An Integrated And Joint Approach Towards Defence Intelligence

Vinod Anand, Senior Fellow, IDSA

 

Knowledge is power, so said the sages of yore. Whether one delves into the sayings of Kautilya or Sun Tzu, information and knowledge has always been used as a weapon and it is the most potent tool for carrying out business of the State. In the military sense, knowledge about an adversary’s or potential adversary’s warfighting capabilities, limitations and his intentions, assumes greater significance in order to degrade his strengths and exploit his weaknesses. Over the ages the means of collecting intelligence have diversified from purely human resources to hi-tech means of the present age. The nature, conduct and character of warfare and conflict has been continuously changing. This naturally has an impact on the requirements of intelligence, sources of intelligence and organisations required for collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence.

In a larger sense intelligence could be categorised into strategic and tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence would generally be intelligence required at the national level to prosecute national policy. It would be required by decision-makers at the government level and high-level military commanders for putting into effect national strategy and military strategy. Tactical intelligence, in the military sense, would be related to acquiring field or combat intelligence required by a military commander to achieve success in operations. Tactical intelligence would involve obtaining information about enemy’s troop strengths, movements, equipment, dispositions and many other attributes. However, with the advance in technology, the extent and depth of battlefield has been expanding rapidly. There have been tremendous improvements in the fields of communications and weapon systems with long ranges. At times, the distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence may become blurred.

Our Defence Forces have been entrusted with the mission of providing security from external aggression as well as assist in the management of internal security. The requirement of timely and accurate intelligence by the armed forces is absolutely essential if they have to carry out their assigned missions efficiently and successfully. It is not only that intelligence would be required in the military field, but also there would be a range of subjects, which contribute to military potential of the adversary about which intelligence would be required. It would cover subjects like enemy’s economic strength, defence and industrial infrastructure, communication and transport systems, political leadership, scientific and technical prowess, sociological, cultural and geographical factors and so on. Thus, the mission of our intelligence agencies would be to support defence planning and operations and contribute to national security through a coordinated effort by the entire intelligence community.

What has been the experience of our intelligence set-up since 52 years of our independent existence? Various intelligence agencies and organisations have gone through an evolutionary process. Though, there have been many intelligence failures which have been highlighted in the media and otherwise, the success stories have been very few and far between. Intelligence failures about capabilities and intentions of the adversary during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the Indo-Pak War of 1965 are well known. During the 1971 war, the success of the intelligence organisations could be attributed to the long preparation time we had before outbreak of hostilities. We did not fare very well on the intelligence front in Operation Pawan, that is, peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka in 1987. The Kargil episode has been a monumental intelligence failure; the lessons from this debacle cannot be overlooked.

Existing Intelligence Structure

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is the oldest organisation. However, it had a legacy from British times of having been used against the nationalist movement. IB had been given the task of both external and internal intelligence till R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing) was formed in 1967 after the intelligence debacles of 1962 and 1965. Not much importance has been given to Military Intelligence; the main function assigned to the military hierarchy was field security. Lieutenant General Thorat had suggested that officers from the armed forces be sent abroad on undercover assignments with the aim of building a network of defence intelligence officers. It had been decided by the Government in mid 1950s to set up a Defence Intelligence Organisation to coordinate intelligence from all the Services and to advise the Chiefs of Staff.1 The plan was later shelved due to shortage of funds and bureaucratic road blocks. Thus Military Intelligence (a common term used for Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence) developed and grew more as a field security service rather than as an external agency. Except for obtaining tactical intelligence, Defence Forces had to rely on other intelligence agencies for both external and internal intelligence having a direct bearing on their roles and missions. This resulted in poor coordination, lack of comprehension of requirements of Defence Forces, poor quality of intelligence products, lack of relevant strategic intelligence and lack of economy of effort.

