ASEAN Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution: The Cambodian Case
- Shankari Sundararaman
Ever since Vietnam intervened and occupied Cambodia in December 1978, one of the major players in the quest for a peaceful settlement to the Cambodian conflict has been the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). During the years of the stalemate in Cambodia, ASEAN's efforts to arrive at a viable solution to the conflict included a combination of political, economic and diplomatic initiatives that were targeted at pressurizing Vietnam into withdrawing from Cambodia, which was considered the first step towards any lasting political resolution of the conflict. However, till about 1990, these efforts did not receive much leeway since any attempt to solve the issue was stalled by Cold War politics.
Background to the ASEAN
The precursors to ASEAN could probably be traced to the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the Maphilindo.1 Both these plans were aborted over issues of security interest, but the move towards a regional grouping that would address the key issues over security of the region and cooperation among the nations in the area continued and these efforts culminated in the formation of the ASEAN in 1967. Its original members were Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Philippines. In 1984, Brunei was included as the sixth member. Vietnam entered the ASEAN fold in 1995 and at the recent ASEAN summit at Kuala Lumpur, both Laos and Myanmar were inducted as members of the ASEAN. This has moved the ASEAN closer to its vision of setting up a Southeast Asia - 10, presently the only country that is left out is Cambodia.
While much has changed since its inception, it is significant to remember that the genesis of ASEAN took place at a time when the American war against Vietnam was at its height. The polarisation over the conflicting trends that were emerging within Southeast Asia at this time were to influence the ASEAN too—concern over communist insurgency was reflected in the policy of each state as well as their collective approach. Though its declared objective was to promote cultural and economic cooperation, the ASEAN from the very beginning had security implications, that probably arose from the fact that it was the formation of a group of non-communist states in a region threatened by communist pressures. At that time it was probably perceived that ASEAN would grow to act as some kind of 'collective political defence' which would eventually replace the US alliances within the region. This was proved very soon after the formation of the ASEAN, in the move towards initiating the ZOPFAN—Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, which was put forward in 1971. The concept of ZOPFAN was threatened right from the start due to the differences within the ASEAN over the view that some of the members welcomed the presence of the west in that region - this was especially so for Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. For the Indonesians, ASEAN as a grouping was more important and the concept of ZOPFAN was, therefore, dispensable. After the 1975 victories in Indochina, ZOPFAN faced the additional hurdle of an incipient trend towards the solidification of two opposing ideological blocs in Southeast Asia.2
The tensions in the ASEAN-Indochina relations were evident soon after the communist sweep in Indochina in 1975. Though the question of contending with Indochina states posed deeper security implications for the ASEAN, the Malaysian Premier stated that the triumph of communist regimes posed no threat and even suggested the possibility of their entry into ASEAN.3 Hoever, this was not acceptable to Vietnam which viewed ASEAN as an American backed anti-communist alliance that had emerged from SEATO. Quite apart from this, the major trend within ASEAN opposed any such moves. Recognising the need for some cordiality with the Indochina states, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was initiated, which stressed upon the inviolability of national sovereignty, territorial intergrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This treaty remained open to other states in the region, thereby allowing it to act as a political link between the ASEAN and Indochina states.4
Despite these expressions of goodwill, there remained differences over the individual members' perceptions on Vietnam. Security issues, geographical proximity and historical relationships contributed to this diversity of views over Vietnam. From the Indochinese side, Vietnam's efforts to moot the idea of the 'Treaties of Peace and Friendship', with its emphasis on peace, independence and neutrality were probably the closest to ASEAN's concept of the ZOPFAN, but this was also rejected. The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia provided ASEAN with its raison d'etre—acting as a catalyst which brought the countries together to respond collectively to articulate an ASEAN point of view.
