by the first generation revolutionaries who had both the legitimacy and personal contacts to serve as the core. The new generation leaders like Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin did not share the experiences necessary to establish this informal power. Among them, Hu Yaobang in fact was a first generation revolutionary, having participated in the Long March. The important point, however, is that he played a relatively minor role in this struggle.6 These leaders had to build the authority necessary to become the core once in power. Jiang Zemin, as will be evident subsequently, emerged the winner in this complex power game.

In modern China, power derives mainly from two sources: the bureaucracy and the "legitimacy" as ruler. Understanding the former is crucial as China has a bureaucratic political system. It is still ruled largely through the bureaucracy. Judged from this angle, one may assume that the relative power of an individual is related to his formal position in, and informal authority over, the bureaucracy. In brief, the bureaucracy is primarily where a power base is built.

The bureaucratic system in China is divided into four major functional areas (kou): Party affairs, government work, state security and foreign affairs.7 These areas have sub-kou. For example, state security contains two separate areas: political and legal affairs, and the military. Complexities involved in the kou, and the relatively uninstitutionalised nature of the Chinese political system often create confusion. Also, one may notice a certain kind of variation in the leadership of the kou and the influence of different functional areas. However, formal positions in different kou are important because they are a prerequisite to informal power.8 Without holding important formal positions, it is almost impossible to gain authority and ultimately legitimacy. There is some functional differentiation in the bureaucratic system. The system also can be viewed as having horizontal layers. It is also to be noted here that the distribution of powers between different bureaucratic systems and between the centre and the localities is not rigid. A top leader can alter these relationships in order to strengthen his power and weaken his opponents.

Formal position, as mentioned before, gives leaders a platform to build in due course of time a wave of informal authority which is essential for the survival of the leader. It can be created in many ways. Most importantly, the ability of a leader to win support for the establishment of informal authority must reflect a deeper understanding of the system itself. Informal authority can be created in three main ways. First, one must understand as well as involve oneself with the contemporary bureaucratic politics. The present generation leadership was relatively junior compared to its immediate subordinates in the formal hierarchy. In such a situation, the leaders were expected to win the support of the subordinates by rewarding them as they did not have the power to remove them. This can be described as distributing "patronage" to different institutions.9 Patronage can also be specific. Also, appealing to the interests of regional governments does bear fruit. In the 1980s, more powers were given to the provinces that created powerful new constituencies in the provinces which generally supported reformist leaders. New leaders also try to gain support from party elders having substantial informal authority.10 Zhao Ziyang made efforts in this regard.11 Second, a leader may give positions to his loyalists in order to control the bureaucracy. Positions in powerful institutions grabbed by the loyalists help the leader establish an apparently stable authority. But there are certain weaknesses in such a method. The installed official also needs his own network of support. This can also clash with the rules that guide inner-Party behaviour and lay out the modalities of elite politics.12 Third, perhaps the most complex way to control the bureaucracy is to reform it. It can strengthen the position of a leader. It can also create additional positions to which loyalists can be appointed. According to Susan Shirk, the leadership of the Communist Party structure decision-making process so that the group on whom they depend for support has a strong voice.13

Apart from the bureaucracy, it is "legitimacy" that is a second source of power in China. One way of gaining legitimacy is successful rule. Successful rule is often fragile as failure to gain success may cause removal of a leader from power. To fill this lacunae, a leader must be bolstered by a personality cult. A good example in this case is Hua Guofeng who during his tenure was increasingly identified with the regime itself. He also tried to gain legitimacy by relating his rule to Mao Zedong.14 Another strategy is that a leader must stress on his theoretical abilities. Nowadays, the ability of leaders to represent China has become very important as China has become more active on the world stage than before. Jiang's recent trip to the United States and subsequent developments have undoubtedly changed his image in a positive way.

