Cambodia Since the UNTAC: Deep into the Quagmire
- Shankari Sundararaman
Four years have passed since the UN-sponsored election in Cambodia, which was responsible for ending nearly two decades of civil war and restoring that country's set-up to one where the people expressed their choice of political leadership in a free and fair election, thus resulting in the coalition government that was in control till recently. However, today, four years after the UN-sponsored election, the country is further away from peace and stability than it had been before and the possibility of completely eroding the few gains that it made from the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission, is severely under threat. There has been a great deal of debate in trying to identify the cause of the present day problems in Cambodia and many observers of the scene lay the blame squarely upon the shoulders of the Paris Peace Treaty itself for having brought together factions which were totally incompatible, purely through international pressure, without any real effort or willingness for reconciliation. As for the framers of the Paris Accord, they seem to have believed in the dubious supposition that with free and fair elections, the actual problems which threatened the state would automatically go away. The larger picture and task of national reconstruction and the development of the requisite institutions upon which a democracy needs to be founded, were myopically ignored. This article attempts to understand the factors which were a fundamental part of the UNTAC mandate and the actual extent to which they were successfully implemented. It also concentrates upon the political developments in the country since the UNTAC period.
Background to the UNTAC Period
Diplomatic initiatives had been active since the thaw in the Cold War between the superpowers and this provided the much needed impetus to the unravelling of the Cambodian imbroglio. Among the several moves which had culminated in the Paris Peace Accords, the blueprint laid down by the Permanent Five of the UN was the most significant, as it was the foundation upon which the UNTAC mandate was based. Having built upon an idea put forward by the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, the Permanent Five approved of the details of the UN involvement in its August 1990 meeting in New York in which an enhanced presence for the UN was assured while keeping in mind five basic tenets that were considered indispensable for a political settlement. These were;
(a) transitional arrangements regarding the administration of Cambodia during the pre-election period;
(b) military arrangements during the transitional period;
(c) elections under UN auspices;
(d) human rights protection;
(e) international guarantees.1
This plan received the final seal of approval when the Cambodian factions accepted the framework for a comprehensive settlement in its entirety. One of the crucial developments towards this was the agreement on the formation of the Supreme National Council (SNC), which was to be the "unique legitimate body and source of authority in which throughout the transitional period the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia was to be enshrined."2 The SNC had representatives from each of the Cambodian factions and represented the country in all international forums during the transitional period, thus acting as the supreme governing body that would delegate authority to the UNTAC in order to implement the various provisions of the settlement.3 With the acceptance by the political parties, the Paris Peace Treaty began to take a more concrete shape and its conclusion in October 1991 formalised the settlement and also elucidated the role of the UNTAC.
The October 1991 peace initiatives endorsed the implementation of the three basic premises—an agreement on a comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian conflict; an agreement concerning the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia; and a declaration on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia.4 In essence, these elements were the main components of the settlement which came into effect with the signing of the two agreements that had a treaty status, whilst the Declaration on Rehabilitation was not legally binding.5 The agreement laid out certain arrangements for the transitional period, which was to begin with effect from the time of entry into the agreement, till the holding of free and fair elections.
Though the treaty consisted of several parts, the most fundamental element of its character was the functioning of the UNTAC as well as the SNC and the respective roles which these two played during the transitional period in Cambodia. First, the UNTAC had been established "under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General" with a "special representative designated by the Secretary-General to act on his behalf."6 Second, it discussed the role of the SNC as the "unique legitimate body" in which authority, sovereignty, independence and the unity of Cambodia was enshrined.7 Thus, the SNC, as envisaged by the Permanent Five Settlement, would not only act as the "legitimate body" and "source of authority", but would also represent Cambodia in "international organisations."8 In order to ensure that a neutral political environment prevailed, the UNTAC took over certain administrative functions including the handling of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information departments.9 The SNC had to delegate the supreme authority to the UNTAC to implement the provisions of the treaty. Therefore, even though the SNC was not the actual government of Cambodia and had no territorial control, it was accepted by the international community as the "single voice" that would ensure the will of the nation.10
Among its several talks, the UNTAC was to verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces along with their stacks of ammunition. This was to be achieved through the implementation of a ceasefire among the factions who were expected to demobilise and disarm 70 per cent of their forces, thus enhancing the stability and confidence necessary for a conducive political environment.11 In order to implement the above tasks, the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) was formed, comprising senior military representatives from each faction. The MMWG was to be shared by the chief of UNTAC's military component, with the assistance of a Secretariat.12
Recognising the need to give the Cambodian people the right to determine their own political destiny, the UNTAC ensured the conduct of free and fair elections. The UN-sponsored elections resulted in the formation of a Constituent Assembly, which, upon approving a draft Constitution, transformed itself into the Legislative Assembly.