ASEAN's Response to the Cambodian Conflict : The First Phase
Immediately after the Vietnamese intervention, the ASEAN standing committee issued a statement that deplored the escalation and enlargement of the conflict in Indochina and called for conformity to the principles of the UN charter as well as the Bandung Declaration. The ASEAN further urged the UN Security Council to discuss the issue and take appropriate measures.5 The core of ASEAN's policy hinged upon its perception that Vietnam's intervention was illegal and unjust. Despite the war-like situation that had existed between Cambodia and Vietnam prior to Vietnam's intervention and the nature of Pol Pot's rule, ASEAN stuck to its claim of the illegality of Vietnam's presence. 6
The most successful implementation of ASEAN's policy was its use of the UN institutions - conforming to its view that Vietnam's presence in Cambodia was illegal, it supported the move for the recognition of Democratic Kampuchea regime in the UN. It also called for a total and immediate withdrawal of forces from Cambodia and the convening of an international conference which would achieve a political settlement inclusive of UN sponsored elections. In order to consolidate its position the Heng Samrin regime held elections in 1981. The ASEAN rejected this and questioned the validity of an election that compelled the Cambodians to accept a foreign backed regime. Denouncing the elections, the ASEAN called for the implementation of the UN General Assembly resolutions which sought a comprehensive and durable solution to the conflict and also asked for UN sponsored elections.7
In July 1981, ASEAN was a principal participant at the International Conference on Kampuchea which was sponsored by the United Nations and was held at New York. The Conference adopted a declaration which called for a ceasefire by all parites to the conflict in Cambodia, withdrawal of foreign forces, arrangement of measures to ensure that armed factions do not disrupt elections under UN supervision and an assurance on the maintenance of law and order. 8
One of the most significant steps that ASEAN intitiatives resulted in was the emergence of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which brought together the three opposition factions of the Khmer Rouge under Khieu Samphan, the United National Front for an Independent Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) under Norodom Sihanouk and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under the republican leader Son Sann. The raison d'etre behind the formation of the CGDK were two—first, it managed to bring together all the resistance factions under one collective umbrella, thereby giving it some semblance of solidarity and unity.9 Secondly, it greatly legitimised the position of the Khmer Rouge which till then had been isolated by the other groups for its genocidal policies.10 The association with the Royalists and the Republicans considerably improved the image of the Khmer Rouge and allowed for its future role in the political process. Another view that has prevailed is that the CGDK was formed in order to present an alternative to the Heng Samrin regime which would also be acceptable to the international community. It is a fact that the prospect of the Khmer Rouges' international isolation worried China, the US and the ASEAN countries. Thus, in order to salvage the Pol Pot regime, the CGDK alliance was presented to the international community and was supposedly formed to 'reinforce the potential of the resistance' and 'facilitate Pol Pot supporters' access to Western aid'.11
Two important initiatives that were taken and met with some success were a proposal for the restoration of peace by the Indochina states, according to which all Vietnamese "volunteers" would be withdrawn after ensuring that the threat from Peking and the factions along the Thai-Cambodian border ceased to exist. The volunteers were to be withdrawn annually and the Heng Samrin government had the freedom to consult Vietnam at any given point. Furthermore, they also agreed to the holding of elections at which foreign observers could be present and the former members of the Khmer Rouge could also participate.12 The second development took place at an unofficial, bilateral level between Malaysia and Vietnam when their representatives met at the Non-Aligned Summit held at New Delhi in March 1983. Here the Malaysian Foreign Minister proposed the five-plus-two formula which included discussions between the ASEAN states as well as Vietnam and Laos. This plan did not include Cambodia since the ASEAN refused to recognise the Heng Samrin regime. Despite this, Vietnam was willing to accept this proposal which it considered to be a significant breakthrough.13 The proposal fell through due to the opposition from Thailand and the Philippines who refused to negotiate with Vietnam until it withdrew from Cambodia. Since this did not conform to the ASEAN policy of consensus, the five-plus-two formula did not gain much ground.14
During this first phase, the efforts of the ASEAN and the Indochina states did not meet with much success and resulted in a deadlock. This was because both sides took intransigent positions and showed a total unwillingness to compromise on any of the issues, a prerequisite for a political solution to the conflict. The crux of the ASEAN policy was based upon the need to ensure the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia, which was to precede any settlement to the issue. In fact, in July 1982 and May 1983 there were some attempts to withdraw troops but whether any real withdrawal took place is highly doubtful since it seemed to be a routine case of troop rotation.15