Power Base Building: The Case of Jiang Zemin

Born on August 17, 1926, in Yangzhou15 (east China's Jiangsu Province), Jiang joined the CCP while studying electrical engineering at Jiaotong University in Shanghai. He became involved in underground activities as a student. He worked under Wu Xueqian and Qiao Shi during that time, both of whom were later to become his subordinates in the official hierarchy.16 After graduating in 1946, Jiang held a series of different posts in the First Ministry of Machine-Building. He also worked as a trainee at the prestigious Stalin Automobile Plant in Moscow in 1955. He was seen as one of the new elite of Chinese engineers. After 1955, he worked at the Number One Automobile Works in Changchun, Jilin.17 With constant promotions coming in his way, by 1974 he was already a Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Machine-Building. He then moved to the Electronics Ministry, where he was appointed Vice-Minister and then Minister. In 1982, he was elected to the CCP Central Committee. Before becoming the General Secretary of the Party, he also held the posts of Mayor and Secretary of the municipal Party committee in Shanghai.

The most unusual aspect of Jiang's career is that he worked in a factory. He is the only top leader in Chinese history ever to have done this.18 This gave him the credential of actually being a member of the proletariat. He also possessed a career that was typical of a third generation leader. He is a technocrat--his career has been marked by formal offices, a professional specialisation and a technical education.19 This separates the new leaders from the old ones as their formative experience was not revolution but practical field experience. In his early career, Jiang, had established relationships that are so important in Chinese politics, working with Zeng Peiyan, Rong Yiren, and Li Peng.20 In Shanghai, Jiang formed relationships with what would later become known as the "Shanghai faction." Equally important, Jiang's role in Shanghai allowed him to meet many of the elders who are so influential in Chinese politics. Shanghai is one of the preferred holiday spots for Party elders, and Jiang used the opportunity to establish good ties with Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian.21

Jiang's first senior official position was General Secretary of the CCP. He sought to increase the power of this kou and also increase his personal authority in this area. This was done by stressing Party building, especially in three aspects: ideology (stress on increased politicisation), organisation (building of Party committees and strengthening central control over these), and working style. Stressing on ideology, Jiang was of the view that "only when ideological and political work is stepped up can we bring about the second development of reform and opening to the outside world."22 His way of carrying this out was to arm the whole Party, the whole Army, and the people of the whole nation with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. He stressed "grasping the two links"--in addition to material civilisation (economic progress), spiritual civilisation (socialist ethics) should be developed. Stress on political and ideological work culminated in 1996 with the campaign to "Pay Attention to Politics."23 While explaining this concept, he emphasised again on continued study of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping's theory of building "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Improving Party organisations was the next challenge Jiang accepted. His main thrust was on the expansion of Party control over the other areas of society, and strengthening central control over Party organisation. The former focussed its attention especially on the PLA. However, it also encompassed family planning, united front work, law enforcement and media. Building up of grassroot Party branches in all areas of society was also on the agenda. The latter laid emphasis on improving discipline within the Party. This desire was most prominently reflected in the "CCPCC Decision on Some Major Issues on Strengthening Party Building."24 Another important aspect of Party building was the anti-corruption campaign. Jiang had commented on this aspect as early as in 1989. His contention was that if corruption was not tackled, "our Party and even state might even perish."25 Some observers feel that such a line pursued by Jiang at that time was less to improve the Party's image than to weaken his enemies.26 The arrest of the Beijing Municipal Party Secretary Chen Xitong on corruption charges in 1995 is a case in point. It was believed that this arrest was really motivated by Jiang's desire to remove the "Beijing faction" from power.