R A W, as mentioned earlier, came into being in 1967-68 with the charter of acquiring intelligence related to external developments having a bearing on national security and thereafter its dissemination to relevant consumers like MEA (Ministry of External Affairs), MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) MHA and Defence Services, NSCS (National Security Council Secretariat) and IB. It depends upon HUMINT (human intelligence) and TECHINT (technical intelligence). For imagery intelligence (IMINT), it has Aviation Research Centre (ARC) which is equipped to take photographs. IMINT is provided to the Army on demand. RAW also collects electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communication intelligence (COMINT) about international telecommunication systems and military communications network of countries of interest. The dissemination of intelligence thus gained is forwarded to the concerned consumers such as NSCS, Defence Services and IB. The specific requirements of consumers determine the targets for ELINT, COMINT and IMINT.

As far as IB is concerned, its charter is to monitor internal security situation and acquire intelligence on developments within the country having a bearing on national security. Defence Forces, especially the Army, which has been continuously involved in counter insurgency operations, and aid to civil authorities in various kinds of situations needs timely, appropriate and actionable intelligence from IB to execute its allotted tasks. IB relies mainly on HUMINT and has a limited COMINT capability for interception of signal messages.

Para-military forces like BSF have their own limited intelligence set-ups for obtaining information in their area of operations.

The three Services of the Defence Forces have their own intelligence directorates, which organise and plan for intelligence acquisition relevant to their specific Services. Army has Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI); Navy and Air Force have Directorates of Naval Intelligence (DNI); and Air Force Intelligence (DAI). They are responsible for collection and dissemination of military intelligence. They co-ordinate and supervise the work of Indian defence attaches abroad and also deal with foreign military attaches in India. The respective Directorates liaise with each other, RAW, IB and other intelligence community for co-ordination.

There are Signal Intelligence units placed under DGMI, which provide SIGINT to all the three Services. There is Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) which looks after the imagery needs to the Services. However, its capabilities are limited to providing satellite photographs of 5.8-meter resolution. The requirements for Defence purposes would be satellite images of metre/submetre resolution. With the availability of IRS-IC/ID, that is Indian Remote Sensing satellite with 5.8 metre resolution, it is possible to detect linear objects like canals, Ditch-cum-Bunds, railway lines and air fields with greater accuracy. With one metre resolution becoming available, the capability for acquiring tactical intelligence would also improve substantially.2

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which had the task of coordinating the intelligence at the highest level has been converted to the secretariat of the National Security Council. Whether, this arrangement would create more problems rather than solve them in the field of integrated intelligence, only time will show. The erstwhile JIC and now NSCS has no primary collection resource but it receives the inputs from various intelligence agencies and prepares reports which would help in policy formulations and address issues having vital bearing on national security. It is a well known fact that JIC has not been able to achieve its missions because of rivalry among intelligence agencies, tendency of certain intelligence agencies like RAW and IB to report direct to PMO or political bosses first and keep JIC oblivious of vital intelligence inputs required by the consumer for urgent action. This is more apparent with regard to inputs required by Defence Services.

Integrational Weakness

A Divisional Commander during Operation Pawan 1987 commenting on the integrational weakness had noted, "despite four decades of independence, three decades of insurgency, five wars and a continuum of a series of security crises, integration of intelligence agencies, their optimum exploitation, harmonious functioning and complementarity have still remained a far cry, instead of making them a war cry."3 This is in line with our strategic culture of status quo or passivity as many foreign analysts like George Tanham have observed. One can hope that our intelligence community evolves an ‘Intelligence Doctrine’, the universal principles and tenets of which are, centralisation, relevance, timeliness, responsiveness, continuous review, source protection and so on.4

On IPKF operations, Lt. Gen SC Sardeshpande had this to say; "We heard little from the representatives of RAW. Perhaps RAW saw us not quite ripe to deserve sharing their findings. As events forced themselves from mid-1989 onwards, we differed with their assessment, sometimes radically, as our faculties remained glued to the ground wave. They seemed to permit themselves the luxury of over enthusiasm, over optimism and virtues of meeting other demands better known to them. Our ‘pulse’ of the people proved right in the end. Intelligence inputs from agencies depend predominantly on their perceptions as well as insight and the milieu in which they operate. Contributions from RAW and IB and the Indian High Commission were limited and seldom helped us."5 One wonders whether the recent controversy (July-August 2000) on cease-fire offer by Hizbul Mujahideen and thereafter its cancellation was due to over-enthusiasm and over-optimism by the concerned intelligence agencies. It is also not known whether any co-ordination with military intelligence was carried out.