ASEAN's Diplomatic Initiatives in the Second Phase
The second phase of the conflict can probably be identified since the beginning of the thaw in the Cold War between the superpowers, and it is in this phase that the diplomatic efforts of ASEAN began to gain momentum, leading ultimately to the Paris Accords of 1991. One of the significant initiatives that ASEAN took at this time was to bring the warring factions together in April 1985 at a meeting that commemorated the 30th Anniversary of the Bandung Conference. At this meeting a plan was proposed by Indonesia and Malaysia, with the support of the other ASEAN members, which subsequently came to be known as the 'proximity talks'.16 These talks were to be held among the various factions to the conflict—the CGDK and Vietnam, and would also be attended by the Peolple's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), with the ASEAN as the mediator. The talks proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops, a United Nations control and supervisory commission, national reconciliation and UN supervised elections and self-determination.17
However, several objections were raised which led to certain structural changes being made to the 'proximity talks'. Initially the PRK was to attend but this had to be later changed since the United States refused to extend support to the idea of proximity talks which included the PRK, as it would give the impression that the PRK was the legitimate government in Cambodia. ASEAN's policy was to assure Washington that it would not move in any direction that may possibly imply a recognition of the Heng Samrin government.18 Finally the Vietnamese were to act as representatives of the PRK and would articulate the PRK's views. This was not acceptable to the Vietnamese, who took exception to the exclusion of the PRK as a main participant. Moreover, Vietnam also objected to holding any direct talks with the CGDK since it refused to enter into a dialogue with the Khmer Rouge. After these talks fell through, the Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference held at Phnom Penh in August 1985 issued a communique which emphasised the willingness of the PRK to negotiate with the factions. It stated that the inclusion of the PRK was imperative to any settlement of the issue. One of the significant steps that resulted in this meeting was the setting up of a timetable for the planned withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, which was to be completed by 1990. ASEAN did not view this with much favour since it seemed that Vietnam, having rejected the proximity talks, offered little by way of consolation with the suggestion for a phased withdrawal.19
From 1986 the move towards a settlement of the conflict began to take a more concrete shape and in March 1986, the CGDK led by Norodom Sihanouk put forward a peace plan with an eight-point programme.20 This was rejected by the Vietnamese who were unwilling to accept any proposal that included the Khmer Rouge. In July 1987, the ASEAN increased the pressure for negotiations and in the aftermath of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumatmaja's visit to Vietnam a new proposal was put forward by the ASEAN which later became known as the 'cocktail-party' diplomacy.21 These talks were to be held in two stages—the first between the PRK and the CGDK, followed by the second in which the Vietnamese would participate. ASEAN essentially viewed this as one meeting of the Cambodian factions followed by the participation of Vietnam, while both Hanoi and Phnom Penh saw it as two separate meetings. This proposal was favourably viewed by the CGDK under Sihanouk, since at the first stage it was to be an all Cambodian meeting, thus suggesting that the problem had to be settled among these factions. Despite the fact that ASEAN had suggested this proposal it met with internal opposition from both Thailand and Singapore, who opposed the idea of Vietnamese involvement only in the second part of the meeting. According to their perception this would have reduced the Cambodian problem to the status of a civil war rather than a war of aggression by Vietnam. Cambodia and Vietnam also rejected the talks due to the revision that the ASEAN had made. Finally, both the Khmer Rouge and its principal backer China rejected the proposal.
By September 1987, there was a definite shift in the policy of the Phnom Penh government and Hun Sen showed a willingness to accept the Khmer Rouge as a part of the peace process and to hold talks with the nominal Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan, who was the Foreign Minister of the CGDK. The following month the PRK put forward a five-point peace proposal.22
One of the most significant diplomatic breakthroughs in the conflict was the meeting between Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The previous attempts to arrange such a meeting had failed and therefore, there was a greater need to succeed with these meetings. The first round of talks between Hun Sen and Sihanouk took place in December 1987, in France and a Joint Communique was signed that stated,
(a) the Cambodian conflict had to be politically settled through talks among the various concerned parties, in order to end the war and carry out national reconstruction.
