Indo-Israel Relations: An Evolutionary Perspective

Farah Naaz, Associate Fellow, IDSA

West Asia continues to occupy an imporant position in international relations due to its geo-political location, for the entire region acts as a link among the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Red Sea, Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean. The vast reserves of oil have perpetually attracted special interest from the Western powers particularly the United States (US). The West Asia policy of India had primarily been shaped by its friendly relations with the Arab countries and with a view to promote its national interests. Several factors were responsible for the formation of India's policy towards the Arab world. First, India and the Arab countries have got historical and cultural affinities. According to Galal El Rashidi, India's traditional opposition to imperialism, aggression, and forcible seizure of territory had strengthened its historic ties with the Arab countries.1 Second, India's relations with the Arabs were also influenced by the nature of its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan regarded itself as closer to West Asia and always tried to project India as anti Islamic. It was to counter this Pan-Islamic movement that India adopted a pro-Arab stance. Third, India had extensive commercial interests with these countries. With the industrial, technological, economic, and commercial developments, the importance of the area grew for India. Fourth, politically, India stood with the Arabs with regards to fighting for the liberation against Western imperialism, colonialism, exploitation, and racialism.

Even before independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of independent India, began cooperating with the Arab nationalists, and the Indian National Congress lent its support for the Arabs' struggle. The same consideration led India to extend its support to the Palestinian issue also. The Congress leaders, while sympathetic to the plight of Jews in Europe, were unresponsive to the idea of Israel. By the time the partition of Palestine became an issue in the United Nations (UN), India had adopted an anti- Israeli attitude and it was with this view that India opposed the partition of Palestine in the General Assembly in November 1947. When Israel came into existence in May 1948, India opposed the creation of the Jewish state and even voted against its creation.2 India regarded it as a theocratic state, which was set up with the backing of the imperialist powers. As Nehru noticed. "I must say that the USA government have handled the Palestine question with quite extraordinary ineptitude and opportunism."3 At other place he stated. "The fact that the USA and USSR and some other powers have hastened to recognise the State of Israel indicates that they will not look on and see the State crushed."4

India's support to Palestine was not on religious grounds but on the principle of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The Indian government refused to recognise Israel in the beginning despite its request. Nehru clarified, "The Government of India have received a request from this State of Israel for recognition. We propose to take no action in this matter at present. India can play no effective part in this conflict at the present stage either diplomatically or otherwise."5 He, however, did not rule out the possibility of its recognition in future in view of the changed circumstances. "this is not an irrevocable decision and the matter will no doubt be considered afresh in view of subsequent developments, including the final decision of the United Nations."6 Nehru made it clear that while Israel would be recognised as an entity, no diplomatic personnel would be exchanged.7 Outlining the overall policy he stated, "Our general policy in the past has been favourable to the Arabs and at the same time not hostile to the Jews. That policy continues."8

India also opposed the UN membership for Israel in 1949. It was only in September 1950, that India accorded a de jure recognition to Israel and permitted an Israeli Consulate to function in Bombay. It, however, placed travel restrictions on the Consular Staff.9 The recognition did not bring any change in Nehru's policy10 and India tried to maintain a studied aloofness from Israel.

As friendship with the Arab states was considered an essential requirement, Gamal Abdel Nasser became a trusted ally of India. He was considered secular and was also interested in espousing the doctrine of non-alignment, to keep Asia and Africa free from the super power alliances. During the Suez crisis in 1956, when Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal on July 26, Nehru publicly voiced support to Nasser. "The Egyptian nationalisation decision was precipitated by the Aswan Dam decision of the United States Government...The suddenness of the nationalisation decision and the manner in which it has been implemented may have contributed to the violent reactions. But the very terms of the nationalisation under the laws of Egypt are within the province of that government."11 The Israeli invasion of Sinai and the Anglo French attack on the canal zone, was denounced by India as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and all Indian political parties condemned it. India also co-sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly urging the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli troops from Egypt. The Suez crisis brought Indo-Israel relations to a low point. However, this attitude was not reciprocated by Nasser during the 1962 Indo-Chinese War when, instead of standing in favour of India, he served as an intermediary and advocated an immediate ceasefire.