Jaswant Singh, the present Minister for External Affairs, in his book Defending India has remarked on the politicisation of intelligence agencies and their lack of accountability. He states thus, "Intelligence agencies were earlier needed and employed as instruments of control, as extension of the interests of the state from ancient to British to an independent India…But accountability, and by derivation, loyalty remains fixedly with the wielders of state power alone…they are answerable only to the political masters of the day."6 He further goes on to add that an unintended but debilitating consequence of all this has been a crippling of the professional competence of India’s entire intelligence apparatus. The agencies tend to shy away from accountability.

Mr. K. Subramanyam, Chairman of the Kargil Review Committee and a well-known defence analyst, on the other hand, has observed that, "the Indian political elite has not appreciated the role of intelligence as an effective tool in policy-making and governance and the intelligence organisations and armed forces forming a common front to safeguard national security. They have allowed turf battles to develop among them to detriment of the interests of both."7

There has generally been a lack of relevant strategic intelligence inputs being provided to the Defence Forces. A former RAW Chief, Mr. Sankaran Nair, recounting an intelligence failure in 1971 has observed that "The only time (Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw) came out with some of his fruity expressions was when our Intelligence lost track of 7 Division from Peshawar (Pakistan’s Strike Force), on its march to our border—a lapse undoubtedly."8 If there was a double check by Military Intelligence and the matters handled independently, perhaps this intelligence failure would not have occurred. Reliance on one agency for intelligence is against the basic principle of corroboration. Military intelligence, so far, functions within a very limited charter and suffers a number of inadequacies.

There is a need to have a fresh look at the functioning and organisations for military intelligence. Within the Defence Services, the emphasis has to be on optimising the functioning of Intelligence agencies of the three Services, achieving economy of effort and using intelligence as a force multiplier. Apparently, Military Intelligence (MI), for instance, Intelligence Corps would never occupy the same pride of place that is given to arms like Infantry, Armoured Corps or Artillery. On the other hand, Moshe Dayan, in his autobiography, observed about the role of Israeli Intelligence thus, "the role of intelligence has been as important as that of air force or the armoured corps." Thus, while formulating our military strategy, future force structures and Five-year Defence Plans we need to factor in the requirements of MI. More attention paid to MI during peace and war would save much more lives during actual combat and make the differences between success and failures. Needless to say that the role of intelligence is as important as combat power.

Need for Defence Intelligence Agency

As early as 1989, Arun Singh, a former Minister of State for Defence had pointed out that "The present intelligence structure of the three Services is grossly inadequate when a holistic approach to this vital component is essential. A Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) will be responsible for the collation and analysis of defence related intelligence and the Director General will be responsible for tasking the individual Service directorates and presenting a comprehensive analysis to Chiefs of Staff Committee."9 Even Kargil Review Committee (KRC) has recommended formation of a DIA. It has argued that in most advanced countries the Armed Forces have a Defence Intelligence Agency with a significant intelligence collection capability. Commenting on the functioning of ARC, it observes, "The Army makes six-monthly indents and, wherever necessary, special indents on ARC. These indents and their prioritisation depend on the nature of threat perception which, in turn, is shaped by inputs from RAW. This circular process entails Army having to depend upon inputs from RAW for its own threat assessment."10 Therefore, entrusting the building up of threat perception to one agency only is against the principles of intelligence. KRC has decried ‘the virtual monopoly of RAW in this regard.’ It has also passed strictures on the imprudence of allowing one agency alone with multifarious capabilities of human, communication, imagery and electronic intelligence. A DIA with expanded role would provide double checks, adequate redundancy and provide safeguards against the failure ad shortcomings of one intelligence agency.