The UNTAC had also maintained a firm and lasting commitment to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms. The preservation and sustenance of these rights was endorsed by the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, whose presence was extended beyond the UNTAC mandate period in February 1993 and its resolution laid down various measures and stipulations by which human rights would be ensured.13
Another area of the UNTAC's focus was the issue of refugees and displaced persons. The UNTAC had to ensure that a conducive political environment existed within Cambodia which would facilitate the return of the refugees. During the conflict years, the Thai-Cambodian border had been a buffer zone that had housed more than 300,000 refugees. "Standards of safety, security and dignity, freedom from intimidation and coercion had to be provided," which in turn would ensure "the voluntary return and integration" of these people into the mainstream of Cambodian society.14 Other provisions of the UNTAC mandate included the release of all political prisoners of war and civil internees, a task in which the International Red Cross assisted the UNTAC chief.15
While these tasks were a part of the first agreement on a comprehensive political settlement, there were other agreements to an overall political solution to the conflict. The second agreement guaranteed the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia, thus ensuring that the above mentioned features would not be compromised under any circumstances.16 The third and final feature of the treaty was a declaration on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. Realising that stability and continuity were dependent upon reconstruction in the post-election period, the international community pledged an aid assurance, thus, ensuring candid "relations between the Cambodian government and any bilateral, regional and international contributors," as well as aid from organisations leading to the growth of the economy, thereby stabilising the infant democracy.17
The above examination of the various clauses of the treaty provisions has tried to define the actual scope of the treaty. It is important to be cognisant of the fact that the October 1991 Paris Peace Treaty was formulated as a blueprint upon which a comprehensive political settlement was based. The role of the United Nations stands out more distinctly since it was the first of its kind—in the words of the UN Secretary-General, the task has been defined as "massive in size, comprehensive in scope and precise in its mandate, the UNTAC set new standards for peacekeeping operations undertaken by the international community."18
It goes without saying that the task was something that the world body had never attempted to do before. Depending upon its success, it was to serve as a model for the resolution of other international and regional conflicts.19 Implementation of the peace process faced several challenges and evaluating its success or failure remains an ambiguous task. Needless to say, the path to the elections and the subsequent transition to democracy and its continuance has been an arduous one.
UNAMIC: The Precursor to the UNTAC
Immediately after signing the Paris Peace Agreement, it was decided on the request of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as President of the SNC, that a team of UN observers would be sent to Cambodia to maintain the fragile ceasefire that was in place and this led to the formation of the United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).20 Headed by Ataul Karim of Bangladesh and the military component under French Brigadier-General Jean-Michael Loridon, the UNAMIC was established in Phnom Penh on November 9, 1991.21 With a team of about 50 officers, the UNAMIC was to assist in the ceasefire and act as a liaison between the various factions of the SNC. Moreover, the UNAMIC had to concentrate on the issue of mine clearance—a task that was to receive the highest priority—and began to train Cambodians in "mine clearance programmes using specialised international military units."22
It is significant to remember that the UNTAC took a longer time being implemented than was earlier planned. This delay in the deployment of the UNTAC was to prove difficult, since the UNAMIC's role was both unscheduled and uncoordinated. Taking into consideration the extent and magnitude of the task at hand, the UNAMIC's success lay in its ability to set up a viable UN presence in Cambodia and alert the UN on the ground realities. As such, during the UNAMIC period, the situation in Cambodia deteriorated and it seemed as if the UN mandate in Cambodia would be jeopardised. However, these early signals were not heeded by the planners of the peace process or they were put aside as mere teething troubles. In the period between the October treaty and the implementation of the UNTAC, several events occurred which furthered the already existing instability in the country—the return of Sihanouk as head of the SNC and head of state was the onset for some disturbances, such as the call for the distancing of the Khmer Rouge and prosecution of their leaders for crimes against humanity.23 The aborted attempt by the FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) and the CPP (Cambodia People's Party) to form a coalition government and the riots that took place in Cambodia on the return of the Khmer Rouge leader, Khieu Samphan, were infractions that not only led to an increase in lawlessness and instability, but were probably the beginning of the Khmer Rouge's isolation from the peace process, later resulting in their non-compliance and withdrawal from the elections.