A similar attitude was seen amongst other Arab countries. For example, in 1962, in a resolution in the UN pertaining to Kashmir, the Arab countries endorsed Pakistan's stance on the disputed area. In 1965, at the Casablanca Conference that followed the Indo-Pakistani War, several Arab states endorsed the Pakistani position. Hence, so far as India's quarrels with Pakistan were concerned, the Arab states did not give any support to India.

India supported the Arab position during the 1967 Arab Israeli War. Demonstrating sympathy for the Arab cause, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, M.C. Chagla said — "We have voiced our sincere and wholehearted sympathy for and solidarity with the Arab peoples in their hours of trial and tribulation."12 Putting the blame on Israel, he stressed, "While the crisis itself was under examination and consideration by the Security Council, Israel struck a lightning blow against its Arab neighbours...It is also a matter of record and deep regret to us that Israel has, through violations of General Armistice Agreements, strengthened its positions, added territory to its area, and used its modern powerful military machine to expel Arabs from their lands and homes. It has ignored United Nations resolutions and has been censured by the Security Council for violations of the General Armistice Agreements."13 However, all the opposition parties except the Communists and the Muslim League supported the Israeli position in 1967. Amongst them were the Swatantra Party and Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh maintained that most Arab states did not deserve special treatment at the expense of Israel and argued, about why India could maintain diplomatic relations with hostile states such as China and Pakistan but not with Israel.14

Later, Dinesh Singh, the minister of external affairs, reaffirmed India's continuation of its pro-Arab policy: "India had not established diplomatic relations with Israel because Israel had followed wrong policies against the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians. Until there was a revision of this policy it would be difficult for India to revise her policy."15

The bad experience at the Rabat Conference also did not deter the Indian government from following a pro-Arab policy. The Rabat Conference of Islamic leaders that was convened on September 23 and 24, 1969, to condemn Israel for the burning and destruction of the Al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem, caused acute embarrassment to New Delhi. When the Indian delegation reached Rabat to attend the conference, the information minister of Rabat conveyed that Pakistan and a few other countries had objected to the Government of India's participation in the conference and pleaded that they—either voluntarily withdraw from the conference or accept the status of observer or remain physically absent from the conference without withdrawing from it.16 They were even refused entry to the conference hall. The conference met without any representation of India and adopted a final declaration which made a reference in its preamble to the representatives of the Muslim community in India being present at the conference which was contrary to the facts. All this had a very undesirable influence on the Government of India and the displeasure could be felt in Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed's (who led the delegation) statemen: "The Government and people of India deplore the discourtesy shown by the Conference in not honouring its own invitation which had been extended unanimously to the Government of India."17

Arab indifference towards India continued during the Bangladesh crisis. When Pakistan was conducting its repression in East Bengal in 1971, the Arab states were noticeably silent. Many members of Parliament criticised this attitude of certain Arab countries. Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh admitted the lukewarm attitude of the Arab countries, but stressed that India's relations with the West Asian countries remain warm and friendly. "Our relations were established not only at the political and cultural planes but led to a growing economic exchange between us, which has been of mutual benefit. No passing feeling of disappointment should mar these close relations which are in our mutual interest."18 It was the economic and political resources of over 130 million Arabs compared to those possessed by three million Israelis, that drove India to conduct its West Asia policy with a practical approach.

In continuation of its policy, India expressed its support for Egypt and Syria, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Though they had launched a coordinated attack on Israel, the Indian government blamed Israel for encouraging the Arab countries to do so as Israel had refused to vacate the territories occupied by force. "The Government have consistently declared that the cause of the tension in the area is due to Israeli aggression and refusal to vacate territories occupied by armed force. Our sympathies are entirely with the Arabs whose sufferings have long reached a point of explosion."19 Swaran Singh later revealed in his speech in the Rajya Sabha that India also offered some material support to the Arab friends and that medicines and doctors were supplied to both Egypt and Syria.20