Jiang also made efforts to ensure full control of the Party over the propaganda and organisation areas. His speech on the mass media in 1989 was a sound beginning in this regard.27 He was of the view that the media should be firmly controlled by the Marxists. Party committees were told to screen and approve editorials. In organisation, the criteria for selecting cadres became a combination of political integrity and professional competence. He also tried to improve his control over the Party apparatus by moving his colleagues and loyalists into positions of power. Most of them were from Shanghai. By 1995, it was clear that most departments like that of Propaganda were under his firm control. Similar steps were taken in the organisation kou. Hu Jintao, the recently elected Vice-President,28 was made its head in 1992. Jiang also gained influence in other areas of the Party apparatus by appointing his loyalists to various elite bodies, like the Central Committee and the Secretariat. Loyalists were accommodated in the Secretariat more than the Politburo. It can be fairly assumed that Jiang was perhaps following Hu Yaobang in increasing the Secretariat's prominence as its loyalty was more certain than that of the Politburo. His other area of dominance were important research departments like the Policy Research Office of the Central Committee, and China Academy of Social Sciences.

It is to be noted here that Jiang held no official posts in the government work until the end of 1992. However, Deng was very anxious to consolidate the power of his latest designated successor to become involved in this important area. Jiang also commenced contemplating on economics and agriculture. His rural policies gave him a foothold in China's economic work, while his involvement in economics was primarily in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). He made frequent tours of the country and called for the invigoration of the SOEs. He called for increased importance to be given to workers. This certainly contained an element of populism which helped him indirectly. An inherent part of his plan to reform the SOEs was to apply modern technologies to them and he also promoted similar policies to improve agricultural performance.29

The real test for Jiang came from the problem of state security that not only involved public security but also national security. After 1993, he delivered several hard-line speeches on the need to strengthen public security which called for strengthening judicial, procuratorial and public security work, improvement of all facets of public security including the legal system and stepping up of law enforcement. The state thus was given more powers in the area of public security. He also tried to induct his own men in political and legal affairs kou and tried to gain more control of this area through bureaucratic reform.30

Jiang's attempt to control the security area began with his role in reforming the Provincial Armed Police (PAP). Falling somewhere between the political and legal affairs areas and the military, he took advantage of the PAP's ill-defined role and the need for the PRC to have a force with which to tackle civil disorder without resorting to the firepower of the PLA. Also, he made attempts to strengthen this force through absorbing large numbers of demobilised PLA personnel. Some reports suggest that Jiang was using the PAP to counteract the power of the PLA.31 But, as subsequent developments show, with the Li Peiyao debacle and the subsequent forced resignation of Ba Zhongtan, he seems to be paying less attention to the PAP since then.

The most important part of the state security is the military. Jiang, being a third generation leader, with no previous military experience, had a tough time in consolidating his position in the PLA. He was made CMC Chairman in 1989. Between 1989 and 1997, he made significant advances in securing control of the PLA. Starting from below, he tightened the lower levels of the military, laying emphasis on discipline. He ordered the military to give top priority to ideological and political education in the military. In the process, he had considerable input in devising new requirements. In brief, political and ideological work was to form the basis for Jiang's personality cult in the military.32 Central authority was also enhanced through organisational means. And, there was an increase in the economic supervision of the military, encapsulated by the "Four Regulations."33 A combination of political and ideological work along with economic supervision has been called Jiang's "dual-track" approach to control the Army.34

Jiang also appealed to the PLA's specific institutional interests. Budgetary increases for the PLA during his period were most visible in this regard. He, in various ways and at various times, had played to, and placated, the political commissars, the military-industrial complex, the defence science and technology establishment, military academies and other arms of the military.35 Apart from specific institutional interests, he also appealed to the individual interests, especially of senior Generals in the PLA. Senior Generals were given an increased role in the civilian affairs. He also promoted a number of officers (between 1993 and 1996) to the rank of General. By doing this, he apparently managed to gain support from many influential individuals in the military. Personnel changes in the military took place especially after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Measures were taken to remove those who had supported the Yang brothers. This process involved the biggest scale, the most personnel, and the widest range since the founding of the PRC.36 There were at least four major reshuffles during the period 1993-95. The changes gave Jiang an opportunity to place his own men in key positions. By 1996, all seven Military Region (MR) Commanders owed either their position or promotion to Jiang. People like Jhang Wannian, Yu Yongbo, Fu Quangyou and Chi Haotian continue to be very active in promoting the Jiang Zemin personality cult within the military.