UNTAC and the Elections in Cambodia.
The actual UNTAC operations began by the end of April 1992 and included approximately 15,900 troops, 3,600 civilian police and over 1,000 international staff. In addition there were about 1,000 international election monitors and 56,000 local recruits during election time (see Table I).24 Led by Yasushi Akashi of Japan with Gen. John M. Sanderson of Australia as head of the military component, the actual cost of the operation was approximately $ 2 billion, received as contributions from member states.
Table 1. UN Member States Contributing Uniformed Personnel (number of personnel at peak strength, June 1993)
Military Component Civilian Police Component
Algeria 16 Algeria 157
Argentina 2 Australia 11
Australia 685 Austria 19
Austria 17 Bangladesh 220
Bangladesh 942 Brunei Darussalam 12
Belgium 5 Bulgaria 74
Brunei Darussalam 3 Cameroon 73
Bulgaria 748 Colombia 144
Cameroon 14 Egypt 100
Canada 218 Fiji 50
Chile 52 France 141
China 444 Germany 74
France 1,350 Ghana 218
Germany 137 Hungary 97
Ghana 912 India 421
India 1,336 Indonesia 224
Indonesia 1,779 Ireland 40
Ireland 11 Italy 75
Japan 605 Japan 66
Malaysia 1,090 Jordan 83
Namibia 43 Kenya 100
Netherlands 809 Malaysia 224
New Zealand 67 Morocco 98
Pakistan 1,106 Nepal 85
Philippines 127 Netherlands 2
Poland 666 Nigeria 150
Russian Federation 52 Norway 20
Senegal 2 Pakistan 197
Singapore 35 Philippines 224
Thailand 716 Singapore 75
Tunisa 883 Sweden 36
United Kingdom 130 Tunisia 29
United States 49
Total 15,991 Total 3,359
Source: The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, Blue Book Series, Vol.II (New York: Department of Public Information, UNO, 1995), p.23.
The challenges the UNTAC had to face were many—the most alarming feature was that in Cambodia "almost everything had to start from scratch, including basic facilities such as roads and communication systems."25 Primarily the issue relating to the repatriation of refugees had to be handled carefully. This was an enormous task since the refugees numbered about 360,000 of whom two-thirds had been engaged in agriculture. Moreover, the plans for repatriation also had to be coupled with measures for the rehabilitation of these people. In this regard, the refugees were provided with transport to the place of their choice; immediate assistance in terms of food and housing was given for a period of one year. To ensure their reintegration into the mainstream, quick impact programmes as well as medium to long-term development projects were initiated. By February 1993, almost 310,000 had returned to Cambodia and were registered for the elections. In fact, by April 1993, roughly 100 per cent success had been achieved as far as the repatriation programme was concerned (see Table 2).