The 1973 oil crisis led to the worldwide oil shortage. As a result, India's dependence on the oil producing states grew in the 1970s and 1980s. The two way trade between India and the Arab states also compelled India to take a liberal stand towards the Arab countries. The Palestinian cause too assumed great importance. In an attempt to win friends in the Arab world, India sought punitive sanctions against Israel in the UN and supported the participation of the PLO (Palestine liberation Organisation) in international meetings, including vigorous endorsement of the PLO's bid for observer status at the UN in 1974. India joined as a co-sponsor of General Assembly Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism in November 1975, and it also became the first non-Arab government to extend formal diplomatic accreditation to the representative of the PLO in January 1975.

The Janata government which came to power in 1977, wanted to develop diplomatic relations with Israel but could not afford to antagonise the Arabs. It was with this purpose, that the then Prime Minister Morarji Desai secretly invited Moshe Dayan in January 1979.21 Desai later admitted: "I could not invite Mr. Dayan officially because there was no diplomatic relations between the two countries and so I told the middlemen that if General Dayan wanted to come, he could come in a different way so that he was not recognised."22 Dayan had talks with Morarji Desai and Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee to obtain India's consent for the establishment of full diplomatic relations, with the embassy located in New Delhi or to upgrade the Israeli consulate in Bombay to consulate general and shift it to New Delhi.23 Taking the Arabs into consideration, Desai insisted that Israel must first vacate the Arab territories. As this was not acceptable to Israel, the negotiations fell through.

When the Congress came back to power in 1980, it stuck to the policy of continued support to the Arabs and the demand of the Palestinians for the vacation of areas occupied by Israel. It did not leave any opportunity to criticise Israel; for example, in July 1982, the Israeli Consul in Bombay Yosef Hasseen made a statement in a newspaper interview: "There was a strong Muslim Arab lobby in New Delhi and the Arab ambassador was making use of Indian Muslims to bring pressures to bear on the Government."24 He also opined that Israel was getting a bad Press in India because the Press was following the official line and that India was competing with Pakistan to impress the Arabs. All this was considered objectionable by the Indian government and the Israeli consul was expelled.

The expulsion was severely criticised by the opposition parties who maintained a pro-Israeli stand. For example, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) vice-president, Ram Jethmalani, called it an uncivilised act and suggested that the better option was to request the appointing state to recall the diplomat.25

Later, Subramanyam Swamy, deputy leader of the Janata Party, pleaded with the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and to take the initiative in bringing about a settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.26 His plea was turned down by the then External Affairs minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao. This policy continued through out the 1980s and was often repeated. The Union finance minister, N.D. Tiwari assured that, "India is not going to change its policy towards Israel under any threat of a cut in US assistance. The country has remained steadfast in opposition to the Zionist state."27

However, during the late 1980s, the shift in India's foreign policy started showing. First, the Israeli request for a new nominee to the post of consul in Bombay was accepted by the Indian officials.28 In June 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met a leading Jewish lobbyist in New York at US Congressman Stephen Solarz's request, and the meeting culminated in the appointment of a fresh Israeli consul in Bombay in a long unfilled vacancy. Since then, the Israeli government launched a carefully orchestrated diplomatic campaign to influence the Government of India to have diplomatic relations with Israel. The campaign included selective leaks to foreign wire services, applications for tourist visas by Israeli diplomats and informal agreements by business organisations of both the countries.29 Second, during the special session convened in Geneva, the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, K.K. Tiwari, headed the Indian delegation. Despite the event of the Palestinian uprising and the denial of a visa by the US to the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to address the General Assembly in New York, Tiwari refrained from denouncing Israel. On the other hand, he recognised Israel's right to live in peace by saying, "The fundamental issues involved in the peace process were the attaining of the Palestinian people of their inalienable right to self determination and the recognition that all states in the region including the states of Palestinians, and Israel and other neighbours, have the right to live in peace and security within internationally recognised borders."30

Third, the Soviet Union too gave indications that it would normalise its relations with Israel. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky informed that Moscow would initiate the process of normalisation of relations with Tel Aviv as soon as the international peace conference was set in motion.31