In the USA, the National Security Agency (NSA) has two principal missions: designing cipher systems that will protect the integrity of US information systems and searching for weaknesses in adversaries systems and codes. It coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialised activities to protect US information systems and produce foreign intelligence information. It is a high technology organisation, which is on the frontiers of communication and data processing. It deals with SIGINT and has many success stories to its credit. All the COMINT and SIGINT efforts of the USA are grouped under one single organisation of NSA. NSA is one of several elements of the intelligence community administered by Department of Defence (DOD).11

The DIA of USA (came into being in October 1961) is the primary producer of foreign military intelligence (in contrast to the Indian intelligence system). It fulfils a critically important need for a central intelligence manager for DOD to support the requirements of the Secretary of Defence the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military forces, as well as other policy makers.12 Prior to DIA, respective military departments separately collected, produced and disseminated intelligence for their individual use. The system proved duplicative, costly, and ineffective as each Service provided their estimates to the consumers. The DOD intelligence responsibilities remained unclear, co-ordination poor and products lacked dependability and national focus. These flaws are more noticeable in our intelligence system. DIA removed most of the flaws noticed in the earlier intelligence set-up.

A similar set-up was forced upon British Military Intelligence in 1964 with the creation of single unified Defence Staff. The former Admiralty, the War Office and Air Ministry were abolished and merged into Ministry of Defence (MOD), the separate department’s then became known as MOD (Navy), MOD (Army) and MOD (RAF). Their intelligence organisations were also merged along with Joint Intelligence Board (which was responsible for obtaining scientific and TECHNIT) to form Defence Intelligence Staff.13 This need was felt due to earlier failures of attempts to unify the collation, analysis and dissemination of strategic intelligence due to the turf battles and parochialism of the three Services. Do we want to learn from our erstwhile mentors? We are almost forty years behind in restructuring our intelligence set-up. Not only do we not learn from failures of others, we also persist in not learning from our own failures. Will Kargil episode move our policy makers to restructure our intelligence agencies? In September 1998, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had evolved an elaborate defensive strategy including the revival of a proposal for an omnibus Defence Intelligence Agency to guard against pre-emptive enemy strikes. This was done in the aftermath of the US Cruise missile attacks against pinpoint targets of terrorist camps in Afghanistan. This agency was originally envisioned to overcome the near total absence of ‘actionable-intelligence’.14 This problem was highlighted by the US missile strikes against Afghanistan.

The stumbling blocks encountered in integrating the intelligence agencies and achieving jointness among the three Services intelligence directorates are almost similar to the ones experienced by the British or Americans in the evolutionary process of their intelligence set up. The stress on removing duplication of work raises the fears of losing out a portion of responsibility to another Service. There is a tendency to create needs specific to parent Service, which militates against joint working and effective use of existing resources. The finance bureaucracies only go by the savings achieved in reduction of manpower and no increases in the cost. They are oblivious to the fact that a cost-benefit analysis could be of more use rather than blandly applying such stipulations in the field of intelligence. As emphasised earlier, force multiplication achieved by timely and accurate intelligence would be much more in order of magnitude than purchase of costly modern weapon platforms.

Though Services have SIGINT and DIPAC for obtaining required intelligence in these fields yet these resources are very limited and inadequate. A large proportion of foreign intelligence through COMINT, IMINT and ELINT is being obtained under the aegis of RAW. Further, the operations of RAW are global in nature, are very broad-based and most of the time do not meet the military needs. There is also a tendency to give a lower priority to military needs. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) after the intelligence debacle has recommended that all COMINT and ELINT efforts be grouped under a single organisation like the NSA of USA, which is under DOD. In the UK, GCHQ (Government Communication Head Quarters) controlling TECHINT is under their MOD. In the knowledge-age era, the role of satellite surveillance, communication interception, crypto-analysis and use of entire electro-magnetic spectrum for intelligence is becoming increasingly important. KRC has emphasised on the need for a centralised communication intelligence agency and has stressed that "while the effort to build-up adequate communication and electronic intelligence capability should be tailored to suit India’s particular needs, parochial departmental interests should be effectively countered."15 Therefore, resources of Signal Intelligence Directorate and DIPAC supplemented by all other national resources of COMINT, ELINT, IMINT and TECHINT (including space reconnaissance) need to be grouped under one agency, which could be DIA, or any other nodal agency under the MOD. Such an arrangement would provide unity of purpose, avoid duplication and achieve optimisation in utilisation of national assets of strategic importance.