(b) An agreement was made to call an international conference, if the two parties could reach a consensus, which would act as a guarantor for both the accord as well as the future independence of Cambodia. Both parties also agreed to meet for the second round of discussions in January 1988.23
In the second meeting that took place in January 1988, five principal issues were discussed.24 Inspite of the obvious gains which had been made these meetings ended in a deadlock, especially over the issue of the timetable for the Vietnamese withdrawal and the formation of the coalition government. Initially, Sihanouk insisted on a complete and immediate withdrawal but later agreed to Hun Sen's plan of a phased withdrawal. As far as the coalition government was concerned, Sihanouk wanted it to be in place before the elections, while Hun Sen was keen that it should be formed after the elections.
The Hun Sen—Sihanouk meetings acted as a prelude to one of the most significant diplomatic moves that ASEAN initiated. This was the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) which became the blueprint upon which the solution to the Cambodian conflict was built. ASEAN's diplomatic initiatives, particularly that of Indonesia, was noteworthy in evolving the JIM process. This took place in two stages—the JIM I, held at Bagor in July 1988. At this meeting the various Cambodian factions participated and it was later followed by the inclusion of Vietnam, Laos and the ASEAN members. This meeting laid out two crucial factors that were linked to an overall political settlement, that is, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese which was within the framework of a political solution to the conflict and the prevention of genocidal policies as that practised by the Pol Pot regime. 25 Apart from this, the meetings aimed at ending the suffering of the Cambodian people, establishing an 'independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia on the basis of self-determination and national reconciliation', which was to be achieved under effective supervision by international observers.26 The first meeting established a working committee of senior officials comprising of all participants who were to examine the specific aspects of a political solution and then give its recommendations to the second meeting. The JIM II talks were held in February 1989, where the parties reitereated their collective stance on the various resolutions.27
The Jim I & II were probably the most significant of the diplomatic initiatives taken by ASEAN. The achievements of these two meetings resulted in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in July/August 1989. Though the Conference succeeded in identifying a number of elements that were necessary for reaching a comprehensive settlement, it lacked consensus due to which no agreement could be reached. It is imperative to note that the JIM process began the final quest for the conflict in Cambodia and the diplomatic beginnings that were made culminated in the evolution of the Paris Peace Settlement that was put forward by Gareth Evans, based on the proposal laid by Stephen Solarz and Sihanouk. In 1990 two important factors added the much needed impetus to the resolution of the imbroglio in Cambodia—the US first agreed to recognise the Vietnamese role in the Cambodian problem and were also willing to engage in direct talks with Vietnam in order to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. The second factor was that in August 1990, Li Peng during a visit to the Southeast Asian nations agreed that China would not seek a dominant role for the Khmer Rouge in a political settlement.28
The meeting of the permanent five members of the Security Council in August 1990 laid out the formula for the UN role in the transitional period and this was fully endorsed by the ASEAN, which sought the continuation of efforts to bring peace to Cambodia through the efforts of the United Nation's interim government or the Supreme National Council, which in the ASEAN calculations was to be a 'representative of all shades of political opinion' and could act as an administrative body in conjuncture with the United Nations.29 With the acceptance of the P-5 formula in its entirety by four main Cambodian factions, the final move towards a resolution of the conflict was reached and the UNTAC mandate in Cambodia came into force with the signing of the Paris Treaty in October 1991. ASEAN had supported the elections in Cambodia and the restoration of a democratic government in that country.