Fourth, a high level Israeli Foreign Ministry official, Joseph Hadass, visited India on an invitation from Indian authorities. In order to avoid controversy, the visit was described as a tourist visit by the Indian official spokesman and not officially connected to Israel.32

In another development, a three member delegation of the American Jewish Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of B'nai B'rith, met officials at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in India. The meeting took place with P.V. Narasimha Rao, minister for external affairs, Alfred Gonsalves, secretary, MEA and P.K. Singh, joint secretary, MEA.33 This meeting was described as the highest level meeting on Indian soil after Moshe Dayan's visit a decade earlier.

Also, at the end of 1988, the PLO had recognised Israel's right to exist, the US had started talking to the PLO and there were pressures on India to open up to Israel.

In January 1992, India and Israel had another highest level meeting in Washington, between Joseph Hadass, and Lalit Mansingh, the Deputy Chief of Mission in India.34 This was followed by India's announcement on January 29, 1992, to establish full diplomatic ties with Israel. "All normal communications between the two countries would now be open."35 India announced it decision in less than 24 hours before Narasimha Rao left for New York for the UN Security Council Summit but Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit denied any link between the two events. It is worth noting that the decision was taken after consultations with a cross section of Opposition leaders, including L.K. Advani.36

There had been several considerations for normalisation. Firstly, there was an urgent need for better relations with America which had emerged as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. India became vulnerable to the US pressure due to its influence in the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank. Developing relations with Israel would be an important gesture that could clear the way for closer economic cooperation with Washington.

Secondly, the fear of religious extremism in the subcontinent also brought the two countries together. In this context, Pakistan has been an important reference, for it has carried on its propaganda in a sustained manner against India in the West Asian and North African states in order to establish an Islamic bloc and to internationalise the Kashmir, issue. Also, India's friendship with the Arab States did not help it during crises. On the other hand, India was attacked on the Kashmir issue by a number of Islamic nations. It was argued that India could cooperate with Israel in order to counter this danger.

Thirdly, the main Opposition parties who maintained a pro-Israeli stand, kept a constant pressure on the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. From the BJP side Pramod Mahajan spearheaded this demand. He was supported by Yashwant Sinha (Samajwadi Janata Party) while Subramanyam Swamy (Janata Party) and R.K. Karanja (nominated) wanted a more humane approach towards Israel. Pramod Mahajan pointed out that both China and Pakistan had occupied large parts of Indian territory, yet there were full diplomatic links with them.37 Yashwant Sinha maintained that India's foreign policy should be based on national interest. By being pro Arab all these years, India was not able to get the support of the Arab countries during critical times and that most of these countries had been consistently pro-Pakistani.38

Fourthly, India wanted to be involved in the Middle East peace talks and the US and Israel had made it clear that it required full diplomatic relations with the latter.39

Lastly, while India insisted on its long standing support for the Palestinian cause, it believed that there were big advantages in developing closer ties with Israel, which include cooperation in the spheres of agriculture, industry, trade, science and technology and defence.

Areas of Cooperation

Political

The relations between the two countries have been progressing at the governmental level. Indian visitors to Israel included the chief ministers of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Haryana. Many industrialists and businessmen also visited Israel. The visit of the Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres gave further impetus to bilateral cooperation in various fields. During his visit, it was decided that both the countries would fork out $1.5 million each to pursue joint research and development activities for civilian purposes.40 A joint committee comprising industrialists and scientists to select the best proposals for joint research and development was also to be formed.

The visit of President Ezer Weizman of Israel was the first ever visit to New Delhi by the head of the state of Israel, at the end of 1996.41 At that time, four agreements were signed between the two countries that deal with industry, agriculture, arts and culture.