The needs of intelligence requirements for Armed Forces have increased manifold due to their continuous involvement in a wide spectrum of conflicts and war since independence. The modern Techint resources would provide to the Defence Services intelligence and information required by them for most of their intelligence needs. Augmenting the capability of Defence Services in Techint assets of both strategies and operational nature would improve their abilities of obtaining real-time and actionable intelligence.16 The placement of additional capabilities with Defence Services would provide intimate support for their missions and roles against external aggression and for internal security. Currently, the entire Indian intelligence community would share the intelligence gained from such a strategic asset.

Defence Attache System

Another important cog in the military intelligence system is the Defence Attaches to various missions abroad. Though by international conventions military attaches are not expected to get involved in any undercover intelligence gathering work yet, in course of their duties, they come across openly available and very useful military information. Military attaches attend various ceremonial functions of the host country’s Defence Forces and are also invited to attend as observers for various military field exercises and fire-power displays. Interaction with other military attaches to the host countries can give them special insights into the military activities and thought processes of the host country. A military attache is also tasked to go through the military publications, press and media and keep a look out for induction of any new equipment and any matters of military interest to his own country. He is a specialist advisor to the Ambassador, and at times can provide invaluable information.17 There is an anecdote of a military attache who had instructed his school-going children to note down the ‘tactical numbers and tactical signs’ of the military vehicles in the city. This information enabled him to confirm presence of some military units, raising of new units or formations and even moving out of the units from their location.

However, in the present system the respective military attaches, report to their own Service directorates. There are large countries where all the three Services are represented by their respective attaches and there are others where only one military attache represents the interests of all. The usual tendency, therefore, is to pass intelligence or information to their respective Service, as there is no Central intelligence gathering organisation. The entire network of defence attaches (DA) could be brought under DIA for a unified intelligence effort and direction. It is needless to say that present DAs need to be trained in intelligence gathering, as they are usually generalists who go for foreign assignments for having excelled in professional military matters rather than in the intelligence field. Some intelligence background to outgoing DA’s would be useful for their mission.

Role of DIA

Therefore, what should be the role, purpose and mission of the proposed Defence Intelligence Agency? As discussed earlier the principal role of intelligence community should be to support defence planning, military operations and diplomacy.18 Under this overall framework DIA would deal with military intelligence issues. Besides RAW, DIA should be given the role of obtaining external intelligence of military nature. It has been generally experienced, as a former DGMI has stated that ‘defence needs are rarely met by non-dedicated organisations or assets’. Though each Service Intelligence directorate strives to meet the intelligence requirements of its service within the limited framework of their laid down charter, a Defence Intelligence Agency would perform important functions as outlined below:-

a) It will co-ordinate the functioning of the Service’s intelligence effort and exchange databases in areas of common interest. It would remove duplication in certain area studies that are common to one or more Service and achieve economy of effort. It would enable Services to exchange intelligence received by one Service and meant to be acted upon urgently by the other Service.

b) DIA will also deal with strategic intelligence and coordinate the functioning of SIGINT, TECHINT and DIPAC. It should have in-built capacity to meet the external intelligence needs of the Defence Services, especially so about the countries of concern to our security. The existing organisational inadequacies of SI Directorate, deficiencies in communication interception analysis, crypto-analysis and satellite surveillance would need to be overcome.

c) Since joint operations would be the order of the day in any future battlespace, DIA would provide integrated intelligence support for joint operations.

d) It will also co-ordinate the functioning of Defence Attaches. In addition to reporting to their respective Services intelligence directorate, they would report to DIA in order to centralise military intelligence gathering efforts as also for giving unified direction.