Jiang's influence over foreign affairs is well known. This area is headed by the Leading Group for Foreign Affairs. Li Peng had been the Chairman of this group and hence had influence over foreign affairs. But, after Jiang became President in 1993, he took the initiative to establish himself as the most prominent figure in this area. By 1994, Li Peng had lost influence and Jiang had instead taken the lead in foreign affairs. Several well publicised trips abroad and attendance at regional forums indeed boosted his image. His recent famous trip to the United States established him as the PRC's most prominent face in the international arena. Apart from this, he also delivered a major speech at the hand over ceremony of Hong Kong. His January 1995 agenda-setting "Eight Point Plan" for Taiwan attracted much publicity.

Strictly speaking, discussions on Hong Kong and Taiwan are not classified as foreign affairs in the Chinese categorisation of the state. But the advance gained by a leader by having influence in this area is similar to that gained from foreign affairs.

Jiang's legitimacy as the supreme leader of China was dependent on several important strategies apart from what has been discussed above. First, his legitimacy involved the developing of ties with the revolutionary generation. He visited many of the old revolutionary areas and made efforts to appeal to different factions by praising many old revolutionaries like Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, Chen Yun, and others. He also built on his links with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Mao's influence was most pronounced in 1995 and 1996, which saw the publication of a Jiang speech on the "Twelve Relationships."37 He cleverly built up Deng's theoretical legitimacy with a campaign to study the theory of building "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The obvious corollary to this strategy resulted in the publication of documents on the theme of "patriotism" in 1994 that contained speeches of Mao, Deng and Jiang. Even the PLA's new guidelines in 1996 contained speeches and writings of these three leaders.

Second, linking Jiang with Mao and Deng was an inherent part of the personality cult. Another aspect was his "man of the people" image. He was presented as being concerned for the lives of the people. He was often portrayed as a likeable figure, often seen to be smiling, laughing and singing. The media also gave prominence to his policies and theoretical contributions. His image was particularly enhanced in the military media. He received more coverage in the media than other leaders. It may seem an exaggeration to say that the personality cult reached such proportion that it was believed to be fast surpassing that of Deng Xiaoping, and indeed, Chairman Mao. However, if one follows the publicity that he has gained so far, one may not be mistaken in accepting such a braggadocio.38

Jiang's position at the apex, ab-initio, rested on a thin foundation. This was not untrue, considering the fact that he owed his position to Deng. This was sufficient to create speculation, especially in the West, that the death of the patriarch would spark off a power struggle in Beijing. However, as the previous analysis shows, Jiang had worked very hard to create a power base independent of Deng and in due course of time even succeeded in creating all the types of power base that exist in the Chinese political system.39 Contrary to the popular fear, Deng's death allowed Jiang to more visibly serve as China's prominent leader. Conclusive evidence of the visibility was his serving as Chairman of the Deng Xiaoping funeral committee. He had the highly public role of delivering the eulogy at the memorial meeting for the patriarch, an occasion he used to express considerable emotion.

Even before Deng's death, there were signs that Jiang had been trying to establish his own "theoretical" line. It was quite distinct from that of his predecessors. It began with the concept of socialist market economy. Emphasis on planning, regional equality, agriculture and price stability was seen as de-Dengification.40 Jiang's new policy agenda initially came at a speech to the Central Party School three months after Deng's death and more recently at the Fifteenth Party Congress. He set out ideological justifications for his new ideas, reintroduced the concept of "primary stage of socialism." Though this concept was first introduced by Zhao Ziyang, he laid emphasis on "productive forces" that were expected to make China move away from a planned economy without endangering the concept of socialism. This was a marked departure from Zhao's line. His recent avowal of perfecting a "socialist market economy structure" is quite challenging. His new ideas elaborated at the Fifteenth Party Congress stressed on this line. He is mindful of the fact that his new line could produce large-scale social disruption. He has been trying to manage this through adoption of several hard-line policies.41