Trade

The two governments have assisted in creating a highly deal- friendly environment for the development of business. Considerable progress has been achieved in trade relations since 1992, with an annual average of 50 per cent growth. In 1990- 91, the total trade was worth $130 million. In 1992, it was $200 million. In 1996, it increased to $600 million, and by 1997, it was over $700 million.42 Indian exports to Israel consist of gems, jewellery, marble, electronic components, handicrafts and engineering goods. Diamonds and cotton yarn constitute 76 per cent of the exports.43 The balance of trade has been in Israel's favour due to India's large imports of rough diamonds and chemicals. India also imports telecom components and medical equipment besides other items. At the governmental level, India and Israel have concentrated on establishing the legal framework for trade and economic cooperation. During Foreign Minister Peres' visit to India, India and Israel signed four agreements and two Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on culture, tourism, aviation, science and technology, foreign office consultations and economic cooperation. This was followed by an agreement on co-operation in agriculture, science and technology, including research and training.44 This was followed by the signing of an agreement on trade and economic cooperation in December 1994,45 which granted MFN (Most Favoured Nation) status to each other and cleared the way for import of Indian goods to Israel without import permits, except for goods where such permits are required from all countries under Israeli custom's regulations.

During January 1996, Israeli Finance Minister Avraham B. Shochat and Indian Finance Minister Manmohan Singh signed agreements on Avoidance of Double Taxation, Bilateral Investment Protection and Customs Cooperation.46 Surface transportation links between India and Israel have also been developed with Shipping Corporation of India vessels stopping over at Haifa port and the Israeli Shipping Line.

Agriculture

There is great potential for cooperation in the agricultural field since there is considerable interest in India in technologies developed in Israel in sprinkler and drip irrigation systems, greenhouses, hybrid seeds, tissue culture, dry land farming, etc. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992, more than 50 joint venture agricultural projects were initiated in India in the fields of irrigation and water management, fertilisers, greenhouses, tissue culture horticulture, use of solar energy, animal husbandry and dairy development.47 Indo Israeli joint ventures have been established in India for the manufacture of drip irrigation systems and similar joint ventures have been established for floriculture and horticulture.

A new chapter in Indo-Israeli cooperation began when President Weizman laid the foundation stone for a $two million joint research and demonstration farm project at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI). Other projects which were initiated wer: cotton demonstration farm in Akola in Maharashtra between the state government and Agridev of Israel; a project between Punjab Agro-Industries Corporation and Ozcot company of Israel which will expedite the Israeli input flow among the farmers of Punjab for quality high yielding cotton farming. Recently, the Israel Dairy Board and Punjab government signed an MOU in Israel to establish the Modern Satellite Dairy Farm in Punjab.48

Science and Technology (S&T)

A bilateral S&T cooperation agreement was signed during Peres' visit in May 1993.49 A detailed work plan was finalised in September 1993, identifying specific areas for cooperation, namely biotechnology, advanced materials, lasers, electro-optics and information technology. In November 1994, during the visit of Shulamit Aloni, the Israeli minister for communications and S&T, to India, the two governments initialled an agreement setting up a S&T fund with $3 million, with equal contributions by both the governments to facilitate joint R&D projects. The work plan is under implementation. An agreement has also been signed between the Indian Science Academy and the Israel National Academy of Science and Humanities providing for regular cooperation and exchanges in the field of S&T.50

Culture and Tourism

Agreements on cooperation in culture and education and tourism were signed during Peres' visit in May 1993.51 This was followed by the finalisation of the detailed Cultural Exchange Programme (CEP) in September 1993. The second CEP was signed during President Weizman's visit in December 1996.52 There were also agreements for the exchange of scholars between Indian and the Israeli universities. Various tourism promotion activities as well as the number of Israeli tourists visiting India have also increased steadily.

Defence

A common front against religious extremism makes the defence cooperation between India and Israel all the more important. India is exploring Israeli defence equipment which includes weapons systems as well as support equipment such as radar, electronic warfare equipment and a range of engineering items in border fencing. Israel's experience of fighting in the desert areas can also be of benefit to India.