The DIA could either be placed under Chiefs of Staff Committee or alternatively could be a resource placed under the MOD. For efficient output and smooth functioning, placing of DIA under COSC or CDS at a later stage would be preferable. The top man of DIA, besides being an adviser to the COSC/CDS could also perform functions of Chairman of Joint Services Intelligence Board. This would move us towards achieving jointness and synergies in military intelligence collection, collation and dissemination.

What could be other purposes for evolving an organisation like DIA? This structural change for collecting, collating and processing strategic and tactical intelligence by creating a new centralised organisation would assist us in achieving the following broad objectives.19

 It would move us towards achieving information superiority in support of our national objectives.

 DIA could also undertake studies on military threats and opportunities based on intelligence inputs.

 Establishments of DIA would generate cohesion among the Defence Forces and engender a common perspective of the intelligence front.

 It would cater for the specific needs of the three Services and exploit HUMINT resources optimally.

 DIA would rationalise and prioritise tasking of civil agencies for collection of military intelligence.

 It would review the feasibility of obtaining state-of-the-art intelligence gathering equipment, phasing-out of obsolescent equipment and make recommendations for ‘make or buy’ decisions concerning such equipment.

 It would have in-built procedures for pro-activeness, responsiveness to customers and most of all structures for audit and accountability. Periodic ‘Intelligence exercises’ could be conducted to estimate the operational readiness of intelligence organisations.

Co-ordination at National Level—New Role for JIC

As mentioned earlier, JIC, the apex intelligence co-ordinating organisation has been absorbed into NSCS for the newly formed National Security Council in November 1998. In pre-1962, era, the JIC was under the COSC; after the 1962 war it was upgraded and transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat in 1985. Its evaluations and assessments were not given adequate attention. When the whole intelligence system is being restructured, maintaining JIC as a separate entity, though under the NSC, would be conducive to better intelligence coordination. National intelligence is a full time task and of vital dimension and as such functioning of JIC should not be subsumed in NSCS. Instead, JIC should be armed with more powers. Funding of all intelligence agencies should be undertaken by NSCS/JIC so that authority and accountability rest conjointly. JIC based on the policy directives from NSC, should work out and prioritise intelligence acquisition plans, carry out appropriate tasking of intelligence agencies and monitor performances of the number of professionals to be able to carry out managerial functions or directing and allotting priorities for tasks. Though the political, economic, diplomatic and other kinds of civil intelligence are very important yet military intelligence, military hardware and military strategy are increasingly becoming too specialised to be comprehended by the generalists. Thus twin track approach for collecting external intelligence by RAW and by DIA (as outlined earlier) and coordinated by JIC would give the nation a comprehensive intelligence picture of our potential adversaries. KRC has also recommended that ‘role of JIC and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of overall reform of the system."20

Conclusion

The Kargil War has once again highlighted the flawed structure of our intelligence apparatus and the pressing need for introducing reforms in our intelligence structures. The government has also formed a Task Force of Group of Ministers to address the issues arising out of KRC’s recommendations on intelligence failures and suggestions to revamp our entire intelligence-gathering set-up. The nation faces a variety of threats from both within and without. Even when India has become a nuclear weapons state and its Defence Forces have been fighting insurgencies continuously for the last five decades besides five wars, there is no evidence to believe that intelligence agencies have reviewed their role.

The Indian intelligence system suffers from a lack of checks and balances and the consumer hardly gets the required intelligence product. The politicisation of some of the intelligence agencies has led to reduction of their efficiency. At times, intelligence agencies even tend to take upon themselves the task of decision-making rather than restricting themselves to the advisory role. The bane of intelligence agencies has been lack of focus and direction, turf-battles, poor coordination, uncorroborated reports and lack of professionalism and motivation.