Table 2. Cambodian Refugees: Repatriation and Relief Returnees: Monthly and Cumulative Flows
(From start of repatriation in March 1992 through conclusion of operation in April 1993)
Number of Number of Number of
convoys returnees returnees
1992 March 2 928 928
April 11 4,777 5,706
May 23 13,068 18,773
June 35 19,830 38,603
July 42 31,021 69,624
August 44 30,935 100,559
September 46 31,865 132,424
October 41 28,992 161,416
November 44 34,010 195,426
December 42 34,454 229,880
1993 January 45 39,776 269,656
February 32 39,890 309,546
March 31 32,038 341,584
April 18 20,625 362,209
Source : UNHCR
Repatriation : Assistance options chosen by returnees
Option Persons Families
Agricultural land 10,262 (2.8%) 2,435 (3.0%)
housing plot 24,147 (6.7%) 9,177 (11.1%)
Cash 317,442 (87.6%) 69,080 (83.9%)
UNTAC/others 4,214 (1.2%) 937 (1.2%)
(Transport plus cash) 462 (0.1%) 112 (0.1%)
No information 5,683 (1.6%) 575 (0.7%)
Total 362,209 (100.0%) 82,316 (100.0%)
Source : United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, Blue Book Series, vol.II (New York: Department of Public Information, UNO, 1995), p.33.
The actual threat to the peace process came from the demobilisation of the forces. The programme for demobilisation was divided into two phases—the first was the observation of a ceasefire and the second included regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilisation of the factions. It was expected that the four political factions in Cambodia would give access to the UNTAC personnel, assist the UNTAC in locating mines and also provide information on arms, ammunition and troops under their control. Thus, according to the UNTAC mandate, it was supposed to assist in a "phased and balanced process" by which 70 percent of the forces should have been demobilised prior to the registration of the voters.26
With regard to this particular task of the UNTAC, the opposition came from the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), popularly known as the Khmer Rouge, which was unwilling to participate in the ceasefire and was the first to back out of the demobilisation process. It is significant to understand that among the political factions, the only two groups that accounted for some strength in military terms were the Khmer Rouge and the forces of Hun Sen's State of Cambodia (SOC), which wielded control over the Cambodian Armed Forces. Once the Khmer Rouge refused to demobilise, the other parties to the treaty were also not willing to comply with the terms of the ceasefire clause. In the actual disarming process, the SOC faction willingly laid down the old arms and ammunition while the more sophisticated weapons remained with the troops.27 The PDK's non-compliance continued to challenge the second phase of the UNTAC operations in Cambodia, that is, after June 1992. Ignoring the various pleas of the sponsors, Khieu Samphan, the nominal Khmer Rouge leader, stated that his party would not participate in the elections under the prevailing circumstances.28
The Khmer Rouge cited two reasons for its non-compliance: first, it claimed that the Vietnamese forces had not been completely withdrawn from regions of Cambodia's eastern tracts. The UNTAC's efforts to check for the presence of foreign forces did not satisfy the Khmer Rouge, who repeatedly stated that the UNTAC had failed in its provision to ensure the withdrawal of the Vietnamese from Cambodia.29 In an attempt to destabilise the peace process, the Khmer Rogue began a policy of ethnic cleansing against the Vietnamese civilians—large groups of Vietnamese who had been settled in Cambodia over a period of several years and had migrated during three different phases of the country's political history.30
Another factor for the Khmer Rouge's non-compliance was that the administration of the country had not been taken over by the UNTAC as was envisaged by the Paris Treaty. This clause had been one of the most crucial factors which was to ensure a neutral political environment, before the holding of the elections. The PDK's expectations that the State of Cambodia (SOC), would be completely dismantled seems, in retrospect, to be quite unrealistic. The UNTAC could not undo the complete administrative system under the SOC, in fact, even in the control of five key Ministries that had initially been identified, the UNTAC was not wholly successful. Two factors were responsible for this—first the SOC conventionally changed the names as well as the order of the five key Ministries under the UNTAC, so as to allow the UNTAC only nominal control while the real authority continued to remain in the hands of the SOC. As such, the view that the SOC had an upper hand in the election could be justified—which would probably be the case for any caretaker government in the run up to the election. Though the SNC was to represent this role, the SOC did remain at an advantage in this regard. Moreover, it is important to remember that the SOC had enjoyed an unchallenged authority over the country for over a decade and its clout and influence had permeated to the lowest levels of the administrative structure. Thus, the task at hand for the UNTAC was very difficult and any attempt to either dismantle or entirely restructure the existing apparatus would have been highly improbable.