Exchanges of defence delegations have been steadily increasing. Among the Indian officials who visited Israel were Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Secretary A.P.J. Abul Kalam Azad, Chief of Air Staff, S.K. Sareen, and then Defence Minister Sharad Pawar. The Israeli naval chief and air chief were among the Israeli officials who visited India.53

Conclusions

India's attitude towards Israel has been guided more by diplomatic prudence rather than moral basis. It is for this reason that India extended a de jure recognition to Israel and left open the option for full recognition, as the situation demanded. G.S. Bhargava has pointed out that, during Suez aggression, Nehru did not display severe criticism of Israel. "Nehru who spearheaded the campaign against the refrained from severe criticism Suez aggression—fully reflecting the Indian opinion in the matter—had singled out Britain, a Commonwealth partner, for criticism. Towards Israel he was sorry than angry There was no anti-Israeli animus in the Indian denunciation of the aggression."54 Informal dealings continued between India and Israel and Israeli officials were not debarred from visiting India. For example, Moshe Sharett who was the foreign minister of Israel during the Mapai days came to India twice in 1950s. It cannot be ignored that when he came to India the second time, his Mapai Party was in government, and Israel along with Britain and France carried out aggression against the Suez canal in 1957.55 Besides this, Igal Alon, a member of the Israeli cabinet came to India in 1969 and Moshe Dayan in 1979.56

After the 1967 Arab Israeli War, the Palestinian movement passed into the hands of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Al Fatah faction. In the changed circumstances, India adopted an activist approach and became pronouncedly pro-PLO and anti-Israel. "The situation had undergone a qualitative change in the subsequent years. Instead of benign neglect of Tel Aviv, there was open hostility or at least declaration of it, very often to please extremist Arab opinion. India had joined the Arab Israeli cold war, as a veritable belligerent."57 Even the Janata government, which was pro-Israel, could not afford to ignore the Arabs. The examples of India's pro- PLO stance included-frequent visits of the PLO delegates to India, India's active support to the PLO in the UN General Assembly in the post-1973 War period, recognition of the PLO in 1975, India's decision to accord full diplomatic status to the PLO in March 1980, India's harsh reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, and setting up of a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Committee in Palestine.58

The late 1980s saw a softening of India's stance towards Israel and by the beginning of the 1990s, its policy towards Israel became clear, India's permission for refuelling of the American planes during the Gulf war in January 1991, was seen as an important development in this direction. It was Narasimha Rao government which completed the process of normalisation between India and Israel in order to bring its policy is accordance with the international situations.

The very policy of first not recognising Israel and then to normalise relations later, indicated careful pragmatism on India's part. Justifying India's not recognising Israel, Nehru had said, "Following up recognition of Israel at its inception with establishment of relations would have been acceptance of the political 'facts of life'—nothing more. It had not been done because of the then prevailing situation, at home and abroad."59 Now the compulsions led to the realisation that nothing would be gained in holding back. As F.J. Khergamwala rightly puts, "Establishing diplomatic relations with Israel is by no stretch of imagination a foreign policy initiative and certainly not a historical step. It is a decision of resignation."60

India and Israel took a fresh look at each other and found substantial interaction in various fields ranging from economic, agricultural, scientific to defence. Now that India has opened up its economy, it would be worthwhile to enhance the level of co-operation in agriculture and industry too. Israel's economy would get an outlet to the rich markets of East and South East Asia through India. Similarly, India would also benefit from Israel's technology and expertise in dry land farming and drip irrigation system besides other spheres. Both countries have gained a lot from each other but Israel's "substantial gain is release from the ostracism from which it was suffering and which was imposed on it by many countries of the world."61

"The smooth pace with which normalisation has proceeded has rewarded Israeli patience and caused Indians to question why they had delayed completing the process for so long?"62 The normalisation has paid the Indian government well and is likely to benefit it in future too.

 

NOTES

1. Cited in Virendra Grover, ed., Introduction to International Relations and India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1992), p. 613.

2. Fahmida Ashraf, "Indo- Israeli Relations", Strategic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1-2, Autumn and Winter 1993, p. 100.

3. G. Parthasarthy, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947- 1964, vol. I, 1947-49 (London: Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 126.

4. Ibid., p. 128.

5. Quoted in, Ibid., n.3, p. 128.

6. Ibid., p. 275.

7. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961) pp. 414-415.