The Present Phase
Since the elections there had been bilateral ties between the ASEAN members and Cambodia, while little responsibility was taken by ASEAN in terms of a regional grouping. This was to have changed in July this year with the induction of Cambodia into the ASEAN, along with both Laos and Myanmar. However, in the face of the recent developments that have occurred in the internal political scene in Cambodia, the ASEAN has made a decision to postpone the entry of Cambodia into its fold. The political turmoil over the capture and the trial of Pol Pot are questions that still remain unanswered. To add to the confusion, the July 5 coup d'etat of Hun Sen and the instability that seems to be an innate part of the Cambodian political scene, have only delayed the entrance of Cambodia into the ASEAN.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the ASEAN voiced its concern over the growing instability in Cambodia and called for a ceasefire between the warring groups. In an official statement the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdullah Ahmed Badawi, who was also the annual chairman of the ASEAN affairs stated "ASEAN is dismayed by and deeply regrets the unfortunate turn of events in Cambodia, resulting in the loss of innocent lives, both of Cambodian citizens and of foreigners."30
The dichotomy of the ASEAN position has been widely debated, especially with regard to the membership granted to Myanmar, while Cambodia which still enjoys a democratically elected leadership has been denied entry. There is a need to be cognisant of the fact that the Cambodian issue is a rather unique one, in the sense that the coalition government in Cambodia was the result of the Paris Peace Process, with the UN sponsored elections. The ASEAN role in this case has been to go according to the Paris Accords and as such it continues to recognise the role of Ranariddh in Cambodia. The coup d'etat clearly violated the Paris Accords which had put in place a King, a coalition government and two Prime Ministers—this was a position that the ASEAN adhered to and was willing to act as the mediator within this framework.31
In this regard the role of the ASEAN has been welcomed by Ranariddh, though Hun Sen has considered the ASEAN response as an interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia. In order to find a solution to the present conflict ASEAN has suggested a three-tiered approach to the issue—(a) the restoration of the former coalition government and the reinstatement of Ranariddh as the First Prime Minister; (b) the second option was for both Ranariddh and Hun Sen to nominate representatives who would head the caretaker government until early elections could be held and (c) the third option was for Ranariddh to nominate a member from the FUNCINPEC who would work with Hun Sen till elections were held. These three options are viable ones which the Cambodian factions must consider.
Cambodia's non-entry into the ASEAN has not only distanced the ASEAN vision of a Southeast Asia 10, but has also effectively undermined the furtherance of two of its most important projects to date—the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While economic cooperation was one of the reasons for which the ASEAN was founded, the ASEAN in the eighties was more a political organisation which had been challenged by the crisis in Cambodia. The groundwork for the AFTA was laid in 1992 itself and was ostensibly done to improve the 'dismal' record that the grouping had in terms of any real economic integration.32 While it remains a fact that the ASEAN region has done exceedingly well in economic growth, this has not been due to any concerted ASEAN effort, but that the growth in the individual countries has occurred with the political stability that ASEAN provided.33 With the increasing move for the Southeast Asia 10 there seems to be a possibility of a more consolidated regional economic growth in this region. However, this may be undermined by the problems that are likely to crop up due to the expansion of the ASEAN and the inherent difficulties which this will bring with it.
Another factor that must be considered is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which has emerged as a multilateral platform for discussing issues with security implications. This has provided an area where there is a grouping of both the Western and European powers alongwith the states of the Asia-Pacific region. The instability in Cambodia will affect the issues of security in this region and is likely to be a setback for the ARF.
It is significant to note that the ASEAN in its early years preferred to maintain a policy of non-interference in the other countries of the region. This has however, undergone a change in the recent times and there is a move towards a policy of constructive engagement, as evidenced in the case of Myanmar. ASEAN, having played a diplomatic role in the Cambodian case in the past, can again offer its good offices. The key issue that must now be addressed is that of national reconciliation—the Paris Treaty had occurred more as a result of the changed international scenario rather than any real effort at reconciliation between the warring factions and this has proved to be the biggest hurdle in the path of national reconstruction. The question of initiating the 'proximity talks' among the factions should now gain ground and if the ASEAN could, perhaps, play a role in this regard its position would be significant. The advantage for ASEAN is that the diversity of security issues that dominated the scene during the years of the Cambodian conflict are no longer present and the process of mediation should be easier, if, there is a willingness towards mutual accommodation.
1. The ASA was started in July 1961 and included Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand as its members, whose main objective was to promote economic and cultural cooperation. All three members were linked to Western powers in various security alliances. Malaysia was part of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement and Thailand and Philippines were members of SEATO. The ASA gave way to the formation of the Maphilindo - an amalgam of the Malay populated states of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. This plan was aborted in the initial stages itself due to the dispute over the Sabah issue. For details see, Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 589-90.
2. Huxley, Tim, "ASEAN's Prospective Security Role: Moving Beyond the Indochina Fixation," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 3, (ISEAS, Singapore, Dec. 1987), p. 196.
3. Philippines Express News (Manila), July 8, 1975.
4. Huxley, Tim, ASEAN and Indochina : A Study of Political Responses 1975-1981 (ANU, Canberra, 1985), p.14.
5. "Statement by the Indonesian Foreign Minister as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on the Escalation of Armed Conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea, Jakarta, January 4, 1979, ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1986 (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1986), p.446.