Overall Assessment

Jiang started power-base building efforts after he became the General Secretary of the Party. Success in this effort has considerably contributed to strengthening his position, especially after the death of Deng. He had several advantages. His mentor, Deng, was of greater help to him than to either Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang. Deng was reported to have told senior leaders like Li Peng and Yao Yilin to support and advise Jiang. It also should not be forgotten that Jiang has been in power at a time when the health of all elder leaders has been declining, thus making Jiang's efforts face few obstacles. His ability to master all methods important for creating a power base has been outstanding. Initially, he seemed to be a consummate politican, appearing to be all things to all the people. But this may not be mistaken as his weakness. The fact that he was a novice having negligible political or military experience does not mean that he is one who follows rather than leads. Through numerous actions, he has proved that he is willing to take the lead in almost every sphere of China's political system. His success in making the leaders of both the bureaucracy and the military beholden to him is sure enough sign that he is fast establishing himself as the paramount leader of China.

From a relatively anonymous figure not too long ago, Jiang has been successful in consolidating his position in the top echelons of the Chinese political system. It is now clear that he has gained the support of key officials and institutions. This is not to say that he has sufficient power to get his own way. However, there are apparently no rivals to him who can muster the breadth of support he now enjoys. With Li Peng's power diminishing and Zhu Rongji's rise, it may seem that the latter might pose a threat to him in the future. Yet it is difficult to predict so for the time being. Zhu certainly does not have as wide a base as Jiang and building a formidable base is a time-taking affair. They are also in the same age group. Considering all this, a future challenge from Zhu seems remote, though not impossible. The on-going search for a fourth generation leadership has put Hu Jintao as a front-runner. Jiang, in the future, may get a young rival in Hu. However, this is another story. His success in power-base building efforts is the most important reason for his confidence in pushing forward some intractable problems of the Chinese system. It is the consequences of these contentious policies, like the reform of SOEs, rather than the inner power struggle per se, that will test the strength of Jiang's position in the future.



1. Hindrances from outside being less demonstrates the fact that China is enjoying perhaps the best security environment since the foundation of the PRC. In the recent years it has not faced any real military threat. In the words of Colonel Xu Xiaojun of the PRC's Academy of Military Sciences, "There is no obvious danger of a major attack by any adversary. And the eruption of a world war or a major regional conflict which might threaten China's security is a far-away possibility. At present, there is not a single country in its neighbouring or surrounding areas which China should define as an antagonist." See Ralph A. Cossa, "The PRC's National Security Objectives in the Post-Cold War Era and the Role of the PLA," Issues and Studies, vol. 30, no. 9, September 1994, pp. 1-29.

2. Jiang's ineffectiveness in Shanghai reportedly earned him the nickname "flower pot." He devoted most of his energy to attending ribbon-cutting functions, going on well-publicised walkabouts, and giving long, empty speeches. See R.N. Shiele," A Portrait of a Powerful Man," Eastern Express, December 27, 1994.

3. A study of various attributes of personality-power relationships in modern China is quite interesting. For details, see Tang Tsou, "Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance of Power Politics or a Game to Win All?," The China Journal, no. 34, July 1995, pp. 154-55.

4. n. 3, p. 102.

5. In fact, a paramount leader like Deng Xiaoping also emphasised on the existence of a "core." He admitted that "there should be a core in any collective. A leadership without a core is unreliable." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)--89-136, July 18, 1989, p. 13.

6. Unlike Hu, the then top leaders of China, especially Mao and Deng, had been leaders of the revolution at various stages. For details of Hu's contribution, see Yang Zhongmei, Hu Yaobang: A Chinese Biography (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc.; 1988).