8. Parthasarthy, n. 3, p. 275.

9. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "The Indo- Israeli Nexus", Regional Studies, vol. 12,no. 3, Summer 1994, p. 3.

10. G. Parthasarthy, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Minister 1947- 1964, vol. II, 1950-52, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.217.

11. The prime minister on the Suez Canal issue, August 8, 1956, in, A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947- 72, vol. II, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.381.

12. Speech by M. C. Chagla, Indian minister of external affairs in the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on June 21, 1967 on the West Asian crisis, in, Ibid., p. 361.

13. Ibid., pp. 361-362.

14. For details see, Arthur G. Rubinoff, "Normalisation of India- Israel Relations—Stillborn for Forty Years", Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 5, May 1995, pp. 496-497.

15. Address delivered by Dinesh Singh, minister of external affairs, May 27, 1969, in, Appadorai, n. 11, p.369.

16. Ibid., p. 371.

17. Ibid., p. 372.

18. Statement by Swaran Singh, minister of external affairs, Lok Sabha, April 26, 1972, in Krishan Gopal and Kokila K. Gopal, West Asia and North Africa: A Documentary Study of Major Crisis 1947-78, (New Delhi : V. I. Publications, 1981), p.135.

19. Statement by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on the eruption of fighting in West Asia, October 7, 1973, in, Ibid., pp. 145-46.

20. Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh's speech in the Rajya Sabha in reply to the debate, December 6, 1973, in Ibid., pp. 153-54.

21. As revealed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in, Hindustan Times, May 15, 1980.

22. National Herald, May, 17, 1980.

23. Hindustan Times, May 15, 1980.

24. Times of India, April 3, 1982.

25. Hindustan Times, July 10, 1982.

26. Indian Express, November 26, 1982.

27. Patriot, August 28, 1987.

28. News Times, June 11, 1988.

29. The Hindu, January 6, 1989.

30. National Herald, December 18, 1988.

31. Ibid.

32. The Statesman, December 28, 1988.

33. The Hindu, January 6, 1989.

34. Times of India, January 11, 1992.

35. Times of India, January 30, 1992.

36. Ibid.

37. The Statesman, November 26, 1991.

38. Financial Express, November 28, 1991.

39. Times, January 21, 1992.

40. Hindustan Times, May 19, 1993.

41. India Israel Relations, Israel Today, vol. 3 no. 5, September- October, 1997. P. 8.

42. Indo-Israel Trade, Ibid., p12.

43. India Israel Relations, Ibid., p.9.

44. Nuri, n. 9, p. 24.

45. Indo-Israel Main Bilateral Agreements, n. 41, p11.

46. Deccan Herald, January 30, 1996.

47. Indo-Israel Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture, n. 41, p. 13.

48. Ibid., p. 13.

49. Ibid., p. 11.

50. India-Israel Relations, UNI Backgrounder, undated,(New Delhi: United News of India) p. 8.

51. Indo-Israel Main Bilateral Agreements, n. 41, p. 11.

52. Ibid., p. 19.

53. A.K. Pasha, "India and Israel: Great Leap Forward", Third Concept, vol. 10, no. 120, February 1997, p. 12.

54. G.S. Bhargava,( Bhargava was the principal information officer of the Government of India's Press Information Bureau in the late 1970s during the days of the Janata Party rule at the centre), "Dealing with Israel", Mainstream, vol. 30, no. 17, February 15, 1992, p. 21.

55. Ibid.

56. Telegraph, November, 11, 1992.

57. Bhargava, n. 54.

58. Bansidhar Pradhan, "India's Policy Towards the PLO", in, Riaz Punjabi and A.K. Pasha, ed., India and the Islamic World, (New Delhi : Radiant Publishers, 1998), pp. 66-67.

59. Quoted in Bhargava, n. 54.

60. F.J. Khergamwala, "India Israel Ties : Who Gains What?", Mainstream,vol. 30, no. 17, February 15, 1992, p. 3.

61. Nuri, n. 9, p. 45.

62. Rubinoff, n. 14, p. 505.