In the present age of information technology, no field of human endeavour has been left untouched by the tremendous rate of change being ushered in by new technologies. Thus, besides our intelligence organisations we need to have a re-look at our intelligence gathering equipment. We need to improve our satellite surveillance, SIGINT, IMINT and TECHINT capabilities for both strategic and tactical intelligence.

We need to evolve a Defence Intelligence Agency to co-ordinate and synergise the functioning of three Services intelligence agencies. DIA needs to be given an expanded mandate for obtaining external intelligence which would not only improve the quality of product required by the Defence Forces, but would also provide a second stream of external intelligence, in addition to RAW, for cross-checking and validation. Depending on one source for important and sensitive military intelligence inputs may be fraught with danger. For a focussed direction and development, all our TECHINT, SIGINT and IMINT resources need to be integrated and placed under one agency under the MOD as is being done in the USA and the UK. All these strategic assets could be organised under the DIA.

The role of JIC needs to be strengthened and its functioning should be separated from the NSCS. It needs to be given additional executive powers for forecasting, planning, directing, coordinating, controlling and monitoring the national intelligence effort. Intelligence set-up in a piece-meal manner does not address national and military intelligence in a comprehensive manner. The business of intelligence needs to be taken seriously with trained and highly motivated professionals posted to intelligence organisations. It would be appropriate to conclude by the following quotation of an intelligence analyst "Intelligence officials are like a dance band which becomes more enthusiastic and plays better when the people on the floor (the decision-makers) are willing to take part in the celebrations and appreciate the music (intelligence). However it must be ensured that the band (intelligence agencies) itself is well integrated as far as various instruments are concerned.21

 

NOTES

1. Bhashyam Kasturi, "Military Intelligence in India: An Analysis" The Indian Defence Review (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 1997).

2. Brig Satbir Singh, "Shaping the Land Battle through Remote Sensing", Strategic Analysis, February 2000, pp. 1911-1917.

3. Satyindra Singh, quoting a Divisional Commander in, "Looking Beyond Kargil Report-I, Much to Learn and Implement", The Tribune, March 11, 2000.

4. Brig CG Holtom, "Intelligence Blunders: A Possible Cure," RUSI Journal, October 1999.

5. Lt. Gen SC Sardeshpande quoted by Satyindra Singh in The Tribune, March 11, 2000.

6. Jaswant Singh, Defending India (Bangalore: Macmillan India, 1999) p. 287.

7. K. Subramanyam, "Intelligence Matrix: Proactive Path to Security, Governance," The Times of India June 27, 2000.

8. Bidanda M Chengappa quoting RAW Chief in "Indian Military Intelligence: A Case for Change", Indian Defence Review, January 1993, p. 107.

9. Ibid.

10. Kargil Review Committee Report, Findings, Chapter 13, p. 202.

11. See the Internet, address, <http//www.nsa.gov/about-nsa/mission.html.>

12. See the Internet, address <http//www.dia.mil/sites/Aboutdia/present/dia-history.toc.htm>

13. Peter Gudgin, Military Intelligence: The British Story (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), p. 75.

14. The Hindustan Times, September 8, 1998.

15. Kargil Review Committee Report, Recommendations, Chapter 14, p. 217.

16. Lt. Gen Revi K Sawhney, "Restructuring of Intelligence Agencies", at a seminar held on October 18-19, 1998 at the U.S.I., New Delhi and proceedings published by USI in 1999; pp. 206-215.

17. See Gudgin n. 13, pp. 99-101 for historical perspective of military attache system.

18. See Lt. Gen Sawhney, n. 16.

19. Also see College of Defence Management, Secunderabad, 1996, Study on "Integration of Three Services to Achieve Synergy in Operations," pp. 34-41.

20. n. 15, p. 218.

21. Lt. Gen. PN Kathpalia, "Management of Intelligence at the National Level" Indian Defence Review, January 1988, p. 111. He also argues for a DIA and integrated intelligence framework at the national level.