6. It is interesting to note that while ASEAN did not recognise the Heng Samrin government in Cambodia, it had given recognition to the government that replaced Idi Amin when Tanzania intervened in Uganda. Since in most cases diplomatic initiatives give way to political realities, it is imperative to realise that humanitarian interests are strong when a nation, or in this case a group of nations, security and strategic concerns are not involved.
7. "Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on the so-called elections in Kampuchea in Manila, March 27, 1981," ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1986 (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1986), p.457.
8. "ICK Declaration on Kampuchea," ASEAN Documents published on the occasion of the 16th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post-Ministerial Conferences with the Dialogue Partners, Bangkok, June 24-28, 1983 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 1983), p.280-81.
9. Willam Bach, "Chance in Cambodia," Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.), vol.62 (Spring, 1986), p.82.
10. Interview with Mr. Saroj Chavanaviraj, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, October 4, 1994, Bangkok.
11. Undeclared War Against the People's Republic of Kampuchea (Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRK, Phnom Penh, 1985), p.28.
12. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.xxx, 1984, p.32670.
13. Ibid., p.32671.
14. For Details See, Yonoeji Kuroyanagi, "The Kampuchean Conflict and ASEAN: A View From the Final Stage," Japan Review of International Affairs (Tokyo), Vol.3, no.1, (Spring 1986), p.69.
15. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. xxix (Longman, Cambridge, January 1984), p.31889.
16. The Nation (Bangkok), April 29, 1985.
17. "Joint Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Kampuchean Problem, Kuala Lumpur, July 8, 1985," Documents of the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985 (Department of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1985), p.185.
18. The Nation, July 13, 1985.
19. For details see, Communique of the Eleventh Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam, Phnom Penh, August 16, 1985, Documents of the Kampuchean Problem 1979-85 (Department of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, September 1985), p.188. See also, Yoneji Kuroyanagi, n.14, p.72.
20. The plan included, (a) a phased withdrawal of Vietnamese forces; (b) the establishment of a four party coalition government; (c) the reconstruction of an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia; (d) free and fair elections under the supervision of international observers.
21. Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "Cambodia : The Vagaries of 'Cocktail Diplomacy'," Contemporary Southeast Asia (ISEAS, Singapore), Vol.9, no.4 (March 1988), p.307.
22. This included the following :
(a) Meeting with Sihanouk and the other members of the CGDK, with the exception of Pol Pot and his close associates. Sihanouk was to be offered a high position in the governmental set up.
(b) The PRK was ready to allow for the withdrawal of troops from Cambodia simultaneously with the cessation of support to the resistance.
(c) After the Vietnamese withdrawal elections were to be held under the supervision of international observers.
(d) It expressed its desire to start negotiations with Thailand so as to change the border into one of peace and friendship, which in turn would allow for the easy and safe repatriation of the refugees along the border.
(e) It sought to convene an international conference on Cambodia—inclusive of the conflicting parties, the Indochinese states, ASEAN, for details see Van Der Kroef, n. 21, p.309-10.
23. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.xxxiv, June 1988, p.35968.
24. These were with regard to the provisions that would usher in the setting for free and fair elections in the country. They were,
(a) the timetable for the Vietnamese withdrawal,
(b) the establishment of the coalition government,
(c) the future political system in Cambodia,
(d) the principles upon which an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia was to be based, and
(e) international guarantees to ensure its security and independence.
25. "Statement by the Chairman of the First Jakarta Informal Meetings, July 28, 1988," Informal Meetings on Cambodia, List of Documents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, February 1990), p.2.
27. For details see, "Consensus Statement of the Chairman of the Second Jakarta Informal Meetings, February 21, 1989," Informal Meetings on Cambodia, List of Documents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, February 1990), pp.1-2.
28. The Hindu (Madras), July 20 and August 29, 1990.
29. "Joint Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Cambodian Problem Issues in Jakarta on July 23, 1990," ASEAN Documents Series 1989-1991, Supplementary Edition (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1991), p.83.
30. The Hindu (Madras), July 9, 1997.
31. The Hindu (Madras), July 24, 1997.
32. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 19, 1997, p.13.