UNTAC's ability to deal with the Khmer Rouge was, however, inadequate. At this juncture it is important to understand that the UNTAC and more significantly its mandate for Cambodia was to act as a peace-keeping force and not a peace-making one. Thus, the UNTAC lacked the ability to enforce its will upon the concerned parties to the settlement. In dealing with the Khmer Rouge, it first tried to use diplomacy, which met with very little success. As far as the issue of economic sanctions was concerned, the scope was rather limited since this involved the cooperation of the Thai government.31 Controlling a region rich in timber and precious gems, the Khmer Rouge had enjoyed an economic viability that sustained them during the years of the stalemate and continued in the post-election period too. Despite the adoption of a moratorium and the assurances of the Thai government's cooperation on this, private business interests that flourished along the borders had kept the illegal trade alive by the use of unofficial channels.32
In spite of the obvious threats that were encountered, the UNTAC continued with the plans for the holding of the elections, which took place between the May 23-28, 1993. With approximately 90 percent of the votes cast, the actual ballot itself was a success for the UNTAC. After assessing that the elections were free and fair, the UNTAC announced the results of the poll in which the FUNCINPEC had won a majority with 45.47 per cent of the votes polled; followed by the CPP with 38.23 percent and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP, formerly called the KPNLF of Son Sann) with 3.81 per cent. The remainder of votes were shared by seventeen other political parties.33
Though the FUNCINPEC won a 7 per cent majority, it could not form the governement since the primary requirement was the formation of a Constituent Assembly which required a two-thirds majority. As such, a coalition was formed between the two leading parties—the FUNCINPEC and the CPP —a Constitution was drafted and approved, by which the country adopted a Constitutional Monarchy with Sihanouk as the King and Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen as First and Second Prime Ministers respectively.
Cambodian Politics in the Post-UNTAC Period
Since the May 1993 elections it has become increasingly obvious that the coalition government in Cambodia is a definite case of a "marriage of convenience" between totally incompatible partners. The dispute between the two Prime Ministers has been evident since the very beginning of the government's functioning and more so recently when the bickering has taken a more serious turn resulting in the present impasse. As a result, the entire United Nations operation in Cambodia now seems to have been rather pointless.
The difficulties in the functioning of the coalition arose primarily from the CPP which despite emerging as the second member of the coalition, wielded the authority and the clout over much of the decision making process. Thus, for the FUNCINPEC, the practical difficulties arose from the CPP itself, which was not only its coalition partner but also its chief political rival. The very fact that the CPP had enjoyed an unchallenged control and authority in Cambodia prior to the elections and that its influence had permeated to the lowest levels of the administrative structure, was a test to the FUNCINPEC's position in Cambodia. The differences between the leaders has constantly underscored the attempts to reconstruct the structural foundations of the nation's archaic political institutions. This inability of the coalition government to build the structural requisites upon which a democracy must be founded has not only threatened the political stability of the government, but also the continuity of the international aid which the country desperately requires.
The first real test for the coalition was whether the government had the political will to modernise the country's financial system, which had been a creaky, corrupt legacy of its Communist past.34 The process of national reconstruction has suffered due to the scepticism among the aid donors over the stability of the government and the economy's dependence upon foreign aid—in fact, it is estimated that about 80 percent of the government's expenditure and 44 percent of the annual budget was procured from direct foreign aid.35 As early as 1994 itself, foreign governments had pledged a total of $777 million as aid.36 Other than this, many of the programmes at key Ministries were funded directly by foreign assistance and staffed by foreign advisors. However, the recent trends in the political developments have embarrassed the aid donors—the worsening political and human rights conditions have seriously jeopardised the continuance of international aid. A more unfavourable implication is that ASEAN has deferred the admission of Cambodia into its fold for the time being—while there remains some doubt over the final decision, it is highly unlikely that ASEAN will welcome Cambodia at this time, in spite of the CPP reaffirmation that the present political crisis is an internal problem.