7. For a comprehensive overview of China's bureaucratic system, see Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 192-207.

8. Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," The China Journal, no. 34, July 1995, p. 11.

9. This distribution solves two purposes. It creates clients and shores up the position of loyalists. It also keeps existing clients. In China, an individual may have more than one client. It is thus important for the loyalists to be cultivated frequently. See Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reforms in China, (Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1993), pp. 87-90.

10. Relationships in China are dyadic. This means the loyalty of a network to one leader follows indirectly to another if the first leader supports the second. See, David Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in Dennis Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu eds., Chinese Military Modernisation, (London: Keegan Paul International; 1996), pp. 212-13.

11. Zhao recognised that those old folks should be respected and what they fear most should be ignored." See Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Paradoxical Post-Mao Transition: From Obeying the Leader to Normal Politics," The China Journal, no. 34, July 1995, pp. 82-83.

12. Frederick C. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession, (London: MacMillan, 1984), p. 94.

13. n. 9, p. 107.

14. Hua linked himself with Mao, mainly with the epithet: "With you in charge, I'm at ease." See Paul Cavey, "Building a Power-Base: Jiang Zemin and the Post-Deng Succession," Issues and Studies, vol. 33, no. 11, November 1997, p. 9.

15. The Statesman, March 17, 1998.

16. n. 14, p. 9.

17. For an interesting account of Jiang's exploits in Changchun, see Jasper Becker, "Long Road From Factory Worker to President," South China Monitoring Post International Weekly, May 25, 1996, p. 6.

18. Deng had also worked in a factory in France for a few months, but was heavily involved in political work. His work experience was very different from that of Jiang who worked as a specialist engineer.

19. Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 9, August 1993, p. 786.

20. It was commonly believed that Jiang and Li had established a very close working relationship.

21. R.N. Schiele, "A Portrait of a Powerful Man," Eastern Express, December 27, 1994.

22. "Jiang Zemin on Modernisation at Party Building Seminar" in FBIS-CHI-91-082, April 28, 1991.

23. "Leading Cadres Must Pay Attention to Politics" in FBIS-CHI-96-011, January 17, 1996.

24. "Communique to the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth CCPCC" in FBIS-CHI-94-189, September 1994.

25. "Jiang Zemin on Corruption," in FBIS-CHI-89-140, July 24, 1989.

26. n. 14, p. 11.

27. "Jiang Zemin Gives Speech on Mass Media Work" in FBIS-CHI-89-234, December 7, 1989.

28. n. 15.

29. "Jiang, Li Peng Inspect Beijing High-Tech Zone" in FBIS-CHI-92-097, May 19, 1992.

30. n. 14, pp. 12-15.

31. n. 14, p. 18.

32. "Regulations Promulgated on Army Political Work" in Summary of World Broadcasts (henceforth SWB)/FE/2321, June 5, 1995, g/9.

33. "How Does Jiang Control the Army?" in FBIS-CHI-95-057, March 24, 1995.

34. n. 33, p. 29.

35. n. 10, p. 214.

36. FBIS-CHI-92-241, December 15, 1992.

37. Mao had made a speech in 1956 on "On the Ten Major Relationships." For Mao's speech, see John K. Leung and Michael Y.M. Kan eds., The Writings of Mao Zedong: 1949-76, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1992), vol. II, pp. 43-66. For Jiang's speech, see, FBIS-CHI-95-195, October 10, 1995.

38. "Article View Jiang Zemin Personality Cult," South China Monitoring Post, February 15, 1995.

39. David Shambaugh explains in detail the steady ascendance of Jiang. See David Shambaugh, "Deng Xiaoping: The Politician," China Quarterly, no. 135, September 1993.

40. n. 14, pp. 22-23.

41. For details, see Jiang Zemin's Political Report at the Fifteenth Party Congress in SWB/FE/3023, September 13, 1997, S/1-10.