The Moscow Summit and the US-Russia Strategic Relationship

Rajiv Nayan, Research Officer, IDSA

 

With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union a new phase began in world politics. Out of the debris of the dismantled Soviet Union emerged several new countries. Of these Russia was the most formidable. It became the successor of some instruments of conflict of the former Soviet Union. Now, it is in command and control of the Soviet nuclear weapons. But Russia adopted an entirely different political system. It liberated itself from the Soviet ideology. It was hoped that a democratic Russia with a liberal philosophy and free market economy would come up and subsequently mature. Some saw it happening whereas many were quite skeptical. Both sides cited facts and instances to substantiate their respective theses and arguments. Some theoreticians, holding the belief that democracy is not indispensable for a liberal system, had no hesitation in calling Russia a liberal system. In the post-Cold War period, it has been evolving a new set of guidelines, norms, principles and values. Because of its size, geographic location, nuclear weapons, its membership of the United Nations security council, diplomatic infrastructure and so forth Russia remained a force to reckon with in world politics. In 1992, James Baker called Russia, "The greatest challenge confronting" the United States. The United States (US), the leader of the western bloc, during and even after the Cold War, was also under pressure to reinvent its foreign policy. Importantly, the US and Russia were both struggling to give a new shape to their policies towards each other. The US and Russia expected to enter into a cooperative partnership, which for some was a 'necessary partnership'.1 Democracy, it was argued, should not become a stumbling bloc, in the 'premature relationship'2 between the two countries. It was visualised that a new Russia would be useful for the US global commitments. The Russian relevance was perceived for strengthening the non-proliferation policy, in checking the nationalist ambitions of Eurasian countries and Islamic fundamentalism, peace keeping operations, etc. However, the initial euphoria did not last long. Though Russia did not revert to the old Soviet system, still the Yeltsin era did not fulfil the aspirations of the US and other western countries. The new regime under Vladimir Putin has taken over. The American search to engage Russia continues and in this direction a summit was held in Moscow from June 3-5, 2000. At the summit both countries concluded some agreements and expressed disagreements on some other issues. Defence once again emerged as a key issue during the summit. The present paper will make a comparative analysis of the arms control measures taken at the Moscow Summit and the Cold War phase of arms control, keeping in mind the emergence of the leadership in Russia under Vladimir Putin.

Agreements

During the summit, the US and Russia took a few steps to address the contours of some of their outstanding concerns. In this regard, two bilateral agreements were signed by Bill Clinton and Vladimir Putin during the summit. One dealt with for the management and disposition of 34 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons programmes.3 Plutonium is to be diluted or degraded in such a way that it is rendered useless for weapon purposes. It is either to be used in nuclear fuel or to be disposed through immobilisation. The task is to be accomplished in a safe, secure, environment-friendly and transparent manner. The entire process would be irreversible. Both leaders declared that the disposition and the management of plutonium would be verified. This work would be taken up later by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To involve IAEA, both countries would separately enter into an agreement with it. Both leaders also felt the need for working with other G-8 countries, since G-8 countries in the past, had extended full support to the plutonium management endeavours and initiatives of these two countries.

As Russia is cash-strapped, there is little hope of monetary contribution from Russia to implement the agreement. The US will have to take the monetary responsibility. The US congress has already allocated $200 million for the project to undertake plutonium disposal and management. As this amount is inappropriate for the task, greater allocation is expected in the future.

The second agreement between the US and Russia intends to establish a joint centre for the exchange of data from early warning systems and notifications of missile launches.4 The Memorandum of the agreement of September 2, 1998 has been guided by the joint statement of the presidents of the US and the Russian Federation on the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning. The main idea is to minimise the consequences of a false missile attack warning and to prevent the possibility of missile launch due to such missile warning. The memorandum has been set out in nineteen articles and six appendices.

As per the memorandum, a Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC)—a joint center for an uninterrupted exchange of data is to be set up in Moscow. Both countries will command equal rights and responsibilities in managing the activities of the JDEC. In Article 1 of the Memorandum, it is clearly stipulated that 'specially trained operational personnel of the parties would be involved in operation of JDEC. Article 3 of the Memorandum lays down the types of objects on which information is to be exchanged. These are:

"a. all launches of ICBMs and SLBMs of the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

b. launches of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs or SLBMs of the United States of American and the Russian Federation.

c. Launches of ballistic missiles of third states that could pose a direct threat to the parties or that could create an ambiguous situation and lead to possible misinterpretation.

d. Launches of space launch vehicles".5 Also either country may voluntarily make available information on other launches and objects such as de-orbiting spacecraft and geo-physical experiments and other work in near-earth space which can disrupt the normal operation of equipment of the warning systems.

Article 5 of the Memorandum demands, "Whenever available, the following information shall be exchanged in accordance with the format set forth in Appendix 3 to this Memorandum:

a. When a launch of a ballistic missile is detected—the time of launch, generic missile class, geographic area of the launch, geographic area of payload impact, estimated time of payload impact and launch azimuth;

b. When a launch of a space launch vehicle is detected—the time of launch, generic missile class, geographic area of the launch and launch azimuth."6

The memorandum clearly prohibits the divulgence of the sources of data. Side by side, a joint commission will be established to oversee the activities of the JDEC. Yet, the Department of Defence of the US and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation would be the executive agents for implementing this agreement.

The JDEC will start operations 365 days after this Memorandum enters into force. Article, 19 of the Memorandum clarified, "This Memorandum, including its associated appendices, all of which form integral parts, thereof, shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for ten years."7 However, this article also makes it clear that both parties can extend the life of the Memorandum for successive five year periods.

Articles 12 and 13 ban transfer of any equipment, software or other materials processed from the other party and information gathered by the centre to fulfil obligations of the Memorandum to any third state or legal or natural person without the written agreement of the country that supplied those materials and information.

Any dispute related to the provisions of this Memorandum is to be resolved diplomatically and if any country wants to amend any provision, it can be effective only after the agreement of the parties in the joint commission. Either country can terminate this Memorandum after giving a six-month written notice to the other country.

After the establishment of the Moscow centre, the old temporary centre, set up in Colorado, in late 1999, jointly manned by Russian and US military experts would be closed down. The present system is to be operationalised in phases. And at the end of the third phase, the system will start gathering information on ballistic missiles and space launches of third parties, if there is a need for it. This third phase is expected to come by the fall of 2001.9 The warning systems will consist of space-based satellites, infra-red systems and the early warning radars that each possesses.10 The detected information is to be released in near real-time i.e. within a minute.

During the summit, Bill Clinton also tried to plead for National Missile Defence (NMD). Russia opposed it for a variety of reasons. The most important being that it would bring the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to an end. Still, both countries developed some common understanding on it. The US admitted the continued relevance of the ABM Treaty, while for the first time, Russia acknowledged the danger of missile attacks from radical countries.11

Significance

The June 2000 summit assumes significance in a variety of ways. With the establishment of the JDEC, for the first time American and Russian military personnel are permanently involved in a joint military operation, over an extended period. These agreements and announcements indicate the possibility of another round, if not another phase of arms control. Undoubtedly, it has to be different from the Cold War phases of arms control. However, a close look at the agreements and pronouncements made during the summit suggest that several features, objectives and implications of the earlier phases of arms control are still operative. So are some of the problems and hurdles. Arms control, in the cold war period, was organically linked to deterrence. It was a part and parcel of deterrence as a concept and as a policy. It was considered 'enlargement of the scope of military strategy.12 The objective of arms control was to reduce the risk of war. The war was, then, feared to become nuclear. The idea of arms control was more specifically for dealing with the danger of surprise nuclear attack which could emanate primarily because of the developments in ballistic missile, guidance and control and nuclear weapons technology.

The concept of arms control was based on the assumption that military relations with potential enemies can take place and it should not necessarily be based on pure conflict. Thus emerged important mutual interests of both superpowers. Arms control measures were limited cooperative arrangements for exercising reciprocal restraint. Arms control was also directed to control the damage in the event of a nuclear war. The officials explicitly mentioned, that the June summit and agreements signed during it, are for continuing the deterrence policy of both countries.13 One of the agreements—to establish JDEC—addressed the subject of surprise attack. Hence, there is a similarity between the arms control of the Cold War phase and that of the Moscow Summit. Nevertheless there is some contrast. The earlier phase had to deal with extremely hostile parties of an agreement, whilst the Moscow Summit addressed the accidental use by two non-hostile parties of the agreement and in future by some other countries.

The early arms control aimed at assuring a condition of mutual assured destruction. It was to be conducted through arms race stability in order to rule out the possibility of unilateral military advantage to any or either of the adversaries in a given situation. Even if deterrence was not sacrificed in the agreements during the summit, assured destruction approach was not the guiding principle in the present arms control. Nor did it pay attention to surprise attack and punitive relationship in its response. Arms race dynamics compelled by the action—reaction phenomenon was no longer in operation because of the end of ideology as the basis of hostility and the poor state of Russia's economy; the Russian weapon development programmes are not America specific, therefore, there was no need to implement the earlier arms control goal of arms race stability.

'Attainment of strategic stability at a given level was a common refrain of the Cold War arms control. With the end of the Cold War, many writers opined that the US-Russian strategic balance does not enjoy a pre-eminent position as far as arms control is concerned. At present, the term is in the process of being given a new meaning and essence. Strategic stability through strategic balancing is no longer valid to explain the US-Russian relationship. The present arms control arrangement did not renounce the notion of strategic stability. The texts of the agreements hint toward it; announcements and addresses of leaders on various occasions repeatedly mentioned 'strategic stability' as an objective of the security arrangements agreed to by both the countries. The term strategic stability, of course, lost its earlier post-Cold War sense. A senior US Administration official stated that the agreement during the summit sought to strengthen strategic stability by further reducing the danger posed by the fact that ballistic missiles might be launched on the basis of false warning of attack.14 The Plutonium accord was also designed to help strategic stability since both parties have to reduce equal amounts of weapons grade plutonium.

In the Cold War period, by and large, bilateral negotiations between the two principal actors had guided the arms control agreements, including ones with global implications. In addition, international multilateral arms control fora were provided thrust by bilateral arms control agreements. In the present phase, bilateral arms control agreements and processes may influence multilateral negotiations, especially in the nuclear field; still, in the post-Cold War period, multilateral negotiations have gained somewhat more autonomy than the previous period. Now, bilateral arms control measures are more interested and focused on bilateral concerns.

Also, in the post-Cold War period, verification architecture has become almost indispensable. It is progressively becoming an integral part of arms control to ensure compliance of member countries or agreed parties. Besides, verification has become increasingly intrusive. It is widely believed in the strategic circles that verification provisions have helped in generating trust and faith and thus in improving relations between and among the state-parties. During the Cold War period, an element of suspicion lingered while negotiating any treaty or agreements. The agreements arrived at the Moscow Summit also acknowledged the importance of verification. In the Plutonium accord, the role of IAEA was envisioned, while the JDEC in itself was a verification system designed to undertake the monitoring work of the launch of ballistic missiles and space vehicles.

Like the previous phase of arms control, arms control of the present phase reflected in the two agreements, during the summit, also aims at economising. In the early phase, too, the countries announced that the amount released from the defence cut through arms control would be utilised for the economic well-being of the countries concerned. In practice, it was used for the development of more sophisticated technology and weapons, especially nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It was hardly used for the economic well-being of the countries and their citizens. Recently, in Russia, there was growing realisation that the country was spending unnecessarily on maintenance of some weapons, components or materials for these weapons. It was also spending unnecessarily on the facilities required to undertake activities for these weapons. This burden hampered the growth of high-technology industry. Owing to this stunted growth Russia is unable to match other western countries in modern technology and the related industry. More recently, the world heard the outburst of Russia's Chief of General Staff, General Anatolyn Kvashnin.15 The General demanded reduction of Russia's stockpile of land-based Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and utilisation of the released funds for strengthening Russia's conventional forces. The Russian General basically articulated the feelings of a large section of the Russian armed forces and the strategic community. This was perceived as important for handling internal instability and secessionist proclivities such as in Chechnya as well as to defend its borders.

Security reasons apart the Russian ruling establishment has planned to modernise its defence industry and is on the path of accomplishing the task of technological development for arms trade. The basic philosophy of research and development is to sell weapons abroad. Technological upgrading and modernisation are expected to help its survival as a supplier in a competitive global market. However, unlike the past, Russia would definitely divert some resources for the revival of its ailing economy. In the present phase, in Russia the released funds are assumed to go to both sectors—defence and civil. For the US, there is no end of the Cold War practice. The US, for sure, will continue to invest in the defence industry. At best, it would invest in the development of dual-use technology.

When the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was being negotiated, many called it a step toward nuclear disarmament. The same status is being accorded to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty that is to be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. But the Plutonium accord does not promise any such illusions. In recent years, calculation of defence sufficiency has become a new mantra. The US undertook restructuring of force structure as an unilateral arms control measure to induce reciprocation. This 'arms control without negotiation' propelled negotiations between the US and Russia to economise the upkeep of Cold War force structures and levels in the beginning of the post-Cold War period. The US brought about Nuclear Posture Review for the strategic force and Bottom up Review for conventional forces. There was no substantial movement in this direction in ensuing years.

There was no change in the defence posture or cut in the composition and the size of nuclear forces at the present summit. It should not be deduced that the US is, in any way, going to cut its nuclear force structure or intending to rely less on nuclear deterrence. Notwithstanding General Kvashnins advocacy to bring land based ICBM launchers down to between 100 and 150 instead of 450 allowed by the START-II, Putin in his address to the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki said that Russia would bring down its arsenal to 1,500 warheads.16 Thus even Russia is not in a mood to cut the arsenal in the near future. The Defence Minister of Russia, Marshal Igor Sergeyev called the Kvashnin plan a crime against Russia. The President Vladimir Putin also ruled out pursuing this proposal.17

Actually, the new nuclear doctrines of both countries have been emphasising the use of nuclear weapons against adversaries in a non-nuclear exchange. The US, as per the new policy, might use nuclear weapons, if chemical and biological weapons are used against it. There are reports18 referring to a new Russian nuclear doctrine, guided by Vladimir Putin, that allows Russia to use nuclear weapons even in a conventional situation. The only condition, it appears, is that these conventional weapons have to overwhelm Russia. The old criterion of endangering the sovereignty of Russia, it seems, is going to be replaced.

After the end of the Cold War, the US tried to rope in Russia to jointly pursue its non-proliferation goals. Russia joined some of the arrangements, promised to follow the norms of some other initiatives and negotiated a few new agreements. The plutonium management and disposal agreement also targets the problem of nuclear proliferation of ex-Soviet weapons. The western countries, for a long period, made the world believe that Russian equipment, materials, weapons and scientists might fall into the wrong hands. Apart from cutting the cost of maintenance of sensitive materials which are no longer needed for defence, the Plutonium accord will ensure safety of the fissile materials. Therefore, it combines the features of both phases of arms control—the post-Cold War and the Cold War. The post-Cold War arms control has a major focus on developing countries and non-proliferation being an important facet of arms control is a significant feature of the Plutonium accord.

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), because of the technological infeasibility during the cold war period, was not a preferred option for deterrence. It was expected to aggravate the arms race. Later, in the 1970s, ABM treaty came to limit the role of anti-ballistic missiles in strategy of deterrence. Now, a section of the US strategic community is vigorously arguing that technology has made significant strides over these years. It is argued that militarily effective Ballistic Missile Defence at affordable cost is a possibility now. The latest versions of Patriot are frequently cited as an interceptor technology success story. During the summit, Clinton proposed that Russia should get involved in his pet NMD programme. Russia rejected the offer. It still considers the missile defence system a destabilising factor that can stimulate a new arms race. Instead, Putin put forward his own concept of European Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence before the summit and continued to support the notion even during and after the summit.

Just before the summit this European model was mooted by Vladimir Putin in Italy.19 This is believed to be a boost-phase antimissile system with satellite based sensors and forward deployed interceptors. This can be land-based, air-borne or be mounted on a ship. Again, the system is understood to have a capability to kill an incoming missile within three to five minutes of its interception. The US defence secretary responded to the concept by stating that. "It might be a complement to our National Missile defence but not a substitute."20 Some in the US strategic community are of the view that any such interceptor has to be based within 250 kms of the enemy's missile launching site and there is a serious danger of interceptor launching base intercepting enemy's missile over its own site. This criticism is not expected to cut much ice because even the American systems are confronting numerous problems. Even supporters of Patriot acknowledge that the interceptors require substantial technological upgradation. Many other anti-ballistic missile development programmes of the US are facing problems at the developmental stages. The NMD has had two successive failures. Still, there are some supporters for it like Japan but several European countries have grown suspicious.

Russia is still not in favour of disturbing the 1972 ABM treaty. According to a report, the concept of boost-phase interceptor is designed as a tactical, not strategic system, therefore, Russia cannot feel guilty of violating the ABM treaty. Moreover, on June 21, 2000, twelve former soviet republics, now constituents of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), supported the Russian stand to save the 1972 ABM treaty. It is regarded as something essential for strategic stability.21 Russia garnered enough support against NMD, China supported it. It extracted a promise from North Korea that it would not embark on the path of ballistic missile development.22 The Russian President utilised the promise to argue against the American NMD. This campaign forced the American establishment to frequently plead to Russia. On July 19, 2000, a US spokesman said that NMD is not directed at China and Russia.23 During the G-8 summit Mr. Clinton and Vladimir Putin in a joint statement said, "The US and Russia are prepared to renew and expand cooperation in the field of Theatre Missile development and involving other states."24 Thus, on the BMD issue, there is no sharp break in arms control of the 1970s and the ongoing phase. The Moscow Summit witnessed serious disagreement between the two countries on this issue.

Arms control agreements signed during the summit reflect the concerns of the developed world. Some of these concerns were voiced during the cold war period, while others were completely new. The new concerns may have existed during the cold war period, but were popularised by the strategic community in the post-Cold War era. Witness for example the threat of accidental or unauthorised nuclear attack which is supposed to be addressed by JDEC. A section of the strategic community did underline such a threat during the cold war phase, but only in the 1990s the likes of Sagan tried to project it as a major nuclear danger. It was believed to become more serious with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the proliferation issue was present during the cold war period but became the main agenda of the western powers after the end of the Cold War. Both agreements in different ways have sought to deal with the proliferation matter.

The deliberations during the summit demonstrated that the new president of Russia was giving Russian security a new dimension and he was handling arms control with a different style and approach. Many in the international community expected that the arrival of Vladimir Putin would take Russia back to Soviet days obstinacy and confrontation in defence matters. This view gained ground as he was a favourite of the armed forces. One report noted, "More than 80 per cent of Russia's 1.2 million strong armed forces voted Putin."25 Also, the report noted that during Putin's prime ministership the defence budget was boosted to 142 billion roubles in 2000, while the initial allocation for defence in the 1999 budget was 93.7 billion roubles.

Research, development and procurement elements of the defence budget were hiked simultaneously and substantially. This year 62 billion roubles have been earmarked for this purpose, whereas in 1999, initially 36 billion roubles were allocated for the same purpose.26 Putin promised to provide additional 5 billion for research, development and procurement. The defence industry already began to respond to Putin's gestures.27 In 1999, the industry produced 30 per cent more that what it did in 1998.28 However, he did not blindly infuse funds into the Russian defence industry. The support came with caution. He favoured restructuring of the defence industry by reducing the legions of contractors of the federal government and by weakening the Soviet era military industrial complex. There will be no indiscriminate funding for defence companies. Putin appears set to remove the deadwood while clearing the cobwebs.

Vladimir Putin's approach to foreign policy, it seems, is an extension and continuation of his approach to domestic policy. During Yeltsin's presidentship, Russia was seen sacrificing its interests before western powers. Inspite of possessing a formidable war machine Russia was considered a weak power in international politics. So, it was also weak in bargaining, had very little say in world events and was subject to sustained pressure of the western line of thinking even if it did not suit it. Before the summit through various statements at different places—inside the country and abroad—Putin made it clear that he was going to assert Russia's position at the international level. He would do tough bargaining for Russia's national interests, he would pursue a strong foreign and economic policy, he would exploit Russia's strength to compensate for its weakness, elsewhere he would not mind ignoring the advice and reservations of western powers; he would not even hesitate in renegotiating the commitments made by Yeltsin and so on.

However, Putin has not forgotten to mix prudence with toughness. On the one hand, he announced the easing of curbs on exporting sensitive nuclear equipment to countries whose nuclear power plants are not under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).29 It was a unilateral break with western powers thus making it clear that Russia alone would judge who would get Russian products. On the other hand, he made it clear to his defence managers to be discriminating while selling sensitive technologies. He asked them not to sell in panic when they did not get state orders.30 This new Russian mood and the style of functioning of the new Russian president has been putting the US on the horns of a dilemma. Now, the US cannot afford to bully the Russian leadership as it did Yeltsin nor can it go back to the cold war phase.