The second challenge to the coalition was the security threat that came from the scattered presence of the Khmer Rouge troops. The security threats from the Khmer Rouge have never been faced squarely by the government—a fact that is quite evident from the early gains which the guerrilla faction made at the battles at Pailin and Anlong Veng. However, in the recent past, the troops of the Khmer Rouge have suffered some serious reverses, added to which they have also been weakened by the defections that have taken place—Leng Sary's move in October last and the royal pardon granted to him have greatly contributed to reducing the fighting force of this guerrilla outfit. It may be an accepted fact that the Khmer Rouge in general and Pol Pot in particular, have met with their political demise. However, the fact remains that in the process they have been able to churn up more trouble than was expected. The latest drama over the "capture" of the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, has added a new dimension to the existing political confusion in Cambodia and has exposed the deep rift within the coalition.37 The recent events at Anlong Veng—the execution of Son Sen and members of his family and the conflict within the Khmer Rouge—raise doubts over the possibility of their re-integration into the mainstream of Cambodian society. Considering the brutality of the force and its isolation from the political developments in the country, the process of re-integration is likely to be tough.
The question of bringing Pol Pot to book will have even more conflicting implications—though such a trial will have to focus primarily upon Pol Pot himself, it remains unclear whether his associates will also be tried. Other than the Khmer Rouge themselves, there will be a bearing upon the international community that had supported the Khmer Rouge during the years of the Cambodian stalemate. The Khmer Rouge may no longer enjoy the backing it received during the years of the conflict—its principal allies China and Thailand are no longer backing it. Thailand's policy is more in tune with the rest of ASEAN, and China, in a bid to restore its image in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident willingly dumped the Khmer Rouge. Despite this, the Chinese have already opposed the move to try Pol Pot by an international tribunal. In such a case, China will have to face the implications of supporting the Khmer Rouge. Thailand too will have to answer for its inability to stop the illegal trading across the Thai-Cambodia border, in which several Thai military personnel have been implicated. Even the United States will have to justify its support to the CGDK of which the Khmer Rouge was a member—since there are strong indications that US aid to the republican KPNLF was being channelled to the Khmer Rouge.
A third factor that has emerged as a challenge to the nation's stability is the strong evidence of the involvement of senior government officials in the growing drug trade. It is a prevalent view that high level corrupion has been responsible for the flow of about 600 kg of heroin through Phnom Penh every week. The country has emerged as an important transit point for drugs that are produced in Burma, Laos and Thailand, which are being pushed into Cambodia for trans-shipment to Europe and North America.38 Another factor that has been responsible for the increase in the drug trade is the rampant money laundering activities in Cambodia. In the absence of adequate supervision of the banking system and financial institutions, weaknesses in the legal framework and loopholes in law enforcement, money laundering has not only survived, but, in fact, thrived. Other than the banking system, nightclubs, casinos and even luxury goods shops have served this purpose quite adequately, thus worsening the existing situation.39
Other than these issues, several factors have indicated that the democratic values in Cambodia are definitely being eroded. One such problem has been the unwillingness of the coalition to accept dissent as part of the political culture in Cambodia. The ouster of the former Finance Minister, Sam Rainsy; the draconian Press law that was passed in 1994; the assassination of journalists who have made anti-government remarks; the recent grenade attack on a rally that was being addressed by Rainsy; and the recent takeover by Hun Sen have clearly exposed the inherent weaknesses in the political set-up and confirmed the worst fears that democracy is Cambodia is definitely on the decline. The issues compounding the country at present are an ailing and maverick monarch; total lack of coordination among the leaders of the factions and the rapidly increasing political instability and human rights violations; lack of any national or foreign agenda; and a complete halt to the economic progress.
In conclusion, can one question where the responsibility for these conditions lay? Primarily upon the leaders of the political groups for exhibiting an utter lack of vision and responsibility. The framers of the peace treaty will also be held to account for bringing together factions due to international pressure without any willingness on the part of the groups for reconciliation. There has already been a request by Ranariddh for the presence of international observers at next year's general elections. But with the present impasse, even the possibility of elections seems to be remote. There is no doubt that international mediation is required and that too urgently. The Cambodian factions as well as the international community owe the people of this war-torn country the right to enjoy the fruits of freedom and democracy that were promised to them by the UNTAC operations and in an effort to ensure this, they must act in consonance to prevent this country from plunging backwards.
1. The United Nations and Cambodia 1991-1995, Blue Book Series vol. II (New York: Department of Public Information, UNO, 1995), p.88.
2. Ibid., p.93.
4. Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, Paris, October 23, 1991 (Department of Public Information, UNO, January 1992), p.4.
5. For details, see, S.R. Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements", American Journal of International Law, vol.87, no.1, January 1993, p.8.
6. Article 2,n.4, p.9.
7. Article 3, Ibid., p.10.
8. Letter dated August 30, 1990, from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, USSR, UK and USA to the UN Secretary-General, United Nations Blue Book, n.1, p.88.
9. Articles 3 to 7, n.4, p.10.
10. Ratner, n.5, pp.10-11. See also, Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Stockholm; SIPRI, Research Report No.9, 1995), p.12.
11. Articles 8 to 11, n.4, p.11.
12. See Findlay, n.10, p.15.
13. Commission on Human Rights Resolution requesting the Secretary General to ensure a continued United Nations Human Rights presence in Cambodia after the end of the UNTAC mandate, including through the operational presence of the UNCHR, E/CN.4/RES/1993/B, February 19, 1993, United Nations Blue Book, vol.11, n.1, p.277. See also Articles 15 to 17 of the Paris Peace Conference.
14. Articles 19 and 20, n.4, p.13.
15. Articles 21 and 22, n.4, p.14.
16. As such it was believed that the features which were to be an inherent part of the settlement would be respected even by the government that was to emerge in the post-election period. However,as the recent events prove, this was more of a misconception, since these basic tenets of the treaty have been totally violated by the political factions within Cambodia.
17. See Paris Peace Treaty, pp.48-49.
18. United Nations Blue Book, n.1, p.3.
19. Sridhar Krishnaswamy, "Cambodia: Out of a Traumatic Past," The Hindu, November 10, 1991.
20. United Nations Blue Book, n.1, p.10.
21. Canberra Times, November 7, 1991.
22. United Nations Blue Book, n.1, p.10-11.
23. Keesing's Record of World Events, vol.37, no.11, p.38573.
24. United Nations Blue Book, n.1, p.12.
25. Discussions with Sridhar Krishnaswamy, South-East Asia Correspondent, The Hindu, August 7, 1994, Singapore.
26. Discussions with Benny Widyano, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Cambodia, October 26, 1994, Phnom Penh.
28. Mallet Victor, "Kmer Rouge Shatters $2 Billion UN Peacekeeping Plan", Times of India, November 14, 1992.
29. Ramses Amer, Peacekeeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia, Report No.40, (Sweden: Uppsala University, 1995), p.55.
30. Discussions with Benny Widyano, n.26.
31. Discussions with Peter Schier, Permanent Representative of the Konrad-Adeneur Research Foundation, October 28, 1994, Phnom Penh.
32. Discussions with Saroj Chavanaviraj, Deputy Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, October 4, 1994, Bangkok. Though the Thai government's stance was that it did not favour trade with the Khmer Rouge, it remained unable to control the private business interests within the country from having links with the Khmer Rouge. Even after the elections the areas of Pailin and Anlong Veng have been strongholds of the Khmer Rouge and the business along the borders has continued unabated.
33. United Nations Blue Book, n.1, p.46.
34. Far Eastern Economic Review, February 25, 1994, p.32.
35. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 6, 1995.
36. For details see, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 24, 1994.
37. See The Hindu, June 15-30, 1997.
38. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 7, 195.
39. Discussions with Toulong Soumara, Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia, October 28, 1994, Phnom Penh.