The US has to engage a new Russia. The US is to enter into a partnership with Russia where it cannot change its agenda. It cannot afford the isolation of Russia, neither can it make it feel discriminated against. The US foreign policy is gearing up to avoid the Russian backlash which can have serious implications for many arms control and disarmament agreements and treaties. In 1999, the US embassy in Moscow was stoned by around 5,000 Russian protesters venting their anger against NATO's military involvement in Yugoslavia. Putin symbolises this seething Russian anger against Western powers. The US is planning to thwart a new international alignment which might take place under the aggressive leadership of Putin. As discussed, Putin toured European countries before the summit where he proposed formation of the European Ballistic Missile Defence. There is intense domestic pressure on the US foreign policy community to pay serious attention to Russia. For example, one congressman Rep. Curt Weldon said it was embarrassing to witness Russia receiving $15 billion in foreign investment while China is receiving $50 billion.31 It is argued that if Russia is not properly engaged, its nascent democratic institutions and market reforms would receive a serious blow. It will be a serious setback for the US. Through the agreements of the Moscow Summit and by promising that the US would not jeopardise the ABM Treaty, the US tried to keep Russia in good humour. After the summit on a number of occasions, the US reiterated the need for a positive US-Russian relationship.

Conclusion

Arms control agreements of the US and Russia at the Moscow Summit may have certain similarities with the Cold War arms control measures, still it cannot be denied that a number of changes have taken place in the very nature and character of arms control in the post Cold War era. The arms control agreements of the Moscow Summit have not remained untouched. Active hostility of the Cold War phase is not the moving factor at present. They conclude arms control agreements for real mutual benefits—such as for shedding unnecessary burdens.

The Putin factor is going to be very important in the coming months. In the present context, too, it is true that the foundation stones of both the agreements were laid much earlier, but it was only the arrival of Putin which speeded up the process of the conclusion of agreements. These agreements are mere broad outlines for the future and are symbolic in nature. Basically, these two agreements are in the nature of confidence building measures. Putin is definitely going to adopt a proactive role. He does not seem to be giving up Russia's great power status which appeared to be slipping away due to the economic decline of the country and Yeltsin's indifference to the claim.

It also appears that Russia will try to offset the American strategic superiority by mobilising not only its old allies, but also American strategic partners. The concept of European Ballistic Missile Defence is a case in point. Since nuclear weapons are going to stay as an instrument of influence in the international system, he is not going to drastically reduce Russia's nuclear stockpile. The shift of strategy to the safety of nuclear arsenals and the products and processes required for the making of nuclear arsenals will not ignore strategic military balance.

The entire approach of Putin approximates Benjamin Miller's ideal—type of resolute restraint which leads to tacit crisis management. In this model, resolve that means coercive threats or actions and caution that refers to accommodative offers and concessions go together. In it, relevance of force and power is principally for signaling and bargaining. Under all circumstances, diplomatic logic remains the operating principle.

 

NOTES

1. Michael Cox, "The Necessary Partnership? The Clinton Presidency and Post-Soviet Russia," International Affairs, 70(4), 1994.

2. The phrase has been taken from the title of the essay of Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2, 1994. However in this article, he is skeptical of Russia's developing to a democracy.

3. Embassy of the Russian Federation in India, News from Russia, vol. III, no. 23, June 9, 2000, p. 6.

4. The White House, office of the Press Secretary (Moscow, Russia), Memorandum of Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Centre for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches, June 4, 2000.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. The White House, office of the Press Secretary (Moscow, Russia), Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Early Warning System Agreements, June 4, 2000.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Fried Weir, "US, Russia not destined to be adversaries", The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 6, 2000.

12. Kerry M. Kartchner, "The Objectives of Arms Control" in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray (ed.), Arms Control: Toward the 21st Century, (London: 1996), p. 31. For more details see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, (New York: 1961); Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, (New York: 1961).

13. No. 8 Press Briefing.

14. Ibid.

15. Vladimir Radyuhin, "Training Guns on Each Other", The Hindu, July 23, 2000.

16. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 8, 2000.

17. The Hindu, New Delhi, July 18, 2000.

18. Simon Saradzhyan, "Russian Military Chiefs Aim to Mend Relations with NATO," Defense News, May 8, 2000.

19. Luke Hill, "Putin Readies Details of Russian Missile Defence", Defense News, June 19, 2000.

20. Ibid.

21. The Hindu, New Delhi, June 22, 2000.

22. The Hindu, New Delhi, July 21, 2000.

23. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 20, 2000.

24. The Hindu, New Delhi, July 22, 2000.

25. Simon Saradzhyan, "Leaders in Russia Place High Hopes in Putin," Defense News, April 20, 2000.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. The Hindu, New Delhi, June 2, 2000.

30. Simon, n. 25.

31. Defense Week, June 12, 2000, p